5 ideas
| 19378 | Early modern possibility is what occurs sometime; for Leibniz, it is what is not contradictory [Arthur,R] |
| Full Idea: For Descartes, Hobbes and Spinoza, if a state of things is possible, it must occur at some time, whether past, present or future. For Leibniz possibility makes no reference to time; an individual is possible if its concept contains no contradiction. | |
| From: Richard T.W. Arthur (Leibniz [2014], 4 'Contingent') | |
| A reaction: It has always struck me as fallacious to say that anything that is possible must at some time occur. If '6' is possible on the die, what will constrain it to eventually come up when thrown? Mere non-contradiction doesn't imply possibility either. |
| 8836 | Must all justification be inferential? [Ginet] |
| Full Idea: The infinitist view of justification holds that every justification must be inferential: no other kind of justification is possible. | |
| From: Carl Ginet (Infinitism not solution to regress problem [2005], p.141) | |
| A reaction: This is the key question in discussing whether justification is foundational. I'm not sure whether 'inference' is the best word when something is evidence for something else. I am inclined to think that only propositions can be reasons. |
| 8837 | Inference cannot originate justification, it can only transfer it from premises to conclusion [Ginet] |
| Full Idea: Inference cannot originate justification, it can only transfer it from premises to conclusion. And so it cannot be that, if there actually occurs justification, it is all inferential. | |
| From: Carl Ginet (Infinitism not solution to regress problem [2005], p.148) | |
| A reaction: The idea that justification must have an 'origin' seems to beg the question. I take Klein's inifinitism to be a version of coherence, where the accumulation of good reasons adds up to justification. It is not purely inferential. |
| 19380 | Occasionalism contradicts the Eucharist, which needs genuine changes of substance [Arthur,R] |
| Full Idea: The Jesuits rejected occasionalism ... because it is incompatible with the Catholic interpretation of the Eucharist, which there is genuine change of substance of the bread into the substance of Christ (transubstantiation). | |
| From: Richard T.W. Arthur (Leibniz [2014], 5 'Substance') | |
| A reaction: Not sure I understand this, but I take it that the Eucharist needs a real relation across the substance-spirit boundary, and not just a co-ordination. |
| 15640 | Courage is not a virtue, but the form of every virtue at its testing point [Lewis,CS] |
| Full Idea: Courage is not simply one of the virtues, but the form of every virtue at the testing point. | |
| From: C.S. Lewis (works [1950]) | |
| A reaction: This appeared on Twitter, without mention of its source. Adding it breaks my normal rules, but I hope you agree that it is too good to miss. Is not even resolutely facing up to suffering or death a case of genuine courage? Determination, prioritisation? |