27 ideas
6294 | In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the word was God [John] |
Full Idea: In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the word was God. | |
From: St John (04: Gospel of St John [c.95], 01.01) | |
A reaction: 'Word' translates the Greek word 'logos', which has come a long way since Heraclitus. The interesting contrast is with the later Platonist view that the essence of God is the Good. So is the source of everything to be found in reason, or in value? |
8821 | Jesus said he bore witness to the truth. Pilate asked, What is truth? [John] |
Full Idea: Jesus: I came into the world, that I should bear witness unto the truth. Everyone that is of the truth heareth my voice. Pilate saith unto him, What is truth? | |
From: St John (04: Gospel of St John [c.95], 18:37-8) | |
A reaction: There is very little explicit discussion of truth in philosophy before this exchange (apart from Ideas 251 and 586), and there isn't any real debate prior to Russell and the pragmatists. What was Pilate's tone? Did he spit at the end of his question? |
2584 | Lobotomised patients can cease to care about a pain [Block] |
Full Idea: After frontal lobotomies, patients typically report that they still have pains, though the pains no longer bother them. | |
From: Ned Block (Troubles with Functionalism [1978], p. 83) | |
A reaction: I take this to be an endorsement of reductive physicalism, because what matters about pains is that they bother us, not how they feel, so frog pain could do the job, if it felt different from ours, but was disliked by the frog. |
6172 | The Inverted Earth example shows that phenomenal properties are not representational [Block, by Rowlands] |
Full Idea: Block's Inverted Earth example (with matching inversion of both colours and colour-language) tries to show a variation of representational properties without a variation of phenomenal properties, so that the latter are not constituted by the former. | |
From: report of Ned Block (Inverted Earth [1990]) by Mark Rowlands - Externalism Ch.7 | |
A reaction: (The example is actually quite complex). This type of argument - a thought experiment in which qualia are held steady while everything else varies, or vice versa - seems to be the only way that we can possibly get at an assessment of the role of qualia. |
2582 | A brain looks no more likely than anything else to cause qualia [Block] |
Full Idea: NO physical mechanism seems very intuitively plausible as a seat of qualia, least of all a brain. | |
From: Ned Block (Troubles with Functionalism [1978], p. 78) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure about "least of all", given the mind-boggling complexity of the brain's connections. Certainly, though, nothing in either folk physics or academic physics suggests that any physical object is likely to be aware of anything. |
2574 | Behaviour requires knowledge as well as dispositions [Block] |
Full Idea: A desire cannot be identified with a disposition to act, since the agent might not know that a particular act leads to the thing desired, and thus might not be disposed to do it. | |
From: Ned Block (Troubles with Functionalism [1978], p. 69) | |
A reaction: One might have a disposition to act, but not in a particular way. "Something must be done". To get to the particular act, it seems that indeed a belief must be added to the desire. |
2575 | Functionalism is behaviourism, but with mental states as intermediaries [Block] |
Full Idea: Functionalism is a new incarnation of behaviourism, replacing sensory inputs with sensory inputs plus mental states, and replacing dispositions to act with dispositions plus certain mental states. | |
From: Ned Block (Troubles with Functionalism [1978], p. 69) | |
A reaction: I think of functionalism as behaviourism which extends inside the 'black box' between stimulus and response. It proposes internal stimuli and responses. Consequently functionalism inherits some behaviourist problems. |
2576 | In functionalism, desires are internal states with causal relations [Block] |
Full Idea: According to functionalism, a system might have the behaviouristic input-output relations, yet not desire something, as this requires internal states with certain causal relations. | |
From: Ned Block (Troubles with Functionalism [1978], p. 69) | |
A reaction: Such a system might be Putnam's 'superactor', who only behaves as if he desires something. Of course, the internal states might need more than just 'causal relations'. |
2583 | You might invert colours, but you can't invert beliefs [Block] |
Full Idea: It is hard to see how to make sense of the analog of color spectrum inversion with respect to non-qualitative states such a beliefs (where they are functionally equivalent but have different beliefs). | |
From: Ned Block (Troubles with Functionalism [1978], p. 81) | |
