5515
|
Imaginary cases are good for revealing our beliefs, rather than the truth [Parfit]
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Full Idea:
I believe it is worth considering imaginary cases (such as Teletransportation), as we can use them to discover, not what the truth is, but what we believe.
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From:
Derek Parfit (The Unimportance of Identity [1995], p.293)
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A reaction:
The trouble is that we might say that IF I were suddenly turned into a pig, then I would come to believe in dualism, but that will not and cannot happen, because dualism is false. It seems essential to accept the natural possibility of the case.
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5516
|
Reduction can be by identity, or constitution, or elimination [Parfit, by PG]
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Full Idea:
We can distinguish Identifying Reductionism (as in 'persons are bodies'), or Constitutive Reductionism (as in 'persons are distinct, but consist of thoughts etc.'), or Eliminative Reductionism (as in 'there are no persons, only thoughts etc.').
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From:
report of Derek Parfit (The Unimportance of Identity [1995], p.295) by PG - Db (ideas)
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A reaction:
Constitutive Reductionism seems the most common one, as in 'chemistry just consists of lots of complicated physics'. He doesn't mention bridge laws, which are presumably only required in more complicated cases of constitutive reduction.
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6901
|
Understanding is needed for imagination, just as much as the other way around [Betteridge]
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Full Idea:
Although it might be right to say that imagination is required in order to make reasoning and understanding possible, this also works the other way, as imagination cannot occur without some prior understanding.
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From:
Alex Betteridge (talk [2005]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas)
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A reaction:
This strikes me as a very illuminating remark, particularly for anyone who aspires to draw a simplified flowdiagram of the mind showing logical priority between its various parts. In fact, the parts are interdependent. Maybe imagination is understanding.
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5514
|
Psychologists are interested in identity as a type of person, but philosophers study numerical identity [Parfit]
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Full Idea:
When psychologists discuss identity, they are typically concerned with the kind of person someone is, or wants to be (as in an 'identity crisis'). But when philosophers discuss identity, it is numerical identity they mean.
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From:
Derek Parfit (The Unimportance of Identity [1995], p.293)
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A reaction:
I think it is important to note that the philosophical problem breaks down into two areas: whether I have numerical identity with myself over time, and whether other people have it. It may be that two different sets of criteria will emerge.
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5521
|
If my brain-halves are transplanted into two bodies, I have continuity, and don't need identity [Parfit]
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Full Idea:
If the two halves of my brain are transplanted into different bodies just like mine, they cannot both be me, since that would make them the same person. ..But my relation to these two contains everything that matters, so identity is not what matters.
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From:
Derek Parfit (The Unimportance of Identity [1995], p.314)
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A reaction:
I challenge his concept of what 'matters'. He has a rather solipsistic view of the problem, and I take Parfit to be a rather unsociable person, since his friends and partner will be keenly interested in the identities of the new beings.
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1392
|
If we split like amoeba, we would be two people, neither of them being us [Parfit]
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Full Idea:
In the case of the man who, like an amoeba, divides….we can suggest that he survives as two different people without implying that he is those people.
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From:
Derek Parfit (Personal Identity [1971], §1)
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A reaction:
Maybe an amoeba is a homogeneous substance for which splitting is insignificant, but when a person has certain parts that are totally crucial, splitting them is catastrophic, and quite different. I'm not sure that splitting a self would leave persons.
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5519
|
It is fine to save two dying twins by merging parts of their bodies into one, and identity is irrelevant [Parfit]
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Full Idea:
If I am largely paralysed, and my twin brother is dying of brain disease, then if the operation to graft my head onto his body is offered, I should accept the operation, and it is irrelevant whether this person would be me.
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From:
Derek Parfit (The Unimportance of Identity [1995], p.308)
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A reaction:
Parfit notes that the brain is a particularly significant part of the process. The fact that I might cheerfully accept this offer without philosophical worries doesn't get rid of the question 'who is this person?' Who should they remain married to?
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5520
|
If two humans are merged surgically, the new identity is a purely verbal problem [Parfit]
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Full Idea:
If there is someone with my head and my brother's body, it is a merely verbal question whether that person will be me, and that is why, even if it won't be me, that doesn't matter. ..What matters is not identity, but the facts of which identity consists.
