44 ideas
| 23728 | Analysis aims to express the full set of platitudes surrounding a given concept [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: The aim of analysis is to give us knowledge of all and only the platitudes surrounding our use of the concept that is up for analysis. | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 1.10) | |
| A reaction: His earlier specimen concept is 'redness'. For other concepts there might be considerable disagreement about which propositions are or are not the relevant platitudes. Smith emphasises that analysis need not be reductive. |
| 23744 | Defining a set of things by paradigms doesn't pin them down enough [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: The discussion of colour concepts shows that permutation problems arise when a set of concepts, acquired inter alia via the presentation of paradigms, is largely interdefined. | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 5.9) | |
| A reaction: Smith says that our normative moral concepts are largely interdefined in this way. The 'permutation' problem is that they can change places in the definition set, and so their intrinsic individual character is not pinned down. Sounds right. |
| 6346 | The main epistemological theories are foundationalist, coherence, probabilistic and reliabilist [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: The most familiar epistemological theories are foundation theories, coherence theories, probabilistic theories, and reliabilist theories. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], Pref) | |
| A reaction: A helpful list. Reliabilism is now the dominant externalist theory. Probability theories will centre on Bayes' Theorem (Idea 2798). The authors want an internalist theory that includes perceptions as well as beliefs. I currently favour coherence. |
| 6351 | Most people now agree that our reasoning proceeds defeasibly, rather than deductively [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: One of the most important modern advances in epistemology was the recognition of defeasible reasons; it is now generally acknowledged that most of our reasoning proceeds defeasibly rather than deductively. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §1.2) | |
| A reaction: I agree totally. This is why fallibilism is clearly a correct position in epistemology (e.g. Ideas 2736 and 2755). Deduction is not the only grounds given for certainty - there are rationalist foundations (Descartes) and empiricist foundations (Moore). |
| 6374 | To believe maximum truths, believe everything; to have infallible beliefs, believe nothing [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: If we want an agent to believe as many truths as possible, this could be achieved by simply believing everything; if we want an agent to have only true beliefs, this could be achieved by believing nothing. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §6.6) | |
| A reaction: I like this. It highlights the pragmatic need for a middle road, in which a core set of beliefs are going to be approved of as 'knowledge', so that we can get on with life. This has to be a social matter, and needs flexibility of Fallibilism. |
| 6355 | Direct realism says justification is partly a function of pure perceptual states, not of beliefs [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: We defend a version of direct realism, saying that justification must be partly a function of perceptual states themselves, and not just a function of our beliefs about perceptual states. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §1.5.3) | |
| A reaction: Judgement suggests that perceptual states give good justification about primary qualities (like mass or shape), but not of secondary qualities (like smell or colour). Perceptions can be downright misleading. |
| 6359 | Phenomenalism offered conclusive perceptual knowledge, but conclusive reasons no longer seem essential [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: Phenomenalism offered the prospect of explaining perceptual knowledge within a framework that recognised only conclusive reasons; once it is acknowledged that at least induction uses nonconclusive reasons, it is no longer needed. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §2.3.3.2) | |
| A reaction: I'm not sure that that is the only motivation for phenomenalism, which seemed to be attempting to get as close to 'reality' as intellectual honesty would allow. I certainly favour the modern relaxed attitude to knowledge, which needn't be 'conclusive'. |
| 6366 | Perception causes beliefs in us, without inference or justification [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: Perception is a causal process that inputs beliefs into our doxastic system without their being inferred from or justified on the basis of other beliefs we already have. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §3.2.3) | |
| A reaction: This topic is much discussed (e.g. by MacDowell). I don't see how something is going to qualify as a 'belief' if it doesn't involve concepts and propositions. The point that we are caused to have many of our beliefs (rather than judging) seems right. |
| 6362 | Sense evidence is not beliefs, because they are about objective properties, not about appearances [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: We think it is a mistake to suppose that the evidence of our senses comes to us in the form of beliefs; in perception, the beliefs we form are almost invariably about the objective properties of physical objects - not about how they appear to us. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §2.5.5) | |