A reaction: I would suggest that beliefs can be 'inverted', because there are all sorts of ways to implement a belief, but colour can't be inverted, because that depends on a particular brain state. It makes good sense to me... |
2578 | Could a creature without a brain be in the right functional state for pain? [Block] |
Full Idea: If pain is a functional state, it cannot be a brain state, because creatures without brains could realise the same Turing machine as creatures with brains. | |
From: Ned Block (Troubles with Functionalism [1978], p. 70) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as being a poorly grounded claim. There may be some hypothetical world where brainless creatures implement all our functions, but from here brains look the only plausible option. |
2585 | Not just any old functional network will have mental states [Block] |
Full Idea: If there are any fixed points in the mind-body problem, one of them is that the economy of Bolivia could not have mental states, no matter how it is distorted. | |
From: Ned Block (Troubles with Functionalism [1978], p. 86) | |
A reaction: It is hard to disagree with this, but then it can hardly be a serious suggestion that anyone could see how to reconfigure an economy so that it mapped the functional state of the human brain. This is not a crucial problem. |
2586 | In functionalism, what are the special inputs and outputs of conscious creatures? [Block] |
Full Idea: In functionalism, it is very hard to see how there could be a single physical characterization of the inputs and outputs of all and only creatures with mentality. | |
From: Ned Block (Troubles with Functionalism [1978], p. 87) | |
A reaction: It would be theoretically possible if the only way to achieve mentality was to have a particular pattern of inputs and outputs. I don't think, though, that 'mentality' is an all-or-nothing concept. |
2579 | Physicalism is prejudiced in favour of our neurology, when other systems might have minds [Block] |
Full Idea: Physicalism is a chauvinist theory: it withholds mental properties from systems that in fact have them. | |
From: Ned Block (Troubles with Functionalism [1978], p. 71) | |
A reaction: This criticism interprets physicalism too rigidly. There may be several ways to implement a state. My own view is that other systems might implement our functions, but they won't experience them in a human way. |
2577 | Simple machine-functionalism says mind just is a Turing machine [Block] |
Full Idea: In the simplest Turing-machine version of functionalism (Putnam 1967), mental states are identified with the total Turing-machine state, involving a machine table and its inputs and outputs. | |
From: Ned Block (Troubles with Functionalism [1978], p. 70) | |
A reaction: This obviously invites the question of why mental states would be conscious and phenomenal, given that modern computers are devoid of same, despite being classy Turing machines. |
2580 | A Turing machine, given a state and input, specifies an output and the next state [Block] |
Full Idea: In a Turing machine, given any state and input, the machine table specifies an output and the next state. …To have full power the tape must be infinite in at least one direction, and be movable in both directions. | |
From: Ned Block (Troubles with Functionalism [1978], p. 71) | |
A reaction: In retrospect, the proposal that this feeble item should be taken as a model for the glorious complexity and richness of human consciousness doesn't look too plausible. |
3178 | A fast machine could pass all behavioural tests with a vast lookup table [Block, by Rey] |
Full Idea: Ned Block proposes a machine (a 'blockhead') which could pass the Turing Test just by looking up responses in a vast look-up table. | |
From: report of Ned Block (works [1984]) by Georges Rey - Contemporary Philosophy of Mind 5.3 | |
A reaction: Once you suspected you were talking to a blockhead, I think you could catch it out in a Turing Test. How can the lookup table keep up to date with immediate experience? Ask it about your new poem. |
18033 | The meaning of a representation is its role in thought, perception or decisions [Block] |
Full Idea: According to conceptual role semantics, the meaning of a representation is the role of that representation in the cognitive life of the agent, for example, in perception, thought and decision-making. | |
From: Ned Block (Semantics, Conceptual Role [1998]) | |
A reaction: I never believe theories of this kind, because I always find myself asking 'what is the nature of this representation which enables it to play this role?'. |
2581 | Intuition may say that a complex sentence is ungrammatical, but linguistics can show that it is not [Block] |
Full Idea: Linguistics rejects (on theoretical grounds) the intuition that the sentence "the boy the girl the cat bit scratched died" is ungrammatical. | |
From: Ned Block (Troubles with Functionalism [1978], p. 78) | |
