38 ideas
4739 | In "if and only if" (iff), "if" expresses the sufficient condition, and "only if" the necessary condition [Engel] |
Full Idea: Necessary and sufficient conditions are usually expressed by "if and only if" (abbr. "iff"), where "if" is the sufficient condition, and "only if" is the necessary condition. | |
From: Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §1.1) | |
A reaction: 'I take my umbrella if and only if it is raining' (oh, and if I'm still alive). There may be other necessary conditions than the one specified. Oh, and I take it if my wife slips it into my car… |
4262 | If the only aim was consistent beliefs then new evidence and experiments would be irrelevant [Goldman] |
Full Idea: If mere consistency is our aim in achieving a coherent set of beliefs, then new evidence and experiments are irrelevant. | |
From: Alvin I. Goldman (The Internalist Conception of Justification [1980], §VIII) | |
A reaction: An important reminder. What epistemic duty requires us to attend to anomalous observations, instead of sweeping them under the carpet? |
4737 | Are truth-bearers propositions, or ideas/beliefs, or sentences/utterances? [Engel] |
Full Idea: The tradition of the Stoics and Frege says that truth-bearers are propositions, Descartes and the classical empiricist say they are ideas or beliefs, and Ockham and Quine say they are sentences or utterances. | |
From: Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §1.1) | |
A reaction: I'm with propositions, which are unambiguous, can be expressed in a variety of ways, embody the 'logical form' of sentences, and could be physically embodied in brains (the language of thought?). |
4750 | The redundancy theory gets rid of facts, for 'it is a fact that p' just means 'p' [Engel] |
Full Idea: The redundancy theory gets rid of facts, for 'it is a fact that p' just means 'p'. | |
From: Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §2.2) | |
A reaction: But then when you ask what p means, you have to give the truth-conditions for its assertion, and you find you have to mention the facts after all. |
4744 | We can't explain the corresponding structure of the world except by referring to our thoughts [Engel] |
Full Idea: The correspondence theory implies displaying an identity or similarity of structure between the contents of thoughts and the way the world is structured, but we seem only to be able to say that the world's structure corresponds to our thoughts. | |
From: Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §1.2) | |
A reaction: I don't accept this. The structure of the world gives rise to our thoughts. There is an epistemological problem here (big time!), but that doesn't alter the metaphysical situation of what truth is supposed to be, which is correspondence. |
4738 | The coherence theory says truth is an internal relationship between groups of truth-bearers [Engel] |
Full Idea: The coherence theory of truth says that it is a relationship between truth-bearers themselves, that is between propositions or beliefs or sentences. | |
From: Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §1.1) | |
A reaction: We immediately begin to wonder how many truth-bearers are required. Two lies can be coherent. It is hard to make thousands of lies coherent, but not impossible. What fixes the critical number. 'All possible propositions' is not much help. |
4745 | Any coherent set of beliefs can be made more coherent by adding some false beliefs [Engel] |
Full Idea: Any coherent set of beliefs can be made more coherent by adding to it one or more false beliefs. | |
From: Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §1.3) | |
A reaction: A simple but rather devastating point. It is the policeman manufacturing a bogus piece of evidence to clinch the conviction, the scientist faking a single observation to fill in the last corner of a promising theory. |
4753 | Deflationism seems to block philosophers' main occupation, asking metatheoretical questions [Engel] |
Full Idea: Deflationism about truth seems to deprive us of any hope of asking genuinely metatheoretical questions, which are the questions that occupy philosophers most of the time. | |
From: Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §2.5) | |
A reaction: This seems like the best reason for moving from deflationism to at least minimalism. Clearly one can talk meaningfully about the success of assertions and theories. You can say a sentence is true, but not assert it. |
4755 | Deflationism cannot explain why we hold beliefs for reasons [Engel] |
Full Idea: The deflationist view is silent about the fact that our assertions and beliefs are generally made or held for certain reasons. | |
From: Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §2.5) | |
A reaction: The point here must be that I attribute strength to my beliefs, depending on how much support I have for them - how much support for their real truth. I scream "That's really TRUE!" when I have very good reasons. |
4751 | Maybe there is no more to be said about 'true' than there is about the function of 'and' in logic [Engel] |
Full Idea: We could compare the status of 'true' with the status of the logical operator 'and' in logic. Once we have explained how it functions to conjoin two propositions, there is not much more to be said about it. | |
From: Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §2.4) | |
