Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Diogenes Laertius, Peter Lipton and Alvin Plantinga

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107 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Good inference has mechanism, precision, scope, simplicity, fertility and background fit [Lipton]
     Full Idea: Among the inferential virtues commonly cited are mechanism, precision, scope, simplicity, fertility or fruitfulness, and fit with background beliefs.
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 08 'the guiding')
     A reaction: [He cites Hempel, Kuhn, Quine, and Newton-Smith] I take the over-arching term 'coherence' to cover much of this, though a bolder hypothesis offers more than mere coherence.
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 4. Contraries
Contrary pairs entail contradictions; one member entails negation of the other [Lipton]
     Full Idea: All pairs of contraries entail a pair of contradictories, since one member of such a pair always entails the negation of the other. P&Q and not-P are contraries, but the first entails P, which is contradictory of not-P.
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 09 'Is the best')
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Dialectic involves conversations with short questions and brief answers [Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Dialectic is when men converse by putting short questions and giving brief answers to those who question them.
     From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 3.1.52)
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
Maybe proper names involve essentialism [Plantinga]
     Full Idea: Perhaps the notion of a proper name itself involves essentialism.
     From: Alvin Plantinga (De Re and De Dicto [1969], p.43)
     A reaction: This is just before Kripke's announcement of 'rigid designation', which seems to have relaunched modern essentialism. The thought is that you can't name something, if you don't have a stable notion of what is (and isn't) being named.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
Could I name all of the real numbers in one fell swoop? Call them all 'Charley'? [Plantinga]
     Full Idea: Can't I name all the real numbers in the interval (0,1) at once? Couldn't I name them all 'Charley', for example?
     From: Alvin Plantinga (De Re and De Dicto [1969], p.40)
     A reaction: Plantinga is nervous about such a sweeping move, but can't think of an objection. This addresses a big problem, I think - that you are supposed to accept the real numbers when we cannot possibly name them all.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
Necessary beings (numbers, properties, sets, propositions, states of affairs, God) exist in all possible worlds [Plantinga]
     Full Idea: A 'necessary being' is one that exists in every possible world; and only some objects - numbers, properties, pure sets, propositions, states of affairs, God - have this distinction.
     From: Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976], 2)
     A reaction: This a very odd list, though it is fairly orthodox among philosophers trained in modern modal logic. At the very least it looks rather parochial to me.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
Plantinga proposes necessary existent essences as surrogates for the nonexistent things [Plantinga, by Stalnaker]
     Full Idea: Plantinga proposes surrogates for nonexistent things - individual essences that are themselves necessary existents and that correspond one-to-one with all the 'things' that might exist.
     From: report of Alvin Plantinga (World and Essence [1970]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Mere Possibilities 1
     A reaction: There are an awful lot of competing concepts of essence flying around these days. This one seems to require some abstract 'third realm' (or worse) in which these essences can exist, awaiting the arrival of thinkers. Not for me.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
The 'identity criteria' of a name are a group of essential and established facts [Plantinga]
     Full Idea: What we might call 'identity criteria' associated with a name such as 'Aristotle' are what the users of the name regard as essential and established facts about him.
     From: Alvin Plantinga (World and Essence [1970], I)
     A reaction: The problem here is that identifying something is superficial, whereas essences run deep. Plantinga is, in fact, talking about Lockean 'nominal essence' (and seems unaware of the fact, and never mentions the Lockean real/nominal distinction).
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
Surely self-identity is essential to Socrates? [Plantinga]
     Full Idea: If anything is essential to Socrates, surely self-identity is.
     From: Alvin Plantinga (De Re and De Dicto [1969], p.37)
     A reaction: This is the modern move of Plantinga and Adams, to make 'is identical with Socrates' the one property which assures the identity of Socrates (his 'haecceity'). My view is that self-identity is not a property. Plantinga wonders about that on p.44.
'Being Socrates' and 'being identical with Socrates' characterise Socrates, so they are among his properties [Plantinga]
     Full Idea: Surely it is true of Socrates that he is Socrates and he is identical with Socrates. If these are true of him, then 'being Socrates' and 'being identical with Socrates' characterize him; they are among his properties or attributes.
     From: Alvin Plantinga (World and Essence [1970], II)
     A reaction: As far as I can see (if you insist on accepting self-identity as meaningful) the most you get here is that these are predicates that can attach to Socrates. If you identify predicates with properties you are in deep metaphysical trouble.
A snowball's haecceity is the property of being identical with itself [Plantinga, by Westerhoff]
     Full Idea: Plantinga assumes that being identical with that snowball names a property which is that snowball's haecceity.
     From: report of Alvin Plantinga (De Essentia [1979]) by Jan Westerhoff - Ontological Categories §52
     A reaction: Only a philosopher would suggest such a bizarre way of establishing the unique individuality of a given snowball. You could hardly keep track of the snowball with just that criterion. How do you decide whether something has Plantinga's property?
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Socrates is a contingent being, but his essence is not; without Socrates, his essence is unexemplified [Plantinga]
     Full Idea: Socrates is a contingent being; his essence, however, is not. Properties, like propositions and possible worlds, are necessary beings. If Socrates had not existed, his essence would have been unexemplified, but not non-existent.
     From: Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976], 4)
     A reaction: This is a distinctive Plantinga view, of which I can make little sense. I take it that Socrates used to have an essence. Being dead, the essence no longer exists, but when we talk about Socrates it is largely this essence to which we refer. OK?
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
Does Socrates have essential properties, plus a unique essence (or 'haecceity') which entails them? [Plantinga]
     Full Idea: Does Socrates have, in addition to his essential properties, an 'essence' or 'haecceity' - a property essential to him that entails each of his essential properties and that nothing distinct from him has in the world?
