11 ideas
3035 | Dialectic involves conversations with short questions and brief answers [Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Dialectic is when men converse by putting short questions and giving brief answers to those who question them. | |
From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 3.1.52) |
10670 | A 'singulariser' converts a plural like 'number of' to a syntactically neutral form [Cartwright,H, by Hossack] |
Full Idea: Helen Cartwright calls 'a number of' a 'singulariser', an expression whose linguistic function is to convert to a syntactically neutral form an expression whose semantic value remains plural. It is a great convenience grammatically. | |
From: report of Helen Cartwright (On Plural Reference and Set Theory [1993]) by Keith Hossack - Plurals and Complexes 2 | |
A reaction: Compare Hofweber's Idea 10004, suggesting it is a crucial psychological convenience for reasoning, as well as a 'grammatical' convenience. |
1816 | Sceptics say demonstration depends on self-demonstrating things, or indemonstrable things [Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Sceptics say that every demonstration depends on things which demonstrates themselves, or on things which can't be demonstrated. | |
From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 9.Py.11) | |
A reaction: This refers to two parts of Agrippa's Trilemma (the third being that demonstration could go on forever). He makes the first option sound very rationalist, rather than experiential. |
1819 | Scepticism has two dogmas: that nothing is definable, and every argument has an opposite argument [Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Sceptics actually assert two dogmas: that nothing should be defined, and that every argument has an opposite argument. | |
From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 9.Py.11) |
3064 | When sceptics say that nothing is definable, or all arguments have an opposite, they are being dogmatic [Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: When sceptics say that they define nothing, and that every argument has an opposite argument, they here give a positive definition, and assert a positive dogma. | |
From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 9.11.11) |
3033 | Induction moves from some truths to similar ones, by contraries or consequents [Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Induction is an argument which by means of some admitted truths establishes naturally other truths which resemble them; there are two kinds, one proceeding from contraries, the other from consequents. | |
From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 3.1.23) |
8063 | Baumgarten founded aesthetics in 1750 [Baumgarten, by Tolstoy] |
Full Idea: Baumgarten founded aesthetics in the year 1750. | |
From: report of Alexander Baumgarten (Aesthetica [1739]) by Leo Tolstoy - What is Art? Ch.2 | |
A reaction: He gave it a label, separated it off from the rest of philosophy, and made taste the main focus. The philosophy of art goes back to at least Plato's 'Republic' and 'Symposium'. |
8118 | Beauty is an order between parts, and in relation to the whole [Baumgarten, by Tolstoy] |
Full Idea: Beauty is defined by Baumgarten as a correspondence, that is, an order of parts in their mutual relations to each other and in their relation to the whole. | |
From: report of Alexander Baumgarten (Aesthetica [1739]) by Leo Tolstoy - What is Art? Ch.3 | |
A reaction: This may be one aspect of what is beautiful, but rather more than a nice arrangement is probably needed for art. We must distinguish flower arranging from poetic drama. Some masterpieces are rather messily arranged. |
8117 | Perfection comes through the senses (Beauty), through reason (Truth), and through moral will (Good) [Baumgarten, by Tolstoy] |
Full Idea: For Baumgarten, Beauty is the Perfect (the Absolute), recognised through the senses; Truth is the Perfect perceived through reason; Goodness is the Perfect reached by moral will. | |
From: report of Alexander Baumgarten (Aesthetica [1739]) by Leo Tolstoy - What is Art? Ch.3 | |
A reaction: At last, after many years of searching, I have found the origin of that great trio of ideals: Beauty, Goodness and Truth. Tolstoy sneers at them, but a person could do a lot worse than spending their lives trying to promote them. |
1838 | Cyrenaic pleasure is a motion, but Epicurean pleasure is a condition [Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Cyrenaics place pleasure wholly in motion, whereas Epicurus admits it as a condition. | |
From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 10.28) | |
A reaction: Not a distinction we meet in modern discussions. Do events within the mind count as 'motion'? If so, these two agree. If not, I'd vote for Epicurus. |
1769 | Cynics believe that when a man wishes for nothing he is like the gods [Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Cynics believe that when a man wishes for nothing he is like the gods. | |
From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 6.Men.3) |