20 ideas
21829 | Philosophy aims to understand how things (broadly understood) hang together (broadly understood) [Sellars] |
Full Idea: The aim of philosophy, abstractly formulated, is to understand how things in the broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest possible sense of the term. | |
From: Wilfrid Sellars (Philosophy and Scientific Image of Man [1962], p.3), quoted by Owen Flanagan - The Really Hard Problem 1 'Vocation' | |
A reaction: I'm happier with broad things than broad hanging together, but to me this sounds about right. |
9271 | Human knowledge may not produce well-being; the examined life may not be worth living [Gray] |
Full Idea: Human knowledge is one thing, human well-being another. There is no predetermined harmony between the two. The examined life may not be worth living. | |
From: John Gray (Straw Dogs [2002], 1.9) | |
A reaction: John Gray has set himself up as the Eeyore of modern times, but this point may obviously be correct. Presumably Socrates meant that the examined life was better even if the result was less 'well-being'. Even Gray doesn't want a lobotomy. |
6550 | Reduction requires that an object's properties consist of its constituents' properties and relations [Sellars] |
Full Idea: The 'Principle of Reducibility' says if an object is a system of objects, then every property of the object must consist in the fact that its constituents have such and such qualities and such and such relations | |
From: Wilfrid Sellars (Philosophy and Scientific Image of Man [1962], p.27), quoted by William Lycan - Consciousness | |
A reaction: This sounds to me a more promising attitude to reduction than all this talk of Ernest Nagel's 'Bridge Laws'. If we ask HOW a higher level property arises because of a lower level property, we can describe a mechanism rather than a law. |
8793 | If observation is knowledge, it is not just an experience; it is a justification in the space of reasons [Sellars] |
Full Idea: In characterizing an observational episode or state as 'knowing', we are not giving an empirical description of it; we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says. | |
From: Wilfrid Sellars (Does Emp.Knowledge have Foundation? [1956], p.123) | |
A reaction: McDowell has made the Kantian phrase 'the logical space of reasons' very popular. This is a very nice statement of the internalist view of justification, with which I sympathise more and more. It is a rationalist coherentist view. It needn't be mystical! |
8792 | Observations like 'this is green' presuppose truths about what is a reliable symptom of what [Sellars] |
Full Idea: Observational knowledge of any particular fact, e.g. that this is green, presupposes that one knows general facts of the form 'X is a reliable symptom of Y'. | |
From: Wilfrid Sellars (Does Emp.Knowledge have Foundation? [1956], p.123) | |
A reaction: This is a nicely observed version of the regress problem with justification. I would guess that foundationalists would simply deny that this further knowledge is required; 'this is green' arises out of the experience, but it is not an inference. |
9275 | Knowledge does not need minds or nervous systems; it is found in all living things [Gray] |
Full Idea: Knowledge does not need minds, or even nervous systems. It is found in all living things. | |
From: John Gray (Straw Dogs [2002], 2.10) | |
A reaction: I consider it a misnomer to call such things 'knowledge', for which I have much higher standards. Gray is talking about 'information'. Knowledge needs reasons, and possibility of error, not just anticipatory behaviour. |
9276 | The will hardly ever does anything; most of our life just happens to us [Gray] |
Full Idea: We think our actions express our decisions, but in nearly all of our life, willing decides nothing. We cannot wake up or fall asleep, remember or forget our dreams, summon or banish our thoughts, by deciding to do so. | |
From: John Gray (Straw Dogs [2002], 2.12) | |
A reaction: Gray's point does not rule out occasional total control over mental life, but his point is important. The traditional picture is of a life controlled, so the will is seen as at the centre of a person, but it just isn't the case. |
6382 | The 'grain problem' says physical objects are granular, where sensations appear not to be [Sellars, by Polger] |
Full Idea: Sellars' Grain Problem contended that it was a problem for materialism that physical objects have a granularity whereas sensations are homogeneous and without grain. | |
From: report of Wilfrid Sellars (Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind [1956], Ch. n22) by Thomas W. Polger - Natural Minds Ch.1 n22 | |
A reaction: This doesn't strike me as a serious problem. I assume that my sensations are granular, but at a level too fine for me to introspect. There are three hundred trillion connections in the brain (Idea 2952), a lot of them involved in sensations. |
8791 | The concept of 'green' involves a battery of other concepts [Sellars] |
Full Idea: One can only have the concept of green by having a whole battery of concepts of which it is one element. | |
From: Wilfrid Sellars (Does Emp.Knowledge have Foundation? [1956], p.120) | |
A reaction: This points in the direction of holism about language and thought, but need not imply it. It might be that concepts have to be learned in small families. It is not clear, though, what is absolutely essential to 'green', except that it indicates colour. |
9278 | Nowadays we identify the free life with the good life [Gray] |
Full Idea: We do not value freedom more than people did in earlier times, but we have identified the good life with the chosen life. | |
From: John Gray (Straw Dogs [2002], 3.13) | |
