Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Cleanthes, Helen Cartwright and David M. Rosenthal

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6 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 4. Divisions of Philosophy
Six parts: dialectic, rhetoric, ethics, politics, physics, theology [Cleanthes, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Cleanthes says there are six parts: dialectic, rhetoric, ethics, politics, physics, and theology.
     From: report of Cleanthes (fragments/reports [c.270 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.41
     A reaction: This was a minority view, as most stoics agreed with Zeno and Chrysippus that there are three main topics. Nowadays there is little discussion of the 'parts' of philosophy, but the recent revival of meta-philosophy should encourage it.
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
A 'singulariser' converts a plural like 'number of' to a syntactically neutral form [Cartwright,H, by Hossack]
     Full Idea: Helen Cartwright calls 'a number of' a 'singulariser', an expression whose linguistic function is to convert to a syntactically neutral form an expression whose semantic value remains plural. It is a great convenience grammatically.
     From: report of Helen Cartwright (On Plural Reference and Set Theory [1993]) by Keith Hossack - Plurals and Complexes 2
     A reaction: Compare Hofweber's Idea 10004, suggesting it is a crucial psychological convenience for reasoning, as well as a 'grammatical' convenience.
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
Introspection is not perception, because there are no extra qualities apart from the mental events themselves [Rosenthal]
     Full Idea: Introspection cannot be a form of perceiving, since that invariably involves sensory qualities, and no qualities occur in introspection other than those of the sensations and perceptions we introspect; there are no additional qualities.
     From: David M. Rosenthal (Instrospection [1998])
     A reaction: This sounds pretty conclusive. Presumably introspection is best described as meta-thought rather than perception, which means that it involves beliefs and judgements, rather than new perceptual qualities. It has to be conceptual, and probably linguistic.
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
Bodies interact with other bodies, and cuts cause pain, and shame causes blushing, so the soul is a body [Cleanthes, by Nemesius]
     Full Idea: Cleanthes says no incorporeal interacts with a body, but one body interacts with another body; the soul interacts with the body when it is sick and being cut, and the body feels shame and fear, and turns red or pale, so the soul is a body.
     From: report of Cleanthes (fragments/reports [c.270 BCE]) by Nemesius - De Natura Hominis 78,7
     A reaction: This is precisely the interaction problem with dualism, or, as we might now say, the problem of mental causation. The standard Stoic view is that the soul is a sort of rarefied fire, which disperses at death.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
The soul suffers when the body hurts, creates redness from shame, and pallor from fear [Cleanthes]
     Full Idea: Nothing incorporeal shares an experience with a body …but the soul suffers with the body when it is ill and when it is cut, and the body suffers with the soul - when the soul is ashamed the body turns red, and pale when the soul is frightened.
     From: Cleanthes (fragments/reports [c.270 BCE]), quoted by Nemesius - De Natura Hominis 2
     A reaction: Aha - my favourite example of the corporeal nature of the mind - blushing! It is the conscious content of the thought which brings blood to the cheeks.
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
The ascending scale of living creatures requires a perfect being [Cleanthes, by Tieleman]
     Full Idea: Cleanthes tried to prove the existence of God, arguing that the ascending scale of living creatures requires there to be a perfect being.
     From: report of Cleanthes (fragments/reports [c.270 BCE]) by Teun L. Tieleman - Cleanthes
     A reaction: Not a very good argument. Even if you accept its basic claim, it is not clear what has to exist. A perfect tree? If the being transcends the physical (in order to achieve perfection), does it cease to be a 'being'?