7 ideas
7855 | Some suggest that materialism is empty, because 'physical' cannot be properly characterized [Mellor/Crane, by Papineau] |
Full Idea: It is sometimes contended that the whole idea of materialism is somehow empty, on the grounds that there is no proper way to characterize the 'physical' realm. | |
From: report of DH Mellor / T Crane (There is no question of physicalism [1990]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 1.1 | |
A reaction: [Papineau also cites Gabriel Segal] I agree with Papineau in rejecting this. Uncertainties about quantum states do not pose a problem, and the position tends to have an implicit dualism buried in it somewhere. |
3214 | The models we use in reasoning may be more like perceptions than like language [Johnson-Laird] |
Full Idea: The models that people use to reason are more likely to resemble perception or conception of the events (from a God's-eye view) than a string of symbols directly corresponding to the linguistic form of the premises and then applying rules of inference. | |
From: P. Johnson-Laird (Mental Models [1983], p.53), quoted by Georges Rey - Contemporary Philosophy of Mind 10.1.2 | |
A reaction: My intuition is that imagination is the single most important faculty in any conscious mind, and that even small animals have an inkling of the God's-eye view. Decisions need 'what-if' scenarios. |
6120 | Causation depends on intrinsic properties [Mellor/Crane] |
Full Idea: The problem thoughts pose for causation is that causation depends directly only on intrinsic properties, whereas the causal powers of token thoughts depend on their contents, which are not intrinsic. | |
From: DH Mellor / T Crane (There is no question of physicalism [1990], p.194) | |
A reaction: This, as we find later in the paper, depends on an externalist account of thoughts. Could a relational property not be causal? Edinburgh's being wetter than London is caused by its being further north? |
6121 | There are many psychophysicals laws - about the effects of sweets, colours and soft cushions [Mellor/Crane] |
Full Idea: There are many psychophysical laws, linking sensations to non-mental features of those who have them; the industries of anaesthetics, scents, narcotics, sweeteners, coloured paints, loudspeakers and soft cushions depend on them. | |
From: DH Mellor / T Crane (There is no question of physicalism [1990], p.198) | |
A reaction: It may be expressing it a little strongly to call these 'laws', but they are certainly reliable regularities, and they are probably enough to undermine Davidson's claim that such laws don't exist. |
6122 | No defences of physicalism can deprive psychology of the ontological authority of other sciences [Mellor/Crane] |
Full Idea: Neither laws nor causation nor claims of supervenience (the last refuge of the physicalist) deprive psychology of the ontological authority of non-mental science. | |
From: DH Mellor / T Crane (There is no question of physicalism [1990], p.203) | |
A reaction: There is no need to defend the practice of psychologists (or garden designers) from the depradations of bandit physicalists. But what is the ontology of psychology if it isn't dualist or physicalist? |
1868 | The world was made as much for animals as for man [Celsus] |
Full Idea: The world was made as much for the irrational animals as for men. | |
From: Celsus (On the True Doctrine (Against Christians) [c.178], §V) | |
A reaction: A good remark. It seems to be a classic distortion of European Christianity that the world is made for us, and that animals only exist to fill our sandwiches. |
1867 | Christians presented Jesus as a new kind of logos to oppose that of the philosophers [Celsus] |
Full Idea: Christians put forth this Jesus not only as the son of God, but as the very Logos - not the pure and holy Logos known to the philosophers, but a new kind of Logos. | |
From: Celsus (On the True Doctrine (Against Christians) [c.178], III) |