71 ideas
| 3695 | Philosophy is a priori if it is anything [Bonjour] |
| Full Idea: My conviction is that philosophy is a priori if it is anything. | |
| From: Laurence Bonjour (In Defence of Pure Reason [1998], Pref) | |
| A reaction: How about knowledge of a posteriori necessities, such as the length of a metre, known by observation of the standard metre in Paris? |
| 3651 | Perceiving necessary connections is the essence of reasoning [Bonjour] |
| Full Idea: If one never in fact grasps any necessary connections between anything, it is hard to see what reasoning could possible amount to. | |
| From: Laurence Bonjour (In Defence of Pure Reason [1998], §4.3) |
| 3700 | Coherence can't be validated by appeal to coherence [Bonjour] |
| Full Idea: The epistemic authority of coherence cannot itself be established by appeal to coherence. | |
| From: Laurence Bonjour (In Defence of Pure Reason [1998], §3.7 n50) | |
| A reaction: The standard approach amongs modern philosophers (following, I think, Kripke) is to insist on 'intuition' as basic, despite all its problems. I have no better suggestion. |
| 8893 | For any given area, there seem to be a huge number of possible coherent systems of beliefs [Bonjour] |
| Full Idea: The 2nd standard objection to coherence is 'alternative coherent systems' - that there will be indefinitely many possible systems of belief in relation to any given subject area, each as internally coherent as the others. | |
| From: Laurence Bonjour (A Version of Internalist Foundationalism [2003], 3.2) | |
| A reaction: This seems to imply that you could just invent an explanation, as long as it was coherent, but presumably good coherence is highly sensitive to the actual evidence. Bonjour observes that many of these systems would not survive over time. |
| 15716 | If axioms and their implications have no contradictions, they pass my criterion of truth and existence [Hilbert] |
| Full Idea: If the arbitrarily given axioms do not contradict each other with all their consequences, then they are true and the things defined by the axioms exist. For me this is the criterion of truth and existence. | |
| From: David Hilbert (Letter to Frege 29.12.1899 [1899]), quoted by R Kaplan / E Kaplan - The Art of the Infinite 2 'Mind' | |
| A reaction: If an axiom says something equivalent to 'fairies exist, but they are totally undetectable', this would seem to avoid contradiction with anything, and hence be true. Hilbert's idea sounds crazy to me. He developed full Formalism later. |
| 18844 | You would cripple mathematics if you denied Excluded Middle [Hilbert] |
| Full Idea: Taking the principle of Excluded Middle away from the mathematician would be the same, say, as prohibiting the astronomer from using the telescope or the boxer from using his fists. | |
| From: David Hilbert (The Foundations of Mathematics [1927], p.476), quoted by Ian Rumfitt - The Boundary Stones of Thought 9.4 | |
| A reaction: [p.476 in Van Heijenoort] |
| 17963 | The facts of geometry, arithmetic or statics order themselves into theories [Hilbert] |
| Full Idea: The facts of geometry order themselves into a geometry, the facts of arithmetic into a theory of numbers, the facts of statics, electrodynamics into a theory of statics, electrodynamics, or the facts of the physics of gases into a theory of gases. | |
| From: David Hilbert (Axiomatic Thought [1918], [03]) | |
| A reaction: This is the confident (I would say 'essentialist') view of axioms, which received a bit of a setback with Gödel's Theorems. I certainly agree that the world proposes an order to us - we don't just randomly invent one that suits us. |
| 17966 | Axioms must reveal their dependence (or not), and must be consistent [Hilbert] |
| Full Idea: If a theory is to serve its purpose of orienting and ordering, it must first give us an overview of the independence and dependence of its propositions, and second give a guarantee of the consistency of all of the propositions. | |
| From: David Hilbert (Axiomatic Thought [1918], [09]) | |
| A reaction: Gödel's Second theorem showed that the theory can never prove its own consistency, which made the second Hilbert requirement more difficult. It is generally assumed that each of the axioms must be independent of the others. |
| 4261 | The Lottery Paradox says each ticket is likely to lose, so there probably won't be a winner [Bonjour, by PG] |
| Full Idea: The Lottery Paradox says that for 100 tickets and one winner, each ticket has a .99 likelihood of defeat, so they are all likely to lose, so there is unlikely to be a winner. | |
| From: report of Laurence Bonjour (Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge [1980], §5) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
| A reaction: The problem seems to be viewing each ticket in isolation. If I buy two tickets, I increase my chances of winning. |
| 8717 | Hilbert wanted to prove the consistency of all of mathematics (which realists take for granted) [Hilbert, by Friend] |
