45 ideas
10859 | A set is 'well-ordered' if every subset has a first element [Clegg] |
Full Idea: For a set to be 'well-ordered' it is required that every subset of the set has a first element. | |
From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.13) |
10857 | Set theory made a closer study of infinity possible [Clegg] |
Full Idea: Set theory made a closer study of infinity possible. | |
From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.13) |
10864 | Any set can always generate a larger set - its powerset, of subsets [Clegg] |
Full Idea: The idea of the 'power set' means that it is always possible to generate a bigger one using only the elements of that set, namely the set of all its subsets. | |
From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.14) |
10872 | Extensionality: Two sets are equal if and only if they have the same elements [Clegg] |
Full Idea: Axiom of Extension: Two sets are equal if and only if they have the same elements. | |
From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.15) |
10875 | Pairing: For any two sets there exists a set to which they both belong [Clegg] |
Full Idea: Axiom of Pairing: For any two sets there exists a set to which they both belong. So you can make a set out of two other sets. | |
From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.15) |
10876 | Unions: There is a set of all the elements which belong to at least one set in a collection [Clegg] |
Full Idea: Axiom of Unions: For every collection of sets there exists a set that contains all the elements that belong to at least one of the sets in the collection. | |
From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.15) |
10878 | Infinity: There exists a set of the empty set and the successor of each element [Clegg] |
Full Idea: Axiom of Infinity: There exists a set containing the empty set and the successor of each of its elements. | |
From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.15) | |
A reaction: This is rather different from the other axioms because it contains the notion of 'successor', though that can be generated by an ordering procedure. |
10877 | Powers: All the subsets of a given set form their own new powerset [Clegg] |
Full Idea: Axiom of Powers: For each set there exists a collection of sets that contains amongst its elements all the subsets of the given set. | |
From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.15) | |
A reaction: Obviously this must include the whole of the base set (i.e. not just 'proper' subsets), otherwise the new set would just be a duplicate of the base set. |
10879 | Choice: For every set a mechanism will choose one member of any non-empty subset [Clegg] |
Full Idea: Axiom of Choice: For every set we can provide a mechanism for choosing one member of any non-empty subset of the set. | |
From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.15) | |
A reaction: This axiom is unusual because it makes the bold claim that such a 'mechanism' can always be found. Cohen showed that this axiom is separate. The tricky bit is choosing from an infinite subset. |
10871 | Axiom of Existence: there exists at least one set [Clegg] |
Full Idea: Axiom of Existence: there exists at least one set. This may be the empty set, but you need to start with something. | |
From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.15) |
10874 | Specification: a condition applied to a set will always produce a new set [Clegg] |
Full Idea: Axiom of Specification: For every set and every condition, there corresponds a set whose elements are exactly the same as those elements of the original set for which the condition is true. So the concept 'number is even' produces a set from the integers. | |
From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.15) | |
A reaction: What if the condition won't apply to the set? 'Number is even' presumably won't produce a set if it is applied to a set of non-numbers. |
10880 | Mathematics can be 'pure' (unapplied), 'real' (physically grounded); or 'applied' (just applicable) [Clegg] |
Full Idea: Three views of mathematics: 'pure' mathematics, where it doesn't matter if it could ever have any application; 'real' mathematics, where every concept must be physically grounded; and 'applied' mathematics, using the non-real if the results are real. | |
From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.17) | |
A reaction: Very helpful. No one can deny the activities of 'pure' mathematics, but I think it is undeniable that the origins of the subject are 'real' (rather than platonic). We do economics by pretending there are concepts like the 'average family'. |
10860 | An ordinal number is defined by the set that comes before it [Clegg] |
Full Idea: You can think of an ordinal number as being defined by the set that comes before it, so, in the non-negative integers, ordinal 5 is defined as {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}. | |
From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.13) |
10861 | Beyond infinity cardinals and ordinals can come apart [Clegg] |
Full Idea: With ordinary finite numbers ordinals and cardinals are in effect the same, but beyond infinity it is possible for two sets to have the same cardinality but different ordinals. | |
From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.13) |
