Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Charles Parsons, Scott Sturgeon and Niccolo Machiavelli

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23 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
Modal logic is not an extensional language [Parsons,C]
     Full Idea: Modal logic is not an extensional language.
     From: Charles Parsons (A Plea for Substitutional Quantification [1971], p.159 n8)
     A reaction: [I record this for investigation. Possible worlds seem to contain objects]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
The old problems with the axiom of choice are probably better ascribed to the law of excluded middle [Parsons,C]
     Full Idea: The difficulties historically attributed to the axiom of choice are probably better ascribed to the law of excluded middle.
     From: Charles Parsons (Review of Tait 'Provenance of Pure Reason' [2009], §2)
     A reaction: The law of excluded middle was a target for the intuitionists, so presumably the debate went off in that direction.
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
Substitutional existential quantifier may explain the existence of linguistic entities [Parsons,C]
     Full Idea: I argue (against Quine) that the existential quantifier substitutionally interpreted has a genuine claim to express a concept of existence, which may give the best account of linguistic abstract entities such as propositions, attributes, and classes.
     From: Charles Parsons (A Plea for Substitutional Quantification [1971], p.156)
     A reaction: Intuitively I have my doubts about this, since the whole thing sounds like a verbal and conventional game, rather than anything with a proper ontology. Ruth Marcus and Quine disagree over this one.
On the substitutional interpretation, '(∃x) Fx' is true iff a closed term 't' makes Ft true [Parsons,C]
     Full Idea: For the substitutional interpretation of quantifiers, a sentence of the form '(∃x) Fx' is true iff there is some closed term 't' of the language such that 'Ft' is true. For the objectual interpretation some object x must exist such that Fx is true.
     From: Charles Parsons (A Plea for Substitutional Quantification [1971], p.156)
     A reaction: How could you decide if it was true for 't' if you didn't know what object 't' referred to?
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Parsons says counting is tagging as first, second, third..., and converting the last to a cardinal [Parsons,C, by Heck]
     Full Idea: In Parsons's demonstrative model of counting, '1' means the first, and counting says 'the first, the second, the third', where one is supposed to 'tag' each object exactly once, and report how many by converting the last ordinal into a cardinal.
     From: report of Charles Parsons (Frege's Theory of Numbers [1965]) by Richard G. Heck - Cardinality, Counting and Equinumerosity 3
     A reaction: This sounds good. Counting seems to rely on that fact that numbers can be both ordinals and cardinals. You don't 'convert' at the end, though, because all the way you mean 'this cardinality in this order'.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
General principles can be obvious in mathematics, but bold speculations in empirical science [Parsons,C]
     Full Idea: The existence of very general principles in mathematics are universally regarded as obvious, where on an empiricist view one would expect them to be bold hypotheses, about which a prudent scientist would maintain reserve.
     From: Charles Parsons (Mathematical Intuition [1980], p.152), quoted by Penelope Maddy - Naturalism in Mathematics
     A reaction: This is mainly aimed at Quine's and Putnam's indispensability (to science) argument about mathematics.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 8. Finitism
If functions are transfinite objects, finitists can have no conception of them [Parsons,C]
     Full Idea: The finitist may have no conception of function, because functions are transfinite objects.
     From: Charles Parsons (Review of Tait 'Provenance of Pure Reason' [2009], §4)
     A reaction: He is offering a view of Tait's. Above my pay scale, but it sounds like a powerful objection to the finitist view. Maybe there is a finitist account of functions that could be given?
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
If a mathematical structure is rejected from a physical theory, it retains its mathematical status [Parsons,C]
     Full Idea: If experience shows that some aspect of the physical world fails to instantiate a certain mathematical structure, one will modify the theory by sustituting a different structure, while the original structure doesn't lose its status as part of mathematics.
     From: Charles Parsons (Review of Tait 'Provenance of Pure Reason' [2009], §2)
     A reaction: This seems to be a beautifully simple and powerful objection to the Quinean idea that mathematics somehow only gets its authority from physics. It looked like a daft view to begin with, of course.
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind
Mindless bodies are zombies, bodiless minds are ghosts [Sturgeon]
     Full Idea: When bodies are conceived without mind, Zombies are the topic; when mind is conceived without bodies, Ghosts are the topic.
     From: Scott Sturgeon (Matters of Mind [2000], Intro)
     A reaction: Personally I am not too impressed by either possibility. I doubt whether either of them are even logically possible. Can you have a magnet without its magnetism? Can you have magnetism with no magnet?
Types are properties, and tokens are events. Are they split between mental and physical, or not? [Sturgeon]
     Full Idea: The question is whether mental and physical types (which are properties) are distinct, and whether mental and physical tokens (which are events) are distinct.
     From: Scott Sturgeon (Matters of Mind [2000], Intro)
     A reaction: Helpful. While the first one gives us the rather dodgy notion of 'property dualism', the second one seems to imply Cartesian dualism, if the events really are distinct. It seems to me that thought is an aspect of brain events, not a distinct event.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
Intentionality isn't reducible, because of its experiential aspect [Sturgeon]
     Full Idea: The link between Aboutness and consciousness, plus the latter's theoretical recalcitrance, have prevented reduction of the former.
     From: Scott Sturgeon (Matters of Mind [2000], Intro)
     A reaction: I remain unconvinced that Aboutness (intentionality) has to be wholly (or even partly conscious). We are more interested in our conscious mental states, because those are the ones we can report to other people, and discuss.
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
Rule-following can't be reduced to the physical [Sturgeon]
     Full Idea: If you can't squeeze an 'ought' from an 'is', then the feature of normativity will prevent the reduction of Aboutness.