| Full Idea: Hilbert wanted to derive ideal mathematics from the secure, paradox-free, finite mathematics (known as 'Hilbert's Programme'). ...Note that for the realist consistency is not something we need to prove; it is a precondition of thought. | |
| From: report of David Hilbert (works [1900], 6.7) by Michèle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics | |
| A reaction: I am an intuitive realist, though I am not so sure about that on cautious reflection. Compare the claims that there are reasons or causes for everything. Reality cannot contain contradicitions (can it?). Contradictions would be our fault. |
| 12456 | I aim to establish certainty for mathematical methods [Hilbert] |
| Full Idea: The goal of my theory is to establish once and for all the certitude of mathematical methods. | |
| From: David Hilbert (On the Infinite [1925], p.184) | |
| A reaction: This is the clearest statement of the famous Hilbert Programme, which is said to have been brought to an abrupt end by Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems. |
| 12461 | We believe all mathematical problems are solvable [Hilbert] |
| Full Idea: The thesis that every mathematical problem is solvable - we are all convinced that it really is so. | |
| From: David Hilbert (On the Infinite [1925], p.200) | |
| A reaction: This will include, for example, Goldbach's Conjecture (every even is the sum of two primes), which is utterly simple but with no proof anywhere in sight. |
| 13472 | Hilbert aimed to eliminate number from geometry [Hilbert, by Hart,WD] |
| Full Idea: One of Hilbert's aims in 'The Foundations of Geometry' was to eliminate number [as measure of lengths and angles] from geometry. | |
| From: report of David Hilbert (Foundations of Geometry [1899]) by William D. Hart - The Evolution of Logic 2 | |
| A reaction: Presumably this would particularly have to include the elimination of ratios (rather than actual specific lengths). |
| 9633 | No one shall drive us out of the paradise the Cantor has created for us [Hilbert] |
| Full Idea: No one shall drive us out of the paradise the Cantor has created for us. | |
| From: David Hilbert (On the Infinite [1925], p.191), quoted by James Robert Brown - Philosophy of Mathematics | |
| A reaction: This is Hilbert's famous refusal to accept any account of mathematics, such as Kant's, which excludes actual infinities. Cantor had laid out a whole glorious hierarchy of different infinities. |
| 12460 | We extend finite statements with ideal ones, in order to preserve our logic [Hilbert] |
| Full Idea: To preserve the simple formal rules of ordinary Aristotelian logic, we must supplement the finitary statements with ideal statements. | |
| From: David Hilbert (On the Infinite [1925], p.195) | |
| A reaction: I find very appealing the picture of mathematics as rooted in the physical world, and then gradually extended by a series of 'idealisations', which should perhaps be thought of as fictions. |
| 12462 | Only the finite can bring certainty to the infinite [Hilbert] |
| Full Idea: Operating with the infinite can be made certain only by the finitary. | |
| From: David Hilbert (On the Infinite [1925], p.201) | |
| A reaction: See 'Compactness' for one aspect of this claim. I think Hilbert was fighting a rearguard action, and his idea now has few followers. |
| 12455 | The idea of an infinite totality is an illusion [Hilbert] |
| Full Idea: Just as in the limit processes of the infinitesimal calculus, the infinitely large and small proved to be a mere figure of speech, so too we must realise that the infinite in the sense of an infinite totality, used in deductive methods, is an illusion. | |
| From: David Hilbert (On the Infinite [1925], p.184) | |
| A reaction: This is a very authoritative rearguard action. I no longer think the dispute matters much, it being just a dispute over a proposed new meaning for the word 'number'. |
| 12457 | There is no continuum in reality to realise the infinitely small [Hilbert] |
| Full Idea: A homogeneous continuum which admits of the sort of divisibility needed to realise the infinitely small is nowhere to be found in reality. | |
| From: David Hilbert (On the Infinite [1925], p.186) | |
| A reaction: He makes this remark as a response to Planck's new quantum theory (the year before the big works of Heisenberg and Schrödinger). Personally I don't see why infinities should depend on the physical world, since they are imaginary. |
| 17967 | To decide some questions, we must study the essence of mathematical proof itself [Hilbert] |
| Full Idea: It is necessary to study the essence of mathematical proof itself if one wishes to answer such questions as the one about decidability in a finite number of operations. | |
| From: David Hilbert (Axiomatic Thought [1918], [53]) |
| 9546 | Euclid axioms concerns possibilities of construction, but Hilbert's assert the existence of objects [Hilbert, by Chihara] |
