14 ideas
7914 | To try to be wise all on one's own is folly [Rochefoucauld] |
Full Idea: To try to be wise all on one's own is sheer folly. | |
From: La Rochefoucauld (Maxims [1663], 231) | |
A reaction: I agree strongly with this. There are counter-examples, of whom Spinoza may be the greatest, and Nietzsche thought that philosophy was essentially a solitary business, but most of us are not Spinoza or Nietzsche. |
17266 | Using modal logic, philosophers tried to handle all metaphysics in modal terms [Correia/Schnieder] |
Full Idea: In the heyday of modal logic, philosophers typically tried to account for any metaphysical notions in modal terms. | |
From: Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 2.4) | |
A reaction: Lewisian realism about possible worlds actually gets rid of purely 'modal' terms, but I suppose they include possible worlds in their remark. Annoying for modal logicians to be told they had a 'heyday' - a nice example of the rhetoric of philosophy. |
17263 | Why do rationalists accept Sufficient Reason, when it denies the existence of fundamental facts? [Correia/Schnieder] |
Full Idea: What is most puzzling about the rationalist tradition is the steadfast certainty with which the Principle of Sufficient Reason was often accepted, since it in effect denies that there are fundamental facts. | |
From: Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 2.2) | |
A reaction: A very simple and interesting observation. The principle implies either a circle of reasons, or an infinite regress of reasons. Nothing can be labelled as 'primitive' or 'foundational' or 'given'. The principle is irrational! |
17270 | Is existential dependence by grounding, or do grounding claims arise from existential dependence? [Correia/Schnieder] |
Full Idea: We may take existential dependence to be a relation induced by certain cases of grounding, but one may also think that facts about existential dependence are prior to corresponding ground claims, and in fact ground those claims. | |
From: Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 4.3) | |
A reaction: I would vote for grounding, since dependence seems more abstract, and seems to demand explanation, whereas grounding seems more like a feature of reality, and to resist further intrinsic explanation (on the whole). |
17268 | Grounding is metaphysical and explanation epistemic, so keep them apart [Correia/Schnieder] |
Full Idea: To us it seems advisable to separate the objective notion of grounding, which belongs to the field of metaphysics, from the epistemically loaded notion of explanation. | |
From: Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 4.2) | |
A reaction: Paul Audi is the defender of the opposite view. I'm with Audi. The 'epistemically loaded' pragmatic aspect is just contextual - that we have different interests in different aspects of the grounding on different occasions. |
17267 | The identity of two facts may depend on how 'fine-grained' we think facts are [Correia/Schnieder] |
Full Idea: There is a disagreement on the issue of factual identity, concerning the 'granularity' of facts, the question of how fine-grained they are. | |
From: Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 3.3) | |
A reaction: If they are very fine-grained, then no two descriptions of a supposed fact will capture the same details. If we go broadbrush, facts become fuzzy and less helpful. 'Fact' was never going to be a clear term. |
490 | Everything happens by reason and necessity [Leucippus] |
Full Idea: Nothing happens at random; everything happens out of reason and by necessity. | |
From: Leucippus (fragments/reports [c.435 BCE], B002), quoted by (who?) - where? |
7118 | La Rochefoucauld's idea of disguised self-love implies an unconscious mind [Rochefoucauld, by Sartre] |
Full Idea: La Rochefoucauld is one of the first to have made use of the unconscious without naming it: for him, amour-propre conceals itself in the most diverse disguises. | |
From: report of La Rochefoucauld (Maxims [1663]) by Jean-Paul Sartre - Transcendence of the Ego I (C) | |
A reaction: It seems odd that no one before that ever thought that someone might have hidden motives of which even they themselves were unaware. How about Iago, or Macbeth, or Hamlet? It is a profound change in our view of human nature. |
7912 | Judging by effects, love looks more like hatred than friendship [Rochefoucauld] |
Full Idea: If love be judged by its most visible effects it looks more like hatred than friendship. | |
From: La Rochefoucauld (Maxims [1663], 072) | |
A reaction: Presumably he is thinking of pursuit, possession and jealousy. The remark is plausible if you add the word 'sometimes' to it, but as a universal generalisation it is ridiculous, the product of a society where they competed to exceed in cynicism. |
7915 | Supreme cleverness is knowledge of the real value of things [Rochefoucauld] |
Full Idea: Supreme cleverness is knowledge of the real value of things. | |
From: La Rochefoucauld (Maxims [1663], 244) | |
A reaction: Good. Right at the heart of wisdom is some kind of grasp of right values. It is so complex and subtle that it seems like pure intuition, but I am sure that reason is involved. 'Intelligent' people tend to be better at it. Some justifications can be given. |
7917 | Realising our future misery is a kind of happiness [Rochefoucauld] |
Full Idea: To realise how much misery we have to face is in itself a kind of happiness. | |
From: La Rochefoucauld (Maxims [1663], 570) | |
A reaction: Probably true. Knowing that you have got hold of the truth is a sort of happiness in any area, no matter how grim the truth. However, a happy life could easily be poisoned by brooding on the future. Should the happily married brood on future solitude? |
7913 | Virtue doesn't go far without the support of vanity [Rochefoucauld] |
Full Idea: Virtue would not go far without vanity to bear it company. | |
From: La Rochefoucauld (Maxims [1663], 200) | |
A reaction: Rochefoucauld's cynicism gets a bit tedious, but lovers of virtue must face up to this possibility when they consider what motivates them. At the heart of Aristotle there is a missing question, of what is so good about right-functioning and virtue. |
7916 | True friendship is even rarer than true love [Rochefoucauld] |
Full Idea: Rare though true love may be, true friendship is rarer still. | |
From: La Rochefoucauld (Maxims [1663], 473) | |
A reaction: This seems to be true. Our culture doesn't encourage friendship as a high ideal. Are women better at friendship than men? Which culture, past or present, led to the greatest flourishing of friendship? Epicurus's Garden? |
9299 | We are bored by people to whom we ourselves are boring [Rochefoucauld] |
Full Idea: Almost always we are bored by people to whom we ourselves are boring. | |
From: La Rochefoucauld (Maxims [1663], 555) | |
A reaction: An obvious exception would be a celebrity being bored with their fans. Their very excess of interest is precisely what is boring. If two people communicate well, it is unlikely that either of them will ever be bored. |