A reaction: A good statement of the minimalist view. I don't believe it, because I don't believe that truth is confined to language. An uneasy feeling I can't put into words can turn out to be true. Truth is a relational feature of mental states. |
4752 | Deflationism must reduce bivalence ('p is true or false') to excluded middle ('p or not-p') [Engel] |
Full Idea: It is said that deflationism cannot even formulate the principle of bivalence, for 'either p is true or p is false' will amount to the principle of excluded middle, 'either p or not-p'. | |
From: Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §2.4) | |
A reaction: Presumably deflationists don't lost any sleep over this - in fact, it looks like a good concise way to state the deflationist thesis. However, excluded middle refers to a proposition (not-p) that was never mentioned by bivalence. Cf Idea 6163. |
4045 | Children may have three innate principles which enable them to learn to count [Goldman] |
Full Idea: It has been proposed (on the basis of observations) that young children have three innate principles of counting - one-to-one correspondence of number to item, stable order for numbers, and cardinality (which labels the nth item counted). | |
From: Alvin I. Goldman (Phil Applications of Cognitive Science [1993], p.60) | |
A reaction: I like the idea of observed patterns as central (which is the one-to-one principle). But the other two principles are plausible, and show why pure empiricism won't work. |
4044 | Rat behaviour reveals a considerable ability to count [Goldman] |
Full Idea: Rats can determine the number of times they have pressed a lever up to at least twenty-four presses,…and can consistently turn down the fifth tunnel on the left in a maze. | |
From: Alvin I. Goldman (Phil Applications of Cognitive Science [1993], p.58) | |
A reaction: This seems to encourage an empirical view of maths (pattern recognition?) rather than a Platonic one. Or numbers are innate in rat brains? |
4048 | Infant brains appear to have inbuilt ontological categories [Goldman] |
Full Idea: Infant behaviour implies inbuilt ontological categories of thing, place, event, path, action, sound, manner, amount and number. ...There is an algebra of relationships between them. | |
From: Alvin I. Goldman (Phil Applications of Cognitive Science [1993], p.109) | |
A reaction: Interesting. We would expect the categories in infant brains to have instrumental value, but we don't have to accept them as true. Adults (even Aristotle) are big infants. |
4762 | The Humean theory of motivation is that beliefs may be motivators as well as desires [Engel] |
Full Idea: A problem for the Humean theory of motivation is that it is disputed that beliefs are only representational states, which cannot, unlike desires, move us to act. | |
From: Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §4.2) | |
A reaction: This is a crucial issue for Humeans and empiricists. Rationalists claim that people act for reasons, so that reasons are intrinsically motivational (like the Form of the Good), and reasons may even be considered direct causes of actions. |
4754 | Our beliefs are meant to fit the world (i.e. be true), where we want the world to fit our desires [Engel] |
Full Idea: Belief is said to 'aim at truth', in the sense that beliefs are the kind of mental states that have to be true for the mind to 'fit' the world (where our desires have the opposite 'direction of fit'; the world is supposed to fit our desires). | |
From: Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §2.5) | |
A reaction: I don't think it is possible to give a plausible definition of belief without mentioning truth. Hume's account of them as thoughts with a funny feeling attached is ridiculous. Thinking is an activity, not a passive state. |
4763 | 'Evidentialists' say, and 'voluntarists' deny, that we only believe on the basis of evidence [Engel] |
Full Idea: The 'evidentialists' (such as Locke and Hume) deny, and the 'voluntarists' (such as William James) affirm, that we ought to, or at least may, believe for other reasons than evidential epistemic reasons (e.g. for pragmatic reasons). | |
From: Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §5.2) | |
A reaction: No need to be black-or-white here. Blatant evidence compels belief, but we may also come to believe by spotting a coherence, without additional evidence. We can also be in a state of trying to believe something. But see 4764. |
4043 | Elephants can be correctly identified from as few as three primitive shapes [Goldman] |
Full Idea: An elephant may be fully represented by nine primitive shapes ('geons'), but it may require as few as three geons in appropriate relations to be correctly identified. | |
From: Alvin I. Goldman (Phil Applications of Cognitive Science [1993], p.7) | |
A reaction: Encouraging the idea of the mind as a maker of maps and models |
4049 | The way in which colour experiences are evoked is physically odd and unpredictable [Goldman] |
Full Idea: A unique yellow experience may be evoked with monochrome light of 580nm, or a mixture of 540nm and 670nm. ..Our interpretation of colour experience is a highly idiosyncratic artefact of our visual system. | |
From: Alvin I. Goldman (Phil Applications of Cognitive Science [1993], p.117) | |
A reaction: This confirms what I have always thought - that colour (as qualia) is strictly a feature of minds, not of the world. |
