Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Confucius, Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J and Morris Kline

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21 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation

17606	Axioms reveal the underlying assumptions, and reveal relationships between different areas [Kline]
	Full Idea: The axiomatic method ....revealed precisely what assumptions underlie each branch [of mathematics] and made possible the comparison and clarification of the relationships of various branches.
	From: Morris Kline (Mathematical Thought from Ancient to Modern Times [1972], p.1027), quoted by Penelope Maddy - Defending the Axioms 1.3
	A reaction: I take this to be the 'fruitfulness' which marks out the discovery of the essence of something.

8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations

13076	Scholastics treat relations as two separate predicates of the relata [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
	Full Idea: The scholastics treated it as a step in the right explanatory direction to analyze a relational statement of the form 'aRb' into two subject-predicate statements, attributing different relational predicates to a and to b.
	From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 2.2.1)
	A reaction: The only alternative seems to be Russell's view of relations as pure universals, having a life of their own, quite apart from their relata. Or you could take them as properties of space, time (and powers?), external to the relata?

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation

13102	If you individuate things by their origin, you still have to individuate the origins themselves [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
	Full Idea: If we go for the necessity-of-origins view, A and B are different if the origin of A is different from the origin of B. But one is left with the further question 'When is the origin of A distinct from the origin of B?'
	From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 7.4.1)
	A reaction: There may be an answer to this, in a regress of origins that support one another, but in the end the objection is obviously good. You can't begin to refer to an 'origin' if you can't identify anything in the first place.

13103	Numerical difference is a symmetrical notion, unlike proper individuation [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
	Full Idea: Scholastics distinguished criteria of numerical difference from questions of individuation proper, since numerical difference is a symmetrical notion.
	From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 7.4.1)
	A reaction: This apparently old-fashioned point appears to be conclusively correct. Modern thinkers, though, aren't comfortable with proper individuation, because they don't believe in concepts like 'essence' and 'substance' that are needed for the job.

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity

13104	Haecceity as property, or as colourless thisness, or as singleton set [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
	Full Idea: There is a contemporary property construal of haecceities, ...and a Scotistic construal as primitive, 'colourless' thisnesses which, unlike singleton-set haecceities, are aimed to do some explanatory work.
	From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 7.4.4)
	A reaction: [He associates the contemporary account with David Kaplan] I suppose I would say that individuation is done by properties, but not by some single property, so I take it that I don't believe in haecceities at all. What individuates a haecceity?

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance

13100	Maybe 'substance' is more of a mass-noun than a count-noun [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
	Full Idea: We could think of 'substance' on the model of a mass noun, rather than a count noun.
	From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 7.3)
	A reaction: They offer this to help Leibniz out of a mess, but I think he would be appalled. The proposal seems close to 'prime matter' in Aristotle, which never quite does the job required of it. The idea is nice, though, and should be taken seriously.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance

13068	We can ask for the nature of substance, about type of substance, and about individual substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
	Full Idea: In the 'blueprint' approach to substance, we confront at least three questions: What is it for a thing to be an individual substance? What is it for a thing to be the kind of substance that it is? What is it to be that very individual substance?
	From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 1.1.1)
	A reaction: My working view is that the answer to the first question is that substance is essence, that the second question is overrated and parasitic on the third, and that the third is the key question, and also reduces to essence.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined

13069	The general assumption is that substances cannot possibly be non-substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
	Full Idea: There is a widespread assumption, now and in the past, that substances are essentially substances: nothing is actually a substance but possibly a non-substance.
	From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 1.1.2)
	A reaction: It seems to me that they clearly mean, in this context, that substances are 'necessarily' substances, not that they are 'essentially' substances. I would just say that substances are essences, and leave the necessity question open.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties

13072	Modern essences are sets of essential predicate-functions [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
	Full Idea: The modern view of essence is that the essence of a particular thing is given by the set of predicate-functions essential to it, and the essence of any kind is given by the set of predicate-functions essential to every possible member of that kind.
	From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 1.2.2)
	A reaction: Thus the modern view has elided the meanings of 'essential' and 'necessary' when talking of properties. They are said to be 'functions' from possible worlds to individuals. The old view (and mine) demands real essences, not necessary properties.

17080	Modern essentialists express essence as functions from worlds to extensions for predicates [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
	Full Idea: The modern essentialist gives the same metaphysical treatment to every grammatical predicate - by associating a function from worlds to extensions for each.
	From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 2.2)
	A reaction: I take this to mean that essentialism is the view that if some predicate attaches to an object then that predicate is essential if there is an extension of that predicate in all possible worlds. In English, essential predicates are necessary predicates.

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential

13101	Necessity-of-origin won't distinguish ex nihilo creations, or things sharing an origin [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
	Full Idea: A necessity-of-origins approach cannot work to distinguish things that come into being genuinely ex nihilo, and cannot work to distinguish things sharing a single origin.
	From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 7.4.1)
	A reaction: Since I am deeply suspicious of essentiality or necessity of origin (and they are not, I presume, the same thing) I like these two. Twins have always bothered me with the second case (where order of birth seems irrelevant).

