5 ideas
10355 | Facts can't make claims true, because they are true claims [Brandom, by Kusch] |
Full Idea: Brandom says that facts do not make claims true, because facts simply are true claims. | |
From: report of Robert B. Brandom (Making It Explicit [1994], p.327) by Martin Kusch - Knowledge by Agreement Ch.18 | |
A reaction: Nice. Notoriously, anyone defending the correspondence theory of truth in terms of facts had better say what they mean by a 'fact'. Personally I take a fact to be a non-verbal, mind-independent situation in the world, so I disagree with Brandom. |
6019 | If someone squashed a horse to make a dog, something new would now exist [Mnesarchus] |
Full Idea: If, for the sake of argument, someone were to mould a horse, squash it, then make a dog, it would be reasonable for us on seeing this to say that this previously did not exist but now does exist. | |
From: Mnesarchus (fragments/reports [c.120 BCE]), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 179.11 | |
A reaction: Locke would say it is new, because the substance is the same, but a new life now exists. A sword could cease to exist and become a new ploughshare, I would think. Apply this to the Ship of Theseus. Is form more important than substance? |
8836 | Must all justification be inferential? [Ginet] |
Full Idea: The infinitist view of justification holds that every justification must be inferential: no other kind of justification is possible. | |
From: Carl Ginet (Infinitism not solution to regress problem [2005], p.141) | |
A reaction: This is the key question in discussing whether justification is foundational. I'm not sure whether 'inference' is the best word when something is evidence for something else. I am inclined to think that only propositions can be reasons. |
8837 | Inference cannot originate justification, it can only transfer it from premises to conclusion [Ginet] |
Full Idea: Inference cannot originate justification, it can only transfer it from premises to conclusion. And so it cannot be that, if there actually occurs justification, it is all inferential. | |
From: Carl Ginet (Infinitism not solution to regress problem [2005], p.148) | |
A reaction: The idea that justification must have an 'origin' seems to beg the question. I take Klein's inifinitism to be a version of coherence, where the accumulation of good reasons adds up to justification. It is not purely inferential. |
7765 | The use of a sentence is its commitments and entitlements [Brandom, by Lycan] |
Full Idea: Brandom develops a particular conception of 'use', according to which a sentence's use is the set of commitments and entitlements associated with public utterance of that sentence. | |
From: report of Robert B. Brandom (Articulating Reasons: Intro to Inferentialism [2000]) by William Lycan - Philosophy of Language Ch.6 | |
A reaction: It immediately strikes me that a sentence could only have commitments and entitlements if it already had a meaning. However, the case of money shows how there might be nothing more to a thing's significance than its entitlements. |