10 ideas
20435 | If philosophy could be summarised it would be pointless [Adorno] |
Full Idea: Philosophy is in essence not summarisable. Otherwise it would be superfluous; that most of it allows its to be summarised speaks against it. | |
From: Theodor W. Adorno (Negative Dialectics [1966], p.34), quoted by Gerhard Richter - Benjamin and Adorno 3 | |
A reaction: This seems contradict the Cicero quotation which I take to be the epigraph of my collection of ideas. Adorno has a very 'continental' view, placing philosophy much closer to poetry (Heidegger's later view) than to science. Not like advocacy either. |
3035 | Dialectic involves conversations with short questions and brief answers [Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Dialectic is when men converse by putting short questions and giving brief answers to those who question them. | |
From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 3.1.52) |
8417 | Direct realism is false, because defeasibility questions are essential to perceptual knowledge [Galloway] |
Full Idea: Since awareness of defeasibility issues is an essential prerequisite for any genuine perceptual knowledge of even straightforward physical objects, any realist theory of perception must be indirect or representative, rather than direct. | |
From: David Galloway (lectures [2007]), quoted by PG - lecture notes | |
A reaction: [a very compressed summary] A very interesting claim. The issue might be over what direct realism is actually claiming. If it claims full-blown knowledge, then the criticism seems good. But it might survive if it claimed rather less. |
1816 | Sceptics say demonstration depends on self-demonstrating things, or indemonstrable things [Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Sceptics say that every demonstration depends on things which demonstrates themselves, or on things which can't be demonstrated. | |
From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 9.Py.11) | |
A reaction: This refers to two parts of Agrippa's Trilemma (the third being that demonstration could go on forever). He makes the first option sound very rationalist, rather than experiential. |
1819 | Scepticism has two dogmas: that nothing is definable, and every argument has an opposite argument [Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Sceptics actually assert two dogmas: that nothing should be defined, and that every argument has an opposite argument. | |
From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 9.Py.11) |
3064 | When sceptics say that nothing is definable, or all arguments have an opposite, they are being dogmatic [Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: When sceptics say that they define nothing, and that every argument has an opposite argument, they here give a positive definition, and assert a positive dogma. | |
From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 9.11.11) |
3033 | Induction moves from some truths to similar ones, by contraries or consequents [Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Induction is an argument which by means of some admitted truths establishes naturally other truths which resemble them; there are two kinds, one proceeding from contraries, the other from consequents. | |
From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 3.1.23) |
1838 | Cyrenaic pleasure is a motion, but Epicurean pleasure is a condition [Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Cyrenaics place pleasure wholly in motion, whereas Epicurus admits it as a condition. | |
From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 10.28) | |
A reaction: Not a distinction we meet in modern discussions. Do events within the mind count as 'motion'? If so, these two agree. If not, I'd vote for Epicurus. |
1769 | Cynics believe that when a man wishes for nothing he is like the gods [Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Cynics believe that when a man wishes for nothing he is like the gods. | |
From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 6.Men.3) |
15664 | Ideology is 'socially necessary illusion' or 'socially necessary false-consciousness' [Adorno, by Finlayson] |
Full Idea: Adorno defines ideology as 'socially necessary illusion' or 'socially necessary false-consciousness' (and the young Habermas accepted something like this definition). | |
From: report of Theodor W. Adorno (works [1955]) by James Gordon Finlayson - Habermas Ch.1:11 | |
A reaction: The marxism seems to reside in the view that such things are always 'false'. If they gradually became 'true', would they cease to be ideology? Is it impossible for widespread beliefs to be 'true'? |