Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for David Fair, Ernst Mach and Mark Steiner

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6 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 2. Positivism

15873	Laws of nature are just records of regularities and correlations, with concepts to make recording them easier [Mach, by Harré]
	Full Idea: For Mach, the laws of nature are simply the compendious record of sensory regularities, correlations of elements. Any additional concepts are no more than symbols or devices for the convenient recording of general sensory patterns.
	From: report of Ernst Mach (Popular Scientific Lectures [1894], pp.201-5) by Rom Harré - Laws of Nature 2
	A reaction: Mach is the high priest of scientific positivism, which is really just hard-line empiricism.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences

13230	Particular essence is often captured by generality [Steiner,M]
	Full Idea: Generality is often necessary for capturing the essence of a particular.
	From: Mark Steiner (Mathematical Explanation [1978], p.36)
	A reaction: The most powerful features of an entity are probably those which are universal, like intelligence or physical strength in a human. Those characteristics are powerful because they compete with the same characteristic in others (perhaps?).

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations

13229	Maybe an instance of a generalisation is more explanatory than the particular case [Steiner,M]
	Full Idea: Maybe to deduce a theorem as an instance of a generalization is more explanatory than to deduce it correctly.
	From: Mark Steiner (Mathematical Explanation [1978], p.32)
	A reaction: Steiner eventually comes down against this proposal, on the grounds that some proofs are too general, and hence too far away from the thing they are meant to explain.

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / m. Explanation by proof

13231	Explanatory proofs rest on 'characterizing properties' of entities or structure [Steiner,M]
	Full Idea: My proposal is that an explanatory proof makes reference to the 'characterizing property' of an entity or structure mentioned in the theorem, where the proof depends on the property. If we substitute a different object, the theory collapses.
	From: Mark Steiner (Mathematical Explanation [1978], p.34)
	A reaction: He prefers 'characterizing property' to 'essence', because he is not talking about necessary properties, since all properties are necessary in mathematics. He is, in fact, reverting to the older notion of an essence, as the core power of the thing.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation

8326	Science has shown that causal relations are just transfers of energy or momentum [Fair, by Sosa/Tooley]
	Full Idea: Basic causal relations can, as a consequence of our scientific knowledge, be identified with certain physicalistic [sic] relations between objects that can be characterized in terms of transference of either energy or momentum between objects.
	From: report of David Fair (Causation and the Flow of Energy [1979]) by E Sosa / M Tooley - Introduction to 'Causation' §1
	A reaction: Presumably a transfer of momentum is a transfer of energy. If only anyone had the foggiest idea what energy actually is, we'd be doing well. What is energy made of? 'No identity without substance', I say. I like Fair's idea.

10379	Fair shifted his view to talk of counterfactuals about energy flow [Fair, by Schaffer,J]
	Full Idea: Fair, who originated the energy flow view of causation, moved to a view that understands connection in terms of counterfactuals about energy flow.
	From: report of David Fair (Causation and the Flow of Energy [1979]) by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 2.1.2
	A reaction: David Fair was a pupil of David Lewis, the king of the counterfactual view. To me that sounds like a disappointing move, but it is hard to think that a mere flow of energy through space would amount to causation. Cause must work back from an effect.