     From: Alvin Plantinga (World and Essence [1970], II)
     A reaction: Plantinga says yes, and offers 'Socrateity' (borrowed from Boethius) as his candidate. This is a very odd use of the word 'essence'. I take an essence to be a complex set of fundamental properties. I am also puzzled by his use of the word 'entails'.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
An object has a property essentially if it couldn't conceivably have lacked it [Plantinga]
     Full Idea: An object has a property essentially just in case it couldn't conceivably have lacked that property.
     From: Alvin Plantinga (De Re and De Dicto [1969], p.35)
     A reaction: Making it depend on what we can conceive seems a bit dubious, for someone committed to real essences. The key issue is how narrowly or broadly you interpret the word 'property'. The word 'object' needs a bit of thought, too!
Properties are 'trivially essential' if they are instantiated by every object in every possible world [Plantinga]
     Full Idea: Let us call properties that enjoy the distinction of being instantiated by every object in every possible world 'trivially essential properties'.
     From: Alvin Plantinga (World and Essence [1970], I)
     A reaction: These would appear to be trivially 'necessary' rather than 'essential'. This continual need for the qualifier 'trivial' shows that they are not talking about proper essences.
X is essentially P if it is P in every world, or in every X-world, or in the actual world (and not ¬P elsewhere) [Plantinga]
     Full Idea: Socrates has P essentially if he has P in every world, or has it in every world in which he exists, or - most plausible of all - has P in the actual world and has its complement [non-P] in no world.
     From: Alvin Plantinga (World and Essence [1970], Intro)
     A reaction: These strike me as mere necessary properties, which are not the same thing at all. Essences give rise to the other properties, but Plantinga offers nothing to do the job (and especially not 'Socrateity'!). Essences must explain, say I!
If a property is ever essential, can it only ever be an essential property? [Plantinga]
     Full Idea: Is it the case that any property had essentially by anything is had essentially by everything that has it?
     From: Alvin Plantinga (World and Essence [1970], III)
     A reaction: Plantinga says it is not true, but the only example he can give is Socrates having the property of 'being Socrates or Greek'. I take it to be universally false. There are not two types of property here. Properties sometimes play an essential role.
Essences are instantiated, and are what entails a thing's properties and lack of properties [Plantinga]
     Full Idea: E is an essence if and only if (a) 'has E essentially' is instantiated in some world or other, and (b) for any world W and property P, E entails 'has P in W' or 'does not have P in W'.
     From: Alvin Plantinga (World and Essence [1970], IV)
     A reaction: 'Entail' strikes me as a very odd word when you are talking about the structure of the physical world (or are we??). Why would a unique self-identity (his candidate for essence) do the necessary entailing?
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
Does 'being identical with Socrates' name a property? I can think of no objections to it [Plantinga]
     Full Idea: Is there any reason to suppose that 'being identical with Socrates' names a property? Well, is there any reason to suppose that it does not? I cannot think of any, nor have I heard any that are at all impressive.
     From: Alvin Plantinga (World and Essence [1970], II)
     A reaction: Is there any reason to think that a planet somewhere is entirely under the control of white mice? Extraordinary. No wonder Plantinga believes in God and the Ontological Argument, as well as the existence of 'Socrateity' etc.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
Expressing modality about a statement is 'de dicto'; expressing it of property-possession is 'de re' [Plantinga]
     Full Idea: Some statements predicate modality of another statement (modality 'de dicto'); but others predicate of an object the necessary or essential possession of a property; these latter express modality 'de re'.
     From: Alvin Plantinga (De Re and De Dicto [1969], p.26)
     A reaction: The distinction seems to originate in Aquinas, concerning whether God knows the future (or, how he knows the future). 'De dicto' is straightforward, but possibly the result of convention. 'De re' is controversial, and implies deep metaphysics.
'De dicto' true and 'de re' false is possible, and so is 'de dicto' false and 'de re' true [Plantinga]
     Full Idea: Aquinas says if a 'de dicto' statement is true, the 'de re' version may be false. The opposite also applies: 'What I am thinking of [17] is essentially prime' is true, but 'The proposition "what I am thinking of is prime" is necessarily true' is false.
     From: Alvin Plantinga (De Re and De Dicto [1969], p.27)
     A reaction: In his examples the first is 'de re' (about the number), and the second is 'de dicto' (about that proposition).
Can we find an appropriate 'de dicto' paraphrase for any 'de re' proposition? [Plantinga]
     Full Idea: To explain the 'de re' via the 'de dicto' is to provide a rule enabling us to find, for each de re proposition, an equivalent de dicto proposition.
     From: Alvin Plantinga (De Re and De Dicto [1969], p.41)
     A reaction: Many 'de dicto' paraphrases will change the modality of a 'de re' statement, so the challenge is to find the right equivalent version. Plantinga takes up this challenge. The 'de dicto' statement says the object has the property, and must have it.
'De re' modality is as clear as 'de dicto' modality, because they are logically equivalent [Plantinga]
     Full Idea: The idea of modality 'de re' is no more (although no less) obscure that the idea of modality 'de dicto'; for I think we can see that any statement of the former type is logically equivalent to some statement of the latter.
     From: Alvin Plantinga (World and Essence [1970], Intro)
     A reaction: If two things are logically equivalent, that doesn't ensure that they are equally clear! Personally I am on the side of de re modality.
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
We can imagine being beetles or alligators, so it is possible we might have such bodies [Plantinga]
     Full Idea: We easily understand Kafka's story about the man who wakes up to discover that he now has the body of a beetle; and in fact the state of affairs depicted is entirely possible. I can imagine being an alligator, so Socrates could have had an alligator body.
     From: Alvin Plantinga (World and Essence [1970], III)
     A reaction: This really is going the whole hog with accepting whatever is conceivable as being possible. I take this to be shocking nonsense, and it greatly reduces Plantinga in my esteem, despite his displays of intelligence and erudition.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Asserting a possible property is to say it would have had the property if that world had been actual [Plantinga]
     Full Idea: To say than x has a property in a possible world is simply to say that x would have had the property if that world had been actual.
