58 ideas
14018 | Is Sufficient Reason self-refuting (no reason to accept it!), or is it a legitimate explanatory tool? [Bourne] |
Full Idea: Mackie (1983) dismisses the Principle of Sufficient Reason quickly, arguing that it is self-refuting: there is no sufficient reason to accept it. However, a principle is not invalidated by not applying to itself; it can be a powerful heuristic tool. | |
From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], 6.VI) | |
A reaction: If God was entirely rational, and created everything, that would be a sufficient reason to accept the principle. You would never, though, get to the reason why God was entirely rational. Something will always elude the principle. |
18877 | Moral realism doesn't seem to entail the existence of any things [Cameron] |
Full Idea: Moral realism isn't realism about things, and it seems strange to suggest that moral realism is existence entailing in the way that realism about unobservable is. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Realism') | |
A reaction: Cameron is questioning whether a realist has to believe in truthmakers. It seems to me that his doubts are because he insists that truthmaking is committed to the existence of 'things'. I assume any moral realism must supervene on nature. |
18868 | Surely if some propositions are grounded in existence, they all are? [Cameron] |
Full Idea: What possible reason could one have for thinking of some propositions that they need to be grounded in what there is that doesn't apply to all propositions? | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Max and Nec') | |
A reaction: Well, if truthmaking said that all truths are grounded, then some could be grounded in what there is, and others in how it is, or maybe even how it isn't (if you get a decent account of negative truths). |
18928 | If maximalism is necessary, then that nothing exists has a truthmaker, which it can't have [Cameron] |
Full Idea: I think truthmaker theory is contingently true. [n24] If there could have been nothing, what makes that true? But if truthmaker maximalism is a necessary truth, there's necessarily something. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmaking for Presentists [2011], 4 n24) | |
A reaction: Truthmaking is beginning to feel like Gödel's Theorems. You can 'make' lots and lots of truths ('prove' in Gödel), but there will be truths that elude the making. Truthmaker theory itself will be one example. So is Maximalism another one? |
18867 | Orthodox Truthmaker applies to all propositions, and necessitates their truth [Cameron] |
Full Idea: Orthodox truthmaker theory (Armstrong's) entails Maximalism (that every true proposition has at least one truthmaker), and Necessitarianism (that the existence of a truthmaker necessitates the truth of its proposition). | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Max and Nec') | |
A reaction: I think I accept both of these. If you say only some truths have truthmakers, the other truths are then baffling. And how could a truthmaker fail in its job? But that doesn't necessitate the existence of the proposition. |
18873 | God fixes all the truths of the world by fixing what exists [Cameron] |
Full Idea: The truthmaker thought is that explanation only bottoms out at existence facts; for God to give a complete plan of the world He needs only make an inventory of what is to exist. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Max and Nec') | |
A reaction: He is defending Necessitarianism about truthmaking. I'm struggling with this. An inventory of the contents of my house doesn't begin to fix all the truths that arise from them. Why is Cameron so resistent to 'how' things are being part of the truthmaking? |
15395 | Give up objects necessitating truths, and say their natures cause the truths? [Cameron] |
Full Idea: We could abandon the view that truthmakers necessitate the truth of that which makes them true, and say that an object makes a truth when its intrinsic nature suffices for that truth. The object would have a different intrinsic nature if the truth failed. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties [2009], 'Truthmakers') | |
A reaction: [He cites Josh Parsons 1999, 2005 for this] This approach seems closely related to Kit Fine's proposal that necessities arise from the natures of things. It sounds to me as if an object with that intrinsic nature would necessitate that truth. |
18931 | Determinate truths don't need extra truthmakers, just truthmakers that are themselves determinate [Cameron] |
Full Idea: I reject saying there must be an additional truthmaker for 'Determinately, p': rather, I say that the truthmaker for p must simply be a determinate existent rather than a mere existent. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmaking for Presentists [2011], 6) | |
