7 ideas
19695 | The devil was wise as an angel, and lost no knowledge when he rebelled [Whitcomb] |
Full Idea: The devil is evil but nonetheless wise; he was a wise angel, and through no loss of knowledge, but, rather, through some sort of affective restructuring tried and failed to take over the throne. | |
From: Dennis Whitcomb (Wisdom [2011], 'Argument') | |
A reaction: ['affective restructuring' indeed! philosophers- don't you love 'em?] To fail at something you try to do suggests a flaw in the wisdom. And the new regime the devil wished to introduce doesn't look like a wise regime. Not convinced. |
16643 | Accidents always remain suited to a subject [Bonaventura] |
Full Idea: An accident's aptitudinal relationship to a subject is essential, and this is never taken away from accidents….for it is true to say that they are suited to a subject. | |
From: Bonaventura (Commentary on Sentences [1252], IV.12.1.1.1c) | |
A reaction: This is the compromise view that allows accidents to be separated, for Transubstantiation, while acknowledging that we identify them with their subjects. |
16696 | Successive things reduce to permanent things [Bonaventura] |
Full Idea: Everything successive reduces to something permanent. | |
From: Bonaventura (Commentary on Sentences [1252], II.2.1.1.3 ad 5), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 18.2 | |
A reaction: Avicenna first took successive entities seriously, but Bonaventure and Aquinas seem to have rejected them, or given reductive accounts of them. It resembles modern actualists versus modal realists. |
8808 | Involuntary beliefs can still be evaluated [Feldman/Conee] |
Full Idea: Examples confirm that beliefs may be both involuntary and subject to epistemic evaluation. | |
From: R Feldman / E Conee (Evidentialism [1985], II) | |
A reaction: This is an extremely important point, which summarises the situation with beliefs that arise from (apparent) immediate perception. A belief cannot possibly be knowledge if it has been triggered, but no effort was made to evaluate it. |
8807 | Evidentialism is the view that justification is determined by the quality of the evidence [Feldman/Conee] |
Full Idea: What we call 'evidentialism' is the view that the epistemic justification of a belief is determined by the quality of the believer's evidence for the belief. | |
From: R Feldman / E Conee (Evidentialism [1985], I) | |
A reaction: The immediate question is whether the believer knows the quality of their evidence. A detective might not recognise the crucial clue (like the dog not barking). The definition of 'quality' had better not turn out to be circular. Forgotten evidence? |
8809 | Beliefs should fit evidence, and if you ought to believe it, then you are justified [Feldman/Conee] |
Full Idea: One epistemically ought to have the doxastic attitudes that fit one's evidence. Being epistemically obligatory is equivalent to being epistemically justified. | |
From: R Feldman / E Conee (Evidentialism [1985], III) | |
A reaction: It is normal for someone to refuse to accept something, when another person believes the evidence is overwhelming. Evaluation of evidence must include an assessment of what other evidence might turn up. |
8810 | If someone rejects good criticism through arrogance, that is irrelevant to whether they have knowledge [Feldman/Conee] |
Full Idea: If an arrogant young physicist refuses to recognise valid criticisms from a senior colleague, his or her character has nothing to do with the epistemic status of their belief in the theory. | |
From: R Feldman / E Conee (Evidentialism [1985], III) | |
A reaction: This rejects the idea that epistemic justification is essentially a matter of virtues and vices of character. That view is a version of reliabilism, and hence of externalism. I agree with the criticism, but epistemic virtues are still significant. |