16 ideas
9198 | It is no longer possible to be a sage, but we can practice the exercise of wisdom [Hadot] |
Full Idea: Personally I firmly believe, perhaps naively, that it is possible for modern man to live, not as a sage (sophos) - most of the ancients did not hold this to be possible - but as a practitioner of the ever-fragile exercise of wisdom. | |
From: Pierre Hadot (Philosophy as a way of life [1987], 7) | |
A reaction: It seems to me quite plausible that the philosophical life might yet become a widespread ideal, even though philosophers seem to still be sheltering from storms two thousand years after Plato gave us that image. |
9197 | The logos represents a demand for universal rationality [Hadot] |
Full Idea: The logos represents a demand for universal rationality. | |
From: Pierre Hadot (Philosophy as a way of life [1987], 3.3) | |
A reaction: That is at one end of the spectrum. At the other, in parts of 'Theaetetus', it is just a polite request to be given a few reasons, instead of a splattering of hopes and prejudices. |
2764 | Full coherence might involve consistency and mutual entailment of all propositions [Blanshard, by Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: Blanshard says that in a fully coherent system there would not only be consistency, but every proposition would be entailed by the others, and no proposition would stand outside the system. | |
From: report of Brand Blanshard (The Nature of Thought [1939], 2:265) by Jonathan Dancy - Intro to Contemporary Epistemology 8.1 | |
A reaction: Hm. If a proposition is entailed by the others, then it is a necessary truth (given the others) which sounds deterministic. You could predict all the truths you had never encountered. See 1578:178 for quote. |
19080 | Coherence tests for truth without implying correspondence, so truth is not correspondence [Blanshard, by Young,JO] |
Full Idea: Blanshard said that coherent justification leads to coherence truth. It might be said that coherence is a test for truth, but truth is correspondence. But coherence doesn't guarantee correspondence, and coherence is a test, so truth is not correspondence. | |
From: report of Brand Blanshard (The Nature of Thought [1939], Ch.26) by James O. Young - The Coherence Theory of Truth §2.2 | |
A reaction: [compression of Young's summary] Rescher (1973) says that Blanshard's argument depends on coherence being an infallible test for truth, which it isn't. |
20429 | Most of us are too close to our own motives to understand them [Fry] |
Full Idea: The motives we actually experience are too close to us to enable us to feel them clearly. They are in a sense unintelligible. | |
From: Roger Fry (An Essay in Aesthetics [1909], p.30) | |
A reaction: Fry is defending the role of art in clarifying and highlighting such things, but I am not convinced by his claim. We can grasp most of our motives with a little introspection, and those we can't grasp are probably too subtle for art as well. |
20424 | Imaginative life requires no action, so new kinds of perception and values emerge in art [Fry] |
Full Idea: In the imaginative life no action is necessary, so the whole consciousness may be focused upon the perceptive and the emotional aspects of the experience. Hence we get a different set of values, and a different kind of perception | |
From: Roger Fry (An Essay in Aesthetics [1909], p.24) | |
A reaction: Good. A huge range of human activities are like scientific experiments, where you draw on our evolved faculties, but put them in controlled conditions, where the less convenient and stressful parts are absent. War and sport. Real and theatrical tragedy. |
20427 | Everyone reveals an aesthetic attitude, looking at something which only exists to be seen [Fry] |
Full Idea: It is only when an object exists for no other purpose than to be seen that we really look at it, …and then even the most normal person adopts to some extent the artistic attitude of pure vision abstracted from necessity. | |
From: Roger Fry (An Essay in Aesthetics [1909], p.29) | |
A reaction: A painter of still life looks at things which exist for other purposes, with just the attitude which Fry attributes to the viewers of the paintings. We can encourage a child to look at a flower with just this attitude. |
20433 | 'Beauty' can either mean sensuous charm, or the aesthetic approval of art (which may be ugly) [Fry] |
Full Idea: There is an apparent contradiction between two distinct uses of the word 'beauty', one for that which has sensuous charm, and one for the aesthetic approval of works of imaginative art where the objects presented to us are often of extreme ugliness. | |
From: Roger Fry (An Essay in Aesthetics [1909], p.33) | |
