Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Diogenes Laertius, G.H. von Wright and Saunders MacLane

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15 ideas

2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Dialectic involves conversations with short questions and brief answers [Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Dialectic is when men converse by putting short questions and giving brief answers to those who question them.
     From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 3.1.52)
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
ZFC could contain a contradiction, and it can never prove its own consistency [MacLane]
     Full Idea: We have at hand no proof that the axioms of ZFC for set theory will never yield a contradiction, while Gödel's second theorem tells us that such a consistency proof cannot be conducted within ZFC.
     From: Saunders MacLane (Mathematics: Form and Function [1986], p.406), quoted by Penelope Maddy - Naturalism in Mathematics
     A reaction: Maddy quotes this, while defending set theory as the foundation of mathematics, but it clearly isn't the most secure foundation that could be devised. She says the benefits of set theory do not need guaranteed consistency (p.30).
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
What is true used to be possible, but it may no longer be so [Wright,GHv]
     Full Idea: It is not very natural to say of that which is true that it is also possible. ...What is true was possible - but whether it still is a potency of the world is not certain.
     From: G.H. von Wright (Logic and Epistemology of Causal Relations [1973], §5)
     A reaction: A simple and rather important distinction. Before encountering this, I would certainly have been happy to affirm that the actual is possible, but actually it may not be. The power to create differs from the power to sustain. Could God re-create the world?
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
Sceptics say demonstration depends on self-demonstrating things, or indemonstrable things [Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Sceptics say that every demonstration depends on things which demonstrates themselves, or on things which can't be demonstrated.
     From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 9.Py.11)
     A reaction: This refers to two parts of Agrippa's Trilemma (the third being that demonstration could go on forever). He makes the first option sound very rationalist, rather than experiential.
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Scepticism has two dogmas: that nothing is definable, and every argument has an opposite argument [Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Sceptics actually assert two dogmas: that nothing should be defined, and that every argument has an opposite argument.
     From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 9.Py.11)
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
When sceptics say that nothing is definable, or all arguments have an opposite, they are being dogmatic [Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: When sceptics say that they define nothing, and that every argument has an opposite argument, they here give a positive definition, and assert a positive dogma.
     From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 9.11.11)
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
Induction moves from some truths to similar ones, by contraries or consequents [Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Induction is an argument which by means of some admitted truths establishes naturally other truths which resemble them; there are two kinds, one proceeding from contraries, the other from consequents.
     From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 3.1.23)
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
Cyrenaic pleasure is a motion, but Epicurean pleasure is a condition [Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Cyrenaics place pleasure wholly in motion, whereas Epicurus admits it as a condition.
     From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 10.28)
     A reaction: Not a distinction we meet in modern discussions. Do events within the mind count as 'motion'? If so, these two agree. If not, I'd vote for Epicurus.
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Cynics believe that when a man wishes for nothing he is like the gods [Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Cynics believe that when a man wishes for nothing he is like the gods.
     From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 6.Men.3)
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
p is a cause and q an effect (not vice versa) if manipulations of p change q [Wright,GHv]
     Full Idea: What makes p a cause-factor relative to the effect-factor q (rather than vice versa) is the fact that by manipulating p, producing changes in it 'at will', we could bring about changes in q.
     From: G.H. von Wright (Logic and Epistemology of Causal Relations [1973], §8)
     A reaction: As a solution to the direction-of-causation problem, I suspect that this proposal is begging the question. Will a causal explanation be offered of the action of manipulation? If he mistook his manipulation for a cause when it is actually an effect...
We can imagine controlling floods by controlling rain, but not vice versa [Wright,GHv]
     Full Idea: Given our present knowledge of the laws of nature, we can imagine ways of controlling floods by controlling rainfall, but not the other way round. That is should be so, however, is contingent.
     From: G.H. von Wright (Logic and Epistemology of Causal Relations [1973], §8)
     A reaction: Despite my objections to Idea 8363, this is a good example. It won't establish the metaphysics of the direction of causation, though, because God might control rainfall by controlling floods. Maybe causation is more like a motorway pile-up than dominoes.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
The very notion of a cause depends on agency and action [Wright,GHv]
     Full Idea: There is an implicit dependence of the very notion of a cause on a concept of agency and action.
     From: G.H. von Wright (Logic and Epistemology of Causal Relations [1973], §10)
     A reaction: This is because he thinks experimental intervention is the key to the concept of causation (see Ideas 8362 and 8363). Others go further, and say that the concept of causation arises from subjective experience of performing actions. I quite like that.
We give regularities a causal character by subjecting them to experiment [Wright,GHv]
     Full Idea: What confers on observed regularities the character of causal or nomic connections is the possibility of subjecting cause-factors to experimental test by interfering with the 'natural' course of events.
     From: G.H. von Wright (Logic and Epistemology of Causal Relations [1973], §7)
     A reaction: This is von Wright's distinctive proposal, making causation a feature of the culture of science, rather than of ordinary life. But see Idea 2461. Causation is becoming too epistemological for my taste. Either it is a feature of reality, or forget it.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
We must further analyse conditions for causation, into quantifiers or modal concepts [Wright,GHv]
     Full Idea: We may be able to analyse causation into conditionship relations between events or states of affairs, ...but conditions cannot be regarded as logical primitives, ... and must be analysed into quantifiers, or modal concepts.
     From: G.H. von Wright (Logic and Epistemology of Causal Relations [1973], §2)
     A reaction: [very compressed] A nice illustration of the aim of analytical philosophy - to analyse the elements of reality down to logical primitives. This is the dream of Descartes and Leibniz, continued by Russell and co. Do we still have this aspiration?
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 2. Types of Laws
Some laws are causal (Ohm's Law), but others are conceptual principles (conservation of energy) [Wright,GHv]
     Full Idea: Not all laws are causal 'experimentalist' laws, such as those for falling bodies, or the Gas Law, or Ohm's Law. Some are more like conceptual principles, giving a frame of reference, such as inertia, or conservation of energy, or the law of entropy.
     From: G.H. von Wright (Logic and Epistemology of Causal Relations [1973], §9)
     A reaction: An interesting and important distinction, whenever one is exploring the links between theories of causation and of laws of nature. If one wished to attack the whole concept of 'laws of nature', this might be a good place to start.