A reaction: As he puts it (quite persuasively), God doesn't need to add an extra truthmaker for a determinate truth. Cameron rejects Necessitarianism. He uses 'determinate' fairly uncritically. What makes the truth of the truthmaker's determinacy? |
18879 | What the proposition says may not be its truthmaker [Cameron] |
Full Idea: The explanation of the truth of the proposition [p] doesn't stop at it being the case that p, so it's false to claim that whenever a proposition is true it's true in virtue of the world being as the proposition says it is. The features often lie deeper. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Grounding') | |
A reaction: [He is opposing Jennifer Hornsby 2005] Cameron offers 'the average family has 2.4 children' as a counterexample' (since no one actually has 2.4 children). That seems compelling. Second example: 'the rose is beautiful'. |
18880 | Rather than what exists, some claim that the truthmakers are ways of existence, dispositions, modalities etc [Cameron] |
Full Idea: Rivals to the truthmaker claim that facts about what there is are the truthmakers, there are theories that add facts about how the things are, or add dispositional facts, or modal facts, or haecceitistic facts, or maybe moral facts. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Grounding') | |
A reaction: [compressed] He seems to think his version has a monopoly on truthmaking, but I don't see why these other theories shouldn't count as truthmaking. The truthmaker for 'live grenades are dangerous' is not just the existence of grenades. |
18874 | Truthmaking doesn't require realism, because we can be anti-realist about truthmakers [Cameron] |
Full Idea: It's definitely not sufficient to be a realist that one be a truthmaker theorist, since one can simply be anti-realist about the truthmakers. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Realism') | |
A reaction: It is not quite clear how unreal truth makers could actually MAKE propositions true, rather than just being correlated with them. |
18932 | The facts about the existence of truthmakers can't have a further explanation [Cameron] |
Full Idea: The orthodox truthmaker theorist thinks the facts concerning the existence of the truthmakers do not admit of further explanation. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmaking for Presentists [2011], 6) | |
A reaction: It is fairly obvious, I suppose, that not every truth can have a truthmaker, just as the verification principle could not be verified, and you can't perceive your perception in order to check it. Could God withdraw the power of truthmaking? |
15394 | Truthmaker requires a commitment to tropes or states of affairs, for contingent truths [Cameron] |
Full Idea: The most popular view is that an object is a truthmaker if the object couldn't exist and the truth be false. But contingent predications are also held to need truthmakers. Socrates is not necessarily snub-nosed, so a trope or state of affairs is needed. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties [2009], 'Truthmakers') | |
A reaction: Cameron calls this 'some heavy ontological commitments'. If snub-nosedness is necessitated by the trope of 'being snub-nosed', what is the truthmaker for Socrates having that trope? |
18869 | Without truthmakers, negative truths must be ungrounded [Cameron] |
Full Idea: If negative truths don't have truthmakers then make no mistake: they are ungrounded. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Max and Nec') | |
A reaction: What would be the grounding for truths which expressed the necessary preconditions for all existence? Could 'nothing whatever exists' ever be a truth? |
18923 | The present property 'having been F' says nothing about a thing's intrinsic nature [Cameron] |
Full Idea: The property 'being such as to have been a child' is suspicious because it points beyond its instances in the sense that a thing's presently having that property tells us nothing about the present intrinsic nature of the thing. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmaking for Presentists [2011], 2) | |
A reaction: This is his objection to what he calls the 'Lucretian' strategy, which tries to make history into a property of present reality. That is implausible, I think, because there is no test for the property, apart from knowledge of the past. Reality is tensed? |
18926 | One temporal distibution property grounds our present and past truths [Cameron] |
Full Idea: Temporal distributional properties are fundamental - it is exactly the same property that is grounding the truth about how the bearer now is that is grounding truths about how the bearer was. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmaking for Presentists [2011], 4) | |
A reaction: Some kind of slight of hand is going on here, though he does a nice job of confronting all possible objections. This is the sort of metaphysics you come up with when you stake everything on the dubious notion of a 'property'. |
