5438
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Hermeneutics of tradition is sympathetic, hermeneutics of suspicion is hostile [Ricoeur, by Mautner]
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Full Idea:
Ricoeur distinguishes a hermeneutics of tradition (e.g. Gadamar), which interprets sympathetically looking for hidden messages, and a hermeneutics of suspicion (e.g. Nietzsche, Freud) which sees hidden drives and interests.
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From:
report of Paul Ricoeur (works [1970]) by Thomas Mautner - Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy p.249
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A reaction:
Obviously the answer is somewhere between the two. Nietzsche's suspicion can be wonderful, but Freud's can seem silly (e.g. on Leonardo). On the whole I am on the 'tradition' side, because great thinkers can rise above their culture (on a good day).
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2764
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Full coherence might involve consistency and mutual entailment of all propositions [Blanshard, by Dancy,J]
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Full Idea:
Blanshard says that in a fully coherent system there would not only be consistency, but every proposition would be entailed by the others, and no proposition would stand outside the system.
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From:
report of Brand Blanshard (The Nature of Thought [1939], 2:265) by Jonathan Dancy - Intro to Contemporary Epistemology 8.1
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A reaction:
Hm. If a proposition is entailed by the others, then it is a necessary truth (given the others) which sounds deterministic. You could predict all the truths you had never encountered. See 1578:178 for quote.
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19080
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Coherence tests for truth without implying correspondence, so truth is not correspondence [Blanshard, by Young,JO]
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Full Idea:
Blanshard said that coherent justification leads to coherence truth. It might be said that coherence is a test for truth, but truth is correspondence. But coherence doesn't guarantee correspondence, and coherence is a test, so truth is not correspondence.
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From:
report of Brand Blanshard (The Nature of Thought [1939], Ch.26) by James O. Young - The Coherence Theory of Truth §2.2
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A reaction:
[compression of Young's summary] Rescher (1973) says that Blanshard's argument depends on coherence being an infallible test for truth, which it isn't.
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