7 ideas
| 19695 | The devil was wise as an angel, and lost no knowledge when he rebelled [Whitcomb] |
| Full Idea: The devil is evil but nonetheless wise; he was a wise angel, and through no loss of knowledge, but, rather, through some sort of affective restructuring tried and failed to take over the throne. | |
| From: Dennis Whitcomb (Wisdom [2011], 'Argument') | |
| A reaction: ['affective restructuring' indeed! philosophers- don't you love 'em?] To fail at something you try to do suggests a flaw in the wisdom. And the new regime the devil wished to introduce doesn't look like a wise regime. Not convinced. |
| 19323 | 'Snow is white' depends on meaning; whether snow is white depends on snow [Etchemendy] |
| Full Idea: The difference between (a) snow is white, and (b) 'snow is white' true is that the first makes a claim that only depends on the colour of snow, while the second depends both on the colour of snow and the meaning of the sentence 'snow is white'. | |
| From: John Etchemendy (Tarski on Truth and Logical Consequence [1988], p.61), quoted by Richard L. Kirkham - Theories of Truth: a Critical Introduction 5.7 | |
| A reaction: This is a helpful first step for those who have reached screaming point by being continually offered this apparently vacuous equivalence. This sentence works well if that stuff is a particular colour. |
| 19137 | We can get a substantive account of Tarski's truth by adding primitive 'true' to the object language [Etchemendy] |
| Full Idea: Getting from a Tarskian definition of truth to a substantive account of the semantic properties of the object language may involve as little as the reintroduction of a primitive notion of truth. | |
| From: John Etchemendy (Tarski on Truth and Logical Consequence [1988], p.60), quoted by Donald Davidson - Truth and Predication 1 | |
| A reaction: This is, I think, the first stage in modern developments of axiomatic truth theories. The first problem would be to make sure you haven't reintroduced the Liar Paradox. You need axioms to give behaviour to the 'true' predicate. |
| 14181 | Validity is where either the situation or the interpretation blocks true premises and false conclusion [Etchemendy, by Read] |
| Full Idea: The Representational account of validity says an argument is valid if there is no situation where the premises are true and the conclusion false. The Interpretation account says the premises are true and conclusion false under no interpretations. | |
| From: report of John Etchemendy (The Concept of Logical Consequence [1999]) by Stephen Read - Formal and Material Consequence 'Inval' | |
| A reaction: My immediate instinct is to want logic to be about situations, rather than interpretations. Situations are more about thought, where interpretations are more about language. I think our account of logic should have some applicability to animals. |
| 14180 | Etchemendy says fix the situation and vary the interpretation, or fix interpretations with varying situations [Etchemendy, by Read] |
| Full Idea: In Etchemendy's Interpretational Semantics (perhaps better called 'Substitutional') we keep the situation fixed and vary the interpretation; in Representational Semantics ('Modal'?) we keep interpretations fixed but consider varying situations. | |
| From: report of John Etchemendy (The Concept of Logical Consequence [1999]) by Stephen Read - Formal and Material Consequence 'Inval' | |
| A reaction: [compressed] These are semantic strategies for interpreting logic, so they are two ways you might go about assessing an argument. |
| 16643 | Accidents always remain suited to a subject [Bonaventura] |
| Full Idea: An accident's aptitudinal relationship to a subject is essential, and this is never taken away from accidents….for it is true to say that they are suited to a subject. | |
| From: Bonaventura (Commentary on Sentences [1252], IV.12.1.1.1c) | |
| A reaction: This is the compromise view that allows accidents to be separated, for Transubstantiation, while acknowledging that we identify them with their subjects. |
| 16696 | Successive things reduce to permanent things [Bonaventura] |
| Full Idea: Everything successive reduces to something permanent. | |
| From: Bonaventura (Commentary on Sentences [1252], II.2.1.1.3 ad 5), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 18.2 | |
| A reaction: Avicenna first took successive entities seriously, but Bonaventure and Aquinas seem to have rejected them, or given reductive accounts of them. It resembles modern actualists versus modal realists. |