Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Chilo, R Martin / J Barresi and Ariston

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8 ideas

2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Like spiderswebs, dialectical arguments are clever but useless [Ariston, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: He said that dialectical arguments were like spiderswebs: although they seem to indicate craftsmanlike skill, they are useless.
     From: report of Ariston (fragments/reports [c.250 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.161
     A reaction: Useful for the spider, but useless to Ariston.
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
Maybe we should see persons in four dimensions, with stages or time-slices at an instant [Martin/Barresi]
     Full Idea: Some recent philosophers have argued that we should replace the three-dimensional view of persons with a four-dimensional view according to which only time-slices, or 'stages', of persons exist at short intervals of time.
     From: R Martin / J Barresi (Introduction to 'Personal Identity' [2003], p.3)
     A reaction: At first glance this seems to neatly eliminate lots of traditional worries. But why would I want to retain my identity, if someone threatened to brainwash me. I also want to disown my inadequate earlier selves. Interesting, though. Lewis.
Maybe personal identity is not vital in survival, and other continuations would suffice [Martin/Barresi]
     Full Idea: A modern question is whether personal identity is primarily what matters in survival; that is, people might cease and be continued by others whose continuation the original people would value as much.
     From: R Martin / J Barresi (Introduction to 'Personal Identity' [2003], p.3)
     A reaction: When put like this, the proposal seems hard to grasp. It only makes sense if you don't really believe in a thing called 'personal identity'. I don't see how you can believe in it without also believing that for you it has central importance.
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct
Locke's intrinsic view of personal identity has been replaced by an externalist view [Martin/Barresi]
     Full Idea: In modern times the Lockean intrinsic relations view of personal identity has been superseded by an extrinsic relations view (also called the 'closest-continuer' or 'externalist' view).
     From: R Martin / J Barresi (Introduction to 'Personal Identity' [2003], p.1)
     A reaction: Sounds sweeping. My suspicion is that there is a raging fashion for externalist views of everything (justification, content etc.), but this will pass. I take Parfit to be the source of the modern views.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
The chief good is indifference to what lies midway between virtue and vice [Ariston, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: The chief good is to live in perfect indifference to all those things which are of an intermediate character between virtue and vice.
     From: report of Ariston (fragments/reports [c.250 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.2.1
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The virtue of man is thoughtful foresight of future events [Chilo, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: A foresight of future events, such as could be arrived at by consideration, is the virtue of man.
     From: report of Chilo (poems (frags) [c.490 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 01.4.1
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
Ariston says rules are useless for the virtuous and the non-virtuous [Ariston, by Annas]
     Full Idea: Ariston says that rules are useless if you are virtuous, and useless if you are not.
     From: report of Ariston (fragments/reports [c.250 BCE]) by Julia Annas - The Morality of Happiness 2.4
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
For Aristotle the psyche perishes with the body (except possibly 'nous') [Martin/Barresi]
     Full Idea: In Aristotle's view, with the possible exception of 'nous' the psyche and all its parts come into being at the same time as its associated body; it is inseparable from the body, and perishes along with it.
     From: R Martin / J Barresi (Introduction to 'Personal Identity' [2003], p.8)
     A reaction: It is suggested that he thought there was only one 'nous', which all humans share (p.9). If he wants to claim that one part is immortal, he doesn't have much evidence. If psyche is the form of the body, it is bound to perish.