62 ideas
19695 | The devil was wise as an angel, and lost no knowledge when he rebelled [Whitcomb] |
Full Idea: The devil is evil but nonetheless wise; he was a wise angel, and through no loss of knowledge, but, rather, through some sort of affective restructuring tried and failed to take over the throne. | |
From: Dennis Whitcomb (Wisdom [2011], 'Argument') | |
A reaction: ['affective restructuring' indeed! philosophers- don't you love 'em?] To fail at something you try to do suggests a flaw in the wisdom. And the new regime the devil wished to introduce doesn't look like a wise regime. Not convinced. |
15413 | With four tense operators, all complex tenses reduce to fourteen basic cases [Burgess] |
Full Idea: Fand P as 'will' and 'was', G as 'always going to be', H as 'always has been', all tenses reduce to 14 cases: the past series, each implying the next, FH,H,PH,HP,P,GP, and the future series PG,G,FG,GF,F,HF, plus GH=HG implying all, FP=PF which all imply. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 2.8) | |
A reaction: I have tried to translate the fourteen into English, but am not quite confident enough to publish them here. I leave it as an exercise for the reader. |
15415 | The temporal Barcan formulas fix what exists, which seems absurd [Burgess] |
Full Idea: In temporal logic, if the converse Barcan formula holds then nothing goes out of existence, and the direct Barcan formula holds if nothing ever comes into existence. These results highlight the intuitive absurdity of the Barcan formulas. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 2.9) | |
A reaction: This is my reaction to the modal cases as well - the absurdity of thinking that no actually nonexistent thing might possibly have existed, or that the actual existents might not have existed. Williamson seems to be the biggest friend of the formulas. |
15430 | Is classical logic a part of intuitionist logic, or vice versa? [Burgess] |
Full Idea: From one point of view intuitionistic logic is a part of classical logic, missing one axiom, from another classical logic is a part of intuitionistic logic, missing two connectives, intuitionistic v and → | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 6.4) |
15431 | It is still unsettled whether standard intuitionist logic is complete [Burgess] |
Full Idea: The question of the completeness of the full intuitionistic logic for its intended interpretation is not yet fully resolved. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 6.9) |
15429 | Relevance logic's → is perhaps expressible by 'if A, then B, for that reason' [Burgess] |
Full Idea: The relevantist logician's → is perhaps expressible by 'if A, then B, for that reason'. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 5.8) |
15404 | Technical people see logic as any formal system that can be studied, not a study of argument validity [Burgess] |
Full Idea: Among the more technically oriented a 'logic' no longer means a theory about which forms of argument are valid, but rather means any formalism, regardless of its applications, that resembles original logic enough to be studied by similar methods. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], Pref) | |
A reaction: There doesn't seem to be any great intellectual obligation to be 'technical'. As far as pure logic is concerned, I am very drawn to the computer approach, since I take that to be the original dream of Aristotle and Leibniz - impersonal precision. |
15405 | Classical logic neglects the non-mathematical, such as temporality or modality [Burgess] |
Full Idea: There are topics of great philosophical interest that classical logic neglects because they are not important to mathematics. …These include distinctions of past, present and future, or of necessary, actual and possible. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 1.1) |
15427 | The Cut Rule expresses the classical idea that entailment is transitive [Burgess] |
Full Idea: The Cut rule (from A|-B and B|-C, infer A|-C) directly expresses the classical doctrine that entailment is transitive. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 5.3) |
15421 | Classical logic neglects counterfactuals, temporality and modality, because maths doesn't use them [Burgess] |
Full Idea: Classical logic neglects counterfactual conditionals for the same reason it neglects temporal and modal distinctions, namely, that they play no serious role in mathematics. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 4.1) | |
A reaction: Science obviously needs counterfactuals, and metaphysics needs modality. Maybe so-called 'classical' logic will be renamed 'basic mathematical logic'. Philosophy will become a lot clearer when that happens. |
15403 | Philosophical logic is a branch of logic, and is now centred in computer science [Burgess] |
Full Idea: Philosophical logic is a branch of logic, a technical subject. …Its centre of gravity today lies in theoretical computer science. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], Pref) | |