     From: Scott Sturgeon (Matters of Mind [2000], Intro)
     A reaction: A dubious argument. Hume's point is that no rational inference will get you from is to ought, but you can get there on a whim. I don't see normativity as being so intrinsically magical that it is irreducible.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
The main argument for physicalism is its simple account of causation [Sturgeon]
     Full Idea: The dominant empirical argument for physicalism is the Overdetermination Argument: physics is closed and complete, mind is causally efficacious, the world isn't choc-full of overdetermination, so the mind is physical as well.
     From: Scott Sturgeon (Matters of Mind [2000], Intro)
     A reaction: I find this argument utterly convincing. The idea that there is only one thing which is outside the interconnected causal nexus which seems to constitute the rest of reality, and that is a piece of meat inside our heads, strikes me as totally ridiculous.
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
Do facts cause thoughts, or embody them, or what? [Sturgeon]
     Full Idea: Does a thought relate to its truth conditions like a tree to its age, a bee dance to its target, or smoke to its cause?
     From: Scott Sturgeon (Matters of Mind [2000], Intro)
     A reaction: Nice question. Is truth the purpose of thoughts, or the cause of thoughts, or the constitution(?) of thoughts? I vote for the bee….but we mustn't confuse truth with truth-conditions.
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 3. Promise Keeping
If men are good you should keep promises, but they aren't, so you needn't [Machiavelli]
     Full Idea: If all men were good, promising-breaking would not be good, but because they are bad and do not keep their promises to you, you likewise do not have to keep yours to them.
     From: Niccolo Machiavelli (The Prince [1513], Ch.18)
     A reaction: A rather depressing proposal to get your promise-breaking in first, based on the pessimistic view that people cannot be improved. The subsequent history of ethics in Europe showed Machiavelli to be wrong. Gentlemen began to keep their word.
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 3. Constitutions
The principle foundations of all states are good laws and good armies [Machiavelli]
     Full Idea: The principle foundations of all states are good laws and good armies.
     From: Niccolo Machiavelli (The Prince [1513], Ch.11)
     A reaction: We may be wondering, since 1945, whether a good army is any longer essential, but it would be a foolish modern state which didn't at least form a strong alliance with a state which had a strong army. Fertile land is a huge benefit to a state.
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / c. Despotism
To retain a conquered state, wipe out the ruling family, and preserve everything else [Machiavelli]
     Full Idea: If a ruler acquires a state and is determined to keep it, he observes two cautions: he wipes out the family of their long-established princes; and he does not change either their laws or their taxes; in a short time they will unite with his old princedom.
     From: Niccolo Machiavelli (The Prince [1513], Ch.3)
     A reaction: This nicely illustrates the firmness of purpose for which Machiavelli has become a byword. The question is whether Machiavelli had enough empirical evidence to support this induction. The British in India seem to have been successful without it.
People are vengeful, so be generous to them, or destroy them [Machiavelli]
     Full Idea: Men should be either treated generously or destroyed, because they take revenge for slight injuries.
     From: Niccolo Machiavelli (The Prince [1513], Ch.3)
     A reaction: This sounds like good advice, and works quite well in school teaching too. It seems like advice drawn from the growth of the Roman Empire, rather than from dealing with sophisticated and educated people.
A sensible conqueror does all his harmful deeds immediately, because people soon forget [Machiavelli]
     Full Idea: A prudent conqueror makes a list of all the harmful deeds he must do, and does them all at once, so that he need not repeat them every day, which then makes men feel secure, and gains their support by treating them well.
     From: Niccolo Machiavelli (The Prince [1513], Ch.8)
     A reaction: This might work for a new government in a democracy, or a new boss in a business. It sounds horribly true; dreadful deeds done a long time ago can be completely forgotten, as when reformed criminals become celebrities.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
A desire to conquer, and men who do it, are always praised, or not blamed [Machiavelli]
     Full Idea: It is very natural and normal to wish to conquer, and when men do it who can, they always will be praised, or not blamed.
     From: Niccolo Machiavelli (The Prince [1513], Ch.3)
     A reaction: This view seems shocking to us, but it seems to me that this was a widely held view up until the time of Nietzsche, but came to a swift end with the invention of the machine gun in about 1885, followed by the heavy bomber and atomic bomb.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 2. Religion in Society
All legislators invoke God in support of extraordinary laws, because their justification is not obvious [Machiavelli]
     Full Idea: There has never been a single legislator who, in proposing extraordinary laws, did not have recourse to God, for otherwise they would not be accepted, since many benefits known to a prudent man do not have evident persuasive reasons.
     From: Niccolo Machiavelli (The Discourses [1520], 1.11), quoted by Jean-Jacques Rousseau - The Social Contract (tr Cress) II.7 n8
     A reaction: It does seem to be an important role for God and state religion, to give support to decisions and laws which might not be intrinsically popular.
Rulers should preserve the foundations of religion, to ensure good behaviour and unity [Machiavelli]
     Full Idea: It is the duty of the rulers of a republic or a kingdom to preserve the foundations of the religion they hold; if they do this, it will be an easy thing for them to keep their state religious, and consequently good and united.
     From: Niccolo Machiavelli (The Discourses [1520], I.12)
     A reaction: This is the germ of Marx's view, that the sole role of religion is political, as a tool used by the ruling classes to keep the populace in their place. The same idea can be found in Critias (Idea 542). But what is wrong with some central moral guidance?
Machiavelli emancipated politics from religion [Machiavelli, by Watson]
     Full Idea: Machiavelli emancipated politics from religion.
     From: report of Niccolo Machiavelli (The Prince [1513]) by Peter Watson - Ideas Ch.24
     A reaction: Interestingly, he seems to have done it by saying that ideals are irrelevant to politics, but gradually secular ideals crept back in (sometimes disastrously). A balance needs to be struck on idealism.