253 ideas
| 11300 | Agathon: good [PG] |
| Full Idea: Agathon: good, the highest good | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 01) |
| 11301 | Aisthesis: perception, sensation, consciousness [PG] |
| Full Idea: Aisthesis: perception, sensation, consciousness | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 02) |
| 11302 | Aitia / aition: cause, explanation [PG] |
| Full Idea: Aitia / aition: cause, explanation | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 03) | |
| A reaction: The consensus is that 'explanation' is the better translation, and hence that the famous Four Causes (in 'Physics') must really be understood as the Four Modes of Explanation. They then make far more sense. |
| 11303 | Akrasia: lack of control, weakness of will [PG] |
| Full Idea: Akrasia: lack of control, weakness of will | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 04) | |
| A reaction: The whole Greek debate (and modern debate, I would say) makes much more sense if we stick to 'lack of control' as the translation, and forget about weakness of will - and certainly give up 'incontinence' as a translation. |
| 11304 | Aletheia: truth [PG] |
| Full Idea: Aletheia: truth | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 05) |
| 11305 | Anamnesis: recollection, remembrance [PG] |
| Full Idea: Anamnesis: recollection, remembrance | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 06) | |
| A reaction: This is used for Plato's doctrine that we recollect past lives. |
| 11306 | Ananke: necessity [PG] |
| Full Idea: Ananke: necessity | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 07) |
| 11307 | Antikeimenon: object [PG] |
| Full Idea: Antikeimenon: object | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 08) |
| 11375 | Apatheia: unemotional [PG] |
| Full Idea: Apatheia: lack of involvement, unemotional | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 09) |
| 11308 | Apeiron: the unlimited, indefinite [PG] |
| Full Idea: Apeiron: the unlimited, indefinite | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 10) | |
| A reaction: Key term in the philosophy of Anaximander, the one unknowable underlying element. |
| 11376 | Aphairesis: taking away, abstraction [PG] |
| Full Idea: Aphairesis: taking away, abstraction | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 11) |
| 11309 | Apodeixis: demonstration [PG] |
| Full Idea: Apodeixis: demonstration, proof | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 12) |
| 11310 | Aporia: puzzle, question, anomaly [PG] |
| Full Idea: Aporia: puzzle, question, anomaly | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 13) |
| 11311 | Arche: first principle, the basic [PG] |
| Full Idea: Arché: first principle, the basic | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 14) | |
| A reaction: Interchangeable with 'aitia' by Aristotle. The first principle and the cause are almost identical. |
| 11312 | Arete: virtue, excellence [PG] |
| Full Idea: Areté: virtue, excellence | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 15) | |
| A reaction: The word hovers between moral excellence and being good at what you do. Annas defends the older translation as 'virtue', rather than the modern 'excellence'. |
| 11313 | Chronismos: separation [PG] |
| Full Idea: Chronismos: separation | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 16) |
| 11314 | Diairesis: division [PG] |
| Full Idea: Diairesis: division, distinction | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 17) |
| 11315 | Dialectic: dialectic, discussion [PG] |
| Full Idea: Dialectic: dialectic, discussion | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 18) |
| 11316 | Dianoia: intellection [cf. Noesis] [PG] |
| Full Idea: Dianoia: intellection, understanding [cf. Noesis] | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 21) |
| 11317 | Diaphora: difference [PG] |
| Full Idea: Diaphora: difference | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 22) |
| 11318 | Dikaiosune: moral goodness, justice [PG] |
| Full Idea: Dikaiosune: moral goodness, justice | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 23) | |
| A reaction: Usually translated as 'justice' in 'Republic', but it is a general term of moral approbation, not like the modern political and legal notion of 'justice'. 'Justice' actually seems to be bad translation. |
| 11319 | Doxa: opinion, belief [PG] |
| Full Idea: Doxa: opinion, belief, judgement | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 24) |
| 11320 | Dunamis: faculty, potentiality, capacity [PG] |
| Full Idea: Dunamis: faculty, potentiality, capacity | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 25) |
| 11321 | Eidos: form, idea [PG] |
| Full Idea: Eidos: form, idea | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 26) | |
| A reaction: In Plato it is the word best translated as 'Form' (Theory of...); in Aritotle's 'Categories' it designates the species, and in 'Metaphysics' it ends up naming the structural form of the species (and hence the essence) [Wedin p.120] |
| 11322 | Elenchos: elenchus, interrogation [PG] |
| Full Idea: Elenchos: elenchus, interrogation | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 27) |
| 11323 | Empeiron: experience [PG] |
| Full Idea: Empeiron: experience | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 28) |
| 11324 | Energeia: employment, actuality, power? [PG] |
| Full Idea: Energeia: employment, actuality, power? | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 31) |
| 11325 | Enkrateia: control [PG] |
| Full Idea: Enkrateia: control | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 32) | |
| A reaction: See 'akrasia', of which this is the opposite. The enkratic person is controlled. |
| 11326 | Entelecheia: entelechy, having an end [PG] |
| Full Idea: Entelecheia: entelechy, having an end | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 33) |
| 11327 | Epagoge: induction, explanation [PG] |
| Full Idea: Epagoge: induction, explanation, leading on | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 34) |
| 11328 | Episteme: knowledge, understanding [PG] |
| Full Idea: Episteme: knowledge, understanding | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 35) | |
| A reaction: Note that 'episteme' can form a plural in Greek, but we can't say 'knowledges', so we have to say 'branches of knowledge', or 'sciences'. |
| 11329 | Epithumia: appetite [PG] |
| Full Idea: Epithumia: appetite | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 36) |
| 11330 | Ergon: function [PG] |
| Full Idea: Ergon: function, work | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 37) |
| 11331 | Eristic: polemic, disputation [PG] |
| Full Idea: Eristic: polemic, disputation | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 38) | |
| A reaction: This is confrontational argument, rather than the subtle co-operative dialogue of dialectic. British law courts and the House of Commons are founded on eristic, rather than on dialectic. Could there be a dialectical elected assembly? |
| 11332 | Eros: love [PG] |
| Full Idea: Eros: love, desire | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 41) |
| 11333 | Eudaimonia: flourishing, happiness, fulfilment [PG] |
| Full Idea: Eudaimonia: flourishing, happiness, fulfilment | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 42) | |
| A reaction: Some people defend 'happiness' as the translation, but that seems to me wildly misleading, since eudaimonia is something like life going well, and certainly isn't a psychological state - and definitely not pleasure. |
| 11334 | Genos: type, genus [PG] |
| Full Idea: Genos: type, genus, kind | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 43) |
| 11335 | Hexis: state, habit [PG] |
| Full Idea: Hexis: state, habit | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 44) |
| 11336 | Horismos: definition [PG] |
| Full Idea: Horismos: definition | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 45) |
| 11337 | Hule: matter [PG] |
| Full Idea: Hule: matter | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 46) | |
| A reaction: The first half of the 'hylomorphism' of Aristotle. See 'morphe'! |
| 11338 | Hupokeimenon: subject, underlying thing [cf. Tode ti] [PG] |
| Full Idea: Hupokeimenon: subject, underlying thing, substratum [cf. Tode ti] | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 47) | |
| A reaction: Literally 'that which lies under'. Latin version is 'substratum'. In Aristotle it is the problem, of explaining what lies under. It is not the theory that there is some entity called a 'substratum'. |
| 11339 | Kalos / kalon: beauty, fineness, nobility [PG] |
| Full Idea: Kalos / kalon: beauty, fineness, nobility | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 48) | |
| A reaction: A revealing Greek word, which is not only our rather pure notion of 'beauty', but also seems to mean something like wow!, and (very suggestive, this) applies as much to actions as to objects. |
| 11340 | Kath' hauto: in virtue of itself, essentially [PG] |
| Full Idea: Kath' hauto: in virtue of itself, essentially | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 51) |
| 11341 | Kinesis: movement, process [PG] |
| Full Idea: Kinesis: movement, process, change | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 52) |
| 11342 | Kosmos: order, universe [PG] |
| Full Idea: Kosmos: order, universe | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 53) |
| 11343 | Logos: reason, account, word [PG] |
| Full Idea: Logos: reason, account, word | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 54) |
| 11344 | Meson: the mean [PG] |