18929 | We don't want present truthmakers for the past, if they are about to cease to exist! [Cameron] |
Full Idea: Whilst not logically inconsistent, it would be bad if it could now be true that ten years ago there was a sea battle, but that five years ago it wasn't true that five years before that there was a sea battle. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmaking for Presentists [2011], 4) | |
A reaction: Nicely makes the point that you can't let the past rely on truthmakers in the present, if those truthmakers are about to go out of existence. So you need a sustained truthmaker, without giving up presentism. Enter 'temporally distributed properties'? |
18871 | I support the correspondence theory because I believe in truthmakers [Cameron] |
Full Idea: I tend to think that the fundamental reason we can have the correspondence theory of truth is that truthmaker theory is correct. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Max and Nec') | |
A reaction: [This responds to Fumerton 2006, who gives the opposite view] Cameron gives himself the classic problem of spelling out the correspondence relation (perhaps as 'congruence'). I like truthmaking, but I'm unsure about correspondence. |
18870 | Maybe truthmaking and correspondence stand together, and are interdefinable [Cameron] |
Full Idea: One view says truthmaker theory stands or falls with the correspondence theory of truth, because the truthmaker for p is just the portion of reality that p corresponds to: truthmaker and correspondence can be conversely defined. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Max and Nec') | |
A reaction: The normal view, which I prefer, is that correspondence is a particular theory of truthmaking, invoking a precise 'correspondence' relation. Hence abolishing correspondence would not abolish truthmaking, if you had a rival account. |
14008 | The redundancy theory conflates metalinguistic bivalence with object-language excluded middle [Bourne] |
Full Idea: The problem with the redundancy theory of truth is that it conflates the metalinguistic notion of bivalence with a theorem of the object language, namely the law of excluded middle. | |
From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], 3.III Pr3) |
15102 | S4 says there must be some necessary truths (the actual ones, of which there is at least one) [Cameron] |
Full Idea: S4 says there must be some necessary truths, because the actual necessary truths must be necessary. (It says if there are some actual necessary truths then that is so - but the S4 axiom is an actual necessary truth, if true). | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (On the Source of Necessity [2010], 2) |
18881 | For realists it is analytic that truths are grounded in the world [Cameron] |
Full Idea: The analytic commitment of realism is that truths are grounded in the world. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Grounding') | |
A reaction: Certain fifth-level truths might be a long way from the actual world, and deeply interfused with human concepts and theories. Negative truths must be fitted into this picture. |
18875 | Realism says a discourse is true or false, and some of it is true [Cameron] |
Full Idea: Realism about a discourse is 1) to think that the sentences are, when construed literally, literally true or false, and 2) to think that some of the sentences of the discourse are non-vacuously true. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Realism') | |
A reaction: [Cameron adds 'non-vacuously' to an idea of Sayre-McCord 199 p.5] This is realism based on what is 'true', without specifying 'commitments', so I like it. Cameron says it makes mathematical postulationists into realists. He likes 'mind-independent'. |
18878 | Realism says truths rest on mind-independent reality; truthmaking theories are about which features [Cameron] |
Full Idea: All that is necessary for realism, I claim, is that truth is grounded in mind-independent features of fundamental reality. Truthmaker theory comes into play because it is a theory about what those features are (…so it isn't a commitment to realism). | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Realism') | |
A reaction: [He cites Michael Devitt for this approach] What is the word 'fundamental' doing here? Because the mind-dependent parts of reality are considered non-fundamental? The no-true-Scotsman-hates-whisky move? His truthmaking is committed to 'things'. |
14010 | All relations between spatio-temporal objects are either spatio-temporal, or causal [Bourne] |
Full Idea: If there are any genuine relations at all between spatio-temporal objects, then they are all either spatio-temporal or causal. | |
From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], 3.III Pr4) | |
A reaction: This sounds too easy, but I have wracked my brains for counterexamples and failed to find any. How about qualitative relations? |
