Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Carl Ginet, Mary Louise Gill and Peter E. Pormann

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6 ideas

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
Aristotelian matter seriously threatens the intrinsic unity and substantiality of its object [Gill,ML]
     Full Idea: On the interpretation of Aristotelian matter that I shall propose, matter seriously threatens the intrinsic unity, and hence the substantiality, of the object to which it contributes.
     From: Mary Louise Gill (Aristotle on Substance [1989], Intro)
     A reaction: Presumably the thought is that if an object is form+matter (hylomorphism), then forms are essentially unified, but matter is essentially unified and sloppy.
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
Must all justification be inferential? [Ginet]
     Full Idea: The infinitist view of justification holds that every justification must be inferential: no other kind of justification is possible.
     From: Carl Ginet (Infinitism not solution to regress problem [2005], p.141)
     A reaction: This is the key question in discussing whether justification is foundational. I'm not sure whether 'inference' is the best word when something is evidence for something else. I am inclined to think that only propositions can be reasons.
Inference cannot originate justification, it can only transfer it from premises to conclusion [Ginet]
     Full Idea: Inference cannot originate justification, it can only transfer it from premises to conclusion. And so it cannot be that, if there actually occurs justification, it is all inferential.
     From: Carl Ginet (Infinitism not solution to regress problem [2005], p.148)
     A reaction: The idea that justification must have an 'origin' seems to beg the question. I take Klein's inifinitism to be a version of coherence, where the accumulation of good reasons adds up to justification. It is not purely inferential.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / d. Health
The Greeks had a single word meaning both 'beautiful' and 'good' [Pormann]
     Full Idea: The later Greeks coined the term 'kalokagathia' for the fact of being both beautiful [kalos] and good [agathos], thus linking moral and physical health.
     From: Peter E. Pormann (Medical Conceptions of Health pre-Renaissance [2019], p.44)
     A reaction: In their literature good people are often handsome, and bad people ugly. Socrates was famous for being an exception.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / b. Prime matter
Prime matter has no place in Aristotle's theories, and passages claiming it are misread [Gill,ML]
     Full Idea: I argue that prime matter has no place in Aristotle's elemental theory. ..References to prime matter are found in Aristotle's work because his theory was thought to need the doctrine. If I am right, these passages will all admit of another interpretation.
     From: Mary Louise Gill (Aristotle on Substance [1989], App)
     A reaction: If correct, this strikes me as important for the history of ideas, because scholastics got themselves in a right tangle over prime matter. See Pasnau on it. It pushed the 17th century into corpuscularianism.
Prime matter is actually nothing and potentially everything (or potentially an element) [Gill,ML]
     Full Idea: Prime matter is supposed to be actually nothing and potentially everything or, at any rate, potentially the simplest bodies - earth, water, air and fire.
     From: Mary Louise Gill (Aristotle on Substance [1989], Ch.1)
     A reaction: The view that the four elements turn out to be prime matter is distinctive of Gill's approach. Prime matter sounds like quark soup in the early universe.