A reaction: He firmly distinguishes it from 'philosophy of logic', but doesn't spell it out. I take it that philosophical logic concerns metaprinciples which compare logical systems, and suggest new lines of research. Philosophy of logic seems more like metaphysics. |
15407 | Formalising arguments favours lots of connectives; proving things favours having very few [Burgess] |
Full Idea: When formalising arguments it is convenient to have as many connectives as possible available.; but when proving results about formulas it is convenient to have as few as possible. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 1.4) | |
A reaction: Illuminating. The fact that you can whittle classical logic down to two (or even fewer!) connectives warms the heart of technicians, but makes connection to real life much more difficult. Hence a bunch of extras get added. |
15424 | Asserting a disjunction from one disjunct seems odd, but can be sensible, and needed in maths [Burgess] |
Full Idea: Gricean implicature theory might suggest that a disjunction is never assertable when a disjunct is (though actually the disjunction might be 'pertinent') - but the procedure is indispensable in mathematical practice. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 5.2) | |
A reaction: He gives an example of a proof in maths which needs it, and an unusual conversational occasion where it makes sense. |
15409 | All occurrences of variables in atomic formulas are free [Burgess] |
Full Idea: All occurrences of variables in atomic formulas are free. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 1.7) |
15414 | The denotation of a definite description is flexible, rather than rigid [Burgess] |
Full Idea: By contrast to rigidly designating proper names, …the denotation of definite descriptions is (in general) not rigid but flexible. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 2.9) | |
A reaction: This modern way of putting it greatly clarifies why Russell was interested in the type of reference involved in definite descriptions. Obviously some descriptions (such as 'the only person who could ever have…') might be rigid. |
15406 | 'Induction' and 'recursion' on complexity prove by connecting a formula to its atomic components [Burgess] |
Full Idea: There are atomic formulas, and formulas built from the connectives, and that is all. We show that all formulas have some property, first for the atomics, then the others. This proof is 'induction on complexity'; we also use 'recursion on complexity'. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 1.4) | |
A reaction: That is: 'induction on complexity' builds a proof from atomics, via connectives; 'recursion on complexity' breaks down to the atomics, also via the connectives. You prove something by showing it is rooted in simple truths. |
15426 | We can build one expanding sequence, instead of a chain of deductions [Burgess] |
Full Idea: Instead of demonstrations which are either axioms, or follow from axioms by rules, we can have one ever-growing sequence of formulas of the form 'Axioms |- ______', where the blank is filled by Axioms, then Lemmas, then Theorems, then Corollaries. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 5.3) |
15425 | The sequent calculus makes it possible to have proof without transitivity of entailment [Burgess] |
Full Idea: It might be wondered how one could have any kind of proof procedure at all if transitivity of entailment is disallowed, but the sequent calculus can get around the difficulty. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 5.3) | |
A reaction: He gives examples where transitivity of entailment (so that you can build endless chains of deductions) might fail. This is the point of the 'cut free' version of sequent calculus, since the cut rule allows transitivity. |
15408 | 'Tautologies' are valid formulas of classical sentential logic - or substitution instances in other logics [Burgess] |
Full Idea: The valid formulas of classical sentential logic are called 'tautologically valid', or simply 'tautologies'; with other logics 'tautologies' are formulas that are substitution instances of valid formulas of classical sentential logic. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 1.5) |
15418 | Validity (for truth) and demonstrability (for proof) have correlates in satisfiability and consistency [Burgess] |
Full Idea: Validity (truth by virtue of logical form alone) and demonstrability (provability by virtue of logical form alone) have correlative notions of logical possibility, 'satisfiability' and 'consistency', which come apart in some logics. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 3.3) |
15411 | We only need to study mathematical models, since all other models are isomorphic to these [Burgess] |
Full Idea: In practice there is no need to consider any but mathematical models, models whose universes consist of mathematical objects, since every model is isomorphic to one of these. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 1.8) | |