4047 | Gestalt psychology proposes inbuilt proximity, similarity, smoothness and closure principles [Goldman] |
Full Idea: Gestalt psychology claims that there are at least four unlearned factors in perceptual grouping - the principles of proximity (close things), of similarity, of good continuation (extending lines in a smooth course), and closure (which completes figures). | |
From: Alvin I. Goldman (Phil Applications of Cognitive Science [1993], p.103) | |
A reaction: This offers a bridge between Hume's associationism and rationalist claims of innate ideas |
4746 | Pragmatism is better understood as a theory of belief than as a theory of truth [Engel] |
Full Idea: Pragmatism in general is better construed as a certain conception of belief, rather than as a distinctive conception of truth. | |
From: Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §1.5) | |
A reaction: Which is why aspiring relativists drift towards the pragmatic theory - because they want to dispense with truth (and hence knowledge), and put mere belief in its place. |
8830 | A belief can be justified when the person has forgotten the evidence for it [Goldman] |
Full Idea: A characteristic case in which a belief is justified though the cognizer doesn't know that it's justified is where the original evidence for the belief has long since been forgotten. | |
From: Alvin I. Goldman (What is Justified Belief? [1976], II) | |
A reaction: This is a central problem for any very literal version of internalism. The fully rationalist view (to which I incline) will be that the cognizer must make a balanced assessment of whether they once had the evidence. Were my teachers any good? |
6871 | We can't only believe things if we are currently conscious of their justification - there are too many [Goldman] |
Full Idea: Strong internalism says only current conscious states can justify beliefs, but this has the problem of Stored Beliefs, that most of our beliefs are stored in memory, and one's conscious state includes nothing that justifies them. | |
From: Alvin I. Goldman (Internalism Exposed [1999], §2) | |
A reaction: This point seems obviously correct, but one could still have a 'fairly strong' version, which required that you could always call into consciousness the justificiation for any belief that you happened to remember. |
6872 | Internalism must cover Forgotten Evidence, which is no longer retrievable from memory [Goldman] |
Full Idea: Even weak internalism has the problem of Forgotten Evidence; the agent once had adequate evidence that she subsequently forgot; at the time of epistemic appraisal, she no longer has adequate evidence that is retrievable from memory. | |
From: Alvin I. Goldman (Internalism Exposed [1999], §3) | |
A reaction: This is certainly a basic problem for any account of justification. It will rule out any strict requirement that there be actual mental states available to support a belief. Internalism may be pushed to include non-conscious parts of the mind. |
6874 | Internal justification needs both mental stability and time to compute coherence [Goldman] |
Full Idea: The problem for internalists of Doxastic Decision Interval says internal justification must avoid mental change to preserve the justification status, but must also allow enough time to compute the formal relations between beliefs. | |
From: Alvin I. Goldman (Internalism Exposed [1999], §4) | |
A reaction: The word 'compute' implies a rather odd model of assessing coherence, which seems instantaneous for most of us where everyday beliefs are concerned. In real mental life this does not strike me as a problem. |
8832 | If justified beliefs are well-formed beliefs, then animals and young children have them [Goldman] |
Full Idea: If one shares my view that justified belief is, at least roughly, well-formed belief, surely animals and young children can have justified beliefs. | |
From: Alvin I. Goldman (What is Justified Belief? [1976], III) | |
A reaction: I take this to be a key hallmark of the externalist view of knowledge. Personally I think we should tell the animals that they have got true beliefs, but that they aren't bright enough to aspire to 'knowledge'. Be grateful for what you've got. |
6873 | Coherent justification seems to require retrieving all our beliefs simultaneously [Goldman] |
Full Idea: The problem of Concurrent Retrieval is a problem for internalism, notably coherentism, because an agent could ascertain coherence of her entire corpus only by concurrently retrieving all of her stored beliefs. | |
From: Alvin I. Goldman (Internalism Exposed [1999], §3) | |
A reaction: Sounds neat, but not very convincing. Goldman is relying on scepticism about short-term memory, but all belief and knowledge will collapse if we go down that road. We couldn't do simple arithmetic if Goldman's point were right. |
8829 | Justification depends on the reliability of its cause, where reliable processes tend to produce truth [Goldman] |
Full Idea: The justificational status of a belief is a function of the reliability of the processes that cause it, where (provisionally) reliability consists in the tendency of a process to produce beliefs that are true rather than false. | |
From: Alvin I. Goldman (What is Justified Belief? [1976], II) | |
A reaction: Goldman's original first statement of reliabilism, now the favourite version of externalism. The obvious immediate problem is when a normally very reliable process goes wrong. Wise people still get it wrong, or right for the wrong reasons. |