10854 | Transcendental numbers can't be fitted to finite equations [Clegg] |
Full Idea: The 'transcendental numbers' are those irrationals that can't be fitted to a suitable finite equation, of which π is far and away the best known. | |
From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch. 6) |
10858 | By adding an axis of imaginary numbers, we get the useful 'number plane' instead of number line [Clegg] |
Full Idea: The realisation that brought 'i' into the toolkit of physicists and engineers was that you could extend the 'number line' into a new dimension, with an imaginary number axis at right angles to it. ...We now have a 'number plane'. | |
From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.12) |
10853 | Either lack of zero made early mathematics geometrical, or the geometrical approach made zero meaningless [Clegg] |
Full Idea: It is a chicken-and-egg problem, whether the lack of zero forced forced classical mathematicians to rely mostly on a geometric approach to mathematics, or the geometric approach made 0 a meaningless concept, but the two remain strongly tied together. | |
From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch. 6) |
10866 | Cantor's account of infinities has the shaky foundation of irrational numbers [Clegg] |
Full Idea: As far as Kronecker was concerned, Cantor had built a whole structure on the irrational numbers, and so that structure had no foundation at all. | |
From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.15) |
10869 | The Continuum Hypothesis is independent of the axioms of set theory [Clegg] |
Full Idea: Paul Cohen showed that the Continuum Hypothesis is independent of the axioms of set theory. | |
From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.15) |
10862 | The 'continuum hypothesis' says aleph-one is the cardinality of the reals [Clegg] |
Full Idea: The 'continuum hypothesis' says that aleph-one is the cardinality of the rational and irrational numbers. | |
From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.14) |
21382 | Things get smaller without end [Anaxagoras] |
Full Idea: Of the small there is no smallest, but always a smaller. | |
From: Anaxagoras (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B03), quoted by Gregory Vlastos - The Physical Theory of Anaxagoras II | |
A reaction: Anaxagoras seems to be speaking of the physical world (and probably writing prior to the emergence of atomism, which could have been a rebellion against he current idea). |
481 | Nothing is created or destroyed; there is only mixing and separation [Anaxagoras] |
Full Idea: No thing comes into being or passes away, but it is mixed together or separated from existing things. Thus it would be correct if coming into being was called 'mixing', and passing away 'separation-off''. | |
From: Anaxagoras (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B17), quoted by Simplicius - On Aristotle's 'Physics' 163.20 | |
A reaction: I take this to be the first axiom of the new subject of chemistry. Our world is just patterns of Being. The bigger puzzle is - why those patterns? |
21822 | Anaxagoras's concept of supreme Mind has a simple First and a multiple One [Anaxagoras, by Plotinus] |
Full Idea: Anaxagoras, in his assertion of a Mind pure and unmixed, affirms a simplex First and a sundered One, though writing long ago he failed in precision. | |
From: report of Anaxagoras (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE]) by Plotinus - The Enneads 5.1.09 | |
A reaction: The crunch question is whether the supreme One or Mind is part of Being, or is above and beyond Being. Plotinus claims that Anaxagoras was on his side (with Plato, against Parmenides). |
17995 | Basic is the potentially perceptible, then comes the contrary qualities, and finally the 'elements' [Anaxagoras] |
Full Idea: We must recognise three 'originative sources': first that which is potentially perceptible body, secondly the contrarities (e.g hot and cold), and thirdly Fire, Water, and the like. Only thirdly, however, for these bodies change into one another. | |
From: Anaxagoras (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE]), quoted by Aristotle - The History of Animals 529a34 | |
A reaction: The 'potentially perceptible' seems to be matter. The surprise here is that the contraries are more basic than the elements, rather than being properties of them. Reality is modes of matter, it seems. |
20802 | Snow is not white, and doesn't even appear white, because it is made of black water [Anaxagoras, by Cicero] |
Full Idea: Anaxagoras not only denied that snow was white, but because he knew that the water from which it was composed was black, even denied that it appeared white to himself. | |
From: report of Anaxagoras (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - Academica II.100 | |
A reaction: Not ridiculous. Can you deny that red and yellow balls look orange from a distance? A failure of discrimination on your part. It sounds okay to say 'what I am really perceiving is red and yellow'. [see 'Anaxagoras' poem by D.H.Lawrence!] |
13257 | The senses are too feeble to determine the truth [Anaxagoras] |
Full Idea: Owing to the feebleness of the sense, we are not able to determine the truth. | |
From: Anaxagoras (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B21), quoted by Patricia Curd - Anaxagoras 5.1 | |
