7 ideas
| 13795 | Properties only have identity in the context of their contraries [Elder] |
| Full Idea: The very being, the identity, of any property consists at least in part in its contrasting as it does with its own proper contraries. | |
| From: Crawford L. Elder (Real Natures and Familiar Objects [2004], 2.4) | |
| A reaction: See Elder for the details of this, but the idea that properties can only be individuated contextually sounds promising. |
| 13798 | Maybe we should give up the statue [Elder] |
| Full Idea: Some contemporary metaphysicians infer that one of the objects must go, namely, the statue. | |
| From: Crawford L. Elder (Real Natures and Familiar Objects [2004], 7.2) | |
| A reaction: [He cites Zimmerman 1995] This looks like a recipe for creating a vast gulf between philosophers and the rest of the population. If it is right, it makes the true ontology completely useless in understanding our daily lives. |
| 13797 | The loss of an essential property means the end of an existence [Elder] |
| Full Idea: The loss of any essential property must amount to the end of an existence. | |
| From: Crawford L. Elder (Real Natures and Familiar Objects [2004], 3) | |
| A reaction: This is orthodoxy for essentialists, and I presume that Aristotle would agree, but I have a problem with the essence of a great athlete, who then grows old. Must we say that they lose their identity-as-an-athlete? |
| 13794 | Essential properties by nature occur in clusters or packages [Elder] |
| Full Idea: Essential properties by nature occur in clusters or packages. | |
| From: Crawford L. Elder (Real Natures and Familiar Objects [2004], 2.2) | |
| A reaction: Elder proposes this as his test for the essentialness of a property - his Test of Flanking Uniformities. A nice idea. |
| 13796 | Essential properties are bound together, and would be lost together [Elder] |
| Full Idea: The properties of any essential nature are bound together....[122] so any case in which one of our envisioned familiar objects loses one of its essential properties will be a case in which it loses several. | |
| From: Crawford L. Elder (Real Natures and Familiar Objects [2004], 3) | |
| A reaction: This sounds like a fairly good generalisation rather than a necessary truth. Is there a natural selection for properties, so that only the properties which are able to bind to others to form teams are able to survive and flourish? |
| 16618 | Intellectual and moral states, and even the soul itself, depend on prime matter for their existence [Blasius, by Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: Blasius argued that prime matter is the subject of all our intellectual and moral states. This implies that such states cannot exist apart from the body, which seems to imply further that the soul itself cannot exist apart from the body. | |
| From: report of Blasius of Parma (Les quaestiones de anima (lectures on the soul) [1385], I.8 p.65) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 06.3 | |
| A reaction: It seems that, under pressure, Blasius recanted this view in lectures given eleven years later. |
| 7907 | Human killing is worse if the victim is virtuous [Buddhaghosa] |
| Full Idea: In the case of humans killing is the more blameworthy the more virtuous the victim is. | |
| From: Buddhaghosa (Papancasudani [c.400], 9.7-10) | |
| A reaction: This sentiment has almost become a taboo in western society, and yet it is present all the time. The greatest outcry is about murders of really good citizens. Occasionally the murder of a villain causes little regret. |