7 ideas
| 5435 | An interpreter of a text, because of wider knowledge, can understand it better than its author [Schleiermacher, by Mautner] |
| Full Idea: Schleiermacher proposed that an interpreter of a text may be in a better position to see the author's life and work and historical setting as a whole, and so understand the text better than its author. | |
| From: report of Friedrich Schleiermacher (works [1825]) by Thomas Mautner - Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy p.248 | |
| A reaction: This sounds like a very quaintly old-fashioned enlightenment view which has been swept away by post-modernism, which is why I agree with it. We have a perspective on Descartes now which he could never have dreamt of. |
| 22028 | Unity emerges from understanding particulars, so understanding is prior to seeing unity [Schleiermacher] |
| Full Idea: We only gradually arrive at the knowledge of the inner unity via the understanding of individual utterances, and therefore the art of explication is also presupposed if the inner unity is to be found....The task is infinite, and can never be accomplished. | |
| From: Friedrich Schleiermacher (works [1825], p.235), quoted by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 06 | |
| A reaction: [p.235 in ed Bowie 1998] This is the first statement of the hermeneutic circle, which needs whole to grasp parts, and parts to grasp whole. Personally I think the dangers of circles in philosophy are greatly exaggerated. |
| 22137 | Observation can force rejection of some part of the initial set of claims [Duhem, by Boulter] |
| Full Idea: Logic and observation alone do not force a scientist to reject a scientific claim if experimental observations so not turn out as expected. The scientist must reject something of the initial set of claims, but that is a matter of choice. | |
| From: report of Pierre Duhem (The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory [1906]) by Stephen Boulter - Why Medieval Philosophy Matters 2 | |
| A reaction: This is a key point against any simplified Popperian notion of falsification. Tiny observations can't kill huge well supported theories. |
| 18197 | Experiments only test groups of hypotheses, and can't show which one is wrong [Duhem] |
| Full Idea: The physicist can never subject an isolated hypothesis to experimental test, but only a whole group of hypotheses; when the experiment is in disagreement with his predictions ...it does not designate which one should be changed. | |
| From: Pierre Duhem (The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory [1906], p.187), quoted by Penelope Maddy - Naturalism in Mathematics II.2 | |
| A reaction: This is the idea frequently invoked by Quine, in support of his holistic view of scientific knowledge (along with Neurath's Boat). |
| 20959 | Concepts are only analytic once the predicate is absorbed into the subject [Schleiermacher] |
| Full Idea: The difference between analytic and synthetic judgements is an unimportant fluid one. 'Ice melts' is analytic if it is already taken up into the concept of ice, and synthetic if not yet taken up. It is just a different state of the formation of concepts. | |
| From: Friedrich Schleiermacher (Dialektik [1833], p.563), quoted by Andrew Bowie - Introduction to German Philosophy 8 'Scientific' | |
| A reaction: [compressed] I wonder if Quine ever encountered this quotation. The idea refers to Kant's notion of analyticity, and makes the good point that predicates only become 'contained in the subject' once the situation is very familiar. |
| 8326 | Science has shown that causal relations are just transfers of energy or momentum [Fair, by Sosa/Tooley] |
| Full Idea: Basic causal relations can, as a consequence of our scientific knowledge, be identified with certain physicalistic [sic] relations between objects that can be characterized in terms of transference of either energy or momentum between objects. | |
| From: report of David Fair (Causation and the Flow of Energy [1979]) by E Sosa / M Tooley - Introduction to 'Causation' §1 | |
| A reaction: Presumably a transfer of momentum is a transfer of energy. If only anyone had the foggiest idea what energy actually is, we'd be doing well. What is energy made of? 'No identity without substance', I say. I like Fair's idea. |
| 10379 | Fair shifted his view to talk of counterfactuals about energy flow [Fair, by Schaffer,J] |
| Full Idea: Fair, who originated the energy flow view of causation, moved to a view that understands connection in terms of counterfactuals about energy flow. | |
| From: report of David Fair (Causation and the Flow of Energy [1979]) by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 2.1.2 | |
| A reaction: David Fair was a pupil of David Lewis, the king of the counterfactual view. To me that sounds like a disappointing move, but it is hard to think that a mere flow of energy through space would amount to causation. Cause must work back from an effect. |