Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Carl Ginet, Stuart Hampshire and M Loux / D Zimmerman

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4 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual

9217	Modern empirical metaphysics focuses on ontological commitments of discourse, or on presuppositions [Loux/Zimmerman]
	Full Idea: The empiricist revival of metaphysics came with Quine, who focused on ontological commitments associated with accepting a body of discourse, and Strawson, asking about the presuppositions of our conceptual practices.
	From: M Loux / D Zimmerman (Intro to Oxford Hndbk of Metaphysics [2003])
	A reaction: I find myself preferring the British approach. I can discourse about things without ontological commitment, and utter truths about non-existent things. I really yearn, though, for the third way - actually reasoning towards knowing what's out there.

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues

8836	Must all justification be inferential? [Ginet]
	Full Idea: The infinitist view of justification holds that every justification must be inferential: no other kind of justification is possible.
	From: Carl Ginet (Infinitism not solution to regress problem [2005], p.141)
	A reaction: This is the key question in discussing whether justification is foundational. I'm not sure whether 'inference' is the best word when something is evidence for something else. I am inclined to think that only propositions can be reasons.

8837	Inference cannot originate justification, it can only transfer it from premises to conclusion [Ginet]
	Full Idea: Inference cannot originate justification, it can only transfer it from premises to conclusion. And so it cannot be that, if there actually occurs justification, it is all inferential.
	From: Carl Ginet (Infinitism not solution to regress problem [2005], p.148)
	A reaction: The idea that justification must have an 'origin' seems to beg the question. I take Klein's inifinitism to be a version of coherence, where the accumulation of good reasons adds up to justification. It is not purely inferential.

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility

20166	A man is a responsible agent to the extent he has an intention, and knows what he is doing [Hampshire]
	Full Idea: A man becomes more and more a free and responsible agent the more he at all times knows what he is doing, in every sense of this phrase, and the more he acts with a definite and clearly formed intention.
	From: Stuart Hampshire (Thought and Responsibility [1960], p.178), quoted by John Kekes - The Human Condition 07.1
	A reaction: Kekes quote this (along with Frankfurt, Hart etc) as the 'received view' of responsibility, which he attacks.