A reaction: The crucial link is the technique of Gödel Numbering, which can translate any verbal formula into numerical form. He adds that, because of the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem only subsets of the natural numbers need be considered. |
15412 | Models leave out meaning, and just focus on truth values [Burgess] |
Full Idea: Models generally deliberately leave out meaning, retaining only what is important for the determination of truth values. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 2.2) | |
A reaction: This is the key point to hang on to, if you are to avoid confusing mathematical models with models of things in the real world. |
15416 | We aim to get the technical notion of truth in all models matching intuitive truth in all instances [Burgess] |
Full Idea: The aim in setting up a model theory is that the technical notion of truth in all models should agree with the intuitive notion of truth in all instances. A model is supposed to represent everything about an instance that matters for its truth. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 3.2) |
15428 | The Liar seems like a truth-value 'gap', but dialethists see it as a 'glut' [Burgess] |
Full Idea: It is a common view that the liar sentence ('This very sentence is not true') is an instance of a truth-value gap (neither true nor false), but some dialethists cite it as an example of a truth-value glut (both true and false). | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 5.7) | |
A reaction: The defence of the glut view must be that it is true, then it is false, then it is true... Could it manage both at once? |
12154 | Are 'word token' and 'word type' different sorts of countable objects, or two ways of counting? [Geach, by Perry] |
Full Idea: If we list the words 'bull', 'bull' and 'cow', it is often said that there are three 'word tokens' but only two 'word types', but Geach says there are not two kinds of object to be counted, but two different ways of counting the same object. | |
From: report of Peter Geach (Reference and Generality (3rd ed) [1980]) by John Perry - The Same F II | |
A reaction: Insofar as the notion that a 'word type' is an 'object', my sympathies are entirely with Geach, to my surprise. Geach's point is that 'bull' and 'bull' are the same meaning, but different actual words. Identity is relative to a concept. |
10185 | Set theory is the standard background for modern mathematics [Burgess] |
Full Idea: In present-day mathematics, it is set theory that serves as the background theory in which other branches of mathematics are developed. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Review of Chihara 'Struct. Accnt of Maths' [2005], §1) | |
A reaction: [He cites Bourbaki as an authority for this] See Benacerraf for a famous difficulty here, when you actually try to derive an ontology from the mathematicians' working practices. |
10184 | Structuralists take the name 'R' of the reals to be a variable ranging over structures, not a structure [Burgess] |
Full Idea: On the structuralist interpretation, theorems of analysis concerning the real numbers R are about all complete ordered fields. So R, which appears to be the name of a specific structure, is taken to be a variable ranging over structures. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Review of Chihara 'Struct. Accnt of Maths' [2005], §1) | |
A reaction: Since I am beginning to think that nearly all linguistic expressions should be understood as variables, I find this very appealing, even if Burgess hates it. Terms slide and drift, and are vague, between variable and determinate reference. |
10189 | There is no one relation for the real number 2, as relations differ in different models [Burgess] |
Full Idea: One might meet the 'Van Inwagen Problem' by saying that the intrinsic properties of the object playing the role of 2 will differ from one model to another, so that no statement about the intrinsic properties of 'the' real numbers will make sense. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Review of Chihara 'Struct. Accnt of Maths' [2005], §5) | |
A reaction: There seems to be a potential confusion among opponents of structuralism between relations at the level of actual mathematical operations, and generalisations about relations, which are captured in the word 'patterns'. Call them 'meta-relations'? |
10186 | If set theory is used to define 'structure', we can't define set theory structurally [Burgess] |
Full Idea: It is to set theory that one turns for the very definition of 'structure', ...and this creates a problem of circularity if we try to impose a structuralist interpretation on set theory. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Review of Chihara 'Struct. Accnt of Maths' [2005], §1) | |
A reaction: This seems like a nice difficulty, especially if, like Shapiro, you wade in and try to give a formal account of structures and patterns. Resnik is more circumspect and vague. |
10187 | Abstract algebra concerns relations between models, not common features of all the models [Burgess] |