| Full Idea: Meson: the mean | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 55) | |
| A reaction: This is not the 'average', and hence not some theoretical mid-point. I would call it the 'appropriate compromise', remembering that an extreme may be appropriate in certain circumstances. |
| 11345 | Metechein: partaking, sharing [PG] |
| Full Idea: Metechein: partaking, sharing | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 56) | |
| A reaction: The key word in Plato for the difficult question of the relationships between the Forms and the particulars. The latter 'partake' of the former. Hm. Compare modern 'instantiation', which strikes me as being equally problematic. |
| 11377 | Mimesis: imitation, fine art [PG] |
| Full Idea: Mimesis: imitation, fine art | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 57) |
| 11346 | Morphe: form [PG] |
| Full Idea: Morphe: form | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 58) |
| 11347 | Noesis: intellection, rational thought [cf. Dianoia] [PG] |
| Full Idea: Noesis: intellection, rational thought [cf. Dianoia] | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 59) |
| 11348 | Nomos: convention, law, custom [PG] |
| Full Idea: Nomos: convention, law, custom | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 61) |
| 11349 | Nous: intuition, intellect, understanding [PG] |
| Full Idea: Nous: intuition, intellect | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 62) | |
| A reaction: There is a condensed discussion of 'nous' in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics B.19 |
| 11350 | Orexis: desire [PG] |
| Full Idea: Orexis: desire | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 63) |
| 11351 | Ousia: substance, (primary) being, [see 'Prote ousia'] [PG] |
| Full Idea: Ousia: substance, (primary) being [see 'Prote ousia'] | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 64) | |
| A reaction: It is based on the verb 'to be'. Latin therefore translated it as 'essentia' (esse: to be), and we have ended up translating it as 'essence', but this is wrong! 'Being' is the best translation, and 'substance' is OK. It is the problem, not the answer. |
| 11352 | Pathos: emotion, affection, property [PG] |
| Full Idea: Pathos: emotion, affection, property | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 65) |
| 11353 | Phantasia: imagination [PG] |
| Full Idea: Phantasia: imagination | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 66) |
| 11354 | Philia: friendship [PG] |
| Full Idea: Philia: friendship | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 67) |
| 11355 | Philosophia: philosophy, love of wisdom [PG] |
| Full Idea: Philosophia: philosophy, love of wisdom | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 68) | |
| A reaction: The point of the word is its claim only to love wisdom, and not actually to be wise. |
| 11356 | Phronesis: prudence, practical reason, common sense [PG] |
| Full Idea: Phronesis: prudence, practical reason, common sense | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 71) | |
| A reaction: None of the experts use my own translation, which is 'common sense', but that seems to me to perfectly fit all of Aristotle's discussions of the word in 'Ethics'. 'Prudence' seems a daft translation in modern English. |
| 11357 | Physis: nature [PG] |
| Full Idea: Physis: nature | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 72) |
| 11358 | Praxis: action, activity [PG] |
| Full Idea: Praxis: action, activity | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 73) |
| 11359 | Prote ousia: primary being [PG] |
| Full Idea: Prote ousia: primary being | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 74) | |
| A reaction: The main topic of investigation in Aristotle's 'Metaphysics'. 'Ousia' is the central problem of the text, NOT the answer to the problem. |
| 11360 | Psuche: mind, soul, life [PG] |
| Full Idea: Psuche: mind, soul, life | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 75) | |
| A reaction: The interesting thing about this is that we have tended to translate it as 'soul', but Aristotle says plants have it, and not merely conscious beings. It is something like the 'form' of a living thing, but then 'form' is a misleading translation too. |
| 11361 | Sophia: wisdom [PG] |
| Full Idea: Sophia: wisdom | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 76) |
| 11362 | Sophrosune: moderation, self-control [PG] |
| Full Idea: Sophrosune: moderation, self-control | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 77) |
| 11363 | Stoicheia: elements [PG] |
| Full Idea: Stoicheia: elements | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 78) |
| 11364 | Sullogismos: deduction, syllogism [PG] |
| Full Idea: Sullogismos: deduction, syllogism | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 81) |
| 11365 | Techne: skill, practical knowledge [PG] |
| Full Idea: Techne: skill, practical knowledge | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 82) |
| 11366 | Telos: purpose, end [PG] |
| Full Idea: Telos: purpose, end | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 83) |
| 11367 | Theoria: contemplation [PG] |
| Full Idea: Theoria: contemplation | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 84) |
| 11368 | Theos: god [PG] |
| Full Idea: Theos: god | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 85) |
| 11369 | Ti esti: what-something-is, essence [PG] |
| Full Idea: Ti esti: the what-something-is, essence, whatness | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 86) |
| 11370 | Timoria: vengeance, punishment [PG] |
| Full Idea: Timoria: vengeance, punishment | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 87) |
| 11371 | To ti en einai: essence, what-it-is-to-be [PG] |
| Full Idea: To ti en einai: essence, what-it-is-to-be | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 88) | |
| A reaction: This is Aristotle's main term for what we would now call the 'essence'. It is still not a theory of essence, merely an identification of the target. 'Form' is the nearest we get to his actual theory. |
| 11372 | To ti estin: essence [PG] |
| Full Idea: To ti estin: essence | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 91) |
| 11373 | Tode ti: this-such, subject of predication [cf. hupokeimenon] [PG] |
| Full Idea: Tode ti: this-something, subject of predication, thisness [cf. hupokeimenon] | |
| From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 92) |
| 11461 | 323 (roughly): Euclid wrote 'Elements', summarising all of geometry [PG] |
| Full Idea: Euclid: In around 323 BCE Euclid wrote his 'Elements', summarising all of known geometry. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030]) |
| 11390 | 1000 (roughly): Upanishads written (in Sanskrit); religious and philosophical texts [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 1000 BCE the Upanishads were written, the most philosophical of ancient Hindu texts | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0001) |
| 11391 | 750 (roughly): the Book of Genesis written by Hebrew writers [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 750 BCE the Book of Genesis was written by an anonymous jewish writer | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0250) |
| 11392 | 586: eclipse of the sun on the coast of modern Turkey was predicted by Thales of Miletus [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 585 BCE there was an eclipse of the sun, which Thales of Miletus is said to have predicted | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0415) |
| 11395 | 570: Anaximander flourished in Miletus [PG] |
| Full Idea: Anaximander: In around 570 BCE the philosopher and astronomer Anaximander flourished in Miletus | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0430) |
| 11396 | 563: the Buddha born in northern India [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 563 BCE Siddhartha Gautama, the Buddha, was born in northern India | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0437) |
| 11398 | 540: Lao Tzu wrote 'Tao Te Ching', the basis of Taoism [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 540 BCE Lao Tzu wrote the 'Tao Te Ching', the basis of Taoism | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0460) |
| 11400 | 529: Pythagoras created his secretive community at Croton in Sicily [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 529 BCE Pythagoras set up a community in Croton, with strict and secret rules and teachings | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0471) |
| 11403 | 500: Heraclitus flourishes at Ephesus, in modern Turkey [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 500 BCE Heraclitus flourished in the city of Ephesus in Ionia | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0500) |
| 11404 | 496: Confucius travels widely, persuading rulers to be more moral [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 496 BCE Confucius began a period of wandering, to persuade rulers to be more moral | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0504) |
| 11408 | 472: Empedocles persuades his city (Acragas in Sicily) to become a democracy [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 472 BCE Empedocles helped his city of Acragas change to democracy | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0528) |
| 11412 | 450 (roughly): Parmenides and Zeno visit Athens from Italy [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 450 BCE Parmenides and Zeno visited the festival in Athens | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0550) |