     From: Alvin Plantinga (Transworld Identity or worldbound Individuals? [1973], I)
     A reaction: Plantinga tries to defuse all the problems with identity across possible worlds, by hanging on to subjunctive verbs and modal modifiers. The point, though, was to explain these, or at least to try to give their logical form.
Possible worlds clarify possibility, propositions, properties, sets, counterfacts, time, determinism etc. [Plantinga]
     Full Idea: The idea of possible worlds has delivered insights on logical possibility (de dicto and de re), propositions, properties and sets, counterfactuals, time and temporal relations, causal determinism, the ontological argument, and the problem of evil.
     From: Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976], Intro)
     A reaction: This date (1976) seems to be the high-water mark for enthusiasm about possible worlds. I suppose if we just stick to 'insights' rather than 'answers' then the big claim might still be acceptable. Which problems are created by possible worlds?
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
Plantinga says there is just this world, with possibilities expressed in propositions [Plantinga, by Armstrong]
     Full Idea: Plantinga rejects other possible worlds, but adds to our world an uncountable multitude of sets of propositions, each set a way that the world might have been, but is in fact not. (Roughly, for each Lewis world, Plantinga has such a set).
     From: report of Alvin Plantinga (The Nature of Necessity [1974]) by David M. Armstrong - Truth and Truthmakers 07.2
     A reaction: To me it seems as ontologically extravagant to postulate unexpressed propositions as to postulate concrete possible worlds. I think the best line is that there is just the actual world, with the possibilities implied in its dispositions.
Plantinga's actualism is nominal, because he fills actuality with possibilia [Stalnaker on Plantinga]
     Full Idea: Plantinga's critics worry that the metaphysics is actualist in name only, since it is achieved only by populating the actual world with entities whose nature is explained in terms of merely possible things that would exemplify them if anything did.
     From: comment on Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Mere Possibilities 4.4
     A reaction: Plantinga seems a long way from the usual motivation for actualism, which is probably sceptical empiricism, and building a system on what is smack in front of you. Possibilities have to be true, though. That's why you need dispositions in actuality.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
A possible world is a maximal possible state of affairs [Plantinga]
     Full Idea: A possible world is just a maximal possible state of affairs.
     From: Alvin Plantinga (Transworld Identity or worldbound Individuals? [1973], I)
     A reaction: The key point here is that Plantinga includes the word 'possible' in his definition. Possibility defines the worlds, and so worlds cannot be used on their own to define possibility.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
What Socrates could have been, and could have become, are different? [Plantinga]
     Full Idea: Is there a difference between what Socrates could have been, and what he could have become?
     From: Alvin Plantinga (De Re and De Dicto [1969], p.44)
     A reaction: That is, I take it, 1) how different might he have been in the past, given how he is now?, and 2) how different might he have been in the past, and now, if he had permanently diverged from how he is now? 1) has tight constraints on it.
If possible Socrates differs from actual Socrates, the Indiscernibility of Identicals says they are different [Plantinga]
     Full Idea: If the Socrates of the actual world has snubnosedness but Socrates-in-W does not, this is surely inconsistent with the Indiscernibility of Identicals, a principle than which none sounder can be conceived.
     From: Alvin Plantinga (Transworld Identity or worldbound Individuals? [1973], I)
     A reaction: However, we allow Socrates to differ over time while remaining the same Socrates, so some similar approach should apply here. In both cases we need some notion of what is essential to Socrates. But what unites aged 3 with aged 70?
It doesn't matter that we can't identify the possible Socrates; we can't identify adults from baby photos [Plantinga]
     Full Idea: We may say it makes no sense to say that Socrates exists at a world, if there is in principle no way of identifying him. ...But this is confused. To suppose Agnew was a precocious baby, we needn't be able to pick him from a gallery of babies.
     From: Alvin Plantinga (Transworld Identity or worldbound Individuals? [1973], I)
     A reaction: This seems a good point, and yet we have a space-time line joining adult Agnew with baby Agnew, and no such causal link is available between persons in different possible worlds. What would be the criterion in each case?
If individuals can only exist in one world, then they can never lack any of their properties [Plantinga]
     Full Idea: The Theory of Worldbound Individuals contends that no object exists in more than one possible world; this implies the outrageous view that - taking properties in the broadest sense - no object could have lacked any property that it in fact has.
     From: Alvin Plantinga (Transworld Identity or worldbound Individuals? [1973], II)
     A reaction: Leibniz is the best known exponent of this 'outrageous view', though Plantinga shows that Lewis may be seen in the same light, since only counterparts are found in possible worlds, not the real thing. The Theory does seem wrong.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
Possibilities for an individual can only refer to that individual, in some possible world [Plantinga, by Mackie,P]
     Full Idea: Plantinga says for an individual to exist with certain properties in some possible world is simply for it to be true that, had that possible world obtained, that individual would have existed with those properties.
     From: report of Alvin Plantinga (The Nature of Necessity [1974]) by Penelope Mackie - How Things Might Have Been 5.1
     A reaction: This is intended to dissolve the problem of transworld identity, and is certainly a flat rejection of counterparts. I take the point to be that the individual is the key element in defining the possible world, so can't possibly be different.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
The counterparts of Socrates have self-identity, but only the actual Socrates has identity-with-Socrates [Plantinga]
     Full Idea: While Socrates has no counterparts that lack self-identity, he does have counterparts that lack identity-with-Socrates. He alone has that - the property, that is, of being identical with the object that in fact instantiates Socrateity.
     From: Alvin Plantinga (Transworld Identity or worldbound Individuals? [1973], II)
     A reaction: I am never persuaded by arguments which rest on such dubious pseudo-properties. Whether or not a counterpart of Socrates has any sort of identity with Socrates cannot be prejudged, as it would beg the question.
Counterpart Theory absurdly says I would be someone else if things went differently [Plantinga]
     Full Idea: It makes no sense to say I could have been someone else, yet Counterpart Theory implies not merely that I could have been distinct from myself, but that I would have been distinct from myself had things gone differently in even the most miniscule detail.