Full Idea: Abstract algebra, such as group theory, is not concerned with the features common to all models of the axioms, but rather with the relationships among different models of those axioms (especially homomorphic relation functions). | |
From: John P. Burgess (Review of Chihara 'Struct. Accnt of Maths' [2005], §1) | |
A reaction: It doesn't seem to follow that structuralism can't be about the relations (or patterns) found when abstracting away and overviewing all the models. One can study family relations, or one can study kinship in general. |
10188 | How can mathematical relations be either internal, or external, or intrinsic? [Burgess] |
Full Idea: The 'Van Inwagen Problem' for structuralism is of explaining how a mathematical relation (such as set membership, or the ratios of an ellipse) can fit into one of the three scholastics types of relations: are they internal, external, or intrinsic? | |
From: John P. Burgess (Review of Chihara 'Struct. Accnt of Maths' [2005], §5) | |
A reaction: The difficulty is that mathematical objects seem to need intrinsic properties to get any of these three versions off the ground (which was Russell's complaint against structures). |
10735 | Abstraction from objects won't reveal an operation's being performed 'so many times' [Geach] |
Full Idea: For an understanding of arithmetic the grasp of an operation's being performed 'so many times' is quite indispensable; and abstraction of a feature from groups of nuts cannot give us this grasp. | |
From: Peter Geach (Abstraction Reconsidered [1983], p.170) | |
A reaction: I end up defending the empirical approach to arithmetic because remarks like this are so patently false. Geach seems to think we arrive ready-made in the world, just raring to get on with some counting. He lacks the evolutionary perspective. |
8780 | Attributes are functions, not objects; this distinguishes 'square of 2' from 'double of 2' [Geach] |
Full Idea: Attributes should not be thought of as identifiable objects. It is better to follow Frege and compare them to mathematical functions. 'Square of' and 'double of' x are distinct functions, even though they are not distinguishable in thought when x is 2. | |
From: Peter Geach (Mental Acts: their content and their objects [1957], §11) | |
A reaction: Attributes are features of the world, of which animals are well aware, and the mathematical model is dubious when dealing with physical properties. The route to arriving at 2 is not the same concept as 2. There are many roads to Rome. |
8969 | We should abandon absolute identity, confining it to within some category [Geach, by Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: Geach argued that the notion of absolute identity should be abandoned. ..We can only grasp the meaning of a count noun when we associate it with a criterion of identity, expressed by a particular relative identity sortal. | |
From: report of Peter Geach (Reference and Generality (3rd ed) [1980]) by John Hawthorne - Identity | |
A reaction: In other words, identity needs categorisation. Hawthorne concludes that Geach is wrong. Geach clearly has much common usage on his side. 'What's that?' usually invites a categorisation. Sameness of objects seems to need a 'respect'. |
16075 | Denial of absolute identity has drastic implications for logic, semantics and set theory [Wasserman on Geach] |
Full Idea: Geach's denial of absolute identity has drastic implications for logic, semantics and set theory. He must deny the axiom of extensionality in set theory, for example. | |
From: comment on Peter Geach (Reference and Generality (3rd ed) [1980]) by Ryan Wasserman - Material Constitution 6 | |
A reaction: I'm beginning to think we have two entirely different concepts here - the logicians' and mathematicians' notion of when two things are identical, and the ordinary language concept of two things being 'the same'. 'We like the same music'. |
12152 | Identity is relative. One must not say things are 'the same', but 'the same A as' [Geach] |
Full Idea: Identity is relative. When one says 'x is identical with y' this is an incomplete expression. It is short for 'x is the same A as y', where 'A' represents some count noun understood from the context of utterance. | |
From: Peter Geach (Reference and Generality (3rd ed) [1980], p.39), quoted by John Perry - The Same F I | |
A reaction: Perry notes that Geach's view is in conscious opposition to Frege, who had a pure notion of identity. We say 'they are the same insofar as they are animals', but not 'they are the same animal'. Perfect identity involves all possible A's. |
16073 | Leibniz's Law is incomplete, since it includes a non-relativized identity predicate [Geach, by Wasserman] |
Full Idea: Geach rejects the standard formulation of Leibniz's Law as incomplete, since it includes a non-relativized identity predicate. | |
From: report of Peter Geach (Reference and Generality (3rd ed) [1980]) by Ryan Wasserman - Material Constitution 6 | |
A reaction: Not many people accept Geach's premiss that identity is a relative matter. I agree with Wiggins on this, that identity is an absolute (and possibly indefinable). The problem with the Law is what you mean by a 'property'. |