| 11414 | 445: Protagoras helps write laws for the new colony of Thurii [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 443 BCE Protagoras helped write the laws for the new colony of Thurii | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0557) |
| 11417 | 436 (roughly): Anaxagoras is tried for impiety, and expelled from Athens [PG] |
| Full Idea: In about 436 BCE Anaxagoras was tried on a charge of impiety and expelled from Athens | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0564) |
| 11421 | 427: Gorgias visited Athens as ambassador for Leontini [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 427 BCE Gorgias of Leontini visited Athens as an ambassador for his city | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0573) |
| 11425 | 399: Socrates executed (with Plato absent through ill health) [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 399 BCE Plato was unwell, and was not present at the death of Socrates | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0601) |
| 11432 | 387 (roughly): Plato returned to Athens, and founded the Academy [PG] |
| Full Idea: In about 387 BCE Plato returned to Athens and founded his new school at the Academy | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0613) |
| 11433 | 387 (roughly): Aristippus the Elder founder a hedonist school at Cyrene [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 387 BCE a new school was founded at Cyrene by Aristippus the elder | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0613) |
| 11440 | 367: the teenaged Aristotle came to study at the Academy [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 367 BCE the seventeen-year-old Aristotle came south to study at the Academy | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0633) |
| 11443 | 360 (roughly): Diogenes of Sinope lives in a barrel in central Athens [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 360 BCE Diogenes of Sinope was living in a barrel in the Agora in Athens | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0640) |
| 11445 | 347: death of Plato [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 347 BCE Plato died | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0653) |
| 11454 | 343: Aristotle becomes tutor to 13 year old Alexander (the Great) [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 343 BCE at Stagira Aristotle became personal tutor to the thirteen-year-old Alexander (the Great) | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0657) |
| 11456 | 335: Arisotle founded his school at the Lyceum in Athens [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 335 BCE Aristotle founded the Lyceum in Athens | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0665) |
| 11459 | 330 (roughly): Chuang Tzu wrote his Taoist book [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 330 BCE Chuang Tzu wrote a key work in the Taoist tradition | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0670) |
| 11465 | 322: Aristotle retired to Chalcis, and died there [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 322 BCE Aristotle retired to Chalcis in Euboea, where he died | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0678) |
| 11468 | 307 (roughly): Epicurus founded his school at the Garden in Athens [PG] |
| Full Idea: In about 307 BCE Epicurus founded his school at the Garden in Athens | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0693) |
| 11470 | 301 (roughly): Zeno of Citium founded Stoicism at the Stoa Poikile in Athens [PG] |
| Full Idea: In about 301 BCE the Stoic school was founded by Zeno of Citium in the Stoa Poikile in Athens | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0699) |
| 11483 | 261: Cleanthes replaced Zeno as head of the Stoa [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 261 BCE Cleanthes took over from Zeno as head of the Stoa. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0739) |
| 11486 | 229 (roughly): Chrysippus replaced Cleanthes has head of the Stoa [PG] |
| Full Idea: In about 229 BCE Chrysippus took over from Cleanthes as the head of the Stoic school | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0771) |
| 11492 | 157 (roughly): Carneades became head of the Academy [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 157 BCE Carneades took over as head of the Academy from Hegesinus | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0843) |
| 11509 | 85: most philosophical activity moves to Alexandria [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 85 BCE Athens went into philosophical decline, and leadership moved to Alexandria | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0915) |
| 11513 | 78: Cicero visited the stoic school on Rhodes [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 78 BCE Cicero visited the school of Posidonius in Rhodes. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0922) |
| 11516 | 60 (roughly): Lucretius wrote his Latin poem on epicureanism [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 60 BCE Lucretius wrote his Latin poem on Epicureanism | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0940) |
| 11528 | 65: Seneca forced to commit suicide by Nero [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 65 CE Seneca was forced to commit suicide by the Emperor Nero. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1065) |
| 11531 | 80: the discourses of the stoic Epictetus are written down [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 80 CE the 'Discourses' of the freed slave Epictetus were written down in Rome. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1080) |
| 11535 | 170 (roughly): Marcus Aurelius wrote his private stoic meditations [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 170 CE the Emperor Marcus Aurelius wrote his 'Meditations' for private reading. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1170) |
| 11537 | -200 (roughly): Sextus Empiricus wrote a series of books on scepticism [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 200 CE Sextus Empiricus wrote a series of books (which survive) defending scepticism | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1200) |
| 11541 | 263: Porphyry began to study with Plotinus in Rome [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 263 CE Porphyry joined Plotinus' classes in Rome | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1263) |
| 11545 | 310: Christianity became the official religion of the Roman empire [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 310 CE Christianity became the official religion of the Roman Empire | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1310) |
| 11549 | 387: Ambrose converts Augustine to Christianity [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 387 CE Augustine converted to Christianity in Milan, guided by St Ambrose | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1387) |
| 11555 | 523: Boethius imprisoned at Pavia, and begins to write [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 523 CE Boethius was imprisoned in exile at Pavia, and wrote 'Consolations of Philosophy' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1523) |
| 11557 | 529: the emperor Justinian closes all the philosophy schools in Athens [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 529 CE the Emperor Justinian closed all the philosophy schools in Athens | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1529) |
| 11558 | 622 (roughly): Mohammed writes the Koran [PG] |
| Full Idea: Mohammed: In about 622 CE Muhammed wrote the basic text of Islam, the Koran. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1622) |
| 11559 | 642: Arabs close the philosophy schools in Alexandria [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 642 CE Alexandria was captured by the Arabs, and the philosophy schools were closed | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1642) |
| 11560 | 910 (roughly): Al-Farabi wrote Arabic commentaries on Aristotle [PG] |
| Full Idea: Alfarabi: In around 910 CE Al-Farabi explained and expanded Aristotle for the Islamic world. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1910) |
| 11562 | 1015 (roughly): Ibn Sina (Avicenna) writes a book on Aristotle [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 1015 Avicenna produced his Platonised version of Aristotle in 'The Healing' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2015) |
| 11564 | 1090: Anselm publishes his proof of the existence of God [PG] |
| Full Idea: Anselm: In about 1090 St Anselm of Canterbury publishes his Ontological Proof of God's existence | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2090) |
| 11566 | 1115: Abelard is the chief logic teacher in Paris [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 1115 Abelard became established as the chief logic teacher in Paris | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2115) |
| 11573 | 1166: Ibn Rushd (Averroes) wrote extensive commentaries on Aristotle [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 1166 Averroes (Ibn Rushd), in Seville, wrote extensive commentaries on Aristotle | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2166) |
| 11581 | 1266: Aquinas began writing 'Summa Theologica' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1266 Aquinas began writing his great theological work, the 'Summa Theologica' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2266) |
| 11586 | 1280: after his death, the teaching of Aquinas becomes official Dominican doctrine [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 1280 Aquinas's teaching became the official theology of the Dominican order | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2280) |