14009 | It is a necessary condition for the existence of relations that both of the relata exist [Bourne] |
Full Idea: It is widely held, and I think correctly so, that a necessary condition for the existence of relations is that both of the relata exist. | |
From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], 3.III Pr4) | |
A reaction: This is either trivial or false. Relations in the actual world self-evidently relate components of it. But I seem able to revere Sherlock Holmes, and speculate about relations between possible entities. |
18924 | Being polka-dotted is a 'spatial distribution' property [Cameron] |
Full Idea: Spatial distribution properties say how things are across a region of space, such as being polka-dotted. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmaking for Presentists [2011], 3) | |
A reaction: I think the routine fallacy of inferring properties from predicates is buried here. We truthfully describe it as 'polka-dotted', but that doesn't mean we must reify polka-dottedness, and see it as a feature of the world. What is a 'jumbled' space? |
15401 | Essentialists say intrinsic properties arise from what the thing is, irrespective of surroundings [Cameron] |
Full Idea: The essentialist approach would be to say that an intrinsic property is one such that it is no part of what it is to instantiate that property that the bearer stands in some relation to its surroundings. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties [2009], 'Analysis') | |
A reaction: This is offered as an alternative to the David Lewis account in terms of duplicates across possible worlds. You will have gathered by now, if you have spent days poring over my stuff, that I favour the essentialist approach. |
15393 | An object's intrinsic properties are had in virtue of how it is, independently [Cameron] |
Full Idea: Intrinsic properties are those that an object has solely in virtue of how it is, independently of its surroundings. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties [2009], 'Intro') | |
A reaction: Better not mention quantum mechanics and fields if you want to talk of objects being independent of their surroundings. Am I 'independent' of gravity, or is gravity 'independent' of me? |
15396 | Most criteria for identity over time seem to leave two later objects identical to the earlier one [Cameron] |
Full Idea: Criteria for identity across times have proven hard to give. Whatever criteria we lay down, it seems that there are possible situations in which two later objects bear the relevant relation to one earlier object, though only one of them can be identical. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties [2009], 'Personal') | |
A reaction: We only have to think of twins, amoebae that fission, and the Ship of Theseus. We seem to end up inventing a dubious criterion in order to break the tie. |
18930 | Change is instantiation of a non-uniform distributional property, like 'being red-then-orange' [Cameron] |
Full Idea: What change is on the account being offered is to instantiate a non-uniform distributional property. Being red at one time and orange at a later time is to be analysed as instantiating the distributional property 'being red-then-orange'. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmaking for Presentists [2011], 4) | |
A reaction: One of those moments when you begin to doubt whether 'being analysed' successfully actually adds much to our wisdom. His property sounds suspiciously 'gruesome' - i.e. subject to the vagaries of how we chose to describe the thing. |
15103 | Blackburn fails to show that the necessary cannot be grounded in the contingent [Cameron] |
Full Idea: I conclude that Blackburn has not shown that any grounding of the necessary in the contingent (the Contingency Horn of his dilemma) is doomed to failure. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (On the Source of Necessity [2010], 2) | |
A reaction: [You must read the article for details of Cameron's argument!] He goes on to also reject the Necessity Horn (that there is a regress if necessities must rely on necessities). |
18872 | We should reject distinct but indiscernible worlds [Cameron] |
Full Idea: I think we should reject distinct but indiscernible worlds. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Max and Nec') | |
A reaction: An interesting passing remark. Presumably there would be unknowable truths about such worlds, which wouldn't bother a full-blooded realist. Indiscernible to whom? Me? Humanity? A divine mind? |
23529 | Conduct is not isolated from its effect on the moral code [Hart,HLA] |
Full Idea: We must not view conduct in isolation from its effect on the moral code. | |
From: H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], II 'Moderate') | |
A reaction: The moral code may be excessively conservative, but there is no denying this point. Extreme individualistic libertarians must recognise that 'no man is an island'. |
