5 ideas
| 20183 | So-called 'though experiments' are just philosophers observing features of the world [Cappelen] |
| Full Idea: What are called 'thought experiments' in philosophy are in effect just philosophers drawing our attention to interesting features of the world. | |
| From: Herman Cappelen (Philosophy without Intuitions [2012], 11.3) | |
| A reaction: Thought experiments are said to rely (perhaps excessively) on 'intuition', but Cappelen says intuition is irrelevant, because we are merely making judgements. It think they ARE experiments, if one feature varies while the rest is held steady. |
| 20182 | The word 'intuitive' often plays not role at all in arguments, and can be removed [Cappelen] |
| Full Idea: Careful study of uses of 'intuitive' will reveal that it often plays no significant argumentative role, and that removal will improve overall argumentative transparency. | |
| From: Herman Cappelen (Philosophy without Intuitions [2012], 04.1) | |
| A reaction: This is a key part of Cappelen's argument that 'intuition' is a rather empty concept, and that philosophers do not really rely on it. In effect, he is consigning it to mere rhetoric. He gives lots of examples in support. |
| 8836 | Must all justification be inferential? [Ginet] |
| Full Idea: The infinitist view of justification holds that every justification must be inferential: no other kind of justification is possible. | |
| From: Carl Ginet (Infinitism not solution to regress problem [2005], p.141) | |
| A reaction: This is the key question in discussing whether justification is foundational. I'm not sure whether 'inference' is the best word when something is evidence for something else. I am inclined to think that only propositions can be reasons. |
| 8837 | Inference cannot originate justification, it can only transfer it from premises to conclusion [Ginet] |
| Full Idea: Inference cannot originate justification, it can only transfer it from premises to conclusion. And so it cannot be that, if there actually occurs justification, it is all inferential. | |
| From: Carl Ginet (Infinitism not solution to regress problem [2005], p.148) | |
| A reaction: The idea that justification must have an 'origin' seems to beg the question. I take Klein's inifinitism to be a version of coherence, where the accumulation of good reasons adds up to justification. It is not purely inferential. |
| 20992 | Right and wrong concerns what other people cannot reasonably reject [Scanlon] |
| Full Idea: Thinking about right and wrong is, at the most basic level, thinking about what could be justified to others on grounds that they, if appropriately motivated, could not reasonably reject. | |
| From: Thomas M. Scanlon (What We Owe to Each Other [1998], Intro) | |
| A reaction: The tricky bit is that the acceptance by others must be 'reasonable', so we need a reasonably objective view of rationality. Don't picture your neighbours, picture the locals when you are on holiday in a very different culture. Other Nazis? |