| 11591 | 1328: William of Ockham decides the Pope is a heretic, and moves to Munich [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1328 William of Ockham decided the Pope was a heretic, and moved to Munich | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2328) |
| 17916 | 1347: the Church persecutes philosophical heresies [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1347 the Church began extensive persecution of unorthodox philosophical thought | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2347) |
| 11593 | 1470: Marsilio Ficino founds a Platonic Academy in Florence [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 1470 Marsilio Ficino founded a Platonic Academy in Florence | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2470) |
| 11596 | 1513: Machiavelli wrote 'The Prince' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1513 Machiavelli wrote 'The Prince', a tough view of political theory. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2513) |
| 11599 | 1543: Copernicus publishes his heliocentric view of the solar system [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1543 Nicholas Copernicus, a Polish monk, publishes his new theory of the solar system. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2543) |
| 11601 | 1580: Montaigne publishes his essays [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1580 Montaigne published a volume of his 'Essays' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2580) |
| 11607 | 1600: Giordano Bruno was burned at the stake in Rome [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1600 Giordano Bruno was burnt at the stake in Rome, largely for endorsing Copernicus | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2600) |
| 11613 | 1619: Descartes's famous day of meditation inside a stove [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1619 Descartes had a famous day of meditation in a heated stove at Ulm | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2619) |
| 11614 | 1620: Bacon publishes 'Novum Organum' [PG] |
| Full Idea: Francis Bacon: In 1620 Bacon published his 'Novum Organon', urging the rise of experimental science | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2620) |
| 11619 | 1633: Galileo convicted of heresy by the Inquisition [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1633 Galileo was condemned to life emprisonment for contradicting church teachings. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2633) |
| 11623 | 1641: Descartes publishes his 'Meditations' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1641 Descartes published his well-known 'Meditations', complete with Objections and Replies | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2641) |
| 11626 | 1650: death of Descartes, in Stockholm [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1650 Descartes died in Stockholm, after stressful work for Queen Christina | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2650) |
| 11627 | 1651: Hobbes publishes 'Leviathan' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1651 Hobbes published his great work on politics and contract morality, 'Leviathan' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2651) |
| 11633 | 1662: the Port Royal Logic is published [PG] |
| Full Idea: Antoine Arnauld: In 1662 Arnauld and Nicole published their famous text, the 'Port-Royal Logic' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2662) |
| 11634 | 1665: Spinoza writes his 'Ethics' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1665 the first draft of Spinoza's 'Ethics', his major work, was finished, and published posthumously | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2665) |
| 11643 | 1676: Leibniz settled as librarian to the Duke of Brunswick [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1676 Leibniz became librarian to the Duke of Brunswick, staying for the rest of his life | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2676) |
| 11649 | 1687: Newton publishes his 'Principia Mathematica' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1687 Newton published his 'Principia', containing his theory of gravity. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2687) |
| 11652 | 1690: Locke publishes his 'Essay' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1690 Locke published his 'Essay', his major work on empiricism | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2690) |
| 11654 | 1697: Bayle publishes his 'Dictionary' [PG] |
| Full Idea: Pierre Bayle: In about 1697 Pierre Bayle published his 'Historical and Critical Dictionary' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2697) |
| 11659 | 1713: Berkeley publishes his 'Three Dialogues' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1713 Berkeley published a popular account of his empiricist idealism in 'Three Dialogues' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2713) |
| 11666 | 1734: Voltaire publishes his 'Philosophical Letters' [PG] |
| Full Idea: Francois-Marie Voltaire: In 1734 Voltaire's 'Lettres Philosophiques' praised liberalism and empiricism | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2734) |
| 11667 | 1739: Hume publishes his 'Treatise' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1739 Hume returned to Edinburgh and published his 'Treatise', but it sold very few copies | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2739) |
| 11675 | 1762: Rousseau publishes his 'Social Contract' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1762 Rousseau published his 'Social Contract', basing politics on the popular will | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2762) |
| 11682 | 1781: Kant publishes his 'Critique of Pure Reason' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1781 Kant published his first great work, the 'Critique of Pure Reason' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2781) |
| 11683 | 1785: Reid publishes his essays defending common sense [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1785 Thomas Reid, based in Glasgow, published essays defending common sense. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2785) |
| 11687 | 1798: the French Revolution [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1789 the French Revolution gave strong impetus to the anti-rational 'Romantic' movement | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2789) |
| 11694 | 1807: Hegel publishes his 'Phenomenology of Spirit' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1807 Hegel published his first major work, the 'Phenomenology of Spirit' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2807) |
| 11701 | 1818: Schopenhauer publishes his 'World as Will and Idea' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1818 Schopenhauer published 'The World as Will and Idea', his major work | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2818) |
| 11710 | 1840: Kierkegaard is writing extensively in Copenhagen [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 1840 Kierkegaard lived a quiet life as a writer in Copenhagen | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2840) |
| 11713 | 1843: Mill publishes his 'System of Logic' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1843 Mill published his 'System of Logic' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2843) |
| 11715 | 1848: Marx and Engels publis the Communist Manifesto [PG] |
| Full Idea: Karl Marx: In 1848 Marx and Engels published their 'Communist Manifesto' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2848) |
| 11717 | 1859: Darwin publishes his 'Origin of the Species' [PG] |
| Full Idea: Charles Darwin: In 1859 Charles Darwin published his theory of natural selection in 'Origin of the Species'. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2859) |
| 11721 | 1861: Mill publishes 'Utilitarianism' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1861 Mill published his book 'Utilitarianism' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2861) |
| 11724 | 1867: Marx begins publishing 'Das Kapital' [PG] |
| Full Idea: Karl Marx: In 1867 Karl Marx began publishing his political work 'Das Kapital' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2867) |
| 11733 | 1879: Peirce taught for five years at Johns Hopkins University [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1879 Peirce began five years of teaching at Johns Hopkins University | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2879) |
| 17907 | 1879: Frege invents predicate logic [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1879 Frege published his 'Concept Script', which created predicate logic | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2879) |
| 17909 | 1892: Frege's essay 'Sense and Reference' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1892 Frege published his famous essay 'Sense and Reference' (Sinn und Bedeutung) | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2882) |
| 17908 | 1884: Frege publishes his 'Foundations of Arithmetic' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1884 Frege published his 'Foundations of Arithmetic', the beginning of logicism | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2884) |
| 11735 | 1885: Nietzsche completed 'Thus Spake Zarathustra' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In about 1885 Nietzsche completed his book 'Also Sprach Zarathustra' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2885) |