| A reaction: The tricky word here is 'evidence'. At what point in the process of perception does something begin to count as evidence? It must at least involve concepts (and maybe even propositions) if it is going to be thought about in that way. |
| 6371 | Bayesian epistemology is Bayes' Theorem plus the 'simple rule' (believe P if it is probable) [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: Bayesian epistemology is based upon the 'simple rule' (believe P if it is sufficiently probable) and Bayes' Theorem. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §4.3.1) | |
| A reaction: For Bayes' Theorem, see Idea 2798. There is the question of whether the proposition is subjectively or objectively probable (I believe in ghosts, so any shadow is probably a ghost). There is also the problem of objective evidence for the calculation. |
| 6373 | Internalism says if anything external varies, the justifiability of the belief does not vary [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: Internalist theories make justifiability of a belief a function of the internal states of the believer, in the sense that if we vary anything but his internal states the justifiability of the belief does not vary. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §5.4.3) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be a nice clear definition of internalism (and, by implication, externalism). It favours externalism. I know my car is in the car park; someone takes it for a joyride, then replaces it; my good justification seems thereby weakened. |
| 6353 | People rarely have any basic beliefs, and never enough for good foundations [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: We argue that all foundations theories are false, for the simple reason that people rarely have any epistemological basic beliefs, and never have enough to provide a foundation for the rest of our knowledge. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §1.5.3) | |
| A reaction: Once surprising things start to happen in a film, we rapidly jettison our normal basic beliefs, to be ready for surprises. However, it seems to me that quite a lot of beliefs are hard-wired into us, or inescapably arise from the use of our senses. |
| 6361 | Foundationalism requires self-justification, not incorrigibility [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: What foundationalism requires is self-justification, which is weaker than incorrigibility. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §2.5.3) | |
| A reaction: The writers oppose foundationalism, but this remark obviously helps the theory. Bonjour votes for a fallible rationalist foundationalism, and an fallible empiricist version seems plausible (because we must check for hallucinations etc.). |
| 6357 | Reason cannot be an ultimate foundation, because rational justification requires prior beliefs [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: Reasoning, it seems, can only justify us in holding a belief if we are already justified in holding the beliefs from which we reason, so reasoning cannot provide an ultimate source of justification. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §2.1) | |
| A reaction: This sounds slick and conclusive, but it isn't. If we accept that some truths might be 'self-evident' to reason, they could stand independently. And a large body of rational beliefs might be mutually self-supporting, as in the coherence theory of truth. |
| 6363 | Foundationalism is wrong, because either all beliefs are prima facie justified, or none are [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: Either no belief is prima facie justified or all beliefs are prima facie justified; …we regard this as a decisive refutation of foundationalism. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §2.5.5) | |
| A reaction: The full text must he examined, but it is not at all clear to me how my belief that quantum theory is correct could be even remotely as prima facie justified as my belief that this is my hand. I don't think basic beliefs need be sharply divided off. |
| 6365 | Negative coherence theories do not require reasons, so have no regress problem [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: The regress argument has no apparent strength against negative coherence theories, because they do not require reasons for beliefs. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §3.2.3) | |
| A reaction: A nice point. Such theories endorse Neurath's picture (Idea 6348). On the whole philosophers like positive support for their beliefs, so the rather passive picture of accepting everything unless it is undermined is not appealing. A fall-back position. |
| 6354 | Coherence theories fail, because they can't accommodate perception as the basis of knowledge [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: All coherence theories fail, because they are unable to accommodate perception as the basic source of our knowledge of the world. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §1.5.3) | |
| A reaction: An interesting claim, which the authors attempt to justify. They say it is direct realism, because the perceptions justify, without any intervening beliefs. My immediate thought is that they might justify knowledge of primary qualities, but not secondary. |
| 6367 | Coherence theories isolate justification from the world [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: The Isolation Argument objects that coherence theories cut justification off from the world. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §3.2.4) | |