     From: Alvin Plantinga (Transworld Identity or worldbound Individuals? [1973], II)
     A reaction: A counterpart doesn't appear to be 'me being distinct from myself'. We have to combine counterparts over possible worlds with perdurance over time. I am a 'worm' of time-slices. Anything not in that worm is not strictly me.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Understanding is not mysterious - it is just more knowledge, of causes [Lipton]
     Full Idea: On the causal model of explanation, understanding is unmysterious and objective; it is not some sort of super-knowledge, but simply more knowledge; knowledge of causes.
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 03 'Fact')
     A reaction: There seems to be some distinction between revealing some causes, and revealing a cause which 'makes the light dawn'.
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
Sceptics say demonstration depends on self-demonstrating things, or indemonstrable things [Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Sceptics say that every demonstration depends on things which demonstrates themselves, or on things which can't be demonstrated.
     From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 9.Py.11)
     A reaction: This refers to two parts of Agrippa's Trilemma (the third being that demonstration could go on forever). He makes the first option sound very rationalist, rather than experiential.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
How do we distinguish negative from irrelevant evidence, if both match the hypothesis? [Lipton]
     Full Idea: How can Best Explanation distinguish negative evidence from irrelevant evidence, when the evidence is logically consistent with the hypothesis?
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 05 'A case')
     A reaction: There seems no answer to this other than to assess batches of evidence by their coherence, rather than one at a time. Anomalies can be conclusive, or pure chance.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
Maybe a reliable justification must come from a process working with its 'proper function' [Plantinga, by Pollock/Cruz]
     Full Idea: A modified version of reliabilism proposes that a belief is justified in case it is the product of a process that is working according to its 'proper function' in the environment for which it is appropriate.
     From: report of Alvin Plantinga (Warrant and Proper Function [1993]) by J Pollock / J Cruz - Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) §1.5.4
     A reaction: Something might infallibly indicate something without that being its proper function (e.g. 'Red sky at night/ Shepherds' delight'). An inaccurate clock is fulfilling its proper function (telling the time), but not very well.
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Scepticism has two dogmas: that nothing is definable, and every argument has an opposite argument [Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Sceptics actually assert two dogmas: that nothing should be defined, and that every argument has an opposite argument.
     From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 9.Py.11)
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
When sceptics say that nothing is definable, or all arguments have an opposite, they are being dogmatic [Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: When sceptics say that they define nothing, and that every argument has an opposite argument, they here give a positive definition, and assert a positive dogma.
     From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 9.11.11)
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 1. Observation
The inference to observables and unobservables is almost the same, so why distinguish them? [Lipton]
     Full Idea: The inferential path to unobservables is often the same as to unobserved observables. In these two sorts of case, the reason for belief can be equally strong, so the suggestion that we infer truth in one case but not the other seems perverse.
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 09 'Voltaire's')
     A reaction: [Van Fraassen 1980 is the target of this] Van F seems to be in the grip of some sort of verificationism, which I always disliked on the grounds that speculation can be highly meaningful. Why embrace something because it 'could' be observed?
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration
Inductive inference is not proof, but weighing evidence and probability [Lipton]
     Full Idea: Inductive inference is a matter of weighing evidence and judging probability, not of proof.
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 01 'Underd')
     A reaction: This sounds like a plausible fallibilist response to the optimistic view of Aristotle.
We infer from evidence by working out what would explain that evidence [Lipton]
     Full Idea: Explanatory considerations are an important guide to inference, …we work out what to infer from our evidence by thinking about what would explain that evidence.
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], Pref 2nd ed)
     A reaction: I take this to be inferences about the physical world, rather than of pure logic. The thesis sounds a bit thin, since there is no logical sense of 'infer' here, so all it could mean is 'what caused that?'.
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
It is more impressive that relativity predicted Mercury's orbit than if it had accommodated it [Lipton]
     Full Idea: We are more impressed by the fact that the special theory of relativity was used to predict the shift in the perihelion of Mercury than we would have been if we knew that the theory was constructed in order to account for that effect.
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 10 'The fudging')
     A reaction: Lipton has a nice discussion of the relative merits of predicting data and accommodating it. He invites astrologers to predict events, rather than accommodate past ones.
Predictions are best for finding explanations, because mere accommodations can be fudged [Lipton]
     Full Idea: Accommodations are often worth less than predictions, because only they have to face the possibility that the best explanation of the fit between the theory and data is that the theoretical system was fudged.
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 11 'Circularity')
     A reaction: Lipton illuminatingly explores the discovery by Semmelweiss of the cause of childbed fever. He predicted various explanations, and tested them out in a hospital. It clicks when the prediction occurs.
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
If we make a hypothesis about data, then a deduction, where does the hypothesis come from? [Lipton]
     Full Idea: The cost of the hypothetico-deductive method …is that we are left in the dark about the source of the hypotheses themselves.
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 05 'Explanation')
     A reaction: How do we distinguish a wild hypothesis from a plausible one? It can only be from patterns in the data, rather than mere accumulations of data. If water causes cholera, or smoking causes cancer, the hypothesis guides the data search.
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Induction is repetition, instances, deduction, probability or causation [Lipton]
     Full Idea: Five attempts to describe induction are 'more of the same', the instantial model, the hypothetico-deductive model, the Bayesian approach …and causal inference.
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 01 'Descr')
     A reaction: This interesting list totally fails to mention the best answer, which is essentialism! If you observe some instances, you only begin to think that there will be more of the same if you think you have discerned the essence. Ravens are black things!
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
Standard induction does not allow for vertical inferences, to some unobservable lower level [Lipton]
     Full Idea: One of the problems of the extrapolation and instantial models of confirmation is that they do not cover vertical inferences, where we infer from what we observe to something at a different level that is often unobservable.
