Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for David Fair, Vassilis Politis and Ralph Waldo Emerson

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers

---

7 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason

6558	A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds [Emerson]
	Full Idea: A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines. With consistency a great soul has simply nothing to do.
	From: Ralph Waldo Emerson (Self-Reliance [1841], p.37)
	A reaction: A remark to warm the hearts of pragmatists, Wittgensteinians, Nietzscheans and the post-modern mob. But pay careful attention to the word "foolish". Robert Fogelin gives a very balanced view of the matter (e.g. Idea 6557).

2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions

11257	The Pythagoreans were the first to offer definitions [Politis, by Politis]
	Full Idea: Aristotle praises the Pythagoreans for being the first to offer definitions.
	From: report of Vassilis Politis (Aristotle and the Metaphysics [2004]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 2.4
	A reaction: This sounds like a hugely important step in the development of Greek philosophy which is hardly ever mentioned.

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 4. Uses of Truth

11235	'True of' is applicable to things, while 'true' is applicable to words [Politis]
	Full Idea: It is crucial not to confuse 'true' with 'true of'. 'True of' is applicable to things, while 'true' is applicable to words.
	From: Vassilis Politis (Aristotle and the Metaphysics [2004], 1.4)
	A reaction: A beautifully simple distinction which had never occurred to me, and which (being a thoroughgoing realist) I really like.

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing

11277	Maybe 'What is being? is confusing because we can't ask what non-being is like [Politis]
	Full Idea: We may be unfamiliar with the question 'What is being?' because there appear to be no contrastive questions of the form: how do beings differ from things that are not beings?
	From: Vassilis Politis (Aristotle and the Metaphysics [2004], 4.1)
	A reaction: We can, of course, contrast actual beings with possible beings, or imaginary beings, or even logically impossible beings, but in those cases 'being' strikes me as an entirely inappropriate word.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities

11248	Necessary truths can be two-way relational, where essential truths are one-way or intrinsic [Politis]
	Full Idea: An essence is true in virtue of what the thing is in itself, but a necessary truth may be relational, as the consequence of the relation between two things and their essence. The necessary relation may be two-way, but the essential relation one-way.
	From: Vassilis Politis (Aristotle and the Metaphysics [2004], 2.3)
	A reaction: He is writing about Aristotle, but has in mind Kit Fine 1994 (qv). Politis cites Plato's answer to the Euthyphro Question as a good example. The necessity comes from the intrinsic nature of goodness/piety, not from the desire of the gods.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation

8326	Science has shown that causal relations are just transfers of energy or momentum [Fair, by Sosa/Tooley]
	Full Idea: Basic causal relations can, as a consequence of our scientific knowledge, be identified with certain physicalistic [sic] relations between objects that can be characterized in terms of transference of either energy or momentum between objects.
	From: report of David Fair (Causation and the Flow of Energy [1979]) by E Sosa / M Tooley - Introduction to 'Causation' §1
	A reaction: Presumably a transfer of momentum is a transfer of energy. If only anyone had the foggiest idea what energy actually is, we'd be doing well. What is energy made of? 'No identity without substance', I say. I like Fair's idea.

10379	Fair shifted his view to talk of counterfactuals about energy flow [Fair, by Schaffer,J]
	Full Idea: Fair, who originated the energy flow view of causation, moved to a view that understands connection in terms of counterfactuals about energy flow.
	From: report of David Fair (Causation and the Flow of Energy [1979]) by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 2.1.2
	A reaction: David Fair was a pupil of David Lewis, the king of the counterfactual view. To me that sounds like a disappointing move, but it is hard to think that a mere flow of energy through space would amount to causation. Cause must work back from an effect.