98 ideas
6601 | Science rules the globe because of colonising power, not inherent rationality [Feyerabend] |
Full Idea: Science now reigns supreme all over the globe; but the reason was not insight in its 'inherent rationality' but power play (the colonising nations imposed their way of living) and the need for weapons. | |
From: Paul Feyerabend (Against Method [1975], 3), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.5 | |
A reaction: A nice clear statement of ridiculous relativism about science. What gave the colonisers their power if it was not more accurate knowledge of how to manipulate nature? |
20910 | Everything happens necessarily, and for a reason [Democritus] |
Full Idea: Nothing happens at random, but everything for a reason and as the effect of necessity. | |
From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B002), quoted by Pseudo-Plutarch - On the Doctrine of the Philosophers 1.25.4 | |
A reaction: [In Aetius 'Stob'] This remark reminds us of the link between necessity and sufficient reason. Do all reasons arise for a reason? |
5728 | The concept of truth was originated by the senses [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: The concept of truth was originated by the senses. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], IV.479) | |
A reaction: This is a refreshing challenge to the modern view of truth, which seems entirely entangled with language. Truth seems a useful concept when discussing the workings of an animal mind. As you get closer to an object, you see it more 'truly'. |
16146 | Two can't be a self-contained unit, because it would need to be one to do that [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Democritus claimed that one substance could not be composed from two nor two from one. …The same will clearly go for number, on the popular assumption that number is a combination of units. Unless two is one, it cannot contain a unit in actuality. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1039a15 | |
A reaction: Chrysippus followed this up the first part with the memorable example of Dion and Theon. The problem with the second part is that 2, 3 and 4 are three numbers, so they can count as meta-units. |
20901 | True Being only occurs when it is completely full, with atoms and no void [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: In response to defenders of the One, Democritus says that what is, in the proper sense, is being that is completely full, but that such a being is not one, but that they are unlimited in number and invisible because of the smallness of their masses. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A007) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 325a28 | |
A reaction: Democritus is in a tangle here. He says proper being has no void, having apparently conceded that motion needs void (which he admits is non-existent). So true being only occurs when everything grinds to a halt, which is not now. But Idea 20902. |
20902 | Being does not exist more than non-being [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: They say that being does not exist more than non-being, because neither does the void exist more than the body. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A006) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 0985b09 | |
A reaction: The claim that Being and Non-Being are the same thing is pretty startling. It seems to be an expedient to get Void into the picture, even though it is taken to be wholly devoid of qualities. |
20904 | The non-existent exists as much as the existent, because it has causal powers [Democritus] |
Full Idea: What exists does not exist at all more than what does not exist, and both are causes in a similar way for the things that come about. | |
From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A008), quoted by Simplicius - On Aristotle's 'Physics' p.28.4-27 | |
A reaction: [Simplicius actually attributes this to the shadowy Leucippus] You can see the point. If you drive into a pothole, that has considerable causal powers. |
20903 | The only distinctions are Configuration (shape), Disposition (order) and Turning (position) [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: They say that what is differs only by Configuration ([rhusmos], which is the shape), by Disposition ([diathege], which is the order), and by Turning ([tropê], which is the position. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A006) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 0985b16 | |
A reaction: If you give the shape, structure and position of an object, there is no much more to say. Perhaps mention time. |
20893 | Nothing comes from non-existence, or passes into it [Democritus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Nothing comes into being from what does not exist, nor is it destroyed into what does not exist. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A001) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.44 | |
A reaction: [part of a concise summary of Democritus by DL] Probably an intuition about conservation laws, rather than a speculation about the Big Bang. |
20896 | It is not possible to know what sort each thing is [Democritus] |
Full Idea: In reality [eteé] to recognise what sort each thing is, belongs to what is impracticable [aporos]. | |
From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B008), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Logicians (two books) 7.137 | |
A reaction: On the whole modern scientists (and the rest of us) shoehorn virtually everything into a specific category. It strikes me as wildly bad metaphysics to say that everything necessarily has its category. |
3357 | Democritus denies reality to large objects, because atomic entities can't combine to produce new ones [Benardete,JA on Democritus] |
Full Idea: Democritus appears to rule out from his austere ontology all so-called emergent entities - even mountains and rivers - on the ground that two or more entities can never combine to produce a new one. | |
From: comment on Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.24 |
598 | Democritus said that substances could never be mixed, so atoms are the substances [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Democritus claimed that one substance could not be composed from two nor two from one; for him it is the atoms that are the substances. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1039a10 |
1532 | Sensible qualities can't be real if they appear different to different creatures [Democritus, by Theophrastus] |
