33 ideas
1606 | You have to be a Platonist to debate about reality, so every philosopher is a Platonist [Roochnik] |
Full Idea: Everyone who enters into a debate about reality automatically becomes a Platonist. Since such debates are the essence of philosophy, every philosopher is a Platonist. | |
From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], p.199) | |
A reaction: This is correct |
1595 | Philosophy aims to satisfy the chief human desire - the articulation of beauty itself [Roochnik] |
Full Idea: Philosophy, the attempt to articulate the vision of beauty itself, is the attempt to satisfy the highest human desire. | |
From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], p.120) | |
A reaction: A million miles away from modern philosophy, but still an ideal to be taken seriously. |
1571 | 'Logos' ranges from thought/reasoning, to words, to rational structures outside thought [Roochnik] |
Full Idea: Logos can mean i) a thought or reasoning, ii) the word which expresses a thought, iii) a rational structure outside human thought. These meanings give 'logos' an extraordinary range. | |
From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], Intro. 12) |
1572 | In the seventeenth century the only acceptable form of logos was technical knowledge [Roochnik] |
Full Idea: In the seventeenth century only a certain type of logos was deemed legitimate, namely that identified with technical knowledge (or 'techné'). | |
From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], Intro. 15) |
1573 | The hallmark of a person with logos is that they give reasons why one opinion is superior to another [Roochnik] |
Full Idea: What is supposed to identify the person of logos from the one without is the commitment to giving reasons explaining why one opinion is superior to another. | |
From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], Intro. 17) |
1592 | Logos cannot refute the relativist, and so must admit that it too is a matter of desire (for truth and agreement) [Roochnik] |
Full Idea: Logos cannot refute the radical, consistent and self-conscious relativist. Therefore it must admit that, like the relativist, it itself is essentially a matter of desire. It wants to say what is right and wrong, true and false, and for others to agree. | |
From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], p.108) |
1593 | Human desire has an ordered structure, with logos at the pinnacle [Roochnik] |
Full Idea: Human desire has an ordered structure, with logos at the pinnacle. | |
From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], p.109) |
1603 | Logos is not unconditionally good, but good if there is another person willing to engage with it [Roochnik] |
Full Idea: Logos is not unconditionally good, but good contingent on there being some other person (out there) who is willing to talk with logos, to approach it even as an opponent. | |
From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], p.175) |
1598 | We prefer reason or poetry according to whether basics are intelligible or not [Roochnik] |
Full Idea: Is the arché (basis) intelligible, or is it chaos? Upon this question hinges all, for answering it determines whether poetry or logos is the form of human speech that best does justice to the world. | |
From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], p.139) |
1584 | Modern science, by aiming for clarity about the external world, has abandoned rationality in the human world [Roochnik] |
Full Idea: The modern scientific world view, with all its hope for clarity and precision, has a flipside, …which is its abandonment of rationality in the world of human significance. | |
From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], p.74) |
1591 | Unfortunately for reason, argument can't be used to establish the value of argument [Roochnik] |
Full Idea: Unfortunately for the logos there is no argument that can, without begging the question, establish the goodness of argumentation. | |
From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], p.106) |
1599 | Attempts to suspend all presuppositions are hopeless, because a common ground must be agreed for the process [Roochnik] |
Full Idea: To debate about suspending all our presuppositions requires a common ground which, upon being established, immediately renders the debate superfluous. | |
From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], p.144) |
12797 | If plural variables have 'some values', then non-count variables have 'some value' [Laycock] |
Full Idea: If a plural variable is said to have not a single value but some values (some clothes), then a non-count variable may have, more quirkier still, some value (some clothing, for instance) in ranging arbitrarily over the scattered stuff. | |
From: Henry Laycock (Words without Objects [2006], 4.4) | |
A reaction: We seem to need the notion of a sample, or an archetype, to fit the bill. I hereby name them 'sample variables'. Damn - Laycock got there first, on p.137. |
12794 | Plurals are semantical but not ontological [Laycock] |
Full Idea: Plurality is a semantical but not also an ontological construction. | |
From: Henry Laycock (Words without Objects [2006], Intro 4) | |
A reaction: I love it when philososphers make simple and illuminating remarks like this. You could read 500 pages of technical verbiage about plural reference without grasping that this is the underlying issue. Sounds right to me. |