| 17911 | 1888: Dedekind publishes axioms for arithmetic [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1888 Dedekind created simple axioms for arithmetic (the Peano Axioms) | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2888) |
| 11740 | 1890: James published 'Principles of Psychology' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1890 James published his 'Principles of Psychology' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2890) |
| 11742 | 1895 (roughly): Freud developed theories of the unconscious [PG] |
| Full Idea: In around 1895 Sigmund Freud developed his theories of the unconscious mind | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2895) |
| 11745 | 1900: Husserl began developing Phenomenology [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1900 Edmund Husserl began presenting his new philosophy of Phenomenology | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2900) |
| 11746 | 1903: Moore published 'Principia Ethica' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1903 G.E. Moore published his 'Principia Ethica', attacking naturalistic ethics. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2903) |
| 11747 | 1904: Dewey became professor at Columbia University [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1904 Dewey moved to Columbia University in New York. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2904) |
| 17910 | 1908: Zermelo publishes axioms for set theory [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1908 Zermelo published an axiomatisation of the new set theory | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2908) |
| 11752 | 1910: Russell and Whitehead begin publishing 'Principia Mathematica' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1910 Russell began publication of 'Principia Mathematica', with Whitehead | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2910) |
| 11756 | 1912: Russell meets Wittgenstein in Cambridge [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1912 Russell met Wittgenstein at Cambridge | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2912) |
| 11762 | 1921: Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus' published [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1921 Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus' was published | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2921) |
| 11765 | 1927: Heidegger's 'Being and Time' published [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1927 Heidegger's major work, 'Being and Time', was published | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2927) |
| 11768 | 1930: Frank Ramsey dies at 27 [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1930 Frank Ramsey died at the age of 27. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2930) |
| 11770 | 1931: Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems [PG] |
| Full Idea: Kurt Gödel: In 1931 the mathematician Kurt Gödel publishes his Incompleteness Theorems. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2931) |
| 11773 | 1933: Tarski's theory of truth [PG] |
| Full Idea: Alfred Tarski: In 1933 Alfred Tarski wrote a famous paper presenting a semantic theory of truth. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2933) |
| 11783 | 1942: Camus published 'The Myth of Sisyphus' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1942 Camus published 'The Myth of Sisyphus', exploring suicide and the absurd | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2942) |
| 11784 | 1943: Sartre's 'Being and Nothingness' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1943 Jean-Paul Sartre published his major work, 'Being and Nothingness' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2943) |
| 11787 | 1945: Merleau-Ponty's 'Phenomenology of Perception' [PG] |
| Full Idea: Maurice Merleau-Ponty: In 1945 Maurice Merleau-Pont published 'The Phenomenology of Perception' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2945) |
| 17918 | 1947: Carnap published 'Meaning and Necessity' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1947 Carnap published 'Meaning and Necessity' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2947) |
| 11794 | 1950: Quine's essay 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1950 Willard Quine published 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', attacking analytic truth | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2950) |
| 17917 | 1953: Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Investigations' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1953 Wittgenstein's posthumous work 'Philosophical Investigations' is published | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2953) |
| 17919 | 1956: Place proposed mind-brain identity [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1956 U.T. Place proposed that the mind is identical to the brain | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2956) |
| 11804 | 1962: Kuhn's 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1962 Thomas Kuhn's 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions' questioned the authority of science | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2962) |
| 17921 | 1967: Putnam proposed functionalism of the mind [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1967 Putname proposed the functionalist view of the mind | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2967) |
| 11808 | 1971: Rawls's 'A Theory of Justice' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1971 John Rawls published his famous defence of liberalism in 'A Theory of Justice' | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2971) |
| 11810 | 1972: Kripke publishes 'Naming and Necessity' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1972 Saul Kripke's 'Naming and Necessity' revised theories about language and reality | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2972) |
| 11813 | 1975: Singer publishes 'Animal Rights' [PG] |
| Full Idea: Peter Singer: In 1975 Peter Singer's 'Animal Rights' turned the attention of philosophers to applied ethics. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2975) |
| 17920 | 1975: Putnam published his Twin Earth example [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1975 Putnam published 'The Meaning of 'Meaning'', containing his Twin Earth example | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2975) |
| 11820 | 1986: David Lewis publishes 'On the Plurality of Worlds' [PG] |
| Full Idea: In 1986 David Lewis published 'On the Plurality of Worlds', about possible worlds. | |
| From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2986) |
| 15477 | Ontology is highly abstract physics, containing placeholders and exclusions [Martin,CB] |
| Full Idea: Ontology sets out an even more abstract model of how the world is than theoretical physics, a model that has placeholders for scientific results and excluders for tempting confusions. | |
| From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 04.6) | |
| A reaction: Most modern metaphysicians accept this account. The interesting (mildly!) question is whether physicists will accept it. If the metaphysics is really rooted in physics, a metaphysical physicist is better placed than a metaphysician knowing some physics. |
| 4465 | Note that "is" can assert existence, or predication, or identity, or classification [PG] |
| Full Idea: There are four uses of the word "is" in English: as existence ('he is at home'), as predication ('he is tall'), as identity ('he is the man I saw'), and as classification ('he is British'). | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
| A reaction: This seems a nice instance of the sort of point made by analytical philosophy, which can lead to horrible confusion in other breeds of philosophy when it is overlooked. |
| 14018 | Is Sufficient Reason self-refuting (no reason to accept it!), or is it a legitimate explanatory tool? [Bourne] |
| Full Idea: Mackie (1983) dismisses the Principle of Sufficient Reason quickly, arguing that it is self-refuting: there is no sufficient reason to accept it. However, a principle is not invalidated by not applying to itself; it can be a powerful heuristic tool. | |
| From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], 6.VI) | |
| A reaction: If God was entirely rational, and created everything, that would be a sufficient reason to accept the principle. You would never, though, get to the reason why God was entirely rational. Something will always elude the principle. |
| 4686 | Fallacies are errors in reasoning, 'formal' if a clear rule is breached, and 'informal' if more general [PG] |
| Full Idea: Fallacies are errors in reasoning, labelled as 'formal' if a clear rule has been breached, and 'informal' if some less precise error has been made. | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
| A reaction: Presumably there can be a grey area between the two. |
| 7415 | Question-begging assumes the proposition which is being challenged [PG] |
| Full Idea: To beg the question is to take for granted in your argument that very proposition which is being challenged | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
| A reaction: An undoubted fallacy, and a simple failure to engage in the rational enterprise. I suppose one might give a reason for something, under the mistaken apprehension that it didn't beg the question; analysis of logical form is then needed. |
| 7414 | What is true of a set is also true of its members [PG] |
| Full Idea: The fallacy of division is the claim that what is true of a set must therefore be true of its members. | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