Full Idea: As proof of the fact that sensible qualities have no real existence he points to the fact that they do not appear the same to all creatures. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A135) by Theophrastus - On the Senses 63 |
20894 | Man is separated from reality [Democritus] |
Full Idea: It is necessary to recognise that man by virtue of this criterion is separated from reality. | |
From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B006), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Logicians (two books) 7.137 | |
A reaction: I don't know what 'this criterion' is, but it strikes me as quite a good slogan for fans (like myself) of the representative theory of perception. Critics say it is the big objection to the representative theory, but I say 'get over it'. |
20897 | Obscure knowledge belongs to the five senses, and genuine knowledge is the other type [Democritus] |
Full Idea: There are two forms of knowledge [gnomé], the one genuine, the other obscure. And to the obscure one belongs all of these: sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch. The other is genuine, and is separated from this one. | |
From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B011), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Logicians (two books) 7.139 | |
A reaction: [Sextus goes on to make it clear that the 'genuine' one is knowledge acquired by thought]. I take Parmenides to be the first rationalist. It is interesting that Democritus, who devoted his life to finding causal explanations, seems to be a rationalist. |
517 | All evidence comes from senses, so they are indispensable to the mind [Democritus] |
Full Idea: Mind must never reject the senses, because that is where it gets its evidence, and it would be the mind's downfall. | |
From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B125), quoted by Galen - On Medical Experience 15.8 |
5729 | If the senses are deceptive, reason, which rests on them, is even worse [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: The structure of your reasoning must be rickety and defective, if the senses on which it rests are themselves deceptive. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], IV.518) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as one of the most basic tenets of empiricism. It denies the existence of 'pure' reason, and instead asserts that it is built out of complex and abstracted sense experience, which makes it ultimately a second-class citizen. |
5702 | The senses are much the best way to distinguish true from false [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: What can be a surer guide to the distinction of true from false than our own senses? | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.700) | |
A reaction: This doesn't say they are the only guide, which leaves room for guides such as what is consistent or self-evident or inferred. There is enough here, though, to show that the Epicureans were empiricists in a fairly modern way. |
5697 | The only possible standard for settling doubts is the foundation of the senses [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: If a belief resting directly on the foundation of the senses is not valid, there will be no standard to which we can refer any doubt on obscure questions for rational confirmation. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.422) | |
A reaction: A classic statement of empiricist foundationalism. The Epicureans don't appear to have any time for a priori truths at all. I wonder if they settled mathematical disputes by counting objects and drawing diagrams? |
577 | Democritus says there is either no truth, or it is concealed from us [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Democritus concludes that either there is no truth or it is concealed from us. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A112) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1009b12 |
20895 | We actually know nothing, and opinions are mere flux [Democritus] |
Full Idea: Certainly this argument too makes it clear that in reality [eteé] we know nothing about anything, but for each person opinion is a rhythmic afflux [epirhusmié]. | |
From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B007), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Logicians (two books) 7.137 | |
A reaction: This seems to pick 'all is flux' up from Heraclitus, and make Democritus (along with aspects of Socrates) the true source of ancient scepticism. |
1528 | We in fact know nothing, but we each restructure our reality with beliefs [Democritus] |
Full Idea: In reality we know nothing about anything, but belief restructures things for each of us. | |
From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B007), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Professors (six books) 7.136 |
492 | It is obviously impossible to understand the reality of each thing [Democritus] |
Full Idea: It will be obvious that it is impossible to understand how in reality each thing is. | |
From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B008), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Professors (six books) 7.137 |
515 | We know nothing in reality; for truth lies in an abyss [Democritus] |
Full Idea: We know nothing in reality; for truth lies in an abyss. | |
From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B117), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.72.10 |
5727 | Most supposed delusions of the senses are really misinterpretations by the mind [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: Paradoxical experiences (such a dreams and illusions) cannot shake our faith in the senses. Most of the illusion is due to the mental assumptions we ourselves superimpose, so that things not perceived by the senses pass for perceptions. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], IV.462) | |
A reaction: Some misinterpretations of the senses, such as thinking a square tower round, are the result of foolish lack of judgement, but actual delusions within the senses, such as a ringing in the ears, or a pain in a amputated leg, seem like real sense failures. |
2561 | For Feyerabend the meaning of a term depends on a whole theory [Feyerabend, by Rorty] |
Full Idea: For Feyerabend the meaning of a term depends on a whole theory containing the term. | |
From: report of Paul Feyerabend (Against Method [1975]) by Richard Rorty - Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature 6.3 |