| A reaction: I don't see this as a strong objection. Justification can be in the way beliefs cohere together, but the beliefs themselves consist of holding propositions to be true, and truth asserts a connection to the world (I say). |
| 6370 | Externalism comes as 'probabilism' (probability of truth) and 'reliabilism' (probability of good cognitive process) [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: There are two major kinds of externalist theory in the literature - probabilism (which expresses justification in terms of probability of the belief being true), and reliabilism (which refers to the probability of the cognitive processes being right). | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §4.1) | |
| A reaction: A useful clarification. Reliabilism has an obvious problem, that a process can be reliable, but only luckily correct on this occasion (a clock which has, unusually, stopped). A ghost is more probably there if I believe in ghosts. |
| 6358 | One belief may cause another, without being the basis for the second belief [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: If I fall flat on my back running to a class, my belief that I was late for class may cause me to have the belief that there are birds in the trees, but I do not believe the latter on the basis of the former. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §2.3.1) | |
| A reaction: A nice example, which fairly conclusively demolishes any causal theory of justification. My example is believing correctly that the phone ring is from mother, because she said she would call. Maybe causation is needed somewhere in the right theory. |
| 6364 | We can't start our beliefs from scratch, because we wouldn't know where to start [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: We cannot forsake all of our beliefs and start over again, because then we could not know how to start. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §3.1) | |
| A reaction: A point with which it is hard to disagree, but even Descartes agreed with it (Idea 3604). Presumably all your beliefs can take it in turn to be doubted, while others are held true, or you can whittle the beliefs which can't be abandoned down to a minimum. |
| 6352 | Enumerative induction gives a universal judgement, while statistical induction gives a proportion [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: Enumerative induction examines a sample of objects, observes they all have a property, and infers that they all have that property; statistical induction observes a proportion of the objects having the property, and infers that proportion in general. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §1.4.6) | |
| A reaction: There is also induction by elimination, where it is either p or q, and observation keeps saying it isn't p. A small sample is very unreliable, but a huge sample (e.g. cigarettes and cancer) is almost certain, so where is the small/huge boundary? |
| 6372 | Since every tautology has a probability of 1, should we believe all tautologies? [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: It follows from the probability calculus that every tautology has probability 1; it then follows in Bayesian epistemology that we are justified in believing every tautology. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §4.3.1.5) | |
| A reaction: If I say 'a bachelor is a small ant' you wouldn't believe it, but if I said 'I define a bachelor as a small ant' you would have to believe it. 'Bachelors are unmarried' men is a description of English usage, so is not really a simple tautology. |
| 6360 | Scientific confirmation is best viewed as inference to the best explanation [Pollock/Cruz] |
| Full Idea: The confirmation of scientific theories is probably best viewed in terms of inference to the best explanation. | |
| From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §2.3.3.3) | |
| A reaction: A simple claim, but one with which I strongly agree. 'Inference', of course, implies that there is some fairly strict logical thinking going on, which may not be so. I suspect that dogs can move to the best explanation. It is, though, a rational process. |
| 23743 | Capturing all the common sense facts about rationality is almost impossible [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: It would be a superhuman task just to write down an explicit, non-summary style, statement of the platitudes that capture our idea of what it is to be fully rational. | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 5.9) | |
| A reaction: Well said. Philosophers are inclined to make simplistic binary judgements about whether persons or animals are rational. A visit to YouTube will show fish acting extremely rationally. |
| 23739 | Goals need desires, and so only desires can motivate us [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: Only an agent's desires may constitute her having certain goals, and it follows from this that only her desires may constitute her motivating reasons. | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 4.8) | |
| A reaction: We might distinguish between reasons which direct us towards certain ends, and reasons which motivate us to pursue those ends. Most mornings I have a reason to get out of bed, which precedes my motivation to actually do it. |
| 23724 | A pure desire could be criticised if it were based on a false belief [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: There is a minor proviso to Hume's view, which is that desires are subject to rational criticism, but only insofar as they are based on beliefs that are subject to rational criticism. | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 1.3) | |
