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20349
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Metaphysics aims at the essence of things, and a system to show how this explains other truths [Richardson]
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Full Idea:
The core of metaphysics is an account of the 'essence' or 'being' of things. ...And metaphysics needs system, to show how these primary truths reach out into all the other truths, to help us see that, and how, they are true.
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From:
John Richardson (Nietzsche's System [2002], Intro)
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A reaction:
I like the phrase 'the essential nature' of things, because it doesn't invoke rather dodgy entities called 'essences', but everyone understands the idea of focusing on what is essential, and on things having a distinct 'nature'.
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20351
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Metaphysics needs systems, because analysis just obsesses over details [Richardson]
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Full Idea:
Metaphysics makes system a virtue, contrary to the tendency of analysis, which breaks a problem into ever finer parts and then absorbs itself in these.
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From:
John Richardson (Nietzsche's System [2002], Intro)
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A reaction:
I disagree, because it seems to rule out analytic metaphysics. I prefer Bertrand Russell's view. Admittedly analysis oftens gets stuck in the bog, especially if it hopes for salvation in logic, only to discover its certainties endlessly receding.
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19542
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It is nonsense that understanding does not involve knowledge; to understand, you must know [Dougherty/Rysiew]
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Full Idea:
The proposition that understanding does not involve knowledge is widespread (for example, in discussions of what philosophy aims at), but hardly withstands scrutiny. If you do not know how a jet engine works, you do not understand how it works.
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From:
Dougherty,T/Rysiew,P (Experience First (and reply) [2014], p.24)
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A reaction:
This seems a bit disingenuous. As in 'Theaetetus', knowing the million parts of a jet engine is not to understand it. More strongly - how could knowledge of an infinity of separate propositional truths amount to understanding on their own?
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19541
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Rather than knowledge, our epistemic aim may be mere true belief, or else understanding and wisdom [Dougherty/Rysiew]
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Full Idea:
If we say our cognitive aim is to get knowledge, the opposing views are the naturalistic view that what matters is just true belief (or just 'getting by'), or that there are rival epistemic goods such as understanding and wisdom.
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From:
Dougherty,T/Rysiew,P (Experience First (and reply) [2014], p.17)
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A reaction:
[compressed summary] I'm a fan of understanding. The accumulation of propositional knowledge would relish knowing the mass of every grain of sand on a beach. If you say the propositions should be 'important', other values are invoked.
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19539
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If knowledge is unanalysable, that makes justification more important [Dougherty/Rysiew]
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Full Idea:
If knowledge is indeed unanalyzable, that could be seen as a liberation of justification to assume importance in its own right.
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From:
Dougherty,T/Rysiew,P (What is Knowledge-First Epistemology? [2014], p.11)
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A reaction:
[They cite Kvanvig 2003:192 and Greco 2010:9-] See Scruton's Idea 3897. I suspect that we should just give up discussing 'knowledge', which is a woolly and uninformative term, and focus on where the real epistemological action is.
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20356
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Humans dominate because, unlike other animals, they have a synthesis of conflicting drives [Richardson]
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Full Idea:
In contrast to the other animals, man has cultivated an abundance of contrary drives and impulses within himself: thanks to this synthesis, he is master of the earth.
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From:
John Richardson (Nietzsche's System [2002], §966)
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A reaction:
If this is true, it presents the fundamental challenge of politicial philosophy - to visual a successful social system for a creature which does not have a clear and focused nature. For Nietzsche, this 'synthesis' continually evolves.
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