5714 | Even simple facts are hard to believe at first hearing [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: No fact is so simple that it is not harder to believe than to doubt at the first presentation. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.1022) | |
A reaction: Hence induction is just 'drumming it in' until you come to believe it. There are good evolutionary reasons why we should be like this, because we would otherwise believe all sorts of silly half-perceptions in the gloaming. |
20892 | Democritus was devoted to discovering causal explanations [Democritus, by Eusebius] |
Full Idea: Democritus himself, as they say, stated that he would rather discover a single causal explanation [aitiologia] than become the King of the Persians. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B118) by Eusebius - Preparation for the Gospel 14.27.4 | |
A reaction: Democritus seems to be clearly the father of the physical sciences, because he focused single-mindedly on physical and causal explanations. David Lewis says all explanations are causal. |
5718 | The mind is in the middle of the breast, because there we experience fear and joy [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: The guiding principle of the whole body is the mind or intellect, which is firmly lodged in the mid-region of the breast. Here is felt fear and alarm, and the caressing pulse of joy. Here, then is the seat of the intellect and mind. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], III.140) | |
A reaction: Even by this date thinking people were not clear that the mind is in the brain. They paid insufficient attention to head injuries. The emotions are felt to have a location, but intellect and principles are not. |
5717 | The mind is a part of a man, just like a hand or an eye [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: First, I maintain that the mind, which we often call the intellect, the seat of guidance and control of life, is part of a man, no less than hand or foot or eyes are parts of a whole living creature. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], III.95) | |
A reaction: Presumably Lucretius asserts this because some people were denying it. Sounds like common sense to me. The only reason I can see for anyone denying what he says is if they are desperate to survive death. |
5882 | Democritus says soul consists of smooth round bodies brought together in accidental collision [Democritus, by Cicero] |
Full Idea: Since Democritus makes the soul consist of minute smooth round bodies brought together in some sort of accidental collision, let us pass him over. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - Tusculan Disputations I.xi.23 | |
A reaction: If we accept that Democritus thought the collision of atoms 'accidental', then it doesn't sound like a very good theory. What would Cicero say if we replaced 'accidental' with 'naturally selected'? |
6034 | Atomists say soul has a rational part in the chest, and a diffused non-rational part [Democritus, by Aetius] |
Full Idea: Democritus and Epicurus say the soul has two parts, one which is rational and is situated in the chest area, and the other which is non-rational and is spread throughout the entire compound of the body. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by Aetius - fragments/reports 4.4.6 | |
A reaction: The spread part corresponds to such things as feeling fear in the stomach, or excitement throughout the limbs. I can't think what grounds there would be for choosing the chest as the home of reason. I suppose you can hear reason thumping in there.. |
20912 | The soul is the same as the mind [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Democritus says the soul is the same thing as the mind. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A101) by Aristotle - De Anima 405a10 | |
A reaction: This is not in contrast to the Christian concept of the soul, but in contrast to the normal view of psuché, which is more like the life that permeates the whole body. Democritus was more in tune than Aristotle with modern thought on this. |
21387 | The separate elements and capacities of a mind cannot be distinguished [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: No single element [of the soul] can be separated, nor can their capacities be divided spatially; they are like the multiple powers of a single body | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], III.262), quoted by A.A. Long - Hellenistic Philosophy 2.7 | |
A reaction: It is interesting that this comes from someone with a strongly physicalist view of the mind (though not, if I recall, focusing on the brain). He is still totally impressed by the unified phenomenology of mental experience. He is an empiricist. |
20916 | Animals have a share of reason [Democritus, by Porphyry] |
Full Idea: Democritus recognised that animals have a share of reason. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by Porphyry - On Abstinence 3.6.7 | |
A reaction: Since he considers thinking to be the interaction of atoms in the body, which animals evidently possess, this seems consistent. No one seems to observed animals closely before the 20th century, other than to exploit them. |
20914 | The directive centre is located in the whole head [Democritus, by Ps-Plutarch] |
Full Idea: Democritus says [the directive centre is located] in the whole head. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A105) by Pseudo-Plutarch - On the Doctrine of the Philosophers 4.5.1 | |
A reaction: The whole head is not quite the brain, but he is getting very warm indeed, and long before anyone else got so close. |
5709 | The actions of the mind are not determinate and passive, because atoms can swerve [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: The fact that the mind itself has no internal necessity to determine its every act and compel it to suffer in helpless passivity - this is due to the slight swerve of the atoms at no determinate time or place. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.294) | |
A reaction: No one likes this proposal much, but it is very intriguing. The Epicureans had seen a problem, one which doesn't bother me much. If, nowadays, you are a reductive physicalist who believes in free will, you have a philosophical nightmare ahead of you. |
6033 | Democritus said everything happens of necessity, by natural motion of atoms [Democritus, by Cicero] |
Full Idea: Democritus, the founder of atomism, preferred to accept that all things happened by necessity than to tear from the atomic bodies their natural motions. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') §22 | |
