Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Dennis Whitcomb, GE Hughes/M Cresswell and Philolaus

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13 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
The devil was wise as an angel, and lost no knowledge when he rebelled [Whitcomb]
     Full Idea: The devil is evil but nonetheless wise; he was a wise angel, and through no loss of knowledge, but, rather, through some sort of affective restructuring tried and failed to take over the throne.
     From: Dennis Whitcomb (Wisdom [2011], 'Argument')
     A reaction: ['affective restructuring' indeed! philosophers- don't you love 'em?] To fail at something you try to do suggests a flaw in the wisdom. And the new regime the devil wished to introduce doesn't look like a wise regime. Not convinced.
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / b. Terminology of PL
A 'value-assignment' (V) is when to each variable in the set V assigns either the value 1 or the value 0 [Hughes/Cresswell]
     Full Idea: A 'value-assignment' (V) is when to each variable in the set V assigns either the value 1 or the value 0.
     From: GE Hughes/M Cresswell (An Introduction to Modal Logic [1968], Ch.1)
     A reaction: In the interpreted version of the logic, 1 and 0 would become T (true) and F (false). The procedure seems to be called nowadays a 'valuation'.
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / d. Basic theorems of PL
The Law of Transposition says (P→Q) → (¬Q→¬P) [Hughes/Cresswell]
     Full Idea: The Law of Transposition says that (P→Q) → (¬Q→¬P).
     From: GE Hughes/M Cresswell (An Introduction to Modal Logic [1968], Ch.1)
     A reaction: That is, if the consequent (Q) of a conditional is false, then the antecedent (P) must have been false.
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 4. Soundness of PL
The rules preserve validity from the axioms, so no thesis negates any other thesis [Hughes/Cresswell]
     Full Idea: An axiomatic system is most naturally consistent iff no thesis is the negation of another thesis. It can be shown that every axiom is valid, that the transformation rules are validity-preserving, and if a wff α is valid, then ¬α is not valid.
     From: GE Hughes/M Cresswell (An Introduction to Modal Logic [1968], Ch.1)
     A reaction: [The labels 'soundness' and 'consistency' seem interchangeable here, with the former nowadays preferred]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
A system is 'weakly' complete if all wffs are derivable, and 'strongly' if theses are maximised [Hughes/Cresswell]
     Full Idea: To say that an axiom system is 'weakly complete' is to say that every valid wff of the system is derivable as a thesis. ..The system is 'strongly complete' if it cannot have any more theses than it has without falling into inconsistency.
     From: GE Hughes/M Cresswell (An Introduction to Modal Logic [1968], Ch.1)
     A reaction: [They go on to say that Propositional Logic is strongly complete, but Modal Logic is not]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
No things would be clear to us as entity or relationships unless there existed Number and its essence [Philolaus]
     Full Idea: No existing things would be clear to anyone, either in themselves or in their relationship to one another, unless there existed Number and its essence.
     From: Philolaus (On the Cosmos (lost) [c.435 BCE], B11), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.03.8
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
Some reasonings are stronger than we are [Philolaus]
     Full Idea: Some reasonings are stronger than we are.
     From: Philolaus (fragments/reports [c.425 BCE]), quoted by Aristotle - Eudemian Ethics 1225a33
     A reaction: This endorses the Aristotle view of akrasia (as opposed to the Socratic view). This isolated remark seems to imply that we are more clearly embodiments of will than of reason.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 4. Mathematical Nature
Everything must involve numbers, or it couldn't be thought about or known [Philolaus]
     Full Idea: Everything which is known has number, because otherwise it is impossible for anything to be the object of thought or knowledge.
     From: Philolaus (On the Cosmos (lost) [c.435 BCE], B04), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.21.7b
Harmony must pre-exist the cosmos, to bring the dissimilar sources together [Philolaus]
     Full Idea: It would have been impossible for the dissimilar and incompatible sources to have been made into an orderly universe unless harmony had been present in some form or other.
     From: Philolaus (On the Cosmos (lost) [c.435 BCE], B06), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.21.7d
There is no falsehood in harmony and number, only in irrational things [Philolaus]
     Full Idea: The nature of number and harmony admits of no falsehood; for this is unrelated to them. Falsehood and envy belong to the nature of the Unlimited and the Unintelligent and the Irrational.
     From: Philolaus (On the Cosmos (lost) [c.435 BCE], B11), quoted by (who?) - where?
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / d. The unlimited
Existing things, and hence the Cosmos, are a mixture of the Limited and the Unlimited [Philolaus]
     Full Idea: Since it is plain that existing things are neither wholly from the Limiting, nor wholly from the Unlimited, clearly the cosmos and its contents were fitted together from both the Limiting and the Unlimited.
     From: Philolaus (On the Cosmos (lost) [c.435 BCE], B02), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.21.7a
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 6. Laws as Numerical
Self-created numbers make the universe stable [Philolaus]
     Full Idea: Number is the ruling and self-created bond which maintains the everlasting stability of the contents of the universe.
     From: Philolaus (On the Cosmos (lost) [c.435 BCE], B23), quoted by (who?) - where?
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
Philolaus was the first person to say the earth moves in a circle [Philolaus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Philolaus was the first person to affirm that the earth moves in a circle.
     From: report of Philolaus (On the Cosmos (lost) [c.435 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 08.Ph.3