| Full Idea: Hilbert's geometrical axioms were existential in character, asserting the existence of certain geometrical objects (points and lines). Euclid's postulates do not assert the existence of anything; they assert the possibility of certain constructions. | |
| From: report of David Hilbert (Foundations of Geometry [1899]) by Charles Chihara - A Structural Account of Mathematics 01.1 | |
| A reaction: Chihara says geometry was originally understood modally, but came to be understood existentially. It seems extraordinary to me that philosophers of mathematics can have become more platonist over the centuries. |
| 18742 | Hilbert's formalisation revealed implicit congruence axioms in Euclid [Hilbert, by Horsten/Pettigrew] |
| Full Idea: In his formal investigation of Euclidean geometry, Hilbert uncovered congruence axioms that implicitly played a role in Euclid's proofs but were not explicitly recognised. | |
| From: report of David Hilbert (Foundations of Geometry [1899]) by Horsten,L/Pettigrew,R - Mathematical Methods in Philosophy 2 | |
| A reaction: The writers are offering this as a good example of the benefits of a precise and formal approach to foundational questions. It's hard to disagree, but dispiriting if you need a PhD in maths before you can start doing philosophy. |
| 18217 | Hilbert's geometry is interesting because it captures Euclid without using real numbers [Hilbert, by Field,H] |
| Full Idea: Hilbert's formulation of the Euclidean theory is of special interest because (besides being rigorously axiomatised) it does not employ the real numbers in the axioms. | |
| From: report of David Hilbert (Foundations of Geometry [1899]) by Hartry Field - Science without Numbers 3 | |
| A reaction: Notice that this job was done by Hilbert, and not by the fictionalist Hartry Field. |
| 17965 | The whole of Euclidean geometry derives from a basic equation and transformations [Hilbert] |
| Full Idea: The linearity of the equation of the plane and of the orthogonal transformation of point-coordinates is completely adequate to produce the whole broad science of spatial Euclidean geometry purely by means of analysis. | |
| From: David Hilbert (Axiomatic Thought [1918], [05]) | |
| A reaction: This remark comes from the man who succeeded in producing modern axioms for geometry (in 1897), so he knows what he is talking about. We should not be wholly pessimistic about Hilbert's ambitious projects. He had to dig deeper than this idea... |
| 17964 | Number theory just needs calculation laws and rules for integers [Hilbert] |
| Full Idea: The laws of calculation and the rules of integers suffice for the construction of number theory. | |
| From: David Hilbert (Axiomatic Thought [1918], [05]) | |
| A reaction: This is the confident Hilbert view that the whole system can be fully spelled out. Gödel made this optimism more difficult. |
| 17697 | The existence of an arbitrarily large number refutes the idea that numbers come from experience [Hilbert] |
| Full Idea: The standpoint of pure experience seems to me to be refuted by the objection that the existence, possible or actual, of an arbitrarily large number can never be derived through experience, that is, through experiment. | |
| From: David Hilbert (On the Foundations of Logic and Arithmetic [1904], p.130) | |
| A reaction: Alternatively, empiricism refutes infinite numbers! No modern mathematician will accept that, but you wonder in what sense the proposed entities qualify as 'numbers'. |
| 17698 | Logic already contains some arithmetic, so the two must be developed together [Hilbert] |
| Full Idea: In the traditional exposition of the laws of logic certain fundamental arithmetic notions are already used, for example in the notion of set, and to some extent also of number. Thus we turn in a circle, and a partly simultaneous development is required. | |
| From: David Hilbert (On the Foundations of Logic and Arithmetic [1904], p.131) | |
| A reaction: If the Axiom of Infinity is meant, it may be possible to purge the arithmetic from the logic. Then the challenge to derive arithmetic from it becomes rather tougher. |
| 10113 | The grounding of mathematics is 'in the beginning was the sign' [Hilbert] |
| Full Idea: The solid philosophical attitude that I think is required for the grounding of pure mathematics is this: In the beginning was the sign. | |
| From: David Hilbert (works [1900]), quoted by A.George / D.J.Velleman - Philosophies of Mathematics Ch.6 | |
| A reaction: Why did people invent those particular signs? Presumably they were meant to designate something, in the world or in our experience. |
| 10115 | Hilbert substituted a syntactic for a semantic account of consistency [Hilbert, by George/Velleman] |
| Full Idea: Hilbert replaced a semantic construal of inconsistency (that the theory entails a statement that is necessarily false) by a syntactic one (that the theory formally derives the statement (0 =1 ∧ 0 not-= 1). | |
| From: report of David Hilbert (works [1900]) by A.George / D.J.Velleman - Philosophies of Mathematics Ch.6 | |