| A reaction: He says this is not a refutation of the basic Humean claim. He has in mind a desire such as to consume cyanide because you believe it will be good for you. |
| 23736 | A person can have a desire without feeling it [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: We should concede that a desire may be had in the absence of its being felt. | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 4.5) | |
| A reaction: A nice observation. An example he gives is a father's desire that his child does well. Smith is discussing Hume's account of motivation in terms of desires and beliefs. |
| 23723 | In the Humean account, desires are not true/false, or subject to any rational criticism [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: According to the standard picture of human psychology that we get from Hume, not only are desires not assessable in terms of truth and falsehood, they are not subject to any sort of rational criticism at all. | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 1.3) | |
| A reaction: This is where action theory meets metaethics. The separation of facts from values underlies this, because a desire is a fact, but the wickedness of a desire is not. Surely a desire could be a failure of practical reason? |
| 23735 | Subjects may be fallible about the desires which explain their actions [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: It is an adequacy constraint on any conception of desire that the epistemology of desire it recommends allows that subjects may be fallible about the desires they have. | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 4.5) | |
| A reaction: [I do wish authors would write my short versions instead of their rambling sentences!] Even after the event we may be unsure why we did something. If someone observes self-interest when I thought my action was altruistic, I don't know how to respond. |
| 23738 | Humeans (unlike their opponents) say that desires and judgements can separate [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: Humeans claim that agents who believe they should act may nevertheless lack the desire to do so, where anti-Humeans must say the two go together, and someone with the belief thereby has the desire. | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 4.7) | |
| A reaction: [very compressed] A very helpful distinction about the classic debates over the motivations of action. Smith defends the Humean view, and makes it very plausible. No mere sense of rightness or duty can compel us to act. |
| 23742 | If first- and second-order desires conflict, harmony does not require the second-order to win [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: Even if we assume that reason prefers harmony between first- and second-order desires, there is no reason to assume that reason is on the side of achieving that harmony by changing first-order desires to suit second-order, rather than vice versa. | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 5.7) | |
| A reaction: [Smith is discussing David Lewis 1989 on second-order desires] Smith says that on the Humean view the rational winner should simply be the stronger of the two. Since this sounds like an endorsement for weakness of will, Smith relies on beliefs. |
| 23746 | Objective reasons to act might be the systematic desires of a fully rational person [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: One way to decide what we have normative reasons to do …is by trying to find a set of desires that is systematically justifiable, which is our best assessment of the desires we would have under conditions of full rationality. | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 5.9) | |
| A reaction: This is Smith accepting the Humean view that desires are essential for motivation, but trying to find a marriage of desires with reason to produce the more objective aspects of morality. An interesting aspiration… |
| 23733 | Motivating reasons are psychological, while normative reasons are external [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: There are motivating reasons for action, which are psychological states, and normative reasons, which are propositions of the general form 'a person's doing this is desirable or required'. | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 4.2) | |
| A reaction: Motivating reasons are locatable entities in minds, whereas normative reasons are either abstract, or perhaps motivating reasons expressed by other people. Smith says the two types are unconnected. |
| 23740 | Humeans take maximising desire satisfaction as the normative reasons for actions [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: The distinctive Humean view of normative reasons for action is that the rational thing for an agent to do is simply to act so as to maximally satisfy her desires, whatever the content of those desires. | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 5.1) | |
| A reaction: Smith disagrees with this view (though he agrees with Hume about motivating reasons). An obvious problem for the Humean view would be a strong desire to do something excessively dangerous. |
| 23745 | We cannot expect even fully rational people to converge on having the same desires for action [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: We cannot expect that, even under conditions of full rationality, agents would all converge on the same desires about what is to be done in the various circumstances they might face. | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 5.9) | |