| A reaction: Clearly a fallacy, but if you only accept sets which are rational, then there is always a reason why a particular is a member of a set, and you can infer facts about particulars from the nature of the set |
| 6696 | The Ad Hominem Fallacy criticises the speaker rather than the argument [PG] |
| Full Idea: The Ad Hominem Fallacy is to criticise the person proposing an argument rather than the argument itself, as when you say "You would say that", or "Your behaviour contradicts what you just said". | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
| A reaction: Nietzsche is very keen on ad hominem arguments, and cheerfully insults great philosophers, but then he doesn't believe there is such a thing as 'pure argument', and he is a relativist. |
| 15471 | Truth is a relation between a representation ('bearer') and part of the world ('truthmaker') [Martin,CB] |
| Full Idea: Truth is a relation between two things - a representation (the truth 'bearer') and the world or some part of it (the 'truthmaker'). | |
| From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 03.1) | |
| A reaction: That truth is about representations seems to me to be exactly right. That it is about truthmakers is more controversial. There are well known problems with negative truths, general truths, future truths etc. I'm happy with 'facts'. |
| 14008 | The redundancy theory conflates metalinguistic bivalence with object-language excluded middle [Bourne] |
| Full Idea: The problem with the redundancy theory of truth is that it conflates the metalinguistic notion of bivalence with a theorem of the object language, namely the law of excluded middle. | |
| From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], 3.III Pr3) |
| 4687 | Minimal theories of truth avoid ontological commitment to such things as 'facts' or 'reality' [PG] |
| Full Idea: Minimalist theories of truth are those which involve minimum ontological commitment, avoiding references to 'reality' or 'facts' or 'what works', preferring to refer to formal relationships within language. | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
| A reaction: Personally I am suspicious of minimal theories, which seem to be designed by and for anti-realists. They seem too focused on language, when animals can obviously formulate correct propositions. I'm quite happy with the 'facts', even if that is vague. |
| 6516 | Monty Hall Dilemma: do you abandon your preference after Monty eliminates one of the rivals? [PG] |
| Full Idea: The Monty Hall Dilemma: Three boxes, one with a big prize; pick one to open. Monty Hall then opens one of the other two, which is empty. You may, if you wish, switch from your box to the other unopened box. Should you? | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
| A reaction: The other two boxes, as a pair, are more likely contain the prize than your box. Monty Hall has eliminated one of them for you, so you should choose the other one. Your intuition that the two remaining boxes are equal is incorrect! |
| 14010 | All relations between spatio-temporal objects are either spatio-temporal, or causal [Bourne] |
| Full Idea: If there are any genuine relations at all between spatio-temporal objects, then they are all either spatio-temporal or causal. | |
| From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], 3.III Pr4) | |
| A reaction: This sounds too easy, but I have wracked my brains for counterexamples and failed to find any. How about qualitative relations? |
| 14009 | It is a necessary condition for the existence of relations that both of the relata exist [Bourne] |
| Full Idea: It is widely held, and I think correctly so, that a necessary condition for the existence of relations is that both of the relata exist. | |
| From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], 3.III Pr4) | |
| A reaction: This is either trivial or false. Relations in the actual world self-evidently relate components of it. But I seem able to revere Sherlock Holmes, and speculate about relations between possible entities. |
| 15484 | A property is a combination of a disposition and a quality [Martin,CB] |
| Full Idea: I take properties to have a dual nature; in virtue of possessing a property, an object possesses both a particular dispositionality and a particular qualitative character. | |
| From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 04.6) | |
| A reaction: That leaves you with the question of the relationship between the disposition and the quality. I say you must choose, and I choose the disposition. Qualities (which are partly subjective, obviously) arise from fundamental dispositions. |
| 15478 | Properties are the respects in which objects resemble, which places them in classes [Martin,CB] |
| Full Idea: If objects belong to classes in virtue of resemblances they bear to one another, they resemble one another in virtue of their properties. Objects resemble in some way or respect, and you could think of these ways or respects as 'properties'. | |
| From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 04.6) | |
| A reaction: If you pare the universe down to one object with five distinct properties, they resemble nothing, and fail this definition. Resemblance seems like the epistemology, not the ontology. |
| 15483 | Properties are ways particular things are, and so they are tied to the identity of their possessor [Martin,CB] |
| Full Idea: The redness or sphericity of this tomato cannot migrate to another tomato. This is a consequence of the idea that properties are particular ways things are. The identity of a property is bound up with the identity of its possessor. | |
| From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 04.6) | |
| A reaction: This is part of his declaration that he believes in tropes. At the very least, properties can be thought of separately, and have second-order properties that don't seem tied to the particulars. |
| 15480 | Objects are not bundles of tropes (which are ways things are, not parts of things) [Martin,CB] |
| Full Idea: The bundle theory for tropes treats properties inappositely as parts of objects. Objects can have parts, but an object's properties are not its parts, they are particular ways the object is. | |
| From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 04.6) | |
| A reaction: The 'way an object is' seems a very vague concept. Most things that get labelled as tropes are actually highly complex. Without mention of causal powers I think these discussions drift in a muddle. |
| 15489 | A property that cannot interact is worse than inert - it isn't there at all [Martin,CB] |
| Full Idea: A property that is intrinsically incapable of affecting or being affected by anything else, actual or possible, is not merely a case of inertness - it amounts to a no-thing. | |
| From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 06.6) | |
| A reaction: In the end Martin rejects Shoemaker's purely causal account of properties, but he clearly understands Shoemaker's point well. |
| 15487 | If unmanifested partnerless dispositions are still real, and are not just qualities, they can explain properties [Martin,CB] |
| Full Idea: Given a realist view of dispositions as fully actual, even without manifestations or partners, a purely dispositional account of properties has a degree of plausibility, which is enhanced because properties lack purely qualitative characterisations. | |
| From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 06.4) | |
| A reaction: In the end Martin opts for a mixed account, as in Idea 15484, but he gives reasons here for the view which I favour. If he concedes that dispositions may exist without manifestation, they must surely lack qualities. Are they not properties, then? |
| 15479 | Properties endow a ball with qualities, and with powers or dispositions [Martin,CB] |
| Full Idea: Each property endows a ball with a distinctive qualitative character and a distinctive range of powers or dispositionalities. | |
| From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 04.6) | |
| A reaction: I think this is the wrong way round. Do properties support powers, or powers support properties? I favour the latter. Properties are much vaguer than powers. Powers generate the required causation and activity. |
| 15488 | Qualities and dispositions are aspects of properties - what it exhibits, and what it does [Martin,CB] |
| Full Idea: For any intrinsic and irreducible property, what is qualitative and what is dispositional are one and the same property considered as what that property exhibits of its nature and what that property is directive and selective for in its manifestation. | |
| From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 06.6) | |
| A reaction: This is supposed to support qualities and dispositions as equal partners, but I don't see how 'what a property exhibits' can have any role in fundamental ontology. What it exhibits may be very misleading about its nature. |
| 15469 | Dispositions in action can be destroyed, be recovered, or remain unchanged [Martin,CB] |
| Full Idea: Three forms of dispositionality are illustrated by explosives (which are destroyed by manifestation), being soluble (where the dispositions is lost but recoverable), and being stable (where the disposition is unchanged). | |
| From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 02.7) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] Presumably the explosives could be recovered after the explosion, since the original elements are still there, but it would take a while. The retina remains stable by continually changing. There are no simple distinctions! |