23530 | The great danger of democracy is that the oppression of the minority becomes unobjectionable [Hart,HLA] |
Full Idea: For Mill and De Tocqueville the greatest of the dangers was not that in fact the majority might use their power to oppress a minority, but that, with the spread of democratic ideas, it might come to be thought unobjectionable that they should do so. | |
From: H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], III 'Populism') | |
A reaction: This was vivid in the 2016 Brexit referendum, which was 52-48 in favour of leaving. There were lots voices saying 'you lost, get over it'. It should be a basic (if neglected) principle that the winners of elections now represent the whole population. |
23522 | In an organised society all actions have some effect on other people [Hart,HLA] |
Full Idea: In an organised society it is impossible to identify classes of actions which harm no one, or no one but the individual who does them. | |
From: H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], I 'Enforcement') | |
A reaction: This is attributed to 'some critics' of Mill. I agree with this. The idea that actions performed behind close doors never come to influence social life is an illusion, held by people whose quest for freedom is selfish. |
23528 | The value of liberty allows freedom of action, even if that distresses other people [Hart,HLA] |
Full Idea: Recognition of individual liberty as a value involves, as a minimum, acceptance of the principle that the individual may do what he wants, even if others are distressed when the learn what it is that he does. | |
From: H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], II 'Private') | |
A reaction: He notes that there could be other reasons to block the freedom, such as harm done. This idea seems to identify a key component of liberalism - that we must all tolerate actions which we dislike. |
21004 | Hart (against Bentham) says human rights are what motivate legal rights [Hart,HLA, by Sen] |
Full Idea: Whereas Bentham saw rights as a 'child of law', Herbert Hart's view takes the form of seeing human rights as, in effect, 'parents of law'; they motivate specific legislations. | |
From: report of H.L.A. Hart (The Concept of Law [1961]) by Amartya Sen - The Idea of Justice 17 'Ethics' | |
A reaction: [He cites Hart 1955 'Are there any natural rights?'] I agree with Hart. It is clearer if the parents of law are not referred to as 'rights'. You can demand a right, but it is only a right when it is awarded to you. |
23523 | The principle of legality requires crimes to be precisely defined in advance of any action [Hart,HLA] |
Full Idea: The principle of legality requires criminal offences to be as precisely defined as possible, so that it can be known with reasonable certainty beforehand what acts are criminal and what are not. | |
From: H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], I 'Conspiracy') | |
A reaction: Hart is discussing a breach of this, where moral judgements are used to condemn something which was not obviously illegal. Families and schools don't have such precise rules, but it seems needed in a vast and pluralistic society. |
23524 | Some private moral issues are no concern of the law [Hart,HLA] |
Full Idea: An official report [of 1957] on homosexuality declared that 'there must remain a realm of private morality and immorality which is, in brief and crude terms, not the law's business'. | |
From: H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], I 'Conspiracy') | |
A reaction: We might wonder whether these issues are actually moral, if the law is not interested in them. Are they just a matter of taste? The law doesn't enforce a preference for Mozart over Salieri. |
23521 | Do morals influence law? Is morality an aspect of law? Can law be morally criticised? [Hart,HLA] |
Full Idea: Four questions: 1) Has the development of law been influenced by morals? 2) Must reference to morality enter into an adequate definition of law or legal system? 3) Is law open to moral criticism? 4) Does immorality justify legal punishment? | |
From: H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], I 'Enforcement') | |
A reaction: [compressed] Three nice questions, which are his agenda for the book. It is obvious that immoral laws can be created, and that laws can be criticised for being too concerned with morality, so there is no clear general answer to these dilemmas. |
23525 | Is the enforcement of morality morally justifiable? [Hart,HLA] |
Full Idea: The question about morality and the law is also a question of morality - of whether the enforcement of morality is morally justified. | |
From: H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], I 'Positive') | |
