9 ideas
4483 | If abstract terms are sets of tropes, 'being a unicorn' and 'being a griffin' turn out identical [Loux] |
Full Idea: If trope theorists say abstract singular terms name sets of tropes, what is the referent of 'is a unicorn'? The only candidate is the null set (with no members), but there is just one null set, so 'being a unicorn' and 'being a griffin' will be identical. | |
From: Michael J. Loux (Metaphysics: contemporary introduction [1998], p.86) | |
A reaction: Not crucial, I would think, given that a unicorn is just a horse with a horn. Hume explains how we do that, combining ideas which arose from actual tropes. |
4477 | Universals come in hierarchies of generality [Loux] |
Full Idea: Universals come in hierarchies of generality. | |
From: Michael J. Loux (Metaphysics: contemporary introduction [1998], p.24) | |
A reaction: If it is possible to state facts about universals, this obviously encourages a rather Platonic approach to them, as existent things with properties. But maybe the hierarchies are conventional, not natural. |
4481 | Austere nominalists insist that the realist's universals lack the requisite independent identifiability [Loux] |
Full Idea: Austere nominalists insist that the realist's universals lack the requisite independent identifiability. | |
From: Michael J. Loux (Metaphysics: contemporary introduction [1998], p.60) | |
A reaction: Plato's view seems to be that we don't identify universals independently. We ascend The Line, or think about the shadows in The Cave, and infer the universals from an array of particulars (by dialectic). |
4482 | Austere nominalism has to take a host of things (like being red, or human) as primitive [Loux] |
Full Idea: In return for a one-category ontology (with particulars but no universals), the austere nominalist is forced to take a whole host of things (like being red, or triangular, or human) as unanalysable or primitive. | |
From: Michael J. Loux (Metaphysics: contemporary introduction [1998], p.68) | |
A reaction: I see that 'red' might have to be primitive, but being human can just be a collection of particulars. It is no ontologically worse to call them 'primitive' than to say they exist. |
4478 | Nominalism needs to account for abstract singular terms like 'circularity'. [Loux] |
Full Idea: Nominalists have been very concerned to provide an account of the role of abstract singular terms (such as 'circularity'). | |
From: Michael J. Loux (Metaphysics: contemporary introduction [1998], p.34) | |
A reaction: Whether this is a big problem depends on our view of abstraction. If it only consists of selecting one property of an object and reifying it, then we can give a nominalist account of properties, and the problem is solved. |
4480 | Times and places are identified by objects, so cannot be used in a theory of object-identity [Loux] |
Full Idea: Any account of the identity of material objects which turns on the identity of places and times must face the objection that the identity of places and times depends, in turn, on the identities of the objects located at them. | |
From: Michael J. Loux (Metaphysics: contemporary introduction [1998], p.56) | |
A reaction: This may be a benign circle, in which we concede that there are two basic interdependent concepts of objects and space-time. If you want to define identity - in terms of what? |
8119 | Art aims only at beauty, of form, of idea, and (above all) of expression [Winckelmann, by Tolstoy] |
Full Idea: According to Winckelmann, the law and aim of all art is beauty, independent of goodness. The three kinds of beauty are of form, of idea, and of expression (the highest aim, attainable only when the other two are present). | |
From: report of Johann Winckelmann (History of Ancient Art [1764]) by Leo Tolstoy - What is Art? Ch.3 | |
A reaction: This sounds very like 'art for art's sake', but a hundred years earlier. This is quite a good distinction, and I particularly like the 'beauty of idea', which is often overlooked. |
8326 | Science has shown that causal relations are just transfers of energy or momentum [Fair, by Sosa/Tooley] |
Full Idea: Basic causal relations can, as a consequence of our scientific knowledge, be identified with certain physicalistic [sic] relations between objects that can be characterized in terms of transference of either energy or momentum between objects. | |
From: report of David Fair (Causation and the Flow of Energy [1979]) by E Sosa / M Tooley - Introduction to 'Causation' §1 | |
A reaction: Presumably a transfer of momentum is a transfer of energy. If only anyone had the foggiest idea what energy actually is, we'd be doing well. What is energy made of? 'No identity without substance', I say. I like Fair's idea. |
10379 | Fair shifted his view to talk of counterfactuals about energy flow [Fair, by Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: Fair, who originated the energy flow view of causation, moved to a view that understands connection in terms of counterfactuals about energy flow. | |
From: report of David Fair (Causation and the Flow of Energy [1979]) by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 2.1.2 | |
A reaction: David Fair was a pupil of David Lewis, the king of the counterfactual view. To me that sounds like a disappointing move, but it is hard to think that a mere flow of energy through space would amount to causation. Cause must work back from an effect. |