17694 | Some non-count nouns can be used for counting, as in 'several wines' or 'fewer cheeses' [Laycock] |
Full Idea: The very words we class as non-count nouns may themselves be used for counting, of kinds or types, and phrases like 'several wines' are perfectly in order. ...Not only do we have 'less cheese', but we also have the non-generic 'fewer cheeses'. | |
From: Henry Laycock (Words without Objects [2006], Intro 4 n23) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Laycock generally endorses the thought that what can be counted is not simply distinguished by a precise class of applied vocabulary. He offers lots of borderline or ambiguous cases in his footnotes. |
17695 | Some apparent non-count words can take plural forms, such as 'snows' or 'waters' [Laycock] |
Full Idea: Some words that seem to be semantically non-count can take syntactically plural forms: 'snows', 'sands', 'waters' and the like. | |
From: Henry Laycock (Words without Objects [2006], Intro 4 n24) | |
A reaction: This seems to involve parcels of the stuff. The 'snows of yesteryear' occur at different times. 'Taking the waters' probably involves occasions. The 'Arabian sands' presumably occur in different areas. Semantics won't fix what is countable. |
12792 | The category of stuff does not suit reference [Laycock] |
Full Idea: The central fact about the category of stuff or matter is that it is profoundly antithetical to reference. | |
From: Henry Laycock (Words without Objects [2006], Pref) | |
A reaction: This is taking 'reference' in the strictly singular classical sense, but clearly we refer to water in various ways. Laycock's challenge is very helpful. We have been in the grips of a terrible orthodoxy. |
12799 | Descriptions of stuff are neither singular aggregates nor plural collections [Laycock] |
Full Idea: The definite descriptions of stuff like water are neither singular descriptions denoting individual mereological aggregates, nor plural descriptions denoting multitudes of discrete units or semantically determined atoms. | |
From: Henry Laycock (Words without Objects [2006], 5.3) | |
A reaction: Laycock makes an excellent case for this claim, and seems to invite a considerable rethink of our basic ontology to match it, one which he ultimately hints at calling 'romantic'. Nice. Conservatives try to force stuff into classical moulds. |
12818 | We shouldn't think some water retains its identity when it is mixed with air [Laycock] |
Full Idea: Suppose that water, qua vapour, mixes with the atmosphere. Is there any abstract metaphysical principle, other than that of atomism, which implies that water must, in any such process, retain its identity? That claim seems indefensible. | |
From: Henry Laycock (Words without Objects [2006], 1.2 n22) | |
A reaction: It can't be right that some stuff always loses its identity in a mixture, if the mixture was in a closed vessel, and then separated again. Dispersion is what destroys the identity, not mixing. |
1605 | Reality can be viewed neutrally, or as an object of desire [Roochnik] |
Full Idea: There are two extremes: the Aristotelian views reality simply as reality, and the sophist or poet view reality only as an object of desire. | |
From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], p.199) |
13437 | A CAR and its major PART can become identical, yet seem to have different properties [Gallois] |
Full Idea: At t1 there is a whole CAR, and a PART of it, which is everything except the right front wheel. At t2 the wheel is removed, leaving just PART, so that CAR is now PART. But PART was a proper part of CAR, and CAR had the front wheel. Different properties! | |
From: André Gallois (Occasions of Identity [1998], 1.II) | |
A reaction: [compressed summary] The problem is generated by appealing to Leibniz's Law. My immediate reaction is that this is the sort of trouble you get into if you include such temporal truths about things as 'properties'. |
12795 | Parts must be of the same very general type as the wholes [Laycock] |
Full Idea: The notion of a part is such that parts must be of the same very general type - concrete, material or physical, for instance - as the wholes of which they are (said to be) parts. | |
From: Henry Laycock (Words without Objects [2006], 2.9) | |
A reaction: The phrase 'same very general type' cries out for investigation. Can an army contain someone who isn't much of a soldier? Can the Treasury contain a fear of inflation? |
16233 | Gallois hoped to clarify identity through time, but seems to make talk of it impossible [Hawley on Gallois] |
Full Idea: A problem for Gallois is that he leaves us no way to talk about questions of genuine identity through time, and thus undercuts one motivation for his own position. | |
From: comment on André Gallois (Occasions of Identity [1998]) by Katherine Hawley - How Things Persist 5.8 | |
A reaction: Gallois seems to need a second theory of identity to support his Occasional Identity theory. Two things need an identity each, before we can say that the two identities coincide. (Time to read Gallois!) |
16025 | If things change they become different - but then no one thing undergoes the change! [Gallois] |
Full Idea: If things really change, there can't literally be one thing before and after the change. However, if there isn't one thing before and after the change, then no thing has really undergone any change. | |