11910 | Being 'the same' is meaningless, unless we specify 'the same X' [Geach] |
Full Idea: "The same" is a fragmentary expression, and has no significance unless we say or mean "the same X", where X represents a general term. ...There is no such thing as being just 'the same'. | |
From: Peter Geach (Mental Acts: their content and their objects [1957], §16) | |
A reaction: Geach seems oddly unaware of the perfect identity of Hespherus with Phosphorus. His critics don't spot that he was concerned with identity over time (of 'the same man', who ages). Perry's critique emphasises the type/token distinction. |
15420 | De re modality seems to apply to objects a concept intended for sentences [Burgess] |
Full Idea: There is a problem over 'de re' modality (as contrasted with 'de dicto'), as in ∃x□x. What is meant by '"it is analytic that Px" is satisfied by a', given that analyticity is a notion that in the first instance applies to complete sentences? | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 3.9) | |
A reaction: This is Burgess's summary of one of Quine's original objections. The issue may be a distinction between whether the sentence is analytic, and what makes it analytic. The necessity of bachelors being unmarried makes that sentence analytic. |
15419 | General consensus is S5 for logical modality of validity, and S4 for proof [Burgess] |
Full Idea: To the extent that there is any conventional wisdom about the question, it is that S5 is correct for alethic logical modality, and S4 correct for apodictic logical modality. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 3.8) | |
A reaction: In classical logic these coincide, so presumably one should use the minimum system to do the job, which is S4 (?). |
15417 | Logical necessity has two sides - validity and demonstrability - which coincide in classical logic [Burgess] |
Full Idea: Logical necessity is a genus with two species. For classical logic the truth-related notion of validity and the proof-related notion of demonstrability, coincide - but they are distinct concept. In some logics they come apart, in intension and extension. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 3.3) | |
A reaction: They coincide in classical logic because it is sound and complete. This strikes me as the correct approach to logical necessity, tying it to the actual nature of logic, rather than some handwavy notion of just 'true in all possible worlds'. |
15422 | Three conditionals theories: Materialism (material conditional), Idealism (true=assertable), Nihilism (no truth) [Burgess] |
Full Idea: Three main theories of the truth of indicative conditionals are Materialism (the conditions are the same as for the material conditional), Idealism (identifying assertability with truth-value), and Nihilism (no truth, just assertability). | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 4.3) |
15423 | It is doubtful whether the negation of a conditional has any clear meaning [Burgess] |
Full Idea: It is contentious whether conditionals have negations, and whether 'it is not the case that if A,B' has any clear meaning. | |
From: John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 4.9) | |
A reaction: This seems to be connected to Lewis's proof that a probability conditional cannot be reduced to a single proposition. If a conditional only applies to A-worlds, it is not surprising that its meaning gets lost when it leaves that world. |
8775 | A big flea is a small animal, so 'big' and 'small' cannot be acquired by abstraction [Geach] |
Full Idea: A big flea or rat is a small animal, and a small elephant is a big animal, so there can be no question of ignoring the kind of thing to which 'big' or 'small' is referred and forming those concepts by abstraction. | |
From: Peter Geach (Mental Acts: their content and their objects [1957], §9) | |
A reaction: Geach is attacking a caricature of the theory. Abstraction is a neat mental trick which has developed in stages, from big rats relative to us, to big relative to other rats, to the concept of 'relative' (Idea 8776!), to the concept of 'relative bigness'. |
8776 | We cannot learn relations by abstraction, because their converse must be learned too [Geach] |
Full Idea: Abstractionists are unaware of the difficulty with relations - that they neither exist nor can be observed apart from the converse relation, the two being indivisible, as in grasping 'to the left of' and 'to the right of'. | |
From: Peter Geach (Mental Acts: their content and their objects [1957], §9) | |
A reaction: It is hard to see how a rival account such as platonism could help. It seems obvious to me that 'right' and 'left' would be quite meaningless without some experience of things in space, including an orientation to them. |
10732 | If concepts are just recognitional, then general judgements would be impossible [Geach] |
Full Idea: If concepts were nothing but recognitional capacities, then it is unintelligible that I can judge that cats eat mice when neither of them are present. | |
From: Peter Geach (Abstraction Reconsidered [1983], p.164) | |