A reaction: Anaxagoras offers a corresponding elevation of the power of mind (Idea 13256), so I now realise that he is, along with Pythagoras and Parmenides, one of the fathers of rationalism in philosophy. They probably overrate reason. |
8836 | Must all justification be inferential? [Ginet] |
Full Idea: The infinitist view of justification holds that every justification must be inferential: no other kind of justification is possible. | |
From: Carl Ginet (Infinitism not solution to regress problem [2005], p.141) | |
A reaction: This is the key question in discussing whether justification is foundational. I'm not sure whether 'inference' is the best word when something is evidence for something else. I am inclined to think that only propositions can be reasons. |
8837 | Inference cannot originate justification, it can only transfer it from premises to conclusion [Ginet] |
Full Idea: Inference cannot originate justification, it can only transfer it from premises to conclusion. And so it cannot be that, if there actually occurs justification, it is all inferential. | |
From: Carl Ginet (Infinitism not solution to regress problem [2005], p.148) | |
A reaction: The idea that justification must have an 'origin' seems to beg the question. I take Klein's inifinitism to be a version of coherence, where the accumulation of good reasons adds up to justification. It is not purely inferential. |
22761 | We reveal unreliability in the senses when we cannot discriminate a slow change of colour [Anaxagoras, by Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Our lack of sureness in the senses is shown if we take two colours, back and white, and pour one into the other drop by drop, we are unable to distinguish the gradual alterations although they subsist as actual facts. | |
From: report of Anaxagoras (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE]) by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Logicians (two books) I.090 | |
A reaction: [Sextus calls Anaxagoras 'the greatest of the physicists'] I'm not sure what this proves. People with bad eyesight can distinguish very little, but that doesn't prove scepticism. And there are things too small for anyone to see. |
13256 | Nous is unlimited, self-ruling and pure; it is the finest thing, with great discernment and strength [Anaxagoras] |
Full Idea: Nous is unlimited and self-ruling and has been mixed with no thing, but is alone itself by itself. ...For it is the finest of all things and the purest, and indeed it maintains all discernment about everything and has the greatest strength. | |
From: Anaxagoras (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B12), quoted by Patricia Curd - Anaxagoras 3.3 | |
A reaction: Anaxagoras seems to have been a pioneer in elevating the status of the mind, which is a prop to the rationalist view, and encourages dualism. More naturalistic accounts are, in my view, much healthier. |
13784 | Mind is self-ruling, pure, ordering and ubiquitous [Anaxagoras, by Plato] |
Full Idea: Anaxagoras says that mind is self-ruling, mixes with nothing else, orders the things that are, and travels through everything. | |
From: report of Anaxagoras (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE]) by Plato - Cratylus 413c | |
A reaction: This elevation of the mind in the natural scheme of things by Anaxagoras looks increasingly significant in western culture to me. Without this line of thought, Descartes and Kant are inconceivable. |
5118 | Anaxagoras says mind remains pure, and so is not affected by what it changes [Anaxagoras, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Anaxagoras says that intellect (which is a cause of change) is not affected by or mixed in with anything else; for this is the only way in which it can cause change, while being itself changeless, and control things without mixing with them. | |
From: report of Anaxagoras (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE]) by Aristotle - Physics 256b24 | |
A reaction: I suggest that this is the germ of the original concept of freewill - of the mind as somehow outside the causal processes of the world, so that it can initiate change without itself being affected by other causes. Aristotle says he's right; I disagree. |
18231 | Anaxagoras said a person would choose to be born to contemplate the ordered heavens [Anaxagoras] |
Full Idea: When Anaxagoras was asked what it was for which a person would choose to be born rather than not, he said it would be to apprehend the heavens and the order in the whole universe. | |
From: Anaxagoras (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], 1216), quoted by Aristotle - Eudemian Ethics 8 'Finality' | |
A reaction: [Anaxagoras, quoted by Aristotle, quoted by Korsgaard, quoted by me, and then quoted by you, perhaps] |
631 | For Anaxagoras the Good Mind has no opposite, and causes all movement, for a higher reason [Anaxagoras, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Anaxagoras says the good is a principle as the source of movement, in the form of Mind. However it does it for the sake of something else, which is a further factor. And he allows no opposite to the good Mind. | |
From: report of Anaxagoras (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1075b |
22727 | Mind creates the world from a mixture of pure substances [Anaxagoras, by ] |