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 04 'Attractions')
     A reaction: This is my preferred essentialist view of induction, that we don't just infer that future swans will be white, but also that whiteness is built into the biology of swans. There seems to be predictive induction and explanatory induction.
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
Induction moves from some truths to similar ones, by contraries or consequents [Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Induction is an argument which by means of some admitted truths establishes naturally other truths which resemble them; there are two kinds, one proceeding from contraries, the other from consequents.
     From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 3.1.23)
An inductive inference is underdetermined, by definition [Lipton]
     Full Idea: If an inference is inductive, then by definition it is underdetermined by the evidence and the rules of deduction.
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 01 'Underd')
We can argue to support our beliefs, so induction will support induction, for believers in induction [Lipton]
     Full Idea: There is nothing illegitimate about giving arguments for beliefs one already holds. …So inductive justification of induction, while impotent against the skeptic, is legitimate for those who already rely on induction.
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 11 'Circularity')
     A reaction: Not so fast! The first sentence is generally right, but if the 'beliefs one already holds' are beliefs about methods of argument, that is a different case. Compare 'this book is the word of God, because it says so in the book'. Can logic prove logic?
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / b. Raven paradox
If something in ravens makes them black, it may be essential (definitive of ravens) [Lipton]
     Full Idea: We are considering that there is something in ravens, a gene perhaps, that makes them black, and this cause is part of the essence of ravens. Birds lacking this cause could not interbreed with ravens.
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 05 'Unsuitable')
     A reaction: At last, the essentialist approach to induction! Of course, it is tricky to decide a priori whether there could be albino ravens. It only takes one white (interbreeding) raven to ruin a nice essentialist story. Individuals matter.
My shoes are not white because they lack some black essence of ravens [Lipton]
     Full Idea: The reason my shoe is white is not that it lacks some feature essential to ravens that makes them black.
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 06 'The Method')
     A reaction: Good, but not totally true. If my shoes were made to grow from genes, and then had some raven spliced into them, we might manage it. That is an explanation, but a long way from the best one. Enquiry is explanations, not deductions.
A theory may explain the blackness of a raven, but say nothing about the whiteness of shoes [Lipton]
     Full Idea: Explanatory considerations help with the raven paradox since, while the raven hypothesis may provide an explanation for the blackness of a particular raven, neither the original hypothesis nor its contrastive explanation explain why the shoe is white.
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 06 'Unsuitable')
     A reaction: For me, the examination of ravens is a search for the essence of ravenhood, which is why non-ravens don't help. Of course, if you eliminate all culprits except one, you have your culprit, but will your evidence stand up in court?
We can't turn non-black non-ravens into ravens, to test the theory [Lipton]
     Full Idea: We cannot transform a non-black non-raven into a raven to see whether we get a simultaneous transformation from non-black to black, in the way we can transform a flame without sodium into a flame with sodium.
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 06 'Unsuitable')
     A reaction: A white shoe would be an example of a non-black non-raven. People mesmerised by the raven paradox are too concerned with investigation being a 'logical' process. Lipton makes a nice point. We need to know the nature of ravens.
To pick a suitable contrast to ravens, we need a hypothesis about their genes [Lipton]
     Full Idea: Without something like a hypothesis about the genes of ravens, we simply do not know what would count as a relevantly similar bird for comparison.
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 06 'Unsuitable')
     A reaction: Lipton is endorsing the view that explanation should be 'contrastive', as well as aiming to discover the inner nature of ravens. He makes a good case for the contrastive approach.
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
Bayes seems to rule out prior evidence, since that has a probability of one [Lipton]
     Full Idea: Old evidence seems to provide some confirmation, but Bayesianism does not allow for this, since old evidence will have a prior probability of one, and so have no effect on the posterior probability of the hypothesis.
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 01 'Descr')
A hypothesis is confirmed if an unlikely prediction comes true [Lipton]
     Full Idea: In English, Bayes's Theorem says that there is a high confirmation when your hypothesis entails an unlikely prediction that turns out to be correct - a very plausible claim.
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 01 'Descr')
     A reaction: Presumably the simple point is that a likely prediction could have been caused by many things, but an unlikely prediction will probably only be caused by that thing.
Bayes involves 'prior' probabilities, 'likelihood', 'posterior' probability, and 'conditionalising' [Lipton]
     Full Idea: In p(H|E) = p(E|H)p(H)/p(E), the left side is the 'posterior' probability of H given E, p(E|H) is the 'likelihood' of E given H, and the others are the 'priors' of H and E. Moving from right to left is known as 'conditionalization'.
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 07 'The Bayesian')
Explanation may be an important part of implementing Bayes's Theorem [Lipton]
     Full Idea: Explanatory considerations may play an important role in the actual mechanisms by which inquirers 'realize' Bayesian reasoning.
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 07 'The Bayesian')
     A reaction: Lipton's strategy for making peace between IBE and Bayesians. Explanations give likeliness. The background question for Bayesians always seems to be how the initial probabilities are assigned. Pure logic won't do that job.
Bayes is too liberal, since any logical consequence of a hypothesis confirms it [Lipton]
     Full Idea: Since the Bayesian account says a hypothesis is confirmed by any of its logical consequences …it seems to inherit the over-permissiveness of the hypothetico-deductive model.
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 01 'Descr')
     A reaction: This sounds like Hempel's Raven Paradox, where the probability of some logical consequences seems impossible to assess.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
Explanation may describe induction, but may not show how it justifies, or leads to truth [Lipton]
     Full Idea: Explanation is a partial answer to the descriptive problem of induction, …but the justificatory problem is recalcitrant, since it may seem particularly implausible that explanatory considerations should be a reliable guide to truth.
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 09 'Voltaire's')
     A reaction: His claim that explanation is a guide to inference is intended to bridge the gap. One might say that a good explanation has to be true, so just make sure your explanation is 'good', according to a few criteria.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
An explanation gives the reason the phenomenon occurred [Lipton]
     Full Idea: According to the reason model of explanation, to explain a phenomenon is to give a reason to believe that the phenomenon occurs.
