Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Dennis Whitcomb, Thoralf Skolem and Luitzen E.J. Brouwer

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16 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
The devil was wise as an angel, and lost no knowledge when he rebelled [Whitcomb]
     Full Idea: The devil is evil but nonetheless wise; he was a wise angel, and through no loss of knowledge, but, rather, through some sort of affective restructuring tried and failed to take over the throne.
     From: Dennis Whitcomb (Wisdom [2011], 'Argument')
     A reaction: ['affective restructuring' indeed! philosophers- don't you love 'em?] To fail at something you try to do suggests a flaw in the wisdom. And the new regime the devil wished to introduce doesn't look like a wise regime. Not convinced.
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 7. Paraconsistency
Our dislike of contradiction in logic is a matter of psychology, not mathematics [Brouwer]
     Full Idea: Not to the mathematician, but to the psychologist, belongs the task of explaining why ...we are averse to so-called contradictory systems in which the negative as well as the positive of certain propositions are valid.
     From: Luitzen E.J. Brouwer (Intuitionism and Formalism [1912], p.79)
     A reaction: Was the turning point of Graham Priest's life the day he read this sentence? I don't agree. I take the principle of non-contradiction to be a highly generalised observation of how the world works (and Russell agrees with me).
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
Axiomatising set theory makes it all relative [Skolem]
     Full Idea: Axiomatising set theory leads to a relativity of set-theoretic notions, and this relativity is inseparably bound up with every thoroughgoing axiomatisation.
     From: Thoralf Skolem (Remarks on axiomatised set theory [1922], p.296)
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Skolem did not believe in the existence of uncountable sets [Skolem]
     Full Idea: Skolem did not believe in the existence of uncountable sets.
     From: Thoralf Skolem (works [1920], 5.3)
     A reaction: Kit Fine refers somewhere to 'unrepentent Skolemites' who still hold this view.
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
For intuitionists excluded middle is an outdated historical convention [Brouwer]
     Full Idea: From the intuitionist standpoint the dogma of the universal validity of the principle of excluded third in mathematics can only be considered as a phenomenon of history of civilization, like the rationality of pi or rotation of the sky about the earth.
     From: Luitzen E.J. Brouwer (works [1930]), quoted by Shaughan Lavine - Understanding the Infinite VI.2
     A reaction: [Brouwer 1952:510-11]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
If a 1st-order proposition is satisfied, it is satisfied in a denumerably infinite domain [Skolem]
     Full Idea: Löwenheim's theorem reads as follows: If a first-order proposition is satisfied in any domain at all, it is already satisfied in a denumerably infinite domain.
     From: Thoralf Skolem (Remarks on axiomatised set theory [1922], p.293)
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
Mathematics is a mental activity which does not use language [Brouwer, by Bostock]
     Full Idea: Brouwer made the rather extraordinary claim that mathematics is a mental activity which uses no language.
     From: report of Luitzen E.J. Brouwer (Mathematics, Science and Language [1928]) by David Bostock - Philosophy of Mathematics 7.1
     A reaction: Since I take language to have far less of a role in thought than is commonly believed, I don't think this idea is absurd. I would say that we don't use language much when we are talking!
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / h. Reals from Cauchy
Brouwer saw reals as potential, not actual, and produced by a rule, or a choice [Brouwer, by Shapiro]
     Full Idea: In his early writing, Brouwer took a real number to be a Cauchy sequence determined by a rule. Later he augmented rule-governed sequences with free-choice sequences, but even then the attitude is that Cauchy sequences are potential, not actual infinities.
     From: report of Luitzen E.J. Brouwer (works [1930]) by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics 6.6
     A reaction: This is the 'constructivist' view of numbers, as espoused by intuitionists like Brouwer.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / g. Applying mathematics
Scientific laws largely rest on the results of counting and measuring [Brouwer]
     Full Idea: A large part of the natural laws introduced by science treat only of the mutual relations between the results of counting and measuring.