| A reaction: Finding one particular clash will pinpoint the notion of inconsistency, but it doesn't seem to define what it means, since the concept has very wide application. |
| 22293 | Hilbert said (to block paradoxes) that mathematical existence is entailed by consistency [Hilbert, by Potter] |
| Full Idea: Hilbert proposed to circuvent the paradoxes by means of the doctrine (already proposed by Poincaré) that in mathematics consistency entails existence. | |
| From: report of David Hilbert (On the Concept of Number [1900], p.183) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 19 'Exist' | |
| A reaction: Interesting. Hilbert's idea has struck me as weird, but it makes sense if its main motive is to block the paradoxes. Roughly, the idea is 'it exists if it isn't paradoxical'. A low bar for existence (but then it is only in mathematics!). |
| 12459 | The subject matter of mathematics is immediate and clear concrete symbols [Hilbert] |
| Full Idea: The subject matter of mathematics is the concrete symbols themselves whose structure is immediately clear and recognisable. | |
| From: David Hilbert (On the Infinite [1925], p.192) | |
| A reaction: I don't think many people will agree with Hilbert here. Does he mean token-symbols or type-symbols? You can do maths in your head, or with different symbols. If type-symbols, you have to explain what a type is. |
| 10116 | Hilbert aimed to prove the consistency of mathematics finitely, to show infinities won't produce contradictions [Hilbert, by George/Velleman] |
| Full Idea: Hilbert's project was to establish the consistency of classical mathematics using just finitary means, to convince all parties that no contradictions will follow from employing the infinitary notions and reasoning. | |
| From: report of David Hilbert (works [1900]) by A.George / D.J.Velleman - Philosophies of Mathematics Ch.6 | |
| A reaction: This is the project which was badly torpedoed by Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem. |
| 18112 | Mathematics divides in two: meaningful finitary statements, and empty idealised statements [Hilbert] |
| Full Idea: We can conceive mathematics to be a stock of two kinds of formulas: first, those to which the meaningful communications of finitary statements correspond; and secondly, other formulas which signify nothing and which are ideal structures of our theory. | |
| From: David Hilbert (On the Infinite [1925], p.196), quoted by David Bostock - Philosophy of Mathematics 6.1 |
| 3697 | The concept of possibility is prior to that of necessity [Bonjour] |
| Full Idea: While necessity and possibility are interdefinable concepts, it is the idea of a possible world or situation which is intuitively primary. | |
| From: Laurence Bonjour (In Defence of Pure Reason [1998], §1.3) |
| 8888 | The concept of knowledge is so confused that it is best avoided [Bonjour] |
| Full Idea: The concept of knowledge is seriously problematic in more than one way, and is best avoided as far as possible in sober epistemological discussion. | |
| From: Laurence Bonjour (A Version of Internalist Foundationalism [2003], 1.5) | |
| A reaction: Two sorts of states seem to be conflated: one where an animal has a true belief caused by an environmental event, and the other where a scholar pores over books and experiments to arrive at a hard-won truth. I say only the second is 'knowledge'. |
| 9636 | My theory aims at the certitude of mathematical methods [Hilbert] |
| Full Idea: The goal of my theory is to establish once and for all the certitude of mathematical methods. | |
| From: David Hilbert (On the Infinite [1925], p.184), quoted by James Robert Brown - Philosophy of Mathematics Ch.5 | |
| A reaction: This dream is famous for being shattered by Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem a mere six years later. Neverless there seem to be more limited certainties which are accepted in mathematics. The certainty of the whole of arithmetic is beyond us. |
| 8887 | It is hard to give the concept of 'self-evident' a clear and defensible characterization [Bonjour] |
| Full Idea: Foundationalists find it difficult to attach a clear and defensible content to the idea that basic beliefs that are characterized as 'self-justified' or 'self-evident'. | |
| From: Laurence Bonjour (A Version of Internalist Foundationalism [2003], 1.4) | |
| A reaction: A little surprising from a fan of a priori foundations, especially given that 'self-evident' is common usage, and not just philosophers' jargon. I think we can talk of self-evidence without a precise definition. We talk of an 'ocean' without trouble. |
| 8897 | The adverbial account will still be needed when a mind apprehends its sense-data [Bonjour] |
| Full Idea: The adverbial account of the content of experience is almost certainly correct, because no account can be given of the relation between sense-data and the apprehending mind that is independent of the adverbial theory. | |
| From: Laurence Bonjour (A Version of Internalist Foundationalism [2003], 5.1 n3) | |