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 02 'Reason')
     A reaction: [He cites Hempel 1965] Put like that, it doesn't sound very promising. Personally I believe things occur if my wife tells me they do, because I trust her. Lipton says knowing that it occurs is not understanding why it occurs.
An explanation is what makes the unfamiliar familiar to us [Lipton]
     Full Idea: On the 'familiarity' model of explanation, unfamiliar phenomena call for explanation, and good explanations somehow make them familiar.
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 02 'Reason')
     A reaction: Lipton notes that his encourages explanation by analogy, but that may not add to understanding. A better version is that an explanation makes a phenomenon less surprising (but that sounds rather relative and subjective).
An explanation is what is added to knowledge to yield understanding [Lipton]
     Full Idea: The question about explanation can be put this way: What has to be added to knowledge to yield understanding?
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 02 'Underst')
     A reaction: In the spirit of Aristotle, I take 'understanding' to be the end of all enquiry, even if it's rather open-ended, relative and vague. Presumably there are lots of true explanations which don't deliver understanding, because baffling ingredients are cited.
Seaching for explanations is a good way to discover the structure of the world [Lipton]
     Full Idea: One of the points of our obsessive search for explanations is that this is a peculiarly effective way of discovering the structure of the world.
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 04 'Attractions')
     A reaction: This remark is a nice corrective to the sceptical view that explanations are entirely subjective, pragmatic, and even conventional. Whether this means that there are 'real' and 'objective' explanations is another matter.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / b. Contrastive explanations
In 'contrastive' explanation there is a fact and a foil - why that fact, rather than this foil? [Lipton]
     Full Idea: In a 'contrastive' explanation what gets explained is not 'Why this?', but 'Why this rather than that?'. There is a fact and a foil, and one fact may have several foils. Why do leaves turn yellow in November rather than in January?
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 03 'Fact')
     A reaction: Lipton really likes this, and builds his story around it. Maybe, but it looks to me like an easier step towards a proper explanation. The foils are infinite. Why turn yellow rather than radioactive, insincere, divisible by three, or expensive?
With too many causes, find a suitable 'foil' for contrast, and the field narrows right down [Lipton]
     Full Idea: The class of possible causes is often too big, …but if we are lucky or clever enough to find or produce a contrast where fact and foil have similar histories, most potential explanations are immediately 'cancelled out', and we have a research programme.
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 05 'A case')
     A reaction: He has a nice example of a triumph in 19th century German epidemiology. Once you get a good hypothesis, you can set up comparisons, based on a possible fact and a good foil. Genius is spotting hypothesis and foil. Nice.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
An explanation unifies a phenomenon with our account of other phenomena [Lipton]
     Full Idea: According to the 'unification' model of explanation, we come to understand a phenomenon when we see how it fit together with other phenomena into unified whole.
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 02 'Reason')
     A reaction: [He cites Kitcher 1989] This works quite well for a lot of explanation, but a revolutionary explanation might involve a completely new theory. Lipton says it is rather linguistic, and has no room for a regress of causes, or for singular explanations.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
Deduction explanation is too easy; any law at all will imply the facts - together with the facts! [Lipton]
     Full Idea: Deduction models of explanation make it far too easy to explain. You can explain that planets move in an ellipse from the conjunction of the fact that they do, together with any law you please, say a law in economics.
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 02 'Reason')
We reject deductive explanations if they don't explain, not if the deduction is bad [Lipton]
     Full Idea: The hypothetico-deductive model does not account for the negative impact of explanatory failure. We reject hypotheses because they fail to explain contrasts, not because they are logically incompatible with them.
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 05 'Explanation')
     A reaction: The general move in modern accounts of investigation is away from an excessive emphasis on logic that used to be favoured. The underpinning of this is that science concerns mechanisms more than equations.
Good explanations may involve no laws and no deductions [Lipton]
     Full Idea: Many ordinary explanations include no laws and allow no deduction, yet are not incomplete or mere sketches.
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 02 'Reason')
     A reaction: The simplest sort of explanation simply shows the underlying cause.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / f. Necessity in explanations
An explanation shows why it was necessary that the effect occurred [Lipton]
     Full Idea: According to the 'necessity' model of explanation, an explanation shows that the phenomenon in question had to occur.
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 02 'Reason')
     A reaction: [He cites Glymour 1980] Lipton objects that the sort of necessity involved is too uncertain, can't account for the 'why-regress', and doesn't fit everyday explanation, like why we abandoned the football match.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
A cause may not be an explanation [Lipton]
     Full Idea: I take it that we may think about causes without thinking especially about explanations, and so we might judge likeliest cause without considering loveliest explanation.
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 08 'From cause')
To explain is to give either the causal history, or the causal mechanism [Lipton]
     Full Idea: According to the causal model of explanation, to explain a phenomenon is simply to give information about its causal history, or, where the phenomenon is itself a causal regularity, to give information about the mechanism linking cause and effect.
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 03 'Fact')
     A reaction: [He cites Lewis's 1986 paper] Simply citing causal regularity seems to me to explain nothing. It happened because it always happens. Mechanism, on the other hand, is just what we are after.
Mathematical and philosophical explanations are not causal [Lipton]
     Full Idea: Mathematical explanations are never causal, and philosophical explanations seldom are.
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 03 'Fact')
     A reaction: There may still be a 'direction' of explanation in mathematics, as when the nature of the triangle explains the Pythagoras Theorem, but the theorem may not give you the basic nature of triangles. Lipton suggests 'determination' for 'causation'.
Explanations may be easier to find than causes [Lipton]
     Full Idea: It is often easier to say what a factor would explain than it is to say what it would cause.
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 08 'From cause')
     A reaction: Presumably the presence of some factor might explain something, but the factor itself might have mysterious causal powers. A catalyst, for example. We don't need to understand the factor that explains.