A reaction: This is in opposition to Epicurus, who said that atoms can have a 'swerve', making free will possible. It is suggested that Epicurus was the first to really grasp the problem of free will. Democritus was just stating the (to him) obvious. |
5088 | Some say there is a determinate cause for every apparently spontaneous event [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Some people (Democritus?) say there is no such thing as a chance event; they claim that there is always a determinate cause for everything which is said to be a chance or a spontaneous event. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by Aristotle - Physics 195b37 | |
A reaction: This is the mutual implication of physicalism and determinism, which strikes me as unavoidable. I say: don't panic about morality because determinism is true. Embrace determinism - it is harmless and true. Its opposite is a nonsense. |
21670 | Democritus said atoms only move by their natural motions, which are therefore necessary [Democritus, by Cicero] |
Full Idea: The author of the atomic theory, Democritus, preferred to accept the view that all events are caused by necessity, rather than to deprive the atoms of their natural motions. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 10.23 | |
A reaction: The 'deprivation' would have to be caused by mind, or by the later 'swerve' of Epicurus. |
5695 | Only bodies can touch one another [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: Nothing can touch or be touched except body. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.303) | |
A reaction: This is the key objection to interactionism, and the main reason why the atomists have a thoroughly material view of the mind. It is an induction from a very large number of instances, but the argument is not, of course, conclusive. |
5711 | The earth is and always has been an insentient being [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: The earth is and always has been an insentient being. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.658) | |
A reaction: The fact that Epicurus needs to deny this shows that some idea close to panpsychism must still have been around in his time. He is discussing gods at the time, so maybe pantheism was the view being attacked, but that is a subset of panpsychism. |
5712 | Particles may have sensation, but eggs turning into chicks suggests otherwise [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: There is the possibility that particles have senses like those of an animate being as a whole, …but from the fact that we perceive eggs turning into live fledglings, we may infer that sense can be generated from the insentient. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.914) | |
A reaction: He gives other arguments for his view. The egg example is not a strong argument, but is precisely our puzzle of how consciousness can emerge from the process of evolution, and natural selection makes dualism look unlikely. |
20913 | Democritus says the soul is the body, and thinking is thus the mixture of the body [Democritus, by Theophrastus] |
Full Idea: Democritus explains thinking by the mixture of the body, which is surely in accordance with his reasoning, since he makes the soul the body. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A135) by Theophrastus - On the Senses 58 | |
A reaction: I agree with Democritus. |
24041 | Democritus says spherical atoms are fire, and constitute the soul [psuche] [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Democritus says the soul is a sort of fire. For the shapes and atoms are unlimitied and those that are spherical he says are fire and soul - which are like the motes in the air when sunbeams come through the window. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], DK 67-68) by Aristotle - De Anima 403b31 | |
A reaction: It's hard to see why the spherical atoms should be fire. Maybe because they move together quickly and easily. …At 404a5 Aristotle agrees with me! |
5719 | The mind moves limbs, wakes the body up, changes facial expressions, which involve touch [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: Mind and spirit are both composed of matter, as we see them propelling limbs, rousing the body from sleep, changing the expression of the face, and guiding the whole man - activities which clearly involves touch, which involves matter. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], III.164) | |
A reaction: This is the inverse of Descartes' interaction problem, and strikes me as a straightforward common sense truth. However, if you believe in spiritual gods, this gives you a model for the interaction (however mysterious) of matter and spirit. |
5724 | Lions, foxes and deer have distinct characters because their minds share in their bodies [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: Why are lions ferocious, foxes crafty, and deer timid? It can only be because the mind always shares in the specific growth of the body according to its seed and breed. If it were immortal and reincarnated, living things would have jumbled characters. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], III.743) | |
A reaction: A nice argument which I have not encountered in modern times. Of course, even Descartes admits that the mind is intermingled with the body, but it seems that the essential character of a mind is dictated by the body. |
5713 | You needn't be made of laughing particles to laugh, so why not sensation from senseless seeds? [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: One can laugh without being composed of laughing particles, ..so why cannot the things that we see gifted with sensation be compounded of seeds that are wholly senseless? | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.988) | |
A reaction: Lovely argument! You might feel driven to panpsychism in your desperation to explain the 'weirdness' of consciousness, but it would be mad to attribute laughter to basic matter, so comedy has to 'emerge' at some point. |
1540 | Pleasure and pain guide our choices of good and bad [Democritus] |
Full Idea: The guides to what is good and bad for people are pleasure and pain. | |
From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B188), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.01.46 |