6875 | Reliability involves truth, and truth is external [Goldman] |
Full Idea: Reliability involves truth, and truth (on the usual assumption) is external. | |
From: Alvin I. Goldman (Internalism Exposed [1999], §6) | |
A reaction: As an argument for externalism this seems bogus. I am not sure that truth is either 'internal' or 'external'. How could the truth of 3+2=5 be external? Facts are mostly external, but I take truth to be a relation between internal and external. |
4764 | We cannot directly control our beliefs, but we can control the causes of our involuntary beliefs [Engel] |
Full Idea: Direct psychological voluntarism about beliefs seems to be false, but we can have an indirect voluntary control on many of our beliefs, by manipulating the states in us that are involuntary and which lead to certain beliefs. | |
From: Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §5.2) | |
A reaction: Very nice! This points two ways - to scientific experiments, which can have compelling outcomes (see Fodor), and to brain-washing, and especially auto-brainwashing (only reading articles which support your favourites theories). What magazines do you take? |
8831 | Introspection is really retrospection; my pain is justified by a brief causal history [Goldman] |
Full Idea: Introspection should be regarded as a form of retrospection. Thus, a justified belief that I am 'now' in pain gets its justificational status from a relevant, though brief, causal history. | |
From: Alvin I. Goldman (What is Justified Belief? [1976], II) | |
A reaction: He cites Hobbes and Ryle as having held this view. See Idea 6668. I am unclear why the history must be 'causal'. I may not know the cause of the pain. I may not believe an event which causes a proposition, or I may form a false belief from it. |
4759 | Mental states as functions are second-order properties, realised by first-order physical properties [Engel] |
Full Idea: For functionalism mental states as roles are second-order properties that have to be realised in various ways in first-order physical properties. | |
From: Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §3.3) | |
A reaction: I take that to be properties-of-properties, as in 'bright red' or 'poignantly beautiful'. I am inclined to think (with Edelman) that mind is a process, not a property. |
2850 | How can emotivists explain someone who recognises morality but is indifferent to it? [Brink] |
Full Idea: It is not clear how the emotivist can accommodate the amoralist - one who recognises moral requirements but is indifferent to them. | |
From: David O. Brink (Emotivism [1995], p.224) | |
A reaction: Nietzsche recognised current morals, but was indifferent to them. It is hard to imagine, though, an amoralist who lacked all the feelings which imply morality. |
2848 | Two people might agree in their emotional moral attitude while disagreeing in their judgement [Brink] |
Full Idea: Critics of emotivism claim that moral agreement need not track agreement in attitude; moralists with the same attitude can disagree in their views, and they can hold the same view while disagreeing in attitude. | |
From: David O. Brink (Emotivism [1995], p.224) | |
A reaction: Thus two racists can disagree about how racists should behave. Sounds like a good criticism. |
2851 | Emotivists find it hard to analyse assertions of moral principles, rather than actual judgements [Brink] |
Full Idea: It is hard for the emotivist to give an analysis of the occurrence of moral ideas in unasserted contexts, such as "IF he did wrong, then he should be punished". | |
From: David O. Brink (Emotivism [1995], p.224) | |
A reaction: This is the 'Frege-Geach Problem'. |
2853 | Emotivists claim to explain moral motivation by basing morality on non-cognitive attitudes [Brink] |
Full Idea: By stressing the intimate connection between moral judgements and the agent's non-cognitive attitudes, emotivists claim to capture the motivational properties of moral judgement. | |
From: David O. Brink (Emotivism [1995], p.223) | |
A reaction: The same claim is made by contractarians, who start from our universal self-interest. Emotivists also nicely capture the motivation properties of immoral judgements. |
2852 | Emotivists tend to favour a redundancy theory of truth, making moral judgement meaningless [Brink] |
Full Idea: If you want to recognise the truth of some moral judgements, perhaps to make room for the possibility of moral mistakes, then one may not be satisfied with the emotivists' tendency to appeal to the redundancy theory of truth. | |
From: David O. Brink (Emotivism [1995], p.224) | |
A reaction: Probably thinking of Simon Blackburn. People who adopt a redundancy view of truth for semantics are left floundering when discussing what is true in the rest of philosophy. |
2849 | Emotivism implies relativism about moral meanings, but critics say disagreements are about moral reference [Brink] |
Full Idea: Emotivism suggests that different feelings lead to different individual meanings for moral terms, but critics say that meanings are the same, and disagreement is about the extension (range of reference) of the terms. | |
From: David O. Brink (Emotivism [1995], p.224) | |
A reaction: It's hard to see how 'ought to p' could have quite different meanings for an emotivist and (say) a theistic moralist. 'Ought' is an obvious and simple word. Good criticism. |