A reaction: Having observed the importance of recognition for the abstractionist (Idea 10731), he then seems to assume that there is nothing more to their concepts. Geach fails to grasp levels of abstraction, and cross-reference, and generalisation. |
2567 | You can't define real mental states in terms of behaviour that never happens [Geach] |
Full Idea: We can't take a statement that two men, whose overt behaviour was not actually different, were in different states of mind as being really a statement that the behaviour of one man would have been different in hypothetical circumstances that never arose. | |
From: Peter Geach (Mental Acts: their content and their objects [1957], §3) | |
A reaction: This is the whole problem with trying to define the mind as dispositions. The same might be said of properties, since some properties are active, but others are mere potential or disposition. Hence 'process' looks to me the most promising word for mind. |
2568 | Beliefs aren't tied to particular behaviours [Geach] |
Full Idea: Is there any behaviour characteristic of a given belief? | |
From: Peter Geach (Mental Acts: their content and their objects [1957], §4) | |
A reaction: Well, yes. Belief that a dog is about to bite you. Belief that this nice food is yours, and you are hungry. But he has a good point. He is pointing out that the mental state is a very different thing from the 'disposition' to behave in a certain way. |
8781 | The mind does not lift concepts from experience; it creates them, and then applies them [Geach] |
Full Idea: Having a concept is not recognizing a feature of experience; the mind makes concepts. We then fit our concepts to experience. | |
From: Peter Geach (Mental Acts: their content and their objects [1957], §11) | |
A reaction: This seems to imply that we create concepts ex nihilo, which is a rather worse theory than saying that we abstract them from multiple (and multi-level) experiences. That minds create concepts is a truism. How do we do it? |
10731 | For abstractionists, concepts are capacities to recognise recurrent features of the world [Geach] |
Full Idea: For abstractionists, concepts are essentially capacities for recognizing recurrent features of the world. | |
From: Peter Geach (Abstraction Reconsidered [1983], p.163) | |
A reaction: Recognition certainly strikes me as central to thought (and revelatory of memory, since we continually recognise what we cannot actually recall). Geach dislikes this view, but I see it as crucial to an evolutionary view of thought. |
8769 | If someone has aphasia but can still play chess, they clearly have concepts [Geach] |
Full Idea: If a man struck with aphasia can still play bridge or chess, I certainly wish to say he still has the concepts involved in the game, although he can no longer exercise them verbally. | |
From: Peter Geach (Mental Acts: their content and their objects [1957], §5) | |
A reaction: Geach proceeds thereafter to concentrate on language, but this caveat is crucial. To suggest that concepts are entirely verbal has always struck me as ridiculous, and an insult to our inarticulate mammalian cousins. |
8770 | 'Abstractionism' is acquiring a concept by picking out one experience amongst a group [Geach] |
Full Idea: I call 'abstractionism' the doctrine that a concept is acquired by a process of singling out in attention some one feature given in direct experience - abstracting it - and ignoring the other features simultaneously given - abstracting from them. | |
From: Peter Geach (Mental Acts: their content and their objects [1957], §6) | |
A reaction: Locke seems to be the best known ancestor of this view, and Geach launches a vigorous attack against it. However, contemporary philosophers still refer to the process, and I think Geach should be crushed and this theory revived. |
8771 | 'Or' and 'not' are not to be found in the sensible world, or even in the world of inner experience [Geach] |
Full Idea: Nowhere in the sensible world could you find anything to be suitably labelled 'or' or 'not'. So the abstractionist appeals to an 'inner sense', or hesitation for 'or', and of frustration or inhibition for 'not'. Personally I see a threat in 'or else'! | |
From: Peter Geach (Mental Acts: their content and their objects [1957], §7) | |
A reaction: This is a key argument of Geach's against abstractionism. As a logician he prefers to discuss connectives rather than, say, colours. I think they might be meta-abstractions, which you create internally once you have picked up the knack. |
8772 | We can't acquire number-concepts by extracting the number from the things being counted [Geach] |
Full Idea: The number-concepts just cannot be got by concentrating on the number and abstracting from the kind of things being counted. | |
From: Peter Geach (Mental Acts: their content and their objects [1957], §8) | |
A reaction: This point is from Frege - that if you 'abstract away' everything apart from the number, you are simply left with nothing in experience. The objection might, I think, be met by viewing it as second-order abstraction, perhaps getting to a pattern first. |