     From: Luitzen E.J. Brouwer (Intuitionism and Formalism [1912], p.77)
     A reaction: His point, I take it, is that the higher reaches of numbers have lost touch with the original point of the system. I now see the whole issue as just depending on conventions about the agreed extension of the word 'number'.
Brouwer regards the application of mathematics to the world as somehow 'wicked' [Brouwer, by Bostock]
     Full Idea: Brouwer regards as somehow 'wicked' the idea that mathematics can be applied to a non-mental subject matter, the physical world, and that it might develop in response to the needs which that application reveals.
     From: report of Luitzen E.J. Brouwer (Mathematics, Science and Language [1928]) by David Bostock - Philosophy of Mathematics 7.1
     A reaction: The idea is that mathematics only concerns creations of the human mind. It presumably has no more application than, say, noughts-and-crosses.
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
Integers and induction are clear as foundations, but set-theory axioms certainly aren't [Skolem]
     Full Idea: The initial foundations should be immediately clear, natural and not open to question. This is satisfied by the notion of integer and by inductive inference, by it is not satisfied by the axioms of Zermelo, or anything else of that kind.
     From: Thoralf Skolem (Remarks on axiomatised set theory [1922], p.299)
     A reaction: This is a plea (endorsed by Almog) that the integers themselves should be taken as primitive and foundational. I would say that the idea of successor is more primitive than the integers.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
Mathematician want performable operations, not propositions about objects [Skolem]
     Full Idea: Most mathematicians want mathematics to deal, ultimately, with performable computing operations, and not to consist of formal propositions about objects called this or that.
     From: Thoralf Skolem (Remarks on axiomatised set theory [1922], p.300)
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
Intuitionists only accept denumerable sets [Brouwer]
     Full Idea: The intuitionist recognises only the existence of denumerable sets.
     From: Luitzen E.J. Brouwer (Intuitionism and Formalism [1912], p.80)
     A reaction: That takes you up to omega, but not beyond, presumably because it then loses sight of the original intuition of 'bare two-oneness' (Idea 12453). I sympathise, but the word 'number' has shifted its meaning a lot these days.
Neo-intuitionism abstracts from the reuniting of moments, to intuit bare two-oneness [Brouwer]
     Full Idea: Neo-intuitionism sees the falling apart of moments, reunited while remaining separated in time, as the fundamental phenomenon of human intellect, passing by abstracting to mathematical thinking, the intuition of bare two-oneness.
     From: Luitzen E.J. Brouwer (Intuitionism and Formalism [1912], p.80)
     A reaction: [compressed] A famous and somewhat obscure idea. He goes on to say that this creates one and two, and all the finite ordinals.
Intuitionist mathematics deduces by introspective construction, and rejects unknown truths [Brouwer]
     Full Idea: Mathematics rigorously treated from the point of view of deducing theorems exclusively by means of introspective construction, is called intuitionistic mathematics. It deviates from classical mathematics, which believes in unknown truths.
     From: Luitzen E.J. Brouwer (Consciousness, Philosophy and Mathematics [1948]), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Thinking About Mathematics 1.2
     A reaction: Clearly intuitionist mathematics is a close cousin of logical positivism and the verification principle. This view would be anathema to Frege, because it is psychological. Personally I believe in the existence of unknown truths, big time!
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Intuitonists in mathematics worried about unjustified assertion, as well as contradiction [Brouwer, by George/Velleman]
     Full Idea: The concern of mathematical intuitionists was that the use of certain forms of inference generates, not contradiction, but unjustified assertions.
     From: report of Luitzen E.J. Brouwer (Intuitionism and Formalism [1912]) by A.George / D.J.Velleman - Philosophies of Mathematics Ch.6
     A reaction: This seems to be the real origin of the verificationist idea in the theory of meaning. It is a hugely revolutionary idea - that ideas are not only ruled out of court by contradiction, but that there are other criteria which should also be met.