A reaction: This is a very nice meta-moral question. What moral standards are used to justify the enforcement of moral standards? Presumably there should be no contradiction between the levels, to brutally enforce softness, or softly recommend brutality? |
23526 | Modern law still suppresses practices seen as immoral, and yet harmless [Hart,HLA] |
Full Idea: English and American law still [in1963] contain rules which suppress practices condemned as immoral by positive morality though they involve nothing that would be ordinarily thought of as harm to other persons. | |
From: H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], II 'Use') | |
A reaction: He says most of the examples of this concern sexual practices. In the UK we have moved away from such laws, but many states of the USA still maintain them (or are reintroducing them, in 2023). |
20932 | Positive law needs secondary 'rules of recognition' for their correct application [Hart,HLA, by Zimmermann,J] |
Full Idea: Hart says we have secondary legal 'rules of recognition', by which primary positive law is recognised and applied in a regulated manner. | |
From: report of H.L.A. Hart (The Concept of Law [1961]) by Jens Zimmermann - Hermeneutics: a very short introduction 6 'Rules' | |
A reaction: The example of the authority of a particular court is given. |
20931 | Hart replaced positivism with the democratic requirement of the people's acceptance [Hart,HLA, by Zimmermann,J] |
Full Idea: Hart replaced Austin's concept of positive law as sovereign command with a more democratic ideal. In modern law-based societies the authority of law depends on the people's acceptance of a law's enduring validity. | |
From: report of H.L.A. Hart (The Concept of Law [1961]) by Jens Zimmermann - Hermeneutics: a very short introduction 6 'Hart' | |
A reaction: Presumably the ancestor of this view is the social contract of Hobbes and Locke. |
23527 | Moral wickedness of an offence is always relevant to the degree of punishment [Hart,HLA] |
Full Idea: Leslie Stephen argued that when the question is how severely an offender should be punished, an estimate of the degree of moral wickedness involved in the crime is always relevant. | |
From: H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], II 'Moral') | |
A reaction: [Stephen 'Liberty, Equality, Fraternity' 1873] The degree of responsibility (after excuses etc.) is obviously also highly relevant. If vicious murder is punished more harshly, that seems to be an assessment of the character of the murderer. |
14016 | The idea of simultaneity in Special Relativity is full of verificationist assumptions [Bourne] |
Full Idea: Special Relativity, with its definition of simultaneity, is shot through with verificationist assumptions. | |
From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], 6.IIc) | |
A reaction: [He credits Sklar with this] I love hearing such points made, because all my instincts have rebelled against Einstein's story, even after I have been repeatedly told how stupid I am, and how I should study more maths etc. |
14019 | Relativity denies simultaneity, so it needs past, present and future (unlike Presentism) [Bourne] |
Full Idea: Special Relativity denies absolute simultaneity, and therefore requires a past and a future, as well as a present. The Presentist, however, only requires the present. | |
From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], 6.VII) | |
A reaction: It is nice to accuse Relativity of ontological extravagence. When it 'requires' past and future, that may not be a massive commitment, since the whole theory is fairly operationalist, according to Putnam. |
14013 | Special Relativity allows an absolute past, future, elsewhere and simultaneity [Bourne] |
Full Idea: There is in special relativity a notion of 'absolute past', and of 'absolute future', and of 'absolute elsewhere', and of 'absolute simultaneity' (of events occurring at their space-time conjunction). | |
From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], 5.III) | |
A reaction: [My summary of his paragraph] I am inclined to agree with Bourne that there is enough here to build some sort of notion of 'present' that will support the doctrine of Presentism. |
15104 | The 'moving spotlight' theory makes one time privileged, while all times are on a par ontologically [Cameron] |
Full Idea: What seems so wrong about the 'moving spotlight' theory is that here one time is privileged, but all the times are on a par ontologically. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (On the Source of Necessity [2010], 4) | |
A reaction: The whole thing is baffling, but this looks like a good point. All our intuitions make presentism (there's only the present) look like a better theory than the moving spotlight (that the present is just 'special'). |
14015 | No-Futurists believe in past and present, but not future, and say the world grows as facts increase [Bourne] |