| A reaction: A very good argument in favour of the Humean view that desires are an essential part of moral motivation. Possible convergence of view is a standard hallmark of communal rationality. |
| 23731 | 'Externalists' say moral judgements are not reasons, and maybe not even motives [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: The 'externalist' view of morality says either that judgements of rightness are motives but not reasons, or (more strongly) that they are neither, meaning that moral judgements do not have practical implications. | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 3.1) | |
| A reaction: [Philippa Foot's untypical 1972 article is cited for the strong view. Hare and Blackburn are typical of the first view]. I would say that such judgements are both reasons and motives - but not necessarily for me! 'Someone should do something about this!'. |
| 23732 | A person could make a moral judgement without being in any way motivated by it [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: Amoralists make moral judgements without being motivated accordingly, and without suffering any sort of practical irrationality either; the practicality requirement of moral judgement is thus false. | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 3.3) | |
| A reaction: It is hard to imagine an immoralist with this nihilistic attitude bothering to make any moral judgements at all. Why would someone indifferent to art make aesthetic judgements? What could a 'judgement of rightness' mean to an amoralist? |
| 23729 | Moral internalism says a judgement of rightness is thereby motivating [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: Moral 'internalism' says if an agent judges an action as right in some circumstance, then they are either thereby motivated to do it, or they are irrational (e.g. their will is weak). | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 3.1) | |
| A reaction: [Somewhat reworded] So the motivation comes from an internal judgement, not from external factors. Is it not tautological that 'this is the right thing to do' means it should be done (ceteris paribus)? |
| 23730 | 'Rationalism' says the rightness of an action is a reason to perform it [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: Moral 'rationalism' says if an action is right for agents in some circumstances, then there is a reason for the agents to do it. | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 3.1) | |
| A reaction: That is, there is not merely a motivation to act (the 'internalist' view), but there is a reason to act. Smith calls both views the 'practicality requirement' of normal moral judgements. Smith defends the rationalist view. |
| 23727 | Expressivists count attitudes as 'moral' if they concern features of things, rather than their mere existence [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: The pro- and con- attitudes of the expressivists count as 'moral' only if they are had towards particular people, actions or states of affairs in virtue of their natural features, ….rather than in virtue of being the particulars that they are. | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 2.4) | |
| A reaction: So whereas emotivists don't have to have any reasons for their moral feelings, other expressivists seem to require reasons (i.e. indicating features of things) to endorse their attitudes. What of reasonless emotionless attitudes? |
| 23741 | Is valuing something a matter of believing or a matter of desiring? [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: What is it to value something? That is, equivalently, what is it to accept that we have a normative reason to do something? In Hume's terms, is it a matter of believing? Or is it a matter of desiring? We seem to face a dilemma. | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 5.4) | |
| A reaction: Smith is discussing moral motivation, and there is obviously more to valuing something than acting on it. Nice question, though. Personally I value St Paul's Cathedral, but I don't desire it. I value heart surgeons, but don't want to emulate them. |
| 8326 | Science has shown that causal relations are just transfers of energy or momentum [Fair, by Sosa/Tooley] |
| Full Idea: Basic causal relations can, as a consequence of our scientific knowledge, be identified with certain physicalistic [sic] relations between objects that can be characterized in terms of transference of either energy or momentum between objects. | |
| From: report of David Fair (Causation and the Flow of Energy [1979]) by E Sosa / M Tooley - Introduction to 'Causation' §1 | |
| A reaction: Presumably a transfer of momentum is a transfer of energy. If only anyone had the foggiest idea what energy actually is, we'd be doing well. What is energy made of? 'No identity without substance', I say. I like Fair's idea. |
| 10379 | Fair shifted his view to talk of counterfactuals about energy flow [Fair, by Schaffer,J] |
| Full Idea: Fair, who originated the energy flow view of causation, moved to a view that understands connection in terms of counterfactuals about energy flow. | |
| From: report of David Fair (Causation and the Flow of Energy [1979]) by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 2.1.2 | |
| A reaction: David Fair was a pupil of David Lewis, the king of the counterfactual view. To me that sounds like a disappointing move, but it is hard to think that a mere flow of energy through space would amount to causation. Cause must work back from an effect. |