Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Dennis Whitcomb, Thoralf Skolem and Sigmund Freud

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10 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
The devil was wise as an angel, and lost no knowledge when he rebelled [Whitcomb]
     Full Idea: The devil is evil but nonetheless wise; he was a wise angel, and through no loss of knowledge, but, rather, through some sort of affective restructuring tried and failed to take over the throne.
     From: Dennis Whitcomb (Wisdom [2011], 'Argument')
     A reaction: ['affective restructuring' indeed! philosophers- don't you love 'em?] To fail at something you try to do suggests a flaw in the wisdom. And the new regime the devil wished to introduce doesn't look like a wise regime. Not convinced.
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
Axiomatising set theory makes it all relative [Skolem]
     Full Idea: Axiomatising set theory leads to a relativity of set-theoretic notions, and this relativity is inseparably bound up with every thoroughgoing axiomatisation.
     From: Thoralf Skolem (Remarks on axiomatised set theory [1922], p.296)
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Skolem did not believe in the existence of uncountable sets [Skolem]
     Full Idea: Skolem did not believe in the existence of uncountable sets.
     From: Thoralf Skolem (works [1920], 5.3)
     A reaction: Kit Fine refers somewhere to 'unrepentent Skolemites' who still hold this view.
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
If a 1st-order proposition is satisfied, it is satisfied in a denumerably infinite domain [Skolem]
     Full Idea: Löwenheim's theorem reads as follows: If a first-order proposition is satisfied in any domain at all, it is already satisfied in a denumerably infinite domain.
     From: Thoralf Skolem (Remarks on axiomatised set theory [1922], p.293)
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
Integers and induction are clear as foundations, but set-theory axioms certainly aren't [Skolem]
     Full Idea: The initial foundations should be immediately clear, natural and not open to question. This is satisfied by the notion of integer and by inductive inference, by it is not satisfied by the axioms of Zermelo, or anything else of that kind.
     From: Thoralf Skolem (Remarks on axiomatised set theory [1922], p.299)
     A reaction: This is a plea (endorsed by Almog) that the integers themselves should be taken as primitive and foundational. I would say that the idea of successor is more primitive than the integers.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
Mathematician want performable operations, not propositions about objects [Skolem]
     Full Idea: Most mathematicians want mathematics to deal, ultimately, with performable computing operations, and not to consist of formal propositions about objects called this or that.
     From: Thoralf Skolem (Remarks on axiomatised set theory [1922], p.300)
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
Freud treats the unconscious as intentional and hence mental [Freud, by Searle]
     Full Idea: Freud thinks that our unconscious mental states exist as occurrent intrinsic intentional states even when unconscious. Their ontology is that of the mental, even when they are unconscious.
     From: report of Sigmund Freud (works [1900]) by John Searle - The Rediscovery of the Mind Ch. 7.V
     A reaction: Searle states this view in order to attack it. Whether such states are labelled as 'mental' seems uninteresting. Whether unconscious states can be intentional is crucial, and modern scientific understanding of the brain strongly suggest they can.
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
Freud and others have shown that we don't know our own beliefs, feelings, motive and attitudes [Freud, by Shoemaker]
     Full Idea: Freud persuaded many that beliefs, wishes and feelings are sometimes unconscious, and even sceptics about Freud acknowledge that there is self-deception about motive and attitudes.
     From: report of Sigmund Freud (works [1900]) by Sydney Shoemaker - Introspection p.396
     A reaction: This seems to me obviously correct. The traditional notion is that the consciousness is the mind, but now it seems obvious that consciousness is only one part of the mind, and maybe even a peripheral (epiphenomenal) part of it.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / a. Nature of emotions
Freud said passions are pressures of some flowing hydraulic quantity [Freud, by Solomon]
     Full Idea: Freud argued that the passions in general …were the pressures of a yet unknown 'quantity' (which he simply designated 'Q'). He first thought this flowed through neurones, …and always couched the idea in the language of hydraulics.
     From: report of Sigmund Freud (works [1900]) by Robert C. Solomon - The Passions 3.4
     A reaction: This is the main target of Solomon's criticism, because its imagery has become so widespread. It leads to talk of suppressing emotions, or sublimating them. However, it is not too different from Nietzsche's 'drives' or 'will to power'.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Freud is pessimistic about human nature; it is ambivalent motive and fantasy, rather than reason [Freud, by Murdoch]
     Full Idea: Freud takes a thoroughly pessimistic view of human nature. ...Introspection reveals only the deep tissue of ambivalent motive, and fantasy is a stronger force than reason. Objectivity and unselfishness are not natural to human beings.
     From: report of Sigmund Freud (works [1900], II) by Iris Murdoch - The Sovereignty of Good II
     A reaction: Interesting. His view seems to have coloured the whole of modern culture, reinforced by the hideous irrationality of the Nazis. Adorno and Horkheimer attacking the Enlightenment was the last step in that process.