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From:
Derek Parfit (The Unimportance of Identity [1995], p.310)
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A reaction:
It strikes me that from the subjective psychological point of view identity is of little interest, but from the objective external viewpoint (e.g. the forensic one) such questions are highly significant, and rightly so.
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1391
|
Concern for our own lives isn't the source of belief in identity, it is the result of it [Parfit]
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Full Idea:
Egoism, and the fear not of near but of distant death, and the regret that so much of one's life should have gone by - these are not, I think, wholly natural or instinctive. They are strengthened by a false belief in stable identity.
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From:
Derek Parfit (Personal Identity [1971], §6)
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A reaction:
This raises some very nice questions, about the extent to which various aspects of self-concern are instinctive and natural, or culturally induced, and even totally misguided and false. I can worry about the distant death of my guinea pig, or my grandson.
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9762
|
We should focus less on subjects of experience, and more on the experiences themselves [Parfit]
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Full Idea:
It becomes more plausible, when thinking morally, to focus less upon the person, the subject of experiences, and instead to focus more upon the experiences themselves.
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From:
Derek Parfit (Reasons and Persons [1984], §116)
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A reaction:
This pinpoints how Parfit moves from a view of persons in terms of continuity of consciousness to a utilitarian morality. It brings out nicely what is wrong with utilitarianism - the reductio of a great ball of nice experiences, with no one having them.
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20489
|
Human beings can never really flourish in a long-term state of nature [Wolff,J]
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Full Idea:
We must agree with Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau that nothing genuinely worthy of being called a state of nature will, at least in the long term, be a condition in which human beings can flourish.
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From:
Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 1 'Conc')
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A reaction:
Given our highly encultured concept of modern flourishing, that is obviously right. There may be another reality where hom sap flourishes in a quite different and much simpler way. Education as personal, not institutional?
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20532
|
Should love be the first virtue of a society, as it is of the family? [Wolff,J]
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Full Idea:
Love, or at least affection, not justice, is the first virtue of the family. Should mutual affection also be the first virtue of social and political institutions?
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From:
Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 6 'Transcending')
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A reaction:
Surely this ideal should be at the heart of any society, no matter how far away from the ideal it is pushed by events and failures of character? I take 'respect' to be the form of love we feel for strangers.
|
20490
|
For utilitarians, consent to the state is irrelevant, if it produces more happiness [Wolff,J]
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Full Idea:
On the utilitarian account the state is justified if and only if it produces more happiness than any alternative. Whether we consent to the state is irrelevant.
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From:
Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 2 'Intro')
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A reaction:
The paternalistic character of utilitarianism is a familiar problem. I quite like this approach, even though liberals will find it a bit naughty. We make children go to school, for their own good. Experts endorse society, even when citizens don't.
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20493
|
Social contract theory has the attracton of including everyone, and being voluntary [Wolff,J]
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Full Idea:
Social contract theory ...satisfies the twin demands of universalism - every person must be obligated - and voluntarism - political obligations can come into existence only through consent.
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From:
Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 2 'Voluntaristic')
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A reaction:
I'm going off the idea that being a member of large society is voluntary. It can't possibly be so for most people, and it shouldn't be. I'm British, and society expects me to remain so (though they might release me, if convenient).
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20497
|
How can dictators advance the interests of the people, if they don't consult them about interests? [Wolff,J]
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Full Idea:
Even if a dictator wants to advance the interests of the people, how are those interests to be known? In a democracy people show their interests, it seems, by voting: they vote for what they want.
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From:
Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 3 'Knowledge')
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A reaction:
I suppose a wise and kind despot could observe very carefully, and understand the interests of the people better than they do themselves. Indeed, I very much doubt, in 2017, whether the people know what is good for them.
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20506
|
'Separation of powers' allows legislative, executive and judicial functions to monitor one another [Wolff,J]
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Full Idea:
The Federalists took the idea of 'separation of powers' from Locke and Montesquieu. This places the legislative, executive and judicial functions in independent hands, so that in theory any branch of government would be checked by the other two.
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From:
Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 3 'Representative')
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A reaction:
[The American Federalist writers of 1787-8 were Madison, Hamilton and Jay] This is a brilliant idea. An interesting further element that has been added to it is the monitoring by a free press, presumably because the other three were negligent.