| A reaction: This boils down to the usual objection to sense-data, which is 'cut out the middle man'. Bonjour is right that at some point the mind has finally to experience whatever is coming in, and it must experience it in a particular way. |
| 3707 | Our rules of thought can only be judged by pure rational insight [Bonjour] |
| Full Idea: Criteria or rules do not somehow apply to themselves. They must be judged by the sort of rational insight or intuition that the rationalist is advocating. | |
| From: Laurence Bonjour (In Defence of Pure Reason [1998], §5.2) |
| 3704 | Moderate rationalists believe in fallible a priori justification [Bonjour] |
| Full Idea: Moderate rationalism preserves a priori justification, but rejects the idea that it is infallible. | |
| From: Laurence Bonjour (In Defence of Pure Reason [1998], §4.1) |
| 4255 | Externalist theories of knowledge are one species of foundationalism [Bonjour] |
| Full Idea: Externalist theories of knowledge are one species of foundationalism. | |
| From: Laurence Bonjour (Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge [1980], Intro) | |
| A reaction: I don't see why there shouldn't be a phenomenalist, anti-realist version of externalism, which just has 'starting points' instead of a serious commitment to foundations. |
| 4257 | The big problem for foundationalism is to explain how basic beliefs are possible [Bonjour] |
| Full Idea: The fundamental question that must be answered by any acceptable version of foundationalism is: how are basic beliefs possible? | |
| From: Laurence Bonjour (Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge [1980], §I) | |
| A reaction: This question seems to be asking for a justification for basic beliefs, which smacks of 'Who made God?' Look, basic beliefs are just basic, right? |
| 8896 | Conscious states have built-in awareness of content, so we know if a conceptual description of it is correct [Bonjour] |
| Full Idea: If we describe a non-conceptual conscious state, we are aware of its character via the constitutive or 'built-in' awareness of content without need for a conceptual description, and so recognise that a conceptually formulated belief about it is correct. | |
| From: Laurence Bonjour (A Version of Internalist Foundationalism [2003], 4.3) | |
| A reaction: This is Bonjour working very hard to find an account of primitive sense experiences which will enable them to function as 'basic beliefs' for foundations, without being too thin to do anything, or too thick to be basic. I'm not convinced. |
| 3706 | A priori justification can vary in degree [Bonjour] |
| Full Idea: A priori justification can vary in degree. | |
| From: Laurence Bonjour (In Defence of Pure Reason [1998], §4.5) | |
| A reaction: This idea, which I trace back at least to Russell, seems to me one of breakthrough ideas in modern thought. It means that a priori knowledge can be reconnected with a posteriori knowledge. |
| 3703 | You can't explain away a priori justification as analyticity, and you can't totally give it up [Bonjour] |
| Full Idea: Moderate empiricists try unsuccessfully to explain a priori justification by means of analyticity, and radical empiricist attempts to dispense with a priori justification end in nearly total scepticism. | |
| From: Laurence Bonjour (In Defence of Pure Reason [1998], §4.1) | |
| A reaction: My working theory is neither of the above. Because we can abstract from the physical world, we can directly see/experience generalised (and even necessary) truths about it. |
| 3696 | A priori justification requires understanding but no experience [Bonjour] |
| Full Idea: A proposition will count as being justified a priori as long as no appeal to experience is needed for the proposition to be justified - once it is understood. | |
| From: Laurence Bonjour (In Defence of Pure Reason [1998], §1.2) | |
| A reaction: Could you 'understand' that a square cannot be circular without appeal to experience? I'm losing faith in the pure a priori. |
| 4256 | The main argument for foundationalism is that all other theories involve a regress leading to scepticism [Bonjour] |
| Full Idea: The central argument for foundationalism is simply that all other possible outcomes of the regress of justifications lead inexorably to scepticism. | |
| From: Laurence Bonjour (Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge [1980], §I) | |
| A reaction: If you prefer coherence to foundations, you need the security of reason to assess the coherence (which seems to be an internal foundation!). |
| 3699 | The induction problem blocks any attempted proof of physical statements [Bonjour] |
| Full Idea: The attempt to prove physical statements on the basis of sensory evidence is defeated by the problem of induction. | |
| From: Laurence Bonjour (In Defence of Pure Reason [1998], §3.6) | |
| A reaction: This sounds like a logician's use of the word 'prove', which would be a pretty forlorn hope. Insofar as experience proves anything, fully sensing a chair proves its existence. |
