11 ideas
| 8658 | For there was never yet philosopher/ That could endure the toothache patiently [Shakespeare] |
| Full Idea: For there was never yet philosopher/ That could endure the toothache patiently. | |
| From: William Shakespeare (Much Ado About Nothing [1600], V.i) | |
| A reaction: You can't argue with that. I do think that people who have studied philosophy at length are more likely to be 'philosophical' when faced with human misery, but only up to a point. |
| 22708 | Good reasons must give way to better [Shakespeare] |
| Full Idea: Good reasons must of force give way to better. | |
| From: William Shakespeare (Julius Caesar [1599], 4.3.205) | |
| A reaction: [Brutus to Cassius] This remark is an axiom of rationality. But, of course, reasons can come in groups, and three modest reasons may compete with one very good reason. |
| 19542 | It is nonsense that understanding does not involve knowledge; to understand, you must know [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
| Full Idea: The proposition that understanding does not involve knowledge is widespread (for example, in discussions of what philosophy aims at), but hardly withstands scrutiny. If you do not know how a jet engine works, you do not understand how it works. | |
| From: Dougherty,T/Rysiew,P (Experience First (and reply) [2014], p.24) | |
| A reaction: This seems a bit disingenuous. As in 'Theaetetus', knowing the million parts of a jet engine is not to understand it. More strongly - how could knowledge of an infinity of separate propositional truths amount to understanding on their own? |
| 19543 | To grasp understanding, we should be more explicit about what needs to be known [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
| Full Idea: An essential prerequisite for useful discussion of the relation between knowledge and understanding is systematic explicitness about what is to be known or understood. | |
| From: Dougherty,T/Rysiew,P (Experience First (and reply) [2014], p.25) | |
| A reaction: This is better. I say what needs to be known for understanding is the essence of the item under discussion (my PhD thesis!). Obviously understanding needs some knowledge, but I take it that epistemology should be understanding-first. That is the main aim. |
| 19541 | Rather than knowledge, our epistemic aim may be mere true belief, or else understanding and wisdom [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
| Full Idea: If we say our cognitive aim is to get knowledge, the opposing views are the naturalistic view that what matters is just true belief (or just 'getting by'), or that there are rival epistemic goods such as understanding and wisdom. | |
| From: Dougherty,T/Rysiew,P (Experience First (and reply) [2014], p.17) | |
| A reaction: [compressed summary] I'm a fan of understanding. The accumulation of propositional knowledge would relish knowing the mass of every grain of sand on a beach. If you say the propositions should be 'important', other values are invoked. |
| 19540 | Don't confuse justified belief with justified believers [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
| Full Idea: Much theorizing about justification conflates issues of justified belief with issues of justified/blameless believers. | |
| From: Dougherty,T/Rysiew,P (What is Knowledge-First Epistemology? [2014], p.12) | |
| A reaction: [They cite Kent Bach 1985] Presumably the only thing that really justifies a belief is the truth, or the actual facts. You could then say 'p is a justified belief, though no one actually believes it'. E.g. the number of stars is odd. |
| 19539 | If knowledge is unanalysable, that makes justification more important [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
| Full Idea: If knowledge is indeed unanalyzable, that could be seen as a liberation of justification to assume importance in its own right. | |
| From: Dougherty,T/Rysiew,P (What is Knowledge-First Epistemology? [2014], p.11) | |
| A reaction: [They cite Kvanvig 2003:192 and Greco 2010:9-] See Scruton's Idea 3897. I suspect that we should just give up discussing 'knowledge', which is a woolly and uninformative term, and focus on where the real epistemological action is. |
| 4254 | Externalist accounts of knowledge do not require the traditional sort of justification [Kornblith] |
| Full Idea: What is distinctive about externalist accounts of knowledge is that they do not require justification, at least in the traditional sense. | |
| From: Hilary Kornblith (Internalism and Externalism: a History [2001], p.2) | |
| A reaction: At least this gives animals the chance to know things, but I suspect that they never get beyond true beliefs. I'm sure humans have 'better' knowledge than animals. |
| 19538 | Entailment is modelled in formal semantics as set inclusion (where 'mammals' contains 'cats') [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
| Full Idea: Entailment is modelled in formal semantics as set inclusion. 'Cat' entails 'mammal' because the cats are a subset of the mammals. | |
| From: Dougherty,T/Rysiew,P (What is Knowledge-First Epistemology? [2014], p.10) | |
| A reaction: I would have thought that this was only one type of entailment. 'Travelling to Iceland entails flying'. Travelling includes flying, the reverse of cats/mammals, to a very complex set-theoretic account is needed. Interesting. |
| 20304 | The cause of my action is in my will [Shakespeare] |
| Full Idea: The cause is in my will. I will not come./That is enough to satisfy the senate./But for your private satisfaction,/Because I love you, I will let you know. | |
| From: William Shakespeare (Julius Caesar [1599], II.ii) | |
| A reaction: This asserts the purest form of volitionism, but then qualifies it, because Caesar's will has been influenced by his wife's dreams. |
| 23565 | Our obedience to the king erases any crimes we commit for him [Shakespeare] |
| Full Idea: We know enough if we know we are the king's men. Our obedience to the king wipes the crime of it out of us. | |
| From: William Shakespeare (Henry V [1599]), quoted by Michael Walzer - Just and Unjust Wars 03 | |
| A reaction: He is referring to the slaughter of the French servants behind the lines at Agincourt. A classic expression of 'I was just obeying orders', which was rejected at Nurnberg in 1946. Depends on the seriousness of the crime. |