6611 | One man's meat is another man's poison [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: What is food to one may be literally poison to others. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], IV.638) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the origin of the well-known saying. This is not relativism of perception, but a relativism of how individuals actually respond to the world. It sums up the position with, say, the operas of Wagner. |
5730 | Our bodies weren't created to be used; on the contrary, their creation makes a use possible [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: Nothing in our bodies was born in order that we might be able to use it, but the thing born creates the use. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], IV.834) | |
A reaction: This remark (strongly opposed to Aristotle's view of human function and nature) raises the obvious question of why the body is so very useful for staying alive. Most of its uses are not random. Lucretius would abandon this view if he read Darwin. |
495 | Wisdom creates a healthy passion-free soul [Democritus] |
Full Idea: Medicine heals diseases of the body, wisdom frees the soul from passions. | |
From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B031), quoted by Clement - Pedagogue 1.6.2.1 | |
A reaction: The interesting concept of a healthy mind seems to have got lost in modern moral philosophy. |
5726 | The dead are no different from those who were never born [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: One who no longer is cannot suffer, or differ in any way from one who has never been born. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], III.867) | |
A reaction: There is a special kind of pain in being poor if you were once rich, which is not suffered by those who experience only poverty. Lucretius is right, but we are concerned with how we feel now, not with how we won't feel once dead. |
1537 | Happiness is identifying and separating the pleasures [Democritus, by Stobaeus] |
Full Idea: Democritus thinks that happiness consists in the determination and separation of pleasures, and that this is what is both finest and most beneficial for people. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A167) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 2.07.3 | |
A reaction: A great deal of the strategy and ethics of living consists (if you are lucky) of discriminating among possible pleasures. Philosophers should produce criteria. |
5705 | Nature only wants two things: freedom from pain, and pleasure [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: Nature only clamours for two things, a body free from pain, a mind released from worry and fear for the enjoyment of pleasurable sensation. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.21) | |
A reaction: I can't help agreeing with those (like Aristotle) who consider this a very demeaning view of human life. See Idea 99. Bentham agrees with Lucretius (Idea 3777). I think they are largely right, but not entirely. Other motives are possible than sensations. |
20917 | Contentment comes from moderation and proportion in life [Democritus, by Stobaeus] |
Full Idea: Contentment [euthumia] comes about for human beings from the moderation of enjoyment and proportion [summetria] in life. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B191) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.1.210 | |
A reaction: This is close to Aristotle's doctrine of the Mean. The majority of ethical ideas attributed to Democritus (presumably by the Epicureans) are thought to be spurious. This idea actually sounds rather stoic. |
13551 | Democritus says wealth is a burden to the virtuous mind [Democritus, by Seneca] |
Full Idea: Democritus rejected wealth, regarding it as a burden to the virtuous mind. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by Seneca the Younger - On Providence §6 | |
A reaction: The rival view is that wealth empowers a virtuous person to perform more fine deeds. Democritus seems to have a rather solitary view of virtue. |
5716 | Nature runs the universe by herself without the aid of gods [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: Nature is free and uncontrolled by proud masters and runs the universe by herself without the aid of gods. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.1094) | |
A reaction: A nice remark. This apparent personification of nature implies the application of laws to an essentially passive reality. See Idea 5442 and Nature|Laws of Nature|Essentialism for a different view. |
5704 | There can be no centre in infinity [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: There can be no centre in infinity. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.1069) | |
A reaction: This is highly significant, because if we can establish that the universe is infinite (as Epicurus believes), it follows that the human race cannot be at the centre of it, as the Ptolemaic/medieval view proposed. |
5703 | The universe must be limitless, since there could be nothing outside to limit it [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: The universe is not bounded in any direction. If it were, it would necessarily have a limit somewhere, but a thing cannot have a limit unless there is something outside to limit it. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.959) | |
A reaction: This is a subtler argument than the mere enquiry about why you would have to stop at the end of the universe. It still seems a nice argument, though Einstein's curvature of space seems to have thwarted it. |
493 | Experiences are merely convention; only atoms and the void are real [Democritus] |
Full Idea: Sweet exists by convention, bitter by convention, colour by convention; atoms and void alone exist in reality. | |
From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B009), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Logicians (two books) 7.135 |
17542 | 'Full' and 'Void' secularised Parmenides's Being and Not-being [Democritus, by Heisenberg] |
Full Idea: In atomism, the antithesis of Being and Not-being of Parmenides is secularised into the antithesis of the 'Full' and the 'Void'. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by Werner Heisenberg - Physics and Philosophy 04 |
5947 | If only atoms are real and the rest is convention, we wouldn't bother to avoid pain [Democritus, by Diogenes of Oen.] |
Full Idea: Democritus erred when he said that the atoms alone exist in truth among realities, but everything else is convention; for then, far from discovering the truth, we shall not even be able to live, since we shall avoid neither fire nor wounds. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by Diogenes (Oen) - fragments/reports F2 7 | |
