7 ideas
| 6601 | Science rules the globe because of colonising power, not inherent rationality [Feyerabend] |
| Full Idea: Science now reigns supreme all over the globe; but the reason was not insight in its 'inherent rationality' but power play (the colonising nations imposed their way of living) and the need for weapons. | |
| From: Paul Feyerabend (Against Method [1975], 3), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.5 | |
| A reaction: A nice clear statement of ridiculous relativism about science. What gave the colonisers their power if it was not more accurate knowledge of how to manipulate nature? |
| 9295 | Not only substances have attributes; events, actions, states and qualities can have them [Teichmann] |
| Full Idea: It is not true that only substances have attributes; events, actions, states and qualities can all be characterized. | |
| From: Jenny Teichmann (The Mind and the Soul [1974], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: This is why it is so important to distinguish the actual properties in nature from those that can be fancifully hypothesized by a linguistic being. Is there any limit to the possible number of levels of meta-properties? |
| 2561 | For Feyerabend the meaning of a term depends on a whole theory [Feyerabend, by Rorty] |
| Full Idea: For Feyerabend the meaning of a term depends on a whole theory containing the term. | |
| From: report of Paul Feyerabend (Against Method [1975]) by Richard Rorty - Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature 6.3 |
| 16861 | A false theory could hardly rival the explanatory power of natural selection [Darwin] |
| Full Idea: It can hardly be supposed that a false theory would explain, in so satisfactory a manner as does the theory of natural selection, the several large classes of facts above specified. | |
| From: Charles Darwin (The Origin of the Species [1859], p.476), quoted by Peter Lipton - Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) 11 'The scientific' | |
| A reaction: More needs to be said, since the whims of God could explain absolutely everything (in a manner that would be somehow less that fully satisfying to the enquiring intellect). |
| 9293 | Body-spirit interaction ought to result in losses and increases of energy in the material world [Teichmann] |
| Full Idea: Since the interaction of bodies themselves involves energy-flow, it looks as if interaction between body and spirit ought to result in losses and increases of energy in the material world. | |
| From: Jenny Teichmann (The Mind and the Soul [1974], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: A nice statement of an important argument. It forces the dualist to go the whole way, asserting that not only is the mind immaterial, but that it can be active without energy, and cover its traces in the physical world. Doesn't look good. |
| 9294 | No individuating marks distinguish between Souls [Teichmann] |
| Full Idea: There are no individuating marks which could serve to differentiate one Soul from another. | |
| From: Jenny Teichmann (The Mind and the Soul [1974], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: Presumably they could have at least much identity as two different electrons (if they are in space-time?). It is hard to see why anyone would be interested in their 'own' immortality, if loss of all individuality was a condition. |
| 9292 | The Soul has no particular capacity (in the way thinking belongs to the mind) [Teichmann] |
| Full Idea: On the whole, the Soul has no capacities which belong to it pre-eminently in the way that thinking 'belongs' to the mind. | |
| From: Jenny Teichmann (The Mind and the Soul [1974], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: There are no phenomena which have to be saved by postulating a soul. It lacks a function within a human being, but it has a crucial function within a large theological picture. |