| 21506 | A coherence theory of justification can combine with a correspondence theory of truth [Bonjour] |
| Full Idea: There is no manifest absurdity in combining a coherence theory of justification with a correspondence theory of truth. | |
| From: Laurence Bonjour (The Structure of Empirical Knowledge [1985], 5.1) | |
| A reaction: His point is to sharply (and correctly) distinguish coherent justification from a coherence theory of truth. Personally I would recommend talking of a 'robust' theory of truth, without tricky commitment to 'correspondence' between very dissimilar things. |
| 21509 | There will always be a vast number of equally coherent but rival systems [Bonjour] |
| Full Idea: On any plausible conception of coherence, there will always be many, probably infinitely many, different and incompatible systems of belief which are equally coherent. | |
| From: Laurence Bonjour (The Structure of Empirical Knowledge [1985], 5.5) | |
| A reaction: If 'infinitely many' theories are allowed, that blocks the coherentist hope that widening and precisifying the system will narrow down the options and offer some verisimilitude. If we stick to current English expression, that should keep them finite. |
| 21503 | Empirical coherence must attribute reliability to spontaneous experience [Bonjour] |
| Full Idea: An empirical coherence theory needs, for the beliefs of a cognitive system to be even candidates for empirical justification, that the system must contain laws attributing a high degree of reliability to a variety of spontaneous cognitive beliefs. | |
| From: Laurence Bonjour (The Structure of Empirical Knowledge [1985], 7.1) | |
| A reaction: Wanting such a 'law' seems optimistic, and not in the spirit of true coherentism, which can individually evaluate each experiential belief. I'm not sure Bonjour's Observation Requirement is needed, since it is incoherent to neglect observations. |
| 21504 | The best explanation of coherent observations is they are caused by and correspond to reality [Bonjour] |
| Full Idea: The best explanation for a stable system of beliefs which rely on observation is that the beliefs are caused by what they depict, and the system roughly corresponds to the independent reality it describes. | |
| From: Laurence Bonjour (The Structure of Empirical Knowledge [1985], 8.3) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] Anyone who links best explanation to coherence (and to induction) warms the cockles of my heart. Erik Olson offers a critique, but doesn't convince me. The alternative is to find a better explanation (than reality), or give up. |
| 21511 | A well written novel cannot possibly match a real belief system for coherence [Bonjour] |
| Full Idea: It is not even minimally plausible that a well written novel ...would have the degree of coherence required to be a serious alternative to anyone's actual system of beliefs. | |
| From: Laurence Bonjour (The Structure of Empirical Knowledge [1985], 5.5) | |
| A reaction: This seems correct. 'Bleak House' is wonderfully consistent, but its elements are entirely verbal, and nothing occupies the space between the facts that are described. And Lady Dedlock is not in Debrett. I think this kills a standard objection. |
| 21510 | The objection that a negated system is equally coherent assume that coherence is consistency [Bonjour] |
| Full Idea: Sometimes it is said that if one has an appropriately coherent system, an alternative system can be produced simply be negating all of the components of the first system. This would only be so if coherence amounted simply to consistency. | |
| From: Laurence Bonjour (The Structure of Empirical Knowledge [1985], 5.5) | |
| A reaction: I associate Russell with this original objection to coherentism. I formerly took this to be a serious problem, and am now relieved to see that it clearly isn't. |
| 21505 | A coherent system can be justified with initial beliefs lacking all credibility [Bonjour] |
| Full Idea: It is simply not necessary in order for [the coherence] view to yield justification to suppose that cognitively spontaneous beliefs have some degree of initial or independent credibility. | |
| From: Laurence Bonjour (The Structure of Empirical Knowledge [1985], 7.2) | |
| A reaction: This is thoroughly and rather persuasively criticised by Erik Olson. But he always focuses on the coherence of a 'system' with multiple beliefs. I take the credibility of each individual belief to need coherent assessment against a full background. |
| 8891 | My incoherent beliefs about art should not undermine my very coherent beliefs about physics [Bonjour] |
| Full Idea: If coherentism is construed as involving the believer's entire body of beliefs, that would imply, most implausibly, that the justification of a belief in one area (physics) could be undermined by serious incoherence in another area (art history). | |
| From: Laurence Bonjour (A Version of Internalist Foundationalism [2003], 3.1) | |