A reaction: The point is that we have to treat pain as a reality, not just as a convention. I suspect that Diogenes is making the same mistake made by modern attackers of 'eliminativism'. It is all about identity and reduction and levels of reality… |
13219 | When atoms touch, why don't they coalesce, like water drops? [Aristotle on Democritus] |
Full Idea: Why, when they come into contact, do they [atoms] not coalesce into one, as drops of water run together when drop touches drop? | |
From: comment on Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 326a33 | |
A reaction: Presumably we must think of atoms as having basic ontological unity, rather than as being little globules of 'stuff'. They are more like monads than they are like mud. |
1533 | Because appearance is infinitely varied, atomists assume infinitely many shapes of atom [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: They thought that truth lay in appearances, which they appreciated are contradictory and infinite, so they made the shapes of atoms infinite. Thus the infinite changes in compounds create the infinitely varies appearances. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A009) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 315b9 |
20899 | Atoms cling together, until a stronger necessity disperses them [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Democritus thinks that the substances hold on to one another and remain together for a length of time until some stronger necessity arising from their surroundings shakes and disperses them. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A037) by Aristotle - On Democritus (frag) | |
A reaction: [quoted in Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle's On the Heavens] He's not wrong. This seems to provide a mechanism for the Heracltean flux. Ancient critics wanted to know where the 'stronger necessity' came from. |
20898 | Atoms are irregular, hooked, concave, convex, and many other shapes [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Some substances are irregular, others hook-shaped, other concave, other convex, others provided with innumerable other differences. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A037) by Aristotle - On Democritus (frag) | |
A reaction: [quoted in Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle's On the Heavens] 'Substance' here means a fundamental object, which for Democritus is an undividable atom. |
20908 | There could be an atom the size of the world [Democritus, by Ps-Plutarch] |
Full Idea: Democritus say that it is possible that there exists an atom of the size of the world. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A047) by Pseudo-Plutarch - On the Doctrine of the Philosophers 1.12.6 | |
A reaction: The editor says this may have been a criticism of Democritus - presumably a reductio ad absurdum. But Democritus has no upper limit on the size of an atom. It challenges the imagination to treat such a huge thing as indivisible. |
1527 | There must be atoms, to avoid the absurdity of infinite division down to nothing [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If everything is infinitely divided, what survives the divisions? Alternatively, division would end at points with no magnitude, in which case bodies are composed of nothing. This is the argument claiming there are atoms of some magnitude. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A048b) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 316a14- |
20909 | The basic atoms are without qualities - which only arise from encounters between atoms [Democritus, by Galen] |
Full Idea: Democritus and the Epicureans posit that the first element is without quality, possessing by nature neither whiteness, blackness, sweetness or bitterness, warmth or cold. ...It is from the encounter of the atoms that all the sensible qualities come about. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A049) by Galen - On Hippocrates and Plato 1.2 | |
A reaction: Idea 493 comes in the middle of this summary by Galen. Hence atoms play the role that substrates play in object-based metaphysics. So atoms have the same problem. Is the shape of an atom a quality of an atom. Or are qualities what atoms DO? |
1536 | If a cone is horizontally sliced the surfaces can't be equal, so it goes up in steps [Democritus] |
Full Idea: If a cone is cut parallel to the base are the two new surfaces equal or unequal? If they are unequal, the cone must have gone up in steps. If they are equal then the cone must have been a cylinder, which is absurd. | |
From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B155), quoted by Plutarch - 72: Against Stoics on common Conceptions 1079e1 |
5693 | Everything is created and fed by nature from atoms, and they return to atoms in death [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: The ultimate realities of heaven and the gods are the atoms, from which nature creates all things and increases and feeds them, and into which, when they perish, nature again resolves them. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.46) | |
A reaction: Sounds right to me. Nothing in modern particle theory and string theory has refuted this claim. But what makes the atoms move, and what makes them combine in an orderly way? Is the orderliness of atoms made of atoms? Essences? |
5701 | If an object is infinitely subdivisible, it will be the same as the whole universe [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: If there are no atoms, the smallest bodies will have infinite parts, since they can be endlessly halved. ..But then there will be no difference between the smallest thing and the whole universe, as they will equally have infinite parts. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.620) | |
A reaction: Another argument which remains effective even now. There must surely (intuitively) be more divisions possible in a large object than in a small one? Unless of course there were many different sizes of infinity…. See Cantor. |
5708 | In downward motion, atoms occasionally swerve slightly for no reason [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: When atoms are travelling straight down through empty space by their own weight, at quite indeterminate times and places they swerve ever so little from their course. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.217) | |