A reaction: The gouging of eyes in 'King Lear' was always the big problem case for aesthetics, just as nowadays it is Marcel Duchamp's wretched 'Fountain'. |
20430 | In life we neglect 'cosmic emotion', but it matters, and art brings it to the fore [Fry] |
Full Idea: Those feelings unhappily named cosmic emotion find almost no place in life, but, since they seem to belong to certain very deep springs of our nature, do become of great importance in the arts. | |
From: Roger Fry (An Essay in Aesthetics [1909], p.31) | |
A reaction: Focus on the sublime was big in the romantic era, but Fry still sees its importance, and I don't think it ever goes away. Art styles which scorn the sublime are failing to perform their social duty, say I. |
20431 | Art needs a mixture of order and variety in its sensations [Fry] |
Full Idea: The first quality that we demand in our [artistic] sensations will be order, without which our sensations will be troubled and perplexed, and the other will be variety, without which they will not be fully stimulated. | |
From: Roger Fry (An Essay in Aesthetics [1909], p.32) | |
A reaction: He makes good claims, but gives unconvincing reasons for them. Some of us rather like 'troubled and perplexed' sensations. And a very narrow range of sensations could still be highly stimulated. Is Fry a good aesthetician but a modest philosopher? |
20423 | If graphic arts only aim at imitation, their works are only trivial ingenious toys [Fry] |
Full Idea: If imitation is the sole purpose of the graphic arts, it is surprising that the works of such arts are ever looked upon as more than curiosities, or ingenious toys, and are ever taken seriously by grown-up people. | |
From: Roger Fry (An Essay in Aesthetics [1909], p.23) | |
A reaction: But then you might say that same about fine wines. A mere nice taste is hardly worthy of grown ups, and yet lots of grown ups feeling quite passionately about it. What about Fabergé eggs? |
20428 | Popular opinion favours realism, yet most people never look closely at anything! [Fry] |
Full Idea: Ordinary people have almost no idea of what things really look like, so that the one standard that popular criticism applies to painting (whether it is like nature or not) is the one which most people are prevented frm applying properly. | |
From: Roger Fry (An Essay in Aesthetics [1909], p.29) | |
A reaction: A nice remark, though there is a streak of Bloomsbury artistic snobbery running through Fry. Ordinary people recognise photographic realism, so they can study things closely either in the reality or the picture, should they so choose. |
20432 | When viewing art, rather than flowers, we are aware of purpose, and sympathy with its creator [Fry] |
Full Idea: In our reaction to a work of art (rather than a flower) there is the consciousness of purpose, of a peculiar relation of sympathy with the man who made this thing in order to arouse precisely the sensations we experience. | |
From: Roger Fry (An Essay in Aesthetics [1909], p.33) | |
A reaction: I think this is entirely right. I like the mention of 'sympathy' as well as 'purpose'. |
20425 | In the cinema the emotions are weaker, but much clearer than in ordinary life [Fry] |
Full Idea: One notices in the visions of the cinematograph that whatever emotions are aroused by them, though they are likely to be weaker than those of ordinary life, are presented more clearly to the conscious. | |
From: Roger Fry (An Essay in Aesthetics [1909], p.25) | |
A reaction: Fry had probably only seen very simple melodramas, but the general idea that artistic emotions are weaker than real life, but much clearer, is quite plausible. |
20426 | For pure moralists art must promote right action, and not just be harmless [Fry] |
Full Idea: To the pure moralist, accepting nothing but ethical values, to be justified, the life of the imagination must be shown not only not to hinder but actually to forward right action, otherwise it is not only useless but, by absorbing energies, harmful. | |
From: Roger Fry (An Essay in Aesthetics [1909], p.26) | |
A reaction: I think this is the sort of attitude you find in Samuel Johnson. Puritans even reject light music, which seems pleasantly harmless to the rest of us. 'Absorbing energies' doesn't sound much of an objection, and may not be the actual objection. |
9196 | The pleasure of existing is the only genuine pleasure [Hadot] |
Full Idea: For epicureans, the only genuine pleasure there is is the pleasure of existing. | |
From: Pierre Hadot (Philosophy as a way of life [1987], 3.1) | |
A reaction: I don't know Hadot's source for this claim, but it is a nice idea, which I shall endeavour to incorporate into my own attitude to daily living. I'm not quite clear, though, why the pleasure of music is not a 'genuine' one. |