A reaction: Interesting. This is Enlightenment liberalism gradually filtering down into common consciousness, especially via the hegemony of American culture. I sympathise the Gray; don't get me wrong, but I think freedom is overrated. |
8326 | Science has shown that causal relations are just transfers of energy or momentum [Fair, by Sosa/Tooley] |
Full Idea: Basic causal relations can, as a consequence of our scientific knowledge, be identified with certain physicalistic [sic] relations between objects that can be characterized in terms of transference of either energy or momentum between objects. | |
From: report of David Fair (Causation and the Flow of Energy [1979]) by E Sosa / M Tooley - Introduction to 'Causation' §1 | |
A reaction: Presumably a transfer of momentum is a transfer of energy. If only anyone had the foggiest idea what energy actually is, we'd be doing well. What is energy made of? 'No identity without substance', I say. I like Fair's idea. |
10379 | Fair shifted his view to talk of counterfactuals about energy flow [Fair, by Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: Fair, who originated the energy flow view of causation, moved to a view that understands connection in terms of counterfactuals about energy flow. | |
From: report of David Fair (Causation and the Flow of Energy [1979]) by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 2.1.2 | |
A reaction: David Fair was a pupil of David Lewis, the king of the counterfactual view. To me that sounds like a disappointing move, but it is hard to think that a mere flow of energy through space would amount to causation. Cause must work back from an effect. |
9280 | Over forty percent of the Earth's living tissue is human [Gray] |
Full Idea: Humans co-opt over forty per cent of the Earth's living tissue. | |
From: John Gray (Straw Dogs [2002], 4.15) | |
A reaction: If you add our domestic animals, I understand that the figure goes up to 95 per cent! I take this to be virtually the only significant ecological fact - population, population, population. Why are there so many cars? So many carbon footprints? |
23061 | Free atheism should start by questioning its faith in humanity [Gray] |
Full Idea: A free-thinking atheism would begin by questioning the prevailing faith in humanity. But there is little prospect of contemporary atheists giving up their reverence for this phantom. | |
From: John Gray (Seven Types of Atheism [2018], Conc) | |
A reaction: He seems to be referring to 'humanism', which I take to be quite different from atheism. I take it as obvious that simple atheism is entirely neutral on the question of whether we should have 'faith' in humanity (which presumably mean optimism). |
23057 | Gnosticism has a supreme creator God, giving way to a possibly hostile Demiurge [Gray] |
Full Idea: Gnostic traditions envisage a supreme God that created the universe and then withdrew into itself, leaving the world to be ruled by a lesser god, or Demiurge, which might be indifferent or hostile to mankind. | |
From: John Gray (Seven Types of Atheism [2018], Intro) | |
A reaction: It doesn't seem to solve any problems, given that the first God is 'supreme', and is therefore responsible for the introduction and actions of the later Demiurge. |
23056 | Judaism only became monotheistic around 550 BCE [Gray] |
Full Idea: It was only sometime around the sixth century BC, during the period when the Israelites returned to Jerusalem, that the idea that there is only one God emerged in Jewish religion. | |
From: John Gray (Seven Types of Atheism [2018], Intro) | |
A reaction: There seems to be a parallel move among the Greeks to elevate Zeus to special status. |
9272 | Without Christianity we lose the idea that human history has a meaning [Gray] |
Full Idea: For Christians, it is because they occur in history that the lives of humans have a meaning that the lives of other animals do not. ..If we truly leave Christianity behind, we must give up the idea that human history has a meaning. | |
From: John Gray (Straw Dogs [2002], 2.3) | |
A reaction: Interesting. Compare the dispute between 'whig' and 'tory' historians, the former of whom believe that history is going somewhere. |
9279 | What was our original sin, and how could Christ's suffering redeem it? [Gray] |
Full Idea: No one can say what was humankind's original sin, and no one understands how the suffering of Christ can redeem it. | |
From: John Gray (Straw Dogs [2002], 4.1) | |
A reaction: This nicely articulates a problem that has half bothered me, but I have never put into words. I always assumed Eve committed the sin, and Adam cops the blame for not controlling his woman. Dying for our sins has always puzzled me. |
23055 | Christians introduced the idea that a religion needs a creed [Gray] |
Full Idea: The notion that religions are creeds - lists of propositions or doctrines that everyone must accept or reject - emerged only with Christianity. | |
From: John Gray (Seven Types of Atheism [2018], Intro) | |
A reaction: With a creed comes the possibility of heresy. I''m not happy with children being taught to recite something which begins 'I believe…', but which they have never thought about and barely understand. |
23058 | Buddhism has no divinity or souls, and the aim is to lose the illusion of a self [Gray] |
Full Idea: Buddhism says nothing of any divine mind and rejects any idea of the soul. The world consists of processes and events. The human sense of self is an illusion; freedom is found in ridding oneself of this illusion. | |
From: John Gray (Seven Types of Atheism [2018], Intro) | |
A reaction: I'm not clear why shaking off the illusion of a self is a superior state. Freedom to do what? Presumably nothing at all, since there is no self to desire anything. |