A reaction: Once we have disentangled it, we practical speakers have no right to say it is ungrammatical. It isn't only theory. The sentence is just stylistically infelicitous. |
2854 | Prescriptivism says 'ought' without commitment to act is insincere, or weakly used [Hooker,B] |
Full Idea: Prescriptivism holds that if you think one 'ought' to do a certain kind of act, and yet you are not committed to doing that act in the relevant circumstances, then you either spoke insincerely, or are using the word 'ought' in a weak sense. | |
From: Brad W. Hooker (Prescriptivism [1995], p.640) | |
A reaction: So that's an 'ought', but not a 'genuine ought', then? (No True Scotsman move). Someone ought to rescue that drowning child, but I can't be bothered. |
2856 | Universal moral judgements imply the Golden Rule ('do as you would be done by') [Hooker,B] |
Full Idea: Prescriptivity is especially important if moral judgements are universalizable, for then we can employ golden rule-style reasoning ('do as you would be done by'). | |
From: Brad W. Hooker (Prescriptivism [1995], p.640) |
20883 | Modern utilitarians value knowledge, friendship, autonomy, and achievement, as well as pleasure [Hooker,B] |
Full Idea: Most utilitarians now think that pleasure, even if construed widely, is not the only thing desirable in itself. ...Goods also include important knowledge, friendship, autonomy, achievement and so on. | |
From: Brad W. Hooker (Rule Utilitarianism and Euthanasia [1997], 2) | |
A reaction: That pleasure is desired is empirically verifiable, which certainly motivated Bentham. A string of other desirables each needs to be justified - but how? What would be the value of a 'friendship' if neither party got pleasure from it? |
20884 | Rule-utilitarians prevent things like torture, even on rare occasions when it seems best [Hooker,B] |
Full Idea: For rule-utilitarians acts of murder, torture and so on, can be impermissible even in rare cases where they really would produce better consequences than any alternative act. | |
From: Brad W. Hooker (Rule Utilitarianism and Euthanasia [1997], 4) | |
A reaction: It is basic to rule-utilitarianism that it trumps act-ulitilarianism, even when a particular act wins the utilitarian calculation. But that is hard to understand. Only long-term benefit could justify the rule - but that should win the calculation. |
20885 | Euthanasia is active or passive, and voluntary, non-voluntary or involuntary [Hooker,B] |
Full Idea: Six types of euthanasia: 1) Active voluntary (knowing my wishes), 2) Active non-voluntary (not knowing my wishes), 3) Active involuntary (against my wishes), 4) Passive voluntary, 5) Passive non-voluntary, 6) Passive involuntary. | |
From: Brad W. Hooker (Rule Utilitarianism and Euthanasia [1997], 5) | |
A reaction: 'Active' is intervening, and 'passive' is not intervening. A helpful framework. |
20882 | Euthanasia may not involve killing, so it is 'killing or not saving, out of concern for that person' [Hooker,B] |
Full Idea: Passive euthanasia is arguably not killing, and the death involved is often painful, so let us take the term 'euthanasia' to mean 'either killing or passing up opportunities to save someone, out of concern for that person'. | |
From: Brad W. Hooker (Rule Utilitarianism and Euthanasia [1997], 1) | |
A reaction: This sounds good, and easily settled, until you think concern for that person could have two different outcomes, depending on whether the criteria are those of the decider or of the patient. Think of religious decider and atheist patient, or vice versa. |
8140 | God is love [John] |
Full Idea: God is love. | |
From: St John (23: First Epistle of John [c.90], 4.16) | |
A reaction: Used by Ayer as an example of meaningless religious language (see Idea 5209). One might translate it as 'the existence of God is a necessary condition for the existence of love in the universe'. Like matter is needed for gravity. Not totally meaningless! |
8141 | He that does evil has not seen God [John] |
Full Idea: He that doeth evil hath not seen God. | |
From: St John (25: Third Epistle of John [c.90], 11) | |
A reaction: This gives God a role striking similar to Plato's Form of the Good. Plato thought the Good was prior to the gods, but he gives the good a quasi-religious role. I say we would only be inspired by the sight of God if we already had a moral sense. |
8139 | If you love the world, then you do not love the Father [John] |
Full Idea: Love not the world, neither the things that are in the world. If any man love the world, the love of the Father is not in him. | |
From: St John (23: First Epistle of John [c.90], 2.15) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as an essentially wicked teaching, and one step on the road to suicide. The rejection of life is the worst aspect of all religions - surely it is obvious that we should try to make the best of life, not turn our backs on it? |