8773 | Abstractionists can't explain counting, because it must precede experience of objects [Geach] |
Full Idea: The way counting is learned is wholly contrary to abstractionist preconceptions, because the series of numerals has to be learned before it can be applied. | |
From: Peter Geach (Mental Acts: their content and their objects [1957], §8) | |
A reaction: You might learn to parrot the names of numbers, but you could hardly know what they meant if you couldn't count anything. See Idea 3907. I would have thought that individuating objects must logically and pedagogically precede counting. |
8774 | The numbers don't exist in nature, so they cannot have been abstracted from there into our languages [Geach] |
Full Idea: The pattern of the numeral series that is grasped by a child exists nowhere in nature outside human languages, so the human race cannot possibly have discerned this pattern by abstracting it from some natural context. | |
From: Peter Geach (Mental Acts: their content and their objects [1957], §8) | |
A reaction: This is a spectacular non sequitur, which begs the question. Abstractionists precisely claim that the process of abstraction brings numerals into human language from the natural context. Structuralism is an attempt to explain the process. |
8778 | Blind people can use colour words like 'red' perfectly intelligently [Geach] |
Full Idea: It is not true that men born blind can form no colour-concepts; a man born blind can use the word 'red' with a considerable measure of intelligence; he can show a practical grasp of the logic of the word. | |
From: Peter Geach (Mental Acts: their content and their objects [1957], §10) | |
A reaction: Weak. It is obvious that they pick up the word 'red' from the usage of sighted people, and the usage of the word doesn't guarantee a grasp of the concept, as when non-mathematicians refer to 'calculus'. Compare Idea 7377 and Idea 7866. |
8777 | If 'black' and 'cat' can be used in the absence of such objects, how can such usage be abstracted? [Geach] |
Full Idea: Since we can use the terms 'black' and 'cat' in situations not including any black object or any cat, how could this part of the use be got by abstraction? | |
From: Peter Geach (Mental Acts: their content and their objects [1957], §10) | |
A reaction: [He is attacking H.H. Price] It doesn't seem a huge psychological leap to apply the word 'cat' when we remember a cat, and once it is in the mind we can play games with our abstractions. Cats are smaller than dogs. |
8779 | We can form two different abstract concepts that apply to a single unified experience [Geach] |
Full Idea: It is impossible to form the concept of 'chromatic colour' by discriminative attention to a feature given in my visual experience. In seeing a red window-pane, I do not have two sensations, one of redness and one of chromatic colour. | |
From: Peter Geach (Mental Acts: their content and their objects [1957], §10) | |
A reaction: Again Geach begs the question, because abstractionists claim that you can focus on two different 'aspects' of the one experience, as that it is a 'window', or it is 'red', or it is not a wall, or it is not monochrome. |
10733 | The abstractionist cannot explain 'some' and 'not' [Geach] |
Full Idea: The abstractionist cannot give a logically coherent account of the features that are supposed to be reached by discriminative attention, corresponding to the words 'some' and 'not'. | |
From: Peter Geach (Abstraction Reconsidered [1983], p.167) | |
A reaction: I understand 'some' in terms of mereology, because that connects to experience, and 'not' I take to derive more from psychological experience than from the physical world, building on thwarted expectation, which even animals experience. |
10734 | Only a judgement can distinguish 'striking' from 'being struck' [Geach] |
Full Idea: To understand the verb 'to strike' we must see that 'striking' and 'being struck' are different, but necessarily go together in event and thought; only in the context of a judgment can they be distinguished, when we think of both together. | |
From: Peter Geach (Abstraction Reconsidered [1983], p.168) | |
A reaction: Geach seems to have a strange notion that judgements are pure events which can precede all experience, and are the only ways we can come to understand experience. He needs to start from animals (or 'brutes', as he still calls them!). |
22489 | 'Good' is an attributive adjective like 'large', not predicative like 'red' [Geach, by Foot] |
Full Idea: Geach puts 'good' in the class of attributive adjectives, such as 'large' and 'small', contrasting such adjectives with 'predicative' adjectives such as 'red'. | |
From: report of Peter Geach (Good and Evil [1956]) by Philippa Foot - Natural Goodness Intro | |
A reaction: [In Analysis 17, and 'Theories of Ethics' ed Foot] Thus any object can simply be red, but something can only be large or small 'for a rat' or 'for a car'. Hence nothing is just good, but always a good so-and-so. This is Aristotelian, and Foot loves it. |