Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for David Fair, Augustus De Morgan and Galen Strawson

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6 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
De Morgan started the study of relations and their properties [De Morgan, by Walicki]
     Full Idea: De Morgan started the sustained interest in the study of relations and their properties.
     From: report of Augustus De Morgan (On the Syllogism IV [1859]) by Michal Walicki - Introduction to Mathematical Logic History D.1.1
De Morgan found inferences involving relations, which eluded Aristotle's syllogistic [De Morgan, by Hart,WD]
     Full Idea: There was a prejudice against relations (in favour of properties) but De Morgan and others that impeccable inferences turn on relations and elude Aristotle's syllogistic. Thus: All horses are animals. Hence, all heads of horses are heads of animals.
     From: report of Augustus De Morgan (On the Syllogism IV [1859]) by William D. Hart - The Evolution of Logic 4
     A reaction: This is actually an early example of modern analytic philosophy in action. You start with the inferences, and then work back to the ontology and the definition of concepts. But in pinning down such concepts, do we miss their full meaning?
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
De Morgan introduced a 'universe of discourse', to replace Boole's universe of 'all things' [De Morgan, by Walicki]
     Full Idea: In 1846 De Morgan introduced the enormously influential notion of a possibly arbitrary and stipulated 'universe of discourse'. It replaced Boole's original - and metaphysically a bit suspect - universe of 'all things'.
     From: report of Augustus De Morgan (works [1846]) by Michal Walicki - Introduction to Mathematical Logic History D.1.1
     A reaction: This not only brings formal logic under control, but also reflects normal talk, because there is always an explicit or implicit domain of discourse when we talk. Of virtually any conversation, you can say what it is 'about'.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
Science has shown that causal relations are just transfers of energy or momentum [Fair, by Sosa/Tooley]
     Full Idea: Basic causal relations can, as a consequence of our scientific knowledge, be identified with certain physicalistic [sic] relations between objects that can be characterized in terms of transference of either energy or momentum between objects.
     From: report of David Fair (Causation and the Flow of Energy [1979]) by E Sosa / M Tooley - Introduction to 'Causation' §1
     A reaction: Presumably a transfer of momentum is a transfer of energy. If only anyone had the foggiest idea what energy actually is, we'd be doing well. What is energy made of? 'No identity without substance', I say. I like Fair's idea.
Fair shifted his view to talk of counterfactuals about energy flow [Fair, by Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Fair, who originated the energy flow view of causation, moved to a view that understands connection in terms of counterfactuals about energy flow.
     From: report of David Fair (Causation and the Flow of Energy [1979]) by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 2.1.2
     A reaction: David Fair was a pupil of David Lewis, the king of the counterfactual view. To me that sounds like a disappointing move, but it is hard to think that a mere flow of energy through space would amount to causation. Cause must work back from an effect.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
A phenomenalist about objects has to be a regularity theorist about causation [Strawson,G]
     Full Idea: If you are a phenomenalist about objects, then there is an important sense in which you ought to be a Regularity theorist about what causation is, in such objects.
     From: Galen Strawson (The Secret Connexion [1989], App C)
     A reaction: Strawson is denying that Hume is a phenomenalist. One might go a little further, and say that a phenomenalist should abandon the idea of causation (as Russell did).