| A reaction: Bonjour suggests that a moderated coherentism is needed to avoid this rather serious problem. It is hard to see how a precise specification could be given of 'areas' and 'local coherence'. An idiot about art would inspire little confidence on physics. |
| 8892 | Coherence seems to justify empirical beliefs about externals when there is no external input [Bonjour] |
| Full Idea: The 1st standard objection to coherence is the 'isolation problem', that contingent apparently-empirical beliefs might be justified in the absence of any informational input from the extra-conceptual world they attempt to describe. | |
| From: Laurence Bonjour (A Version of Internalist Foundationalism [2003], 3.2) | |
| A reaction: False beliefs can be well justified. In a perfect virtual reality we would believe our experiences precisely because they were so coherent. Messengers from the front line have top priority, but how do you detect infiltrators and liars? |
| 8894 | Coherentists must give a reason why coherent justification is likely to lead to the truth [Bonjour] |
| Full Idea: The 3rd standard objection to coherence is the demand for a meta-justification for coherence, a reason for thinking that justification on the basis of the coherentist view of justification is in fact likely to lead to believing the truth. | |
| From: Laurence Bonjour (A Version of Internalist Foundationalism [2003], 3.2) | |
| A reaction: Some coherentists respond by adopting a coherence theory of truth, which strikes me as extremely unwise. There must be an underlying optimistic view, centred on the principle of sufficient reason, that reality itself is coherent. I like Idea 8618. |
| 4258 | Extreme externalism says no more justification is required than the truth of the belief [Bonjour] |
| Full Idea: The most extreme version of externalism would be one that held that the external condition required for justification is simply the truth of the belief in question. | |
| From: Laurence Bonjour (Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge [1980], §II) | |
| A reaction: The question is, why should we demand any more than this? The problem case is, traditionally, the lucky guess, but naturalist may say that these just don't occur with any regularity. We only get beliefs right because they are true. |
| 3701 | Externalist theories of justification don't require believers to have reasons for their beliefs [Bonjour] |
| Full Idea: An externalist theory of epistemic justification or warrant need not involve the possession by the believer of anything like a reason for thinking that their belief is true. | |
| From: Laurence Bonjour (In Defence of Pure Reason [1998], §3.7) | |
| A reaction: That is the problem with externalism. If the believer does not have a reason, then why would they believe? Externalists are interesting on justification, but daft about belief. Why do I believe I know something, when I can't recall how I learnt it? |
| 8889 | Reliabilists disagree over whether some further requirement is needed to produce knowledge [Bonjour] |
| Full Idea: Reliabilist views differ among themselves with regard to whether a belief's being produced in a reliable way is by itself sufficient for epistemic justification or whether there are further requirements that must be satisfied as well. | |
| From: Laurence Bonjour (A Version of Internalist Foundationalism [2003], 2.1) | |
| A reaction: If 'further requirements' are needed, the crucial question would be which one is trumps when they clash. If the further requirements can correct the reliable source, then it cannot any longer be called 'reliabilism'. It's Further-requirement-ism. |
| 4259 | External reliability is not enough, if the internal state of the believer is known to be irrational [Bonjour] |
| Full Idea: External or objective reliability is not enough to offset subjective irrationality (such as unexplained clairvoyance). | |
| From: Laurence Bonjour (Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge [1980], §IV) | |
| A reaction: A good argument. Where do animals fit into this? If your clairvoyance kept working, in the end you might concede that you 'knew', even though you were baffled about how you managed it. |
| 8890 | If the reliable facts producing a belief are unknown to me, my belief is not rational or responsible [Bonjour] |
| Full Idea: How can the fact that a belief is reliably produced make my acceptance of that belief rational and responsible when that fact itself is entirely unavailable to me? | |
| From: Laurence Bonjour (A Version of Internalist Foundationalism [2003], 2.2) | |
| A reaction: This question must rival Pollock's proposal (Idea 8815) as the master argument against externalism. Bonjour is assuming that knowledge has to be 'rational and responsible', but clearly externalists take a more lax view of knowledge. |
| 4260 | Even if there is no obvious irrationality, it may be irrational to base knowledge entirely on external criteria [Bonjour] |