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20530
|
Political choice can be by utility, or maximin, or maximax [Wolff,J]
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Full Idea:
Political choices can be made by the utility principles (maximising total utility), or maximin (maximising for the worst off, a view for pessimists), or maximax (not serious, but one for optimists, being unequal, and aiming for a high maximum).
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From:
Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 5 'Choosing')
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A reaction:
[my summary of a page of Wolff] Rawls embodies the maximin view. Wolff implies that we must choose between utilitarianism and Rawls. Would Marxists endorse maximin? He also adds 'constrained maximisation', with a safety net.
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20487
|
A realistic and less utopian anarchism looks increasingly like liberal democracy [Wolff,J]
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Full Idea:
As the anarchist picture of society becomes increasingly realistic and less utopian, it also becomes increasingly difficult to tell it apart from a liberal democratic state.
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From:
Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 1 'Anarchism')
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A reaction:
Nice challenge to anarchism, which is clear in what it opposes, but isn't much of a political philosophy if it doesn't have positive aspirations. Anarchists may hope that people will beautifully co-operate, but what if they re-form the state to do it?
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20511
|
Democracy expresses equal respect (which explains why criminals forfeit the vote) [Wolff,J]
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Full Idea:
Democracy is a way of expressing equal respect for all, which is perhaps why we withdraw the vote from criminals: by their behaviour they forfeit the right to equal respect.
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From:
Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 3 'Conc')
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A reaction:
I disagree, and he has converted me to franchise for criminals. One-off criminals do not forfeit my respect for them as people, though their action may merit a controlling response on our part. Bad character, not a bad action, forfeits respect.
|
20499
|
Condorcet proved that sensible voting leads to an emphatically right answer [Wolff,J]
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Full Idea:
Condorcet proved that provided people have a better than even chance of getting the right answer, and that they vote for their idea of the common good, then majority decisions are an excellent way to get the right result.
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From:
Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 3 'Voting')
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A reaction:
[compressed] The point is that collective voting magnifies the result. If they tend to be right, the collective view is super-right. But if they tend towards the wrong, the collective view goes very wrong indeed. History is full of the latter.
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20518
|
Liberty principles can't justify laws against duelling, incest between siblings and euthanasia [Wolff,J]
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Full Idea:
Many laws of contemporary society are very hard to defend in terms of Mill's Liberty Principle, such as laws against duelling, incest between siblings, and euthanasia.
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From:
Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 4 'Poison')
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A reaction:
[He cites Chief Justice Lord Devlin for this] Being killed in a duel can cause widespread misery. Fear of inbreeding is behind the second one, and fear of murdering the old behind the third one. No man is an island.
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20503
|
Political equality is not much use without social equality [Wolff,J]
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Full Idea:
As Marx observed, and as women have learnt to their cost, equal political rights are worth fighting for, but they are of little value if one is still treated unequally in day-to-day life.
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From:
Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 3 'Participatory')
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A reaction:
In fact social equality comes first, because that will imply political equality and financial justice. I think it is all covered under the virtue of 'respect', which should have pre-eminence in both public and private life.
|
20512
|
Standard rights: life, free speech, assembly, movement, vote, stand (plus shelter, food, health?) [Wolff,J]
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Full Idea:
The normal liberal basic rights are right to life, free speech, free assembly and freedom of movement, plus the rights to vote and stand for office. Some theorists add the right to a decent living standard (shelter, food and health care).
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|
From:
Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 4 'Liberty')
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A reaction:
I think he has forgotten to add education. In Britain Beatrice Webb seems to have single-handedly added the living standard group to the list.
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20514
|
If rights are natural, rather than inferred, how do we know which rights we have? [Wolff,J]
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Full Idea:
If natural rights have a fundamental status, and so are not arrived at on the basis of some other argument, how do we know what rights we have?
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|
From:
Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 4 'Liberty')
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A reaction:
He cites Bentham as using this point. Utilitarianism at least provides a grounding for the identification of possible basic rights. Start from what we want, or what we more objectively need? Human needs, or needs in our present culture?
|
20534
|
Rights and justice are only the last resorts of a society, something to fall back on [Wolff,J]
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Full Idea:
Justice is the last virtue of society, or at least the last resort. Rights, or considerations of justice, are like an insurance policy: something offering security to fall back on.
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|
From:
Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 6 'Transcending')
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A reaction:
I like this. He points out that a good family doesn't talk of rights and justice. We want a friendly harmonious society, with safety nets.
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