16051
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Life has a new supervenient relation, which alters its underlying physical events [Morgan,L]
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Full Idea:
When some new kind of relatedness is supervenient (say at the level of life), the way in which the physical events which are involved run their course is different in virtue of its presence.
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From:
Lloyd Morgan (Emergent Evolution [1923], pp.15-16), quoted by Terence Horgan - From Supervenience to Superdupervenience 1
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A reaction:
This is a clear assertion of 'downward causation' at the first introduction of 'supervenience', supporting 'emergentism' about life and mind. That is, the newly-emerged feature has new causal powers that affect the physical system from outside. Wrong!
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19542
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It is nonsense that understanding does not involve knowledge; to understand, you must know [Dougherty/Rysiew]
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Full Idea:
The proposition that understanding does not involve knowledge is widespread (for example, in discussions of what philosophy aims at), but hardly withstands scrutiny. If you do not know how a jet engine works, you do not understand how it works.
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From:
Dougherty,T/Rysiew,P (Experience First (and reply) [2014], p.24)
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A reaction:
This seems a bit disingenuous. As in 'Theaetetus', knowing the million parts of a jet engine is not to understand it. More strongly - how could knowledge of an infinity of separate propositional truths amount to understanding on their own?
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19541
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Rather than knowledge, our epistemic aim may be mere true belief, or else understanding and wisdom [Dougherty/Rysiew]
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Full Idea:
If we say our cognitive aim is to get knowledge, the opposing views are the naturalistic view that what matters is just true belief (or just 'getting by'), or that there are rival epistemic goods such as understanding and wisdom.
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From:
Dougherty,T/Rysiew,P (Experience First (and reply) [2014], p.17)
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A reaction:
[compressed summary] I'm a fan of understanding. The accumulation of propositional knowledge would relish knowing the mass of every grain of sand on a beach. If you say the propositions should be 'important', other values are invoked.
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19539
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If knowledge is unanalysable, that makes justification more important [Dougherty/Rysiew]
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Full Idea:
If knowledge is indeed unanalyzable, that could be seen as a liberation of justification to assume importance in its own right.
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From:
Dougherty,T/Rysiew,P (What is Knowledge-First Epistemology? [2014], p.11)
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A reaction:
[They cite Kvanvig 2003:192 and Greco 2010:9-] See Scruton's Idea 3897. I suspect that we should just give up discussing 'knowledge', which is a woolly and uninformative term, and focus on where the real epistemological action is.
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7535
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If all beliefs are propositional, then belief and judgement are the same thing [Monk]
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Full Idea:
Whether the words 'belief' and 'judgement' mean the same thing is a moot point. Traditionally, a judgement is the assent of mind to a proposition. If one thinks that all beliefs are propositional, then beliefs and judgements are the same thing.
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From:
Ray Monk (Bertrand Russell: Spirit of Solitude [1996], Ch.19 n6)
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A reaction:
If I think I have put a bit too much toothpaste on my brush, that strikes me as a non-propositional judgement, even though it could be spelled out as a proposition. But it also strikes me as a belief.
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6850
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Wittgenstein pared his life down in his search for decency [Monk]
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Full Idea:
One of the most conspicuous things about Wittgenstein is that, on the ethics side, he pared his life down to the minimum, so as to make as central as possible his search for decency, the drive to be a decent person.
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From:
Ray Monk (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.14)
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A reaction:
It rather looks as if decency was quite an effort for him, as he had a rather waspish temperament, and people found it hard to get close to him. On the whole, though, he sounds like good company, as do nearly all the great philosophers.
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