Causal inferences are clearest when we can manipulate things [Lipton]
     Full Idea: Our most secure basis for causal inference is manipulation, as when flicking the switch causes the light to go on.
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 08 'From cause')
     A reaction: Correct, but Woodward elevates this into an entire theory of causation, which does not convince me.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
We want to know not just the cause, but how the cause operated [Lipton]
     Full Idea: We understand a phenomenon better when we know not just what caused it, but how the cause operated.
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 08 'the guiding')
     A reaction: This is the key point behind the desire for 'mechanism' in explanation. It strikes me as undeniable.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / l. Probabilistic explanations
To maximise probability, don't go beyond your data [Lipton]
     Full Idea: If all we wanted was to maximise probability, we would never venture beyond our data.
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 07 'friends')
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
Is Inference to the Best Explanation nothing more than inferring the likeliest cause? [Lipton]
     Full Idea: A suspicion is that Inference to the Best Explanation is nothing more than Inference to the Likeliest Cause in fancy dress, and so fails to account for the symptoms of likeliness.
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 04 'Attractions')
     A reaction: In a lot of cases the cause is the explanation. An explanation might be the absence of a cause (as in 'you forgot to switch it on'). Lipton's 'lovely' explanations go further, and reveal a network of causes.
Best Explanation as a guide to inference is preferable to best standard explanations [Lipton]
     Full Idea: The core idea of Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) is that explanatory considerations are a guide to inference. …Inserting one of the standard models of explanation yields disappointing results, because of their backward state.
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 04 'Spelling')
     A reaction: Inferences tend to come one at a time, but I see best explanations as the formation of coherent pictures. The tricky bit is when to decide the coherence makes it acceptable. Lipton has that problem too, with his inferences. 'Working explanations'.
The 'likeliest' explanation is the best supported; the 'loveliest' gives the most understanding [Lipton]
     Full Idea: There is a distinction between the explanation best supported by the evidence, and the explanation that would provide the most understanding: in short, between the 'likeliest' and the 'loveliest' explanation.
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 04 'Spelling')
     A reaction: A very nice, very real and very illuminating distinction. Presumably truth must play an important role in both likelihood and loveliness.
IBE is inferring that the best potential explanation is the actual explanation [Lipton]
     Full Idea: According to Inference to the Best Explanation we do not infer the best actual explanation; rather we infer that the best of the available potential explanations is an actual explanation.
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 04 'Spelling')
     A reaction: Clearly to say that you should just accept the best available explanation is asking for trouble, if all the available explanations are absurd. But what are the criteria for saying the best one is the actual one?
Finding the 'loveliest' potential explanation links truth to understanding [Lipton]
     Full Idea: We should considere Inference to the Loveliest Potential Explanation, …which links the search for truth and the search for understanding in a fundamental way.
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 04 'Spelling')
IBE is not passive treatment of data, but involves feedback between theory and data search [Lipton]
     Full Idea: The slogan 'Inference to the Best Explanation' may bring to mind an excessively passive picture of scientific enquiry, …but there is the feedback between hypothesis formation and data acquisition that characterises actual enquiry.
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 05 'Explanation')
     A reaction: Perhaps it should be renamed 'Search for the Best Explanation'.
A contrasting difference is the cause if it offers the best explanation [Lipton]
     Full Idea: We are to infer that a difference marks a cause just in case the difference would provide the best explanation of the contrast.
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 08 'Improved')
     A reaction: Lipton's offers this as his distinctive contribution to Mill's methods of enquiry. His point is that we draw inferences for explanatory reasons. He rests on Mill, and on contrastive explanation. It sounds rightish, but a bit optimistic.
We select possible explanations for explanatory reasons, as well as choosing among them [Lipton]
     Full Idea: Explanatory considerations can play a role in the generation of potential explanations as well as in the subsequent selection from among them.
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 09 'The two-stage')
     A reaction: Lipton offers this to meet an obvious objection to Inference to the Best Explanation - that compiling the possible explanations seems to need guidance. Seems a good reply.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / c. Against best explanation
Must we only have one explanation, and must all the data be made relevant? [Lipton]
     Full Idea: Two problems for IBE are that only one explanation can be inferred from any set of data, and that the only data that are relevant to a hypothesis are data the hypothesis explains.
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 04 'Spelling')
     A reaction: I don't see why the theory prohibits a tie for what is 'best', given that you don't have to commit. The second one is partly to do with what observers should do about anomalies, and it is sometimes right to ignore them.
Bayesians say best explanations build up an incoherent overall position [Lipton]
     Full Idea: Bayesians object to inference to the best explanation, because someone who favoured powerful ('lovely') explanations would end up with an incoherent distribution of states of belief. They would be persuaded by loss-making wagers (a 'dutch book').
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 07 'The Bayesian')
     A reaction: [compressed; he cites Van Fraassen 1989 Ch.7] Lipton's Ch. 7 tries to address this issue.
The best theory is boring: compare 'all planets move elliptically' with 'most of them do' [Lipton]
     Full Idea: The best theory is almost always boring. …The claim that all planets move in ellipses is interesting, and the claim that some do not is not interesting.
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 09 'Is the best')
     A reaction: This applies to any extraction of a universal 'law' by induction. The best theory just affirms what has been observed. How could generalising about what you haven't observed be 'better'? Answer: because it goes via the essence.
Best explanation can't be a guide to truth, because the truth must precede explanation [Lipton]
     Full Idea: Inference to the best explanation cannot be epistemically effective, since an actual explanation must be true, so one would have to know the truth before one could infer an explanation.
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 09 'Voltaire's')
     A reaction: Lipton rests on 'contrastive' explanation, so that the one that explains more is more likely to be true. If true, it explains. That seems to me correct, even though it could occasionally go horribly wrong. Approach explanation cautiously.
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
The idea of abstract objects is not ontological; it comes from the epistemological idea of abstraction [Plantinga]
     Full Idea: The notion of an abstract object comes from the notion of abstraction; it is in origin an epistemological rather than an ontological category.