From: André Gallois (Identity over Time [2011], Intro) | |
A reaction: [He cites Copi for this way of expressing the problem of identity through change] There is an obvious simple ambiguity about 'change' in ordinary English. A change of property isn't a change of object. Painting a red ball blue isn't swapping it. |
16026 | 4D: time is space-like; a thing is its history; past and future are real; or things extend in time [Gallois] |
Full Idea: We have four versions of Four-Dimensionalism: the relativistic view that time is space-like; a persisting thing is identical with its history (so objects are events); past and future are equally real; or (Lewis) things extend in time, with temporal parts. | |
From: André Gallois (Identity over Time [2011], §2.5) | |
A reaction: Broad proposed the second one. I prefer 3-D: at any given time a thing is wholly present. At another time it is wholly present despite having changed. It is ridiculous to think that small changes destroy identity. We acquire identity by dying?? |
14755 | Gallois is committed to identity with respect to times, and denial of simple identity [Gallois, by Sider] |
Full Idea: Gallois's core claim is that the identity relation holds with respect to times, ...and he must claim that there is no such thing as the relation of identity simpliciter. | |
From: report of André Gallois (Occasions of Identity [1998]) by Theodore Sider - Four Dimensionalism 5.5 | |
A reaction: Gallois is essentially responding to the statue and clay problem, but it seems a bit drastic to entirely change our concept of two things being identical, such as Hesperus and Phosphorus. 'Identity' seems to have several meanings; let's sort them out. |
16231 | Occasional Identity: two objects can be identical at one time, and different at others [Gallois, by Hawley] |
Full Idea: Gallois' Occasional Identity Thesis is that objects can be identical at one time without being identical at all times. | |
From: report of André Gallois (Occasions of Identity [1998]) by Katherine Hawley - How Things Persist 5.4 | |
A reaction: The analogy is presumably with two crossing roads being identical at one place but not at others. It is a major misunderstanding to infer from Special Relativity that time is just like space. |
16027 | If two things are equal, each side involves a necessity, so the equality is necessary [Gallois] |
Full Idea: The necessity of identity: a=b; □(a=a); so something necessarily = a; so something necessarily must equal b; so □(a=b). [A summary of the argument of Marcus and Kripke] | |
From: André Gallois (Identity over Time [2011], §3) | |
A reaction: [Lowe 1982 offered a response] The conclusion seems reasonable. If two things are mistakenly thought to be different, but turn out to be one thing, that one thing could not possibly be two things. In no world is one thing two things! |
1577 | Relativism is a disease which destroys the possibility of rational debate [Roochnik] |
Full Idea: Relativism is disease, is pollution, for it negates the efficacy of logos. It destroys the possibility of a complete rational debate of fundamental questions. | |
From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], p.41) |
17696 | 'Humility is a virtue' has an abstract noun, but 'water is a liquid' has a generic concrete noun [Laycock] |
Full Idea: Work is needed to distinguish abstract nouns ...from the generic uses of what are otherwise concrete nouns. The contrast is that of 'humility is a virtue' and 'water is a liquid'. | |
From: Henry Laycock (Words without Objects [2006], Intro 4 n25) | |
A reaction: 'Work is needed' implies 'let me through, I'm an analytic philosopher', but I don't think they will separate very easily. What does 'watery' mean? Does water have concrete virtues? |
12791 | It is said that proper reference is our intellectual link with the world [Laycock] |
Full Idea: Some people hold that it is reference, in some more or less full-blooded sense, which constitutes our basic intellectual or psychological connection with the world. | |
From: Henry Laycock (Words without Objects [2006], Pref) | |
A reaction: This is the view which Laycock sets out to challenge, by showing that we talk about stuff like water without any singular reference occurring at all. I think he is probably right. |
1578 | If relativism is the correct account of human values, then rhetoric is more important than reasoning [Roochnik] |
Full Idea: If relativism offers an accurate description of human values, then rhetoric replaces logos as the most fundamental human activity. | |
From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], p.47) | |
A reaction: Or putting it another way, logos (reason) becomes meaningless. I suppose, though, that a relativist can conduct conditional reasoning (but must belief in some rules of reason). |
1596 | Reasoning aims not at the understanding of objects, but at the desire to give beautiful speeches [Roochnik] |
Full Idea: Logos originates not in a cognitive capacity for the apprehension of objects, but in the desire to give birth to beautiful speeches. | |
From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], p.124) | |
A reaction: It is hard for us to grasp this, but it might be quite life-enhancing if we could return to that old way of thought. |