| 15467 | Powers depend on circumstances, so can't be given a conditional analysis [Martin,CB] |
| Full Idea: Nobody believes, or ought to believe, that manifestations of powers follow upon the single event mentioned in the antecedent of the conditional independently of the circumstances. | |
| From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 02.4) | |
| A reaction: Another way of putting it would be that the behaviour of powers is more ceteris paribus than law. |
| 15466 | 'The wire is live' can't be analysed as a conditional, because a wire can change its powers [Martin,CB] |
| Full Idea: According to the conditional analysis of 'the wire is live', if the wire is touched then it gives off electricity. What ultimately defeats this analysis is the acknowledged possibility of objects gaining or losing powers. | |
| From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 02.3) | |
| A reaction: He offers his 'electro-fink' as a counterexample, where touching the wire changes its disposition. The conditional analysis is simple and clearcut, but dispositions in reality are complex and unstable. |
| 15476 | Structural properties involve dispositionality, so cannot be used to explain it [Martin,CB] |
| Full Idea: I take it as obvious that any structural property involves dispositionality and, therefore, cannot be used to 'explain' dispositionality. | |
| From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 04.3) | |
| A reaction: I think this is the right way round. The so-called 'categorical' properties seem to be close in nature to the 'structural' properties. |
| 15465 | Structures don't explain dispositions, because they consist of dispositions [Martin,CB] |
| Full Idea: It is self-defeating to try to explain dispositionality in terms of structural states because structural states are themselves dispositional. | |
| From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 01.2) | |
| A reaction: No doubt structures have dispositions, but are they entirely dispositional? Might there be 'emergent' dispositions which can only be explained by the structure itself, rather than by the dispositions that make up the structure? |
| 15481 | I favour the idea of a substratum for properties; spacetime seems to be just a bearer of properties [Martin,CB] |
| Full Idea: I favour the old idea of substratum: the haver of properties not itself had as a property. Space-time might itself be the bearer of properties, not itself borne as a property. | |
| From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 04.6) | |
| A reaction: A very nice idea. The choice is between saying either that fundamentals like space-time and physical fields are the propertyless bearers of properties, or that they purely consist of properties (so properties are fundamental, not substrata). |
| 15474 | Properly understood, wholes do no more causal work than their parts [Martin,CB] |
| Full Idea: There is no causal work for the whole that is not done by the parts, provided the complex role of the parts is fully appreciated. | |
| From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 04.1) | |
| A reaction: It seems like a truth that because some parts are doing particular causal work (e.g. glue), the whole can acquire causal powers that the mereological sum of parts lacks. |
| 15486 | Only abstract things can have specific and full identity specifications [Martin,CB] |
| Full Idea: Abstract entities (as nonspatiotemporal) seem to be the only candidates for specific and full identity specifications. | |
| From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 05.2 n1) | |
| A reaction: Martin says that only the 'mad logician' seeks such specifications elsewhere. Some people like persons to have perfect identity. God is a popular candidate too. Can objects have perfect 'macroscopic' identity? |
| 15475 | The concept of 'identity' must allow for some changes in properties or parts [Martin,CB] |
| Full Idea: We must avoid a use of 'identity' that implies that any entity over time must be said to lack continuing identity simply because it has changed properties or has lost, added, or had substituted some parts. | |
| From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 04.3) | |
| A reaction: This may the key area where the logical-mathematical type of philosophy comes into contact with the natural-metaphysical type. Imagine Martin's concept of 'identity' in mathematics. π changes to 3.1387... during the calculation! |
| 24054 | Everything has a probability, something will happen, and probabilities add up [PG] |
| Full Idea: The three Kolgorov axioms of probability: the probability of an event is a non-negative real number; it is certain that one of the 'elementary events' will occur; and the unity of probabilities is the sum of probability of parts ('additivity'). | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
| A reaction: [My attempt to verbalise them; they are normally expressed in terms of set theory]. Got this from a talk handout, and Wikipedia. |
| 15472 | It is pointless to say possible worlds are truthmakers, and then deny that possible worlds exist [Martin,CB] |
| Full Idea: To claim that the truthmaker for a counterfactual, for example, is a set of possible worlds, but to deny that these worlds really exist, seems pointless. | |
| From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 03.3) | |
| A reaction: Lewis therefore argues that they do exist. Martin argues that possible worlds are not truthmakers. He rests his account of modality on dispositions. I prefer Martin. |
| 3875 | If reality is just what we perceive, we would have no need for a sixth sense [PG] |
| Full Idea: Reality must be more than merely what we perceive, because a sixth sense would enhance our current knowledge, and a seventh, and so on. | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) |
| 3876 | If my team is losing 3-1, I have synthetic a priori knowledge that they need two goals for a draw [PG] |
| Full Idea: If my football team is losing 3-1, I seem to have synthetic a priori knowledge that they need two goals to achieve a draw | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) |
| 15492 | Explanations are mind-dependent, theory-laden, and interest-relative [Martin,CB] |
| Full Idea: Explanations are mind-dependent, theory-laden, and interest-relative. | |
| From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 10.2) | |
| A reaction: I don't think you can rule out the 'real' explanation, as the one dominant causal predecessor, such as the earthquake producing a tsunami. |
| 15495 | Analogy works, as when we eat food which others seem to be relishing [Martin,CB] |
| Full Idea: The long-derided way of analogy works! Otherwise why, when someone else is relishing a food we have not tried, is it reasonable for us to try it ourselves? | |
| From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 12.2) | |
| A reaction: Why wouldn't we rush to eat something an animal was relishing? Nice idea. |
| 15493 | Memory requires abstraction, as reminders of what cannot be fully remembered [Martin,CB] |
| Full Idea: Selectivity and abstraction are required for the development of memory, because reminders and promptings are rarely replicas of what is being remembered. | |
| From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 10.3) | |
| A reaction: I take the key idea of mental life to be that of a 'label'. This need not be verbal, so 'conceptual label'. It could be an image, as on a road sign. Labelling is the most indispensable aspect of thought. We label objects, parts, properties and groups. |
| 7734 | Maybe a mollusc's brain events for pain ARE of the same type (broadly) as a human's [PG] |
| Full Idea: To defend type-type identity against the multiple realisability objection, we might say that a molluscs's brain events that register pain ARE of the same type as humans, given that being 'of the same type' is a fairly flexible concept. | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
| A reaction: But this reduces 'of the same type' to such vagueness that it may become vacuous. You would be left with token-token identity, where the mental event is just identical to some brain event, with its 'type' being irrelevant. |
| 7735 | Maybe a frog's brain events for fear are functionally like ours, but not phenomenally [PG] |
| Full Idea: To defend type-type identity against the multiple realisability objection, we might (also) say that while a frog's brain events for fear are functionally identical to a human's (it runs away), that doesn't mean they are phenomenally identical. | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
| A reaction: I take this to be the key reply to the multiple realisability problem. If a frog flees from a loud noise, it is 'frightened' in a functional sense, but that still leaves the question 'What's it like to be a frightened frog?', which may differ from humans. |
| 3877 | Utilitarianism seems to justify the discreet murder of unhappy people [PG] |
| Full Idea: If I discreetly murdered a gloomy and solitary tramp who was upsetting people in my village, if is hard to see how utilitarianism could demonstrate that I had done something wrong. | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) |
| 15485 | Instead of a cause followed by an effect, we have dispositions in reciprocal manifestation [Martin,CB] |
| Full Idea: The two-event cause-and-effect view is easily avoided and replaced by the view of mutual manifestations of reciprocal disposition partners, suggesting a natural contemporaneity. | |
| From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 05.1) | |
