16 ideas
| 7301 | The phenomenalist says that to be is to be perceivable [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| Full Idea: Where the idealist says that to be (i.e. to exist) is to be perceived, the phenomenalist says that to be is to be perceivable. | |
| From: Cardinal/Hayward/Jones (Epistemology [2004], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: This is a nice phenomenalist slogan to add to Mill's well known one (Idea 3583). Expressed in this form, it looks false to me. What about neutrinoes? They weren't at all perceivable until recently. Maybe some physical stuff can never be perceived. |
| 7302 | Linguistic phenomenalism says we can eliminate talk of physical objects [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| Full Idea: Linguistic phenomenalism argues that it is possible to remove all talk of physical objects from our speech with no loss of meaning. | |
| From: Cardinal/Hayward/Jones (Epistemology [2004], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: I find this proposal unappealing. My basic objection is that I cannot understand why anyone would refuse to even contemplate the question of WHY I am having a given group of consistent experiences, of (say) a table kind. |
| 7303 | If we lack enough sense-data, are we to say that parts of reality are 'indeterminate'? [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| Full Idea: The problem with taking sense-data as basic is that some data can appear indeterminate. If we can't discern the colour of someone's eyes, or the number of sides of a complex figure, are we to say that there is no fact about those things? | |
| From: Cardinal/Hayward/Jones (Epistemology [2004], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: I like that. How many electrons are there in the sun? Such things cannot just be reduced to talk of sense-data, as there is obviously a vast gap between the data and the facts. As usual, ontology and epistemology must be kept separate. |
| 7299 | Primary qualities can be described mathematically, unlike secondary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| Full Idea: All the primary qualities lend themselves readily to mathematical or geometric description. ...but it seems that secondary qualities are less amenable to being represented mathematically. | |
| From: Cardinal/Hayward/Jones (Epistemology [2004], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: As a believer in the primary/secondary distinction, I welcome this point. This is either evidence for the external reality of primary qualities, or an interesting observation about maths. Do we make the primary/secondary distinction because we do maths? |
| 7300 | An object cannot remain an object without its primary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| Full Idea: An object cannot lack shape, size, position or motion and remain an object. | |
| From: Cardinal/Hayward/Jones (Epistemology [2004], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: This points towards the essentialist view (see Idea 5453). This does raise the question of whether an object could lose its colour with impugnity, or the quality of sound that it makes when struck. |
| 7297 | My justifications might be very coherent, but totally unconnected to the world [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| Full Idea: My beliefs could be well justified in coherentist terms, while not accurately representing the world, and my system of beliefs could be completely free-floating. | |
| From: Cardinal/Hayward/Jones (Epistemology [2004], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: This nicely encapsulates to correspondence objection to coherence theory. One thing missing from the coherence account is that beliefs aren't chosen for their coherence, but are mostly unthinkingly triggered by experiences. |
| 7506 | God made man in his own image [Anon (Tor)] |
| Full Idea: And God said, let us make man in our image, after our likeness. | |
| From: Anon (Tor) (01: Book of Genesis [c.750 BCE], 1.26) | |
| A reaction: Since we are obviously not identical in every way with God, we can presumably choose in which respects we think of ourselves as being like Him. Reason, understanding, beauty, goodness, consciousness? A troublesome verse, challenged by Darwin. |
| 16782 | The names of all the types of creature were given forever by Adam [Anon (Tor)] |
| Full Idea: Whatsoever Adam called any living creature, the same is its name. And Adam called all the beasts by their names, and all the fowls of the air, and all the cattle of the field. | |
| From: Anon (Tor) (01: Book of Genesis [c.750 BCE], 02:20) |
| 24162 | Planck introduced the idea that energy can be quantized [Baggott] |
| Full Idea: By deriving his radiation law, Planck had inadvertently introduced the idea that energy itself could be 'quantized'. | |
| From: Jim Baggott (The Quantum Story: 40 moments [2011], 01) | |
| A reaction: He earlier assumed energy is continuously variable. I presume this means that the older idea of energy is now subsumed into the concept of fields, which are quantized into particles. The powers of nature are found in the fields. |
| 21731 | Fields can be 'scalar', or 'vector', or 'tensor', or 'spinor' [Baggott] |
| Full Idea: Fields can be 'scalar', with no particular direction (pointing, but not pushing or pulling); or 'vector', with a direction (like magnetism, or Newtonian gravity); or 'tensor' (needing further parameters); or 'spinor' (depending on spin orientation). | |
| From: Jim Baggott (Farewell to Reality: fairytale physics [2013], 2 'Quantum') | |
| A reaction: [compressed] So the question is, why do they differ? What is it in the nature of each field the result in a distinctive directional feature? |
| 21730 | A 'field' is a property with a magnitude, distributed across all of space and time [Baggott] |
| Full Idea: A 'field' is defined in terms of the magnitude of some physical property distributed over every point in time and space. | |
| From: Jim Baggott (Farewell to Reality: fairytale physics [2013], 2 'Quantum') | |
| A reaction: If it involves a 'property', normal usage entails that there is some entity which possesses the property. So what's the entity? Eh? Eh? You don't know! Disappointed... |
| 24163 | Free electrons have clouds of virtual particles, arising from field interaction [Baggott] |
| Full Idea: A free electron doesn't simply persist as a point particle travelling along a predetermined, classical path; it is surrounded by a swarm of virtual particles arsising from self-interactions with its own magnetic field. | |
| From: Jim Baggott (The Quantum Story: 40 moments [2011], 19) | |
| A reaction: It seems to me important for amateurs and mere philosophers to hang on to this idea of virtual particles, because they undermine any attempt to impose a macro picture on sub-atomic events. |
| 24161 | Thermodynamics sees nature as a continuous flow of energy, as radiation and as substance [Baggott] |
| Full Idea: Thermodynamics reinforced a vision of nature as one of harmonious flow. Energy, which could be neither created nor destroyed, flowed continuously between radiation and material substance, in themselves unbroken continua. | |
| From: Jim Baggott (The Quantum Story: 40 moments [2011], 01) | |
| A reaction: Interestingly, Einstein's Special Relativity e = mc2 seems to endorse this view, by equation energy and mass. I've always wanted to know what energy is, but no one seems to know. |
| 21732 | The current standard model requires 61 particles [Baggott] |
| Full Idea: The current model requires 61 particles: three generations of two leptons and two flavours of quark, in three different colours (making 24); the anti-particles of all of these (48); 12 force particles (photon, W1, Z0, 8 gluons), and a Higgs boson. | |
| From: Jim Baggott (Farewell to Reality: fairytale physics [2013], 6 n) |
| 24160 | Particle measurements don't seem to reflect their reality [Baggott] |
| Full Idea: It seems that we can no longer assume that the particle properties we measure necessarily reflect or represent the properties of the particles as they really are. | |
| From: Jim Baggott (The Quantum Story: 40 moments [2011], Pref) | |
| A reaction: [He cites a 2006 experiment] This gives an interesting response to the Copenhagen Interpretation - that observers appear to be creating the reality they observe, because they only have 'observations', with no reality to correspond to them. I like it. |
| 4013 | And God saw the light, that it was good [Anon (Tor)] |
| Full Idea: And God saw the light, that it was good. | |
| From: Anon (Tor) (01: Book of Genesis [c.750 BCE], 01.04) | |
| A reaction: The text seems to suggest that God did not decide that it was good, but that it conformed to a standard of goodness. |