Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for David Fair, Roger Crisp and Robert B. Brandom

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6 ideas

3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts

10355	Facts can't make claims true, because they are true claims [Brandom, by Kusch]
	Full Idea: Brandom says that facts do not make claims true, because facts simply are true claims.
	From: report of Robert B. Brandom (Making It Explicit [1994], p.327) by Martin Kusch - Knowledge by Agreement Ch.18
	A reaction: Nice. Notoriously, anyone defending the correspondence theory of truth in terms of facts had better say what they mean by a 'fact'. Personally I take a fact to be a non-verbal, mind-independent situation in the world, so I disagree with Brandom.

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use

7765	The use of a sentence is its commitments and entitlements [Brandom, by Lycan]
	Full Idea: Brandom develops a particular conception of 'use', according to which a sentence's use is the set of commitments and entitlements associated with public utterance of that sentence.
	From: report of Robert B. Brandom (Articulating Reasons: Intro to Inferentialism [2000]) by William Lycan - Philosophy of Language Ch.6
	A reaction: It immediately strikes me that a sentence could only have commitments and entitlements if it already had a meaning. However, the case of money shows how there might be nothing more to a thing's significance than its entitlements.

22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism

6853	Consequentialism wrongly assumes a clear line between an act and its consequences [Crisp,R]
	Full Idea: What is wrong with consequentialism is that it assumes that there is agreement about when an act ends and when its consequences begin.
	From: Roger Crisp (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.31)
	A reaction: I certainly agree that this is a mistake in consequentialism, which has a crude idea of what an action is, though I am not convinced that this is the key fault in the theory. The theory doesn't distinguish acts by people from those by machines.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation

8326	Science has shown that causal relations are just transfers of energy or momentum [Fair, by Sosa/Tooley]
	Full Idea: Basic causal relations can, as a consequence of our scientific knowledge, be identified with certain physicalistic [sic] relations between objects that can be characterized in terms of transference of either energy or momentum between objects.
	From: report of David Fair (Causation and the Flow of Energy [1979]) by E Sosa / M Tooley - Introduction to 'Causation' §1
	A reaction: Presumably a transfer of momentum is a transfer of energy. If only anyone had the foggiest idea what energy actually is, we'd be doing well. What is energy made of? 'No identity without substance', I say. I like Fair's idea.

10379	Fair shifted his view to talk of counterfactuals about energy flow [Fair, by Schaffer,J]
	Full Idea: Fair, who originated the energy flow view of causation, moved to a view that understands connection in terms of counterfactuals about energy flow.
	From: report of David Fair (Causation and the Flow of Energy [1979]) by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 2.1.2
	A reaction: David Fair was a pupil of David Lewis, the king of the counterfactual view. To me that sounds like a disappointing move, but it is hard to think that a mere flow of energy through space would amount to causation. Cause must work back from an effect.

27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 4. Ecology

6854	Does the environment have value in itself? [Crisp,R]
	Full Idea: The debate which dominates environmental ethics is whether the environment has value in itself.
	From: Roger Crisp (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.37)
	A reaction: I say the answer has to be 'yes'. If it only has value in relation to conscious or human life, it will be difficult to demonstrate that they have value. Pleasure and pain, or wisdom, can't imply value on their own; a bigger picture is needed.