6 ideas
19695 | The devil was wise as an angel, and lost no knowledge when he rebelled [Whitcomb] |
Full Idea: The devil is evil but nonetheless wise; he was a wise angel, and through no loss of knowledge, but, rather, through some sort of affective restructuring tried and failed to take over the throne. | |
From: Dennis Whitcomb (Wisdom [2011], 'Argument') | |
A reaction: ['affective restructuring' indeed! philosophers- don't you love 'em?] To fail at something you try to do suggests a flaw in the wisdom. And the new regime the devil wished to introduce doesn't look like a wise regime. Not convinced. |
12582 | The function of beliefs is to produce beliefs-that-p when p [Millikan] |
Full Idea: Presumably it is a proper function of the belief-manufacturing mechanisms in John to produce beliefs-that-p only if and when p. | |
From: Ruth Garrett Millikan (Thoughts without Laws [1986], p.69), quoted by Christopher Peacocke - A Study of Concepts 5.2 | |
A reaction: This is the 'teleological' account of belief, which is trying to fit belief into an evolutionary view of humans. It is doubtful whether you can say mental states are just their 'proper' function, because then piano-playing becomes a puzzle. |
23801 | Biosemantics says content is useful mapping from a producer to a consumer system [Millikan, by Schulte] |
Full Idea: Millikan's 'biosemantic' view is that representations stand midway between producer and consumer systems. The represented states of affairs (the content) maps onto the second system, and thus enable its proper function. | |
From: report of Ruth Garrett Millikan (Varieties of Meaning [2002]) by Peter Schulte - Mental Content 4.4 | |
A reaction: These meets my standard objection to all functional theories (e.g. of mind), that observing relations and functions tells you nothing about what it actually is. Millikan seems to explain the role of content, but says nothing about its actual nature. |
15675 | We don't condemn people for being bad at reasoning [Finlayson] |
Full Idea: We do not morally disapprove of people who are incompetent reasoners. | |
From: James Gordon Finlayson (Habermas [2005], Ch.6:83) | |
A reaction: Well, we don't morally disapprove simply of their lack of reasoning ability, but we may morally disapprove of their actions, which have arisen entirely from the disability. |
15674 | One can universalise good advice, but that doesn't make it an obligation [Finlayson] |
Full Idea: 'Early to bed and early to rise' is a universalizable maxim, but, though it might be good advice, there is obviously no such obligation. | |
From: James Gordon Finlayson (Habermas [2005], Ch.6:83) | |
A reaction: I take it that Kant's rule won't distinguish moral guidance from prudential guidance. Unfair, I think. I may be a lark, but when I universalise this maxim I see that it can't be willed as a universal rule, because we should tolerate the owls. |
15662 | The 'culture industry' is an advertisement for the way things are [Finlayson] |
Full Idea: Critical theory said that culture unwittingly played the role of an advertisement for the way things are. Horkheimer and Adorno referred to this phenomenon as the 'culture industry'. | |
From: James Gordon Finlayson (Habermas [2005], Ch.1:04) | |
A reaction: An interesting perspective. However, absolutely everything is an advertisement for what it offers. I think this is especially true of moral (and immoral) actions. |