Full Idea: Anaxagoras assumed that Mind, which is God, is the efficient principle, and the multi-mixture of homoeomeries is the material principle. | |
From: report of Anaxagoras (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE]) by - I.6 | |
A reaction: The choice of homoeomeries as basic is a good one. They are much better candidates than materials which are made of parts of a quite different kind, where the parts are a better candidate than the whole. |
550 | Anaxagoras said that the number of principles was infinite [Anaxagoras, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Anaxagoras said that the number of principles was infinite. | |
From: report of Anaxagoras (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 984a |
21383 | The ultimate constituents of reality are the homoeomeries [Anaxagoras, by Vlastos] |
Full Idea: Anaxagoras contrasts with other thinkers in the formula that his 'elements' were not the air of Anaximenes or the fire of Heraclitus or the roots of Empedocles or the atoms of Leucippus, but the infinite variety of homoiomereia. | |
From: report of Anaxagoras (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE]) by Gregory Vlastos - The Physical Theory of Anaxagoras III | |
A reaction: Not sure about the 'roots' of Empedocles. Anaxagoras is particularly thinking of the basic stuffs that make up the body, such as hair, bone and blood. It is plausible to reduce everything to stuffs that seem to have no further structure. |
13208 | Anaxagoreans regard the homoeomeries as elements, which compose earth, air, fire and water [Anaxagoras, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The followers of Anaxagoras regard the 'homoeomeries' as 'simple' and elements, whilst they affirm that Earth, Fire, Water and Air are composite; for each of these is (according to them) a 'common seminary' of all the homoeomeries. | |
From: report of Anaxagoras (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 314a28 | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 13207. Aristotle is amused that the followers of Empedocles and of Anaxagoras have precisely opposite views on this subject. |
367 | Anaxagoras says mind produces order and causes everything [Anaxagoras, by Plato] |
Full Idea: Anaxagoras asserted that it is mind that produces order and is the cause of everything. | |
From: report of Anaxagoras (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE]) by Plato - Phaedo 097d |
21381 | Germs contain microscopic organs, which become visible as they grow [Anaxagoras] |
Full Idea: In the germ there are hair, nails, arteries, sinews, bones, which are not manifest because of the smallness of their parts, but become distinct little by little as they grow. For how could hair come from not-hair, or flesh from non-flesh. | |
From: Anaxagoras (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B10), quoted by Gregory Vlastos - The Physical Theory of Anaxagoras I | |
A reaction: Compare Aristotle's apparent view that the physical world has no microscopic structure, and Democritus's view that hair can come from not-hair by the organisation of atoms. Is this the first suggestion that we need to know what is microscopic? |
22726 | When things were unified, Mind set them in order [Anaxagoras] |
Full Idea: All things were together, and Mind came and set them in order. | |
From: Anaxagoras (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE]) | |
A reaction: This is presumably the source for the passionate belief of Plato in the importance of order. Existence seems like chaos, with order residing beneath it, but we can wonder whether if we go even deeper it is chaos again. |
2629 | Anaxagoras was the first to say that the universe is directed by an intelligence [Anaxagoras, by Cicero] |
Full Idea: Anaxagoras, pupil of Anaximenes, was the first to maintain that the form and motion of the universe was determined and directed by the power and purpose of an infinite intelligence. | |
From: report of Anaxagoras (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') I.26 |
480 | Past, present and future, and the movements of the heavens, were arranged by Mind [Anaxagoras] |
Full Idea: Whatever was then in existence which is not now, and all things that now exist, and whatever shall exist - all were arranged by Mind, as also the revolution followed now by the stars, the sun and the moon. | |
From: Anaxagoras (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B12), quoted by Simplicius - On Aristotle's 'Physics' 164.24 |
5956 | Anaxagoras was charged with impiety for calling the sun a lump of stone [Anaxagoras, by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: Anaxagoras was charged with impiety because he called the sun a lump of stone. | |
From: report of Anaxagoras (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE]) by Plutarch - 14: Superstition §9 | |
A reaction: The point is that he was supposed to say that the sun is a god. |
7488 | Anaxagoras was the first recorded atheist [Anaxagoras, by Watson] |
Full Idea: Anaxagoras was the first recorded atheist. | |
From: report of Anaxagoras (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE]) by Peter Watson - Ideas Ch.25 | |
A reaction: He was a very lively character, right in the middle of the Athenian golden age. |