| Full Idea: It may be that where there are no positive grounds for a charge of irrationality, the acceptance of a belief with only external justification is still subjectively irrational in a sense that rules out its being epistemologically justified. | |
| From: Laurence Bonjour (Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge [1980], §IV) | |
| A reaction: A key objection. Surely rational behaviour requires a judgement to be made before a belief is accepted? If you are consistently clairvoyant, you must ask why. |
| 3702 | Externalism means we have no reason to believe, which is strong scepticism [Bonjour] |
| Full Idea: If externalism is the final story, we have no reason to think that any of our beliefs are true, which amounts to a very strong and intuitively implausible version of scepticism. | |
| From: Laurence Bonjour (In Defence of Pure Reason [1998], §3.7) | |
| A reaction: A very good point. I may, like a cat, know many things, with good external support, but as soon as I ask sceptical questions, I sink without trace if I lack internal reasons. |
| 21508 | Anomalies challenge the claim that the basic explanations are actually basic [Bonjour] |
| Full Idea: The distinctive significance of anomalies lies in the fact that they undermine the claim of the allegedly basic explanatory principles to be genuinely basic. | |
| From: Laurence Bonjour (The Structure of Empirical Knowledge [1985], 5.3) | |
| A reaction: This seems plausible, suggesting that (rather than an anomaly flatly 'falsifying' a theory) an anomaly may just demand a restructuring or reconceptualising of the theory. |
| 3709 | Induction must go beyond the evidence, in order to explain why the evidence occurred [Bonjour] |
| Full Idea: Inductive explanations must be conceived of as something stronger than mere Humean constant conjunction; …anything less than this will not explain why the inductive evidence occurred in the first place. | |
| From: Laurence Bonjour (In Defence of Pure Reason [1998], §7.7) |
| 8895 | If neither the first-level nor the second-level is itself conscious, there seems to be no consciousness present [Bonjour] |
| Full Idea: In the higher-order thought theory of consciousness, if the first-order thought is not itself conscious and the second-order thought is not itself conscious, then there seems to be no consciousness of the first-level content present at all. | |
| From: Laurence Bonjour (A Version of Internalist Foundationalism [2003], 4.2) | |
| A reaction: A nice basic question. The only plausible answer seems to be that consciousness arises out of the combination of levels. Otherwise one of the levels is redundant, or we are facing a regress. |
| 3708 | All thought represents either properties or indexicals [Bonjour] |
| Full Idea: I assume that the contents of thought can be accounted for by appeal to just two general sorts of ingredient - properties (including relations) and indexicals. | |
| From: Laurence Bonjour (In Defence of Pure Reason [1998], §6.7) | |
| A reaction: I don't accept that relations are a type of properties. Since he does not include objects or substances, I take it that he considers objects to be bundles of properties. |
| 3698 | Indeterminacy of translation is actually indeterminacy of meaning and belief [Bonjour] |
| Full Idea: The thesis of the indeterminacy of translation would be better described as the thesis of the indeterminacy of meaning and belief. | |
| From: Laurence Bonjour (In Defence of Pure Reason [1998], §3.5) | |
| A reaction: Not necessarily. It is not incoherent to believe that the target people have a coherent and stable system of meaning and belief, but finding its translation indeterminate because it is holistic, and rooted in a way of life. |
| 17968 | By digging deeper into the axioms we approach the essence of sciences, and unity of knowedge [Hilbert] |
| Full Idea: By pushing ahead to ever deeper layers of axioms ...we also win ever-deeper insights into the essence of scientific thought itself, and become ever more conscious of the unity of our knowledge. | |
| From: David Hilbert (Axiomatic Thought [1918], [56]) | |
| A reaction: This is the less fashionable idea that scientific essentialism can also be applicable in the mathematic sciences, centring on the project of axiomatisation for logic, arithmetic, sets etc. |
| 6011 | There is a remote first god (the Good), and a second god who organises the material world [Numenius, by O'Meara] |
| Full Idea: Numenius argues that material reality depends on intelligible being, which depends on a first god - the Good - which is difficult to grasp, but which inspires a second god to imitate it, turning to matter and organizing it as the world. | |
| From: report of Numenius (fragments/reports [c.160]) by Dominic J. O'Meara - Numenius | |
| A reaction: The interaction problem comes either between the two gods, or between the second god and the world. The argument may have failed to catch on for long when people scented an infinite regress lurking in the middle of it. |