Full Idea: 'No-Futurists' believe in the real existence of the past and present but not the future, and hold that the world grows as more and more facts come into existence. | |
From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], 6.IIb) | |
A reaction: [He cites Broad 1923 and Tooley 1997] My sympathies are with Presentism, but there seems not denying that past events fix truths in a way that future events don't. The unchangeability of past events seems to make them factual. |
14007 | How can presentists talk of 'earlier than', and distinguish past from future? [Bourne] |
Full Idea: Presentists have a difficulty with how they can help themselves to the notion of 'earlier than' without having to invoke real relata, and how presentism can distinguish the past from the future. | |
From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], 2.IV) | |
A reaction: The obvious response is to infer the past from the present (fossils), and infer the future from the present (ticking bomb). But what is it that is being inferred, if the past and future are denied a priori? Tricky! |
14011 | Presentism seems to deny causation, because the cause and the effect can never coexist [Bourne] |
Full Idea: It seems that presentism cannot accommodate causation at all. In a true instance of 'c causes e', it seems to follow that both c and e exist, and it is widely accepted that c is earlier than e. But for presentists that means c and e can't coexist. | |
From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], 4) | |
A reaction: A nice problem. Obviously if the flying ball smashed the window, we are left with only the effect existing - otherwise we could intercept the ball and prevent the disaster. To say this cause and this effect coexist would be even dafter than the problem. |
14017 | Since presentists treat the presentness of events as basic, simultaneity should be define by that means [Bourne] |
Full Idea: Since for presentism there is an ontologically significant and basic sense in which events are present, we should expect a definition of simultaneity in terms of presentness, rather than the other way round. | |
From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], 6.IV) | |
A reaction: Love it. I don't see how you can even articulate questions about simultaneity if you don't already have a notion of presentness. What are the relata you are enquiring about? |
14003 | Time is tensed or tenseless; the latter says all times and objects are real, and there is no passage of time [Bourne] |
Full Idea: Theories of time are in two broad categories, the tenseless and the tensed theories. In tenseless theories, all times are equally real, as are all objects located at them, and there is no passage of time from future to present to past. It's the B-series. | |
From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], Intro IIa) | |
A reaction: It might solve a few of the problems, but is highly counterintuitive. Presumably it makes the passage of time an illusion, and gives no account of how events 'happen', or of their direction, and it leaves causation out on a limb. I'm afraid not. |
14005 | B-series objects relate to each other; A-series objects relate to the present [Bourne] |
Full Idea: Objects in the B-series are earlier than, later than, or simultaneous with each other, whereas objects in the A-series are earlier than, later than or simultaneous with the present. | |
From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], Intro IIb) | |
A reaction: Must we choose? Two past events relate to each other, but there is a further relation when 'now' falls between the events. If I must choose, I suppose I go for the A-series view. The B-series is a subsequent feat of imagination. McTaggart agreed. |
14006 | Time flows, past is fixed, future is open, future is feared but not past, we remember past, we plan future [Bourne] |
Full Idea: We say that time 'flows', that the past is 'fixed' but the future is 'open'; we only dread the future, but not the past; we remember the past but not the future; we plan for the future but not the past. | |
From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], Intro III) | |
A reaction: These seem pretty overwhelming reasons for accepting an asymmetry between the past and the future. If you reject that, you seem to be mired in a multitude of contradictions. Your error theory is going to be massive. |
18927 | Surely if things extend over time, then time itself must be extended? [Cameron] |
Full Idea: If there are temporally extended entities - and there are - then there must be extended regions of time for those entities to extend in. Hence presentism is false. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmaking for Presentists [2011], 4) | |
A reaction: [Cameron is playing devil's advocate] Something has to be weird here, and I take it to be the fact that the past no longer exists, and yet it is fixed and supports truths. Get over it. My childhood has gone. Totally. Irrevocably. |