8 ideas
| 604 | Knowledge is mind and knowing 'cohabiting' [Lycophron, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Lycophron has it that knowledge is the 'cohabitation' (rather than participation or synthesis) of knowing and the soul. | |
| From: report of Lycophron (fragments/reports [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1045b | |
| A reaction: This sounds like a rather passive and inert relationship. Presumably knowing something implies the possibility of acting on it. |
| 20877 | Errors in moral practice might be inconsistent or inappropriate principles, or inappropriate application [LaFollette] |
| Full Idea: I might make parallel 'mistakes' in ethical deliberation. For instance I might 1) use inconsistent ethical principles, 2) have inappropriate moral standards, and 3) apply moral standards inappropriately. | |
| From: Hugh LaFollette (Introductions in 'Ethics in Practice' [2002], p.005) | |
| A reaction: I would want to get the word 'values' in there somewhere. Dogmatic application of moral rules might indicate a failure of values. |
| 20878 | We can discuss the criteria of a judgment, or the weight given to them, or their application [LaFollette] |
| Full Idea: In discussing a movie you can challenge my criteria, the weight I give to those criteria, or my application of the criteria (the claim that the movie satisfies the criteria). | |
| From: Hugh LaFollette (Introductions in 'Ethics in Practice' [2002], p.008) | |
| A reaction: I can't think of anything missing here, so it is a helpful start. |
| 20881 | The act/omission distinction is important for duties, but less so for consequences [LaFollette] |
| Full Idea: Consequentialists, unlike deontologists, are unlikely to think that the act/omission distinction is fundamentally important. | |
| From: Hugh LaFollette (Introductions in 'Ethics in Practice' [2002], p.021) | |
| A reaction: Not sure where virtue theory fits in here. Virtues tend to be applied more locally, where duty tends to be global. All moral theories must acknowledge that failure to act may be either a good or a bad thing, depending on circumstances |
| 5996 | Critolaus redefined Aristotle's moral aim as fulfilment instead of happiness [Critolaus, by White,SA] |
| Full Idea: Critolaus reformulated Aristotelian theory by defining happiness as a 'fulfilment' (sumplêrôma) of psychic, physical, and external goods, where virtue vastly outweighs the rest. | |
| From: report of Critolaus (fragments/reports [c.170 BCE]) by Stephen A. White - Critolaus | |
| A reaction: The sounds more like an attempt at clarification than a real change of Peripatetic doctrine. Occasionally 'fulfilment' is offered as a translation for eudaimonia. Maybe we should just take up Critolaus' suggestion when we are discussing Aristotle. |
| 20886 | Are we only obligated by agreement, or should we always help the weak? [LaFollette] |
| Full Idea: A fundamental question in morality is whether we are obligated to help only those we specifically agreed to help, or are we obligated to help others in need, because they are vulnerable? | |
| From: Hugh LaFollette (Introductions in 'Ethics in Practice' [2002], p.061) | |
| A reaction: [He is considering J.J. Thomson's defence of abortion] The first option sounds extraordinary. If I don't make any agreements at all, then I cease to be a moral being? Not help strangers when they fall over? |
| 20879 | Too many options may open us to unwanted pressures, like being paid very little [LaFollette] |
| Full Idea: Having options is not an unadulterated good. Options may make us vulnerable to unwanted pressure from others. For example, having the option to work for less than the minimum wage increases the chances of employers offering less. | |
| From: Hugh LaFollette (Introductions in 'Ethics in Practice' [2002], p.019) | |
| A reaction: [J.D. Velleman is cited for this] A nice point, beginning to articulate my growing feeling that although freedom is generally a virtue, it is the most overrated virtue. |
| 20880 | Should people be forced to make choices? [LaFollette] |
| Full Idea: Should we give people choices they might not want to have? | |
| From: Hugh LaFollette (Introductions in 'Ethics in Practice' [2002], p.020) | |
| A reaction: In personal life we encounter people who force us to make an unwanted choice (choose the wine, when you know nothing about wine). Politically, there is the sneaky move of giving unwanted choices, to disguise absence of desired choices. |