A reaction: Never a popular theory because it seems to breach the Principle of Sufficient Reason (Ideas 306 + 3646). This seems to be the beginning of a strong need for the concept of free will, and an underlying explanation. Most thinkers put mind outside nature. |
1525 | Atomists say there are only three differences - in shape, arrangement and position [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Democritus and Leucippus say that there are only three differences - in shape, arrangement and position. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A006) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 0985b15 |
23314 | Greeks explained regularity by intellectual design, not by laws [Democritus, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: It is clear that Democritus had no idea of laws of nature …for in Greek thought regularity of behaviour is associated with design by an intellect. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by Michael Frede - A Free Will Intro | |
A reaction: Ah. A simple realisation…! Seventeenth century laws of nature offered an explanation of natural order which didn't rely on God. Even though those scientists were all theists. |
17004 | Nothing can break the binding laws of eternity [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: Nothing has power to break the binding laws of eternity. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], 5.56) | |
A reaction: This seems to be virtually the only remark from the ancient world suggesting that there are 'laws' of nature, so I'm guessing it is a transient metaphor, not a theory about nature. 'Even the gods must bow to necessity'. |
5706 | Atoms move themselves [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: Atoms move themselves. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.133) | |
A reaction: Something has to move itself, I suppose, but then that could be psuché, giving us free will (see Idea 1424). Why does Epicurus need the 'swerve' if atoms are self-movers? See Idea 5708. |
5696 | If there were no space there could be no movement, or even creation [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: We see movement everywhere, but if there were no empty space, things would be denied the power of movement - or rather, they could not possibly have come into existence, embedded as they would have been in motionless matter. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.342) | |
A reaction: This still seems a good argument, if reality is made of particles. People can move in a crowd until it becomes too dense. |
5700 | It is quicker to break things up than to assemble them [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: Anything can be more speedily disintegrated than put together again. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.558) | |
A reaction: Clearly the concept of entropy was around long before anyone tried to give a systematic or mathematical account of it. |
24059 | Democritus is wrong: in a void we wouldn't see a distant ant in exact detail [Aristotle on Democritus] |
Full Idea: Democritus did not speak correctly in supposing that if the intermediate space became a void, we would see an ant in exact detail if it were up in the heaven. …If the intermediate space became a void, rather nothing would be seen at all. | |
From: comment on Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by Aristotle - De Anima 419a15 | |
A reaction: Depends what you mean by void, but Aristotle is nearer the truth. Is vision clearer in outer space than in our higher atmosphere? |
5101 | Movement is impossible in a void, because nothing can decide the direction of movement [Aristotle on Democritus] |
Full Idea: Void makes it impossible for anything to move, since in a void there is nowhere for a thing to move to more or less than anywhere else, because the void by definition contains no differentiation. | |
From: comment on Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by Aristotle - Physics 214b32 | |
A reaction: A lovely application of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. However this assumes that the cause of the movement is going to be in the void (telos?), rather than in the body which will move (modern causation?). |
20905 | Growth and movement would not exist if there were no void to receive them [Democritus] |
Full Idea: They say that one argument for void is that otherwise local motion (that is, locomotion and growth) would not exist: for there would not seem to be motion if there were no void, for what is full is incapable of receiving anything. | |
From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A019), quoted by Aristotle - Physics 213b03 | |
A reaction: The modern concept of a 'field' seems to have removed the possibility of a genuine 'void'. |
5698 | We can only sense time by means of movement, or its absence [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: It must not be claimed that anyone can sense time by itself apart from the movement of things or their restful immobility. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.465) | |
A reaction: This seems a remarkably Einsteinian remark, though he is only talking of the epistemology of the matter, not the ontology. We are not far from the concept of space-time here. |
5715 | This earth is very unlikely to be the only one created [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: It is in the highest degree unlikely that this earth and sky is the only one to have been created. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.1057) | |
A reaction: I can only admire the science fiction imagination of this, which roughly agrees with the assessment of modern cosmologists. We think imagination was cramped in the ancient world, and now wanders free - but that is not so. |
20911 | There are unlimited worlds of varying sizes, some without life or water [Democritus, by Hippolytus] |
Full Idea: Democritus says that there exist unlimited worlds and that they are different in magnitude. ...Some worlds are devoid of animals and plants and of all humidity. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A010, A040) by Hippolytus - Refutation of All Heresies 1.12,13.2-4 | |
A reaction: I'm not clear why Democritus came up with the idea of the Multicosmos. I don't suppose he meant the moon or planets, but another Cosmos. |
5694 | Nothing can be created by divine power out of nothing [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: In studying the workings of nature, our starting-point will be this principle: nothing can ever be created by divine power out of nothing. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.152) | |