| A reaction: This view, which I find much more congenial than the traditional one, is explored in the ideas of Mumford and Anjum. |
| 15491 | Causation should be explained in terms of dispositions and manifestations [Martin,CB] |
| Full Idea: Disposition and manifestation are the basic categories by means of which cause and effect are to be explained. | |
| From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 07.8) | |
| A reaction: 'Manifestation' sounds a bit subjective. The manifestation evident to us may not indicate what is really going on below the surface. I like his basic picture. |
| 15468 | Causal counterfactuals are just clumsy linguistic attempts to indicate dispositions [Martin,CB] |
| Full Idea: 'Causal' counterfactuals have a place, of course, but only as clumsy and inexact linguistic gestures to dispositions, and they should be kept in that place. | |
| From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 02.6) | |
| A reaction: Counterfactuals only seem to give a regularity account of causation, by correlating an effect with a minimal context which will give rise to it. Surely dispositions run deeper than that? |
| 15470 | Causal laws are summaries of powers [Martin,CB] |
| Full Idea: Causal laws are summaries of what entities are capable and incapable of. | |
| From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 02.8) | |
| A reaction: That's a pretty good formulation. Personally I favour a Humean analysis, perhaps along Lewis's lines, but on a basis of real powers. This remark of Martin's has got me rethinking. |
| 14016 | The idea of simultaneity in Special Relativity is full of verificationist assumptions [Bourne] |
| Full Idea: Special Relativity, with its definition of simultaneity, is shot through with verificationist assumptions. | |
| From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], 6.IIc) | |
| A reaction: [He credits Sklar with this] I love hearing such points made, because all my instincts have rebelled against Einstein's story, even after I have been repeatedly told how stupid I am, and how I should study more maths etc. |
| 14019 | Relativity denies simultaneity, so it needs past, present and future (unlike Presentism) [Bourne] |
| Full Idea: Special Relativity denies absolute simultaneity, and therefore requires a past and a future, as well as a present. The Presentist, however, only requires the present. | |
| From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], 6.VII) | |
| A reaction: It is nice to accuse Relativity of ontological extravagence. When it 'requires' past and future, that may not be a massive commitment, since the whole theory is fairly operationalist, according to Putnam. |
| 15482 | We can't think of space-time as empty and propertyless, and it seems to be a substratum [Martin,CB] |
| Full Idea: It makes no sense in ontology or modern physics to think of space-time as empty and propertyless. Space-time nicely fulfils the condition of a substratum. | |
| From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 04.6) | |
| A reaction: At the very least, space-time seems to be 'curved', so it had better be something. Time has properties like being transitive. Space-time (or fields) might be a pure bundle of properties (the only pure bundle?), rather than a substratum. |
| 14013 | Special Relativity allows an absolute past, future, elsewhere and simultaneity [Bourne] |
| Full Idea: There is in special relativity a notion of 'absolute past', and of 'absolute future', and of 'absolute elsewhere', and of 'absolute simultaneity' (of events occurring at their space-time conjunction). | |
| From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], 5.III) | |
| A reaction: [My summary of his paragraph] I am inclined to agree with Bourne that there is enough here to build some sort of notion of 'present' that will support the doctrine of Presentism. |
| 14015 | No-Futurists believe in past and present, but not future, and say the world grows as facts increase [Bourne] |
| Full Idea: 'No-Futurists' believe in the real existence of the past and present but not the future, and hold that the world grows as more and more facts come into existence. | |
| From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], 6.IIb) | |
| A reaction: [He cites Broad 1923 and Tooley 1997] My sympathies are with Presentism, but there seems not denying that past events fix truths in a way that future events don't. The unchangeability of past events seems to make them factual. |
| 14007 | How can presentists talk of 'earlier than', and distinguish past from future? [Bourne] |
| Full Idea: Presentists have a difficulty with how they can help themselves to the notion of 'earlier than' without having to invoke real relata, and how presentism can distinguish the past from the future. | |
| From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], 2.IV) | |
| A reaction: The obvious response is to infer the past from the present (fossils), and infer the future from the present (ticking bomb). But what is it that is being inferred, if the past and future are denied a priori? Tricky! |
| 14011 | Presentism seems to deny causation, because the cause and the effect can never coexist [Bourne] |
| Full Idea: It seems that presentism cannot accommodate causation at all. In a true instance of 'c causes e', it seems to follow that both c and e exist, and it is widely accepted that c is earlier than e. But for presentists that means c and e can't coexist. | |
| From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], 4) | |
| A reaction: A nice problem. Obviously if the flying ball smashed the window, we are left with only the effect existing - otherwise we could intercept the ball and prevent the disaster. To say this cause and this effect coexist would be even dafter than the problem. |
| 14017 | Since presentists treat the presentness of events as basic, simultaneity should be define by that means [Bourne] |
| Full Idea: Since for presentism there is an ontologically significant and basic sense in which events are present, we should expect a definition of simultaneity in terms of presentness, rather than the other way round. | |
| From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], 6.IV) | |
| A reaction: Love it. I don't see how you can even articulate questions about simultaneity if you don't already have a notion of presentness. What are the relata you are enquiring about? |
| 14003 | Time is tensed or tenseless; the latter says all times and objects are real, and there is no passage of time [Bourne] |
| Full Idea: Theories of time are in two broad categories, the tenseless and the tensed theories. In tenseless theories, all times are equally real, as are all objects located at them, and there is no passage of time from future to present to past. It's the B-series. | |
| From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], Intro IIa) | |
| A reaction: It might solve a few of the problems, but is highly counterintuitive. Presumably it makes the passage of time an illusion, and gives no account of how events 'happen', or of their direction, and it leaves causation out on a limb. I'm afraid not. |
| 14005 | B-series objects relate to each other; A-series objects relate to the present [Bourne] |
| Full Idea: Objects in the B-series are earlier than, later than, or simultaneous with each other, whereas objects in the A-series are earlier than, later than or simultaneous with the present. | |
| From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], Intro IIb) | |
| A reaction: Must we choose? Two past events relate to each other, but there is a further relation when 'now' falls between the events. If I must choose, I suppose I go for the A-series view. The B-series is a subsequent feat of imagination. McTaggart agreed. |
| 14006 | Time flows, past is fixed, future is open, future is feared but not past, we remember past, we plan future [Bourne] |
| Full Idea: We say that time 'flows', that the past is 'fixed' but the future is 'open'; we only dread the future, but not the past; we remember the past but not the future; we plan for the future but not the past. | |
| From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], Intro III) | |
| A reaction: These seem pretty overwhelming reasons for accepting an asymmetry between the past and the future. If you reject that, you seem to be mired in a multitude of contradictions. Your error theory is going to be massive. |
| 6126 | Life is Movement, Respiration, Sensation, Nutrition, Excretion, Reproduction, Growth (MRS NERG) [PG] |
| Full Idea: The biologists' acronym for the necessary conditions of life is MRS NERG: that is, Movement, Respiration, Sensation, Nutrition, Excretion, Reproduction, Growth. | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) | |
| A reaction: How strictly necessary are each of these is a point for discussion. A notorious problem case is fire, which (at a stretch) may pass all seven tests. |
| 3873 | An omniscient being couldn't know it was omniscient, as that requires information from beyond its scope of knowledge [PG] |
| Full Idea: God seems to be in the paradoxical situation that He may be omniscient, but can never know that He is, because that involves knowing that there is nothing outside his scope of knowledge (e.g. another God) | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) |
| 3874 | How could God know there wasn't an unknown force controlling his 'free' will? [PG] |
| Full Idea: How could God be certain that he has free will (if He has), if He couldn't be sure that there wasn't an unknown force controlling his will? | |
| From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031]) |