     From: Alvin Plantinga (Why Propositions cannot be concrete [1993], p.232)
     A reaction: Etymology doesn't prove anything. However, if you define abstract objects as not existing in space or time, you must recognise that this may only be because that is how humans imaginatively created them in the first place.
Theists may see abstract objects as really divine thoughts [Plantinga]
     Full Idea: Theists may find attractive a view popular among medieval philosophers from Augustine on: that abstract objects are really divine thoughts. More exactly, propositions are divine thoughts, properties divine concepts, and sets divine collections.
     From: Alvin Plantinga (Why Propositions cannot be concrete [1993], p.233)
     A reaction: Hm. I pass this on because we should be aware that there is a theological history to discussions of abstract objects, and some people have vested interests in keeping them outside of the natural world. Aren't properties natural? Does God gerrymander sets?
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
Plantinga has domains of sets of essences, variables denoting essences, and predicates as functions [Plantinga, by Stalnaker]
     Full Idea: The domains in Plantinga's interpretation of Kripke's semantics are sets of essences, and the values of variables are essences. The values of predicates have to be functions from possible worlds to essences.
     From: report of Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Mere Possibilities 4.4
     A reaction: I begin to think this is quite nice, as long as one doesn't take the commitment to the essences too seriously. For 'essence' read 'minimal identity'? But I take essences to be more than minimal, so use identities (which Kripke does?).
Plantinga's essences have their own properties - so will have essences, giving a hierarchy [Stalnaker on Plantinga]
     Full Idea: For Plantinga, essences are entities in their own right and will have properties different from what instantiates them. Hence he will need individual essences of individual essences, distinct from the essences. I see no way to avoid a hierarchy of them.
     From: comment on Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Mere Possibilities 4.4
     A reaction: This sounds devastating for Plantinga, but it is a challenge for traditional Aristotelians. Only a logician suffers from a hierarchy, but a scientist might have to live with an essence, which contains a super-essence.
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Are propositions and states of affairs two separate things, or only one? I incline to say one [Plantinga]
     Full Idea: Are there two sorts of thing, propositions and states of affairs, or only one? I am inclined to the former view on the ground that propositions have a property, truth or falsehood, not had by states of affairs.
     From: Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976], 1)
     A reaction: Might a proposition be nothing more than an assertion that a state of affairs obtains? It would then pass his test. The idea that a proposition is a complex of facts in the external world ('Russellian' propositions?) quite baffles me.
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
If propositions are concrete they don't have to exist, and so they can't be necessary truths [Plantinga]
     Full Idea: Someone who believes propositions are concrete cannot agree that some propositions are necessary. For propositions are contingent beings, and could have failed to exist. But if they fail to exist, then they fail to be true.
     From: Alvin Plantinga (Why Propositions cannot be concrete [1993], p.230)
     A reaction: [compressed] He implies the actual existence of an infinity of trivial, boring or ridiculous necessary truths. I suspect that he is just confusing a thought with its content. Or we might just treat necessary propositions as hypothetical.
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
Propositions can't just be in brains, because 'there are no human beings' might be true [Plantinga]
     Full Idea: If propositions are brain inscriptions, then if there had been no human beings there would have been no propositions. But then 'there are no human beings' would have been true, so there would have been at least one truth (and thus one proposition).
     From: Alvin Plantinga (Why Propositions cannot be concrete [1993], p.229)
     A reaction: This would make 'there are no x's' true for any value of x apart from actual objects, which implies an infinity of propositions. Does Plantinga really believe that these all exist? He may be confusing propositions with facts.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
Cyrenaic pleasure is a motion, but Epicurean pleasure is a condition [Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Cyrenaics place pleasure wholly in motion, whereas Epicurus admits it as a condition.
     From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 10.28)
     A reaction: Not a distinction we meet in modern discussions. Do events within the mind count as 'motion'? If so, these two agree. If not, I'd vote for Epicurus.
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Cynics believe that when a man wishes for nothing he is like the gods [Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Cynics believe that when a man wishes for nothing he is like the gods.
     From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 6.Men.3)
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Counterfactual causation makes causes necessary but not sufficient [Lipton]
     Full Idea: The counterfactual conception of causation makes causes necessary but not sufficient conditions for their effects.
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 08 'From cause')
     A reaction: Interesting. Then causes would be necessary, but would not necessitate. So what makes a cause sufficient?
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
A possible world contains a being of maximal greatness - which is existence in all worlds [Plantinga, by Davies,B]
     Full Idea: Plantinga reformulates Malcolm's argument thus: 1) There is a possible world in which there exists a being with maximal greatness, 2) A being has maximal greatness in a world only if it exists in every world.
     From: report of Alvin Plantinga (The Nature of Necessity [1974], p.213) by Brian Davies - Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion 4 'b Descartes'
     A reaction: This is only Plantinga's starting point, which says nothing about the nature of God, but only that this 'great' being exists in all worlds. I would like to know why it is a 'being' rather than a 'thing'. Malcolm says if it is possible it is necessary.
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / b. Human Evil
Moral evil may be acceptable to God because it allows free will (even though we don't see why this is necessary) [Plantinga, by PG]
     Full Idea: Moral evil may be acceptable to a benevolent God because it is the only way to allow genuine free will, which may have a supreme value in creation (even if we are unsure what it is).
     From: report of Alvin Plantinga (Free Will Defence [1965], Pref.) by PG - Db (ideas)
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / d. Natural Evil
It is logically possible that natural evil like earthquakes is caused by Satan [Plantinga, by PG]
     Full Idea: Physical evil (e.g. earthquakes) may be attributable to a fallen angel (Satan), who is the enemy of God, and this is enough to retain the idea that God is omnipotent and benevolent, and yet evil exists.
     From: report of Alvin Plantinga (Free Will Defence [1965], III) by PG - Db (ideas)