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity

13081	Even extreme modal realists might allow transworld identity for abstract objects [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
	Full Idea: It might be suggested that even the extreme modal realist can countenance transworld identity for abstract objects.
	From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 3.2.2 n46)
	A reaction: This may sound right for uncontroversial or well-defined abstracta such as numbers and circles, but even 'or' is ambiguous, and heaven knows what the transworld identity of 'democracy' is!

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence

13071	We can go beyond mere causal explanations if we believe in an 'order of being' [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
	Full Idea: The philosopher comfortable with an 'order of being' has richer resources to make sense of the 'in virtue of' relation than that provided only by causal relations between states of affairs, positing in addition other sorts of explanatory relationships.
	From: Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 1.1.2)
	A reaction: This might best be characterised as 'ontological dependence', and could be seen as a non-causal but fundamental explanatory relationship, and not one that has to depend on a theistic world view.

19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric

7357	People who control others with fluent language often end up being hated [Kongzi (Confucius)]
	Full Idea: Of what use is eloquence? He who engages in fluency of words to control men often finds himself hated by them.
	From: Kongzi (Confucius) (The Analects (Lunyu) [c.511 BCE], V.5)
	A reaction: I don't recall Socrates making this very good point to any of the sophists (such as Gorgias). The idea that if you battle or connive your way to dominance over others then you are successful is false. Life is a much longer game than that.

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / h. Against ethics

7358	All men prefer outward appearance to true excellence [Kongzi (Confucius)]
	Full Idea: I have yet to meet a man as fond of excellence as he is of outward appearances.
	From: Kongzi (Confucius) (The Analects (Lunyu) [c.511 BCE], IX.18)
	A reaction: Interestingly, this cynical view of the love of virtue is put by Plato into the mouths of Glaucon and Adeimantus (in Bk II of 'Republic', e.g. Idea 12), and not into the mouth of Socrates, who goes on to defend the possibility of true virtue.

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature

7362	Humans are similar, but social conventions drive us apart (sages and idiots being the exceptions) [Kongzi (Confucius)]
	Full Idea: In our natures we approximate one another; habits put us further and further apart. The only ones who do not change are sages and idiots.
	From: Kongzi (Confucius) (The Analects (Lunyu) [c.511 BCE], XVII.2)
	A reaction: I find most of Confucius rather uninteresting, but this is a splendid remark about the influence of social conventions on human nature. Sages can achieve universal morality if they rise above social convention, and seek the true virtues of human nature.

23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule

7360	Do not do to others what you would not desire yourself [Kongzi (Confucius)]
	Full Idea: Do not do to others what you would not desire yourself. Then you will have no enemies, either in the state or in your home.
	From: Kongzi (Confucius) (The Analects (Lunyu) [c.511 BCE], XII.2)
	A reaction: The Golden Rule, but note the second sentence. Logically, it leads to the absurdity of not giving someone an Elvis record for Christmas because you yourself don't like Elvis. Kant (Idea 3733) and Nietzsche (Idea 4560) offer good criticisms.

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean

7359	Excess and deficiency are equally at fault [Kongzi (Confucius)]
	Full Idea: Excess and deficiency are equally at fault.
	From: Kongzi (Confucius) (The Analects (Lunyu) [c.511 BCE], XI.16)
	A reaction: This is the sort of wisdom we admire in Aristotle (and in any sensible person), but it may also be the deepest motto of conservatism, and it is a long way from romantic philosophy, and the clarion call of Nietzsche to greater excitement in life.

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues

7363	The virtues of the best people are humility, maganimity, sincerity, diligence, and graciousness [Kongzi (Confucius)]
	Full Idea: He who in this world can practise five things may indeed be considered Man-at-his-best: humility, maganimity, sincerity, diligence, and graciousness.
	From: Kongzi (Confucius) (The Analects (Lunyu) [c.511 BCE], XVII.5)
	A reaction: A very nice list. Who could resist working with a colleague who had such virtues? Who could go wrong if they married a person who had them? I can't think of anything important that is missing.

24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / d. Elites

7361	Men of the highest calibre avoid political life completely [Kongzi (Confucius)]
	Full Idea: Men of the highest calibre avoid political life completely.
	From: Kongzi (Confucius) (The Analects (Lunyu) [c.511 BCE], XIV.37)
	A reaction: Plato notes that such people tend to avoid political life (and a left sheltering, as if from a wild storm!), but he thinks they should be dragged into the political arena for the common good. Confucius seems to approve of the avoidance. Plato is right.

24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 3. Conservatism

23393	Confucianism assumes that all good developments have happened, and there is only one Way [Norden on Kongzi (Confucius)]
	Full Idea: The two major limitations of Confucianism are that it assumes that all worthwhile cultural, social and ethical innovation has already occurred, and that it does not recognise the plurality of worthwhile ways of life.
	From: comment on Kongzi (Confucius) (The Analects (Lunyu) [c.511 BCE]) by Bryan van Norden - Intro to Classical Chinese Philosophy 3.III
	A reaction: In modern liberal terms that is about as conservative as it is possible to get. We think of it as the state of mind of an old person who can only long for the way things were when they were young. But 'hold fast to that which is good'!