A reaction: This claim seems to cry out for a bit of empiricist caution. What observation has convinced Lucretius that creation out of nothing is impossible? The early Christians switched to the view that divine creation is 'ex nihilo' - out of nothing. |
5699 | If matter wasn't everlasting, everything would have disappeared by now [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: If the matter in things had not been everlasting, everything by now would have gone back to nothing, and the things we see would be the product of rebirth out of nothing. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.544) | |
A reaction: See Idea 1431, which is Aquinas's Third Way of proving God. Aquinas thinks there must be a necessary being outside of the system, but Lucretius thinks there must be some necessary existence within the system (as Hume had suggested). |
1535 | Democritus said people imagined gods as the source of what awed or frightened them [Democritus, by Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Democritus thought that people imagined gods as responsible for the frightening and awesome things that happen in this world. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A075) by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Professors (six books) 9.24 |
5707 | The universe can't have been created by gods, because it is too imperfect [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: The universe was certainly not created for us by divine power: it is so full of imperfections. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.180) | |
A reaction: This is certainly a problem if God is 'supremely perfect', as Descartes proposed, because then the universe would also have to be supremely perfect. See Idea 2114 for a possible answer from Leibniz. Hume agrees with Epicurus about design. |
5710 | Gods are tranquil and aloof, and have no need of or interest in us [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: The nature of deity is to enjoy immortal existence in utter tranquillity, aloof and detached from our affairs. It is free from all pain and peril, strong in its own resources, exempt from any need of us, indifferent to our merits and immune from anger. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.652) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the seed of late seventeenth century deism - the idea of a Creator who is now absent, and ignores our prayers. At that time 'Epicurean' became a synonym for atheist, but Epicureans never quite reached that point. |
5731 | Why does Jupiter never hurl lightning from a blue sky? [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: Why does Jupiter never hurl his thunderbolt upon the earth and let loose his thunder out of a sky that is wholly blue? | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], VI.400) | |
A reaction: Nice question! It really doesn't take very much to see through superstition, and the fact that most people believed such things shows how staggeringly uncritical they were in their thinking, until philosophers appeared and taught them how to reason. |
20915 | The soul is destroyed with the body [Democritus, by Ps-Plutarch] |
Full Idea: Democritus says the soul is destructible, and is destroyed together with the whole body. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A109) by Pseudo-Plutarch - On the Doctrine of the Philosophers 4.7.4 | |
A reaction: This is the only belief possible for Democritus, since everything, including life and soul, is just the confluence of atoms, and they are regularly dispersed. This is the epitome of materialist philosophy. |
5720 | Spirit is mortal [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: Spirit is mortal. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], III.542) | |
A reaction: This is asserted at an historical moment when immortality is beginning to grip everyone's imagination. |
5722 | For a separated spirit to remain sentient it would need sense organs attached to it [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: If spirit is immortal and can remain sentient when divorced from our body, we must credit it with possession of five senses; but eyes or nostrils or hand or tongue or ears cannot be attached to a disembodied spirit. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], III.624) | |
A reaction: This is a powerful argument against immortality. If you are going to see, you must interact with photons; to hear you must respond to compression waves; to smell you must react to certain molecules. Immortality without those would be a bit dull. |
5725 | An immortal mind couldn't work harmoniously with a mortal body [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: It is crazy to couple a mortal object with an eternal and suppose that they can work in harmony and mutually interact. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], III.799) | |
A reaction: An interesting thought, though not a terrible persuasive argument. A god would indeed be a bit restless if it were chained to a human being, but it would presumably knuckle down to the task if firmly instructed to do it by Zeus. |
5721 | The mind is very small smooth particles, which evaporate at death [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: Since the substance of the mind is extraordinarily mobile, it must consist of particles exceptionally small and smooth and round, ..so that, when the spirit has escaped from the body, the outside of the limbs appears intact and there is no loss of weight. | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], III.201) | |
A reaction: Lucretius is wonderfully attentive to interesting evidence. He goes on to compare it to the evaporation of perfume. The fine-grained connections of the brain are not far off what he is proposing. |
5723 | If spirit is immortal and enters us at birth, why don't we remember a previous existence? [Lucretius] |
Full Idea: If the spirit is by nature immortal and is slipped into the body at birth, why do we retain no memory of an earlier existence, no impress of antecedent events? | |
From: Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], III.670) | |
A reaction: Plato took the view that we do recall previous existence, as seen in our innate ideas. This problem forced the Christian church into the uncomfortable claim that God creates the soul at conception, but that it then goes on to immortality. |