Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Douglas Lackey, Godfrey Vesey and Walter Burley

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6 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / b. Cantor's paradox
21554 Sets always exceed terms, so all the sets must exceed all the sets [Lackey]
     Full Idea: Cantor proved that the number of sets in a collection of terms is larger than the number of terms. Hence Cantor's Paradox says the number of sets in the collection of all sets must be larger than the number of sets in the collection of all sets.
     From: Douglas Lackey (Intros to Russell's 'Essays in Analysis' [1973], p.127)
     A reaction: The sets must count as terms in the next iteration, but that is a normal application of the Power Set axiom.
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / c. Burali-Forti's paradox
21553 It seems that the ordinal number of all the ordinals must be bigger than itself [Lackey]
     Full Idea: The ordinal series is well-ordered and thus has an ordinal number, and a series of ordinals to a given ordinal exceeds that ordinal by 1. So the series of all ordinals has an ordinal number that exceeds its own ordinal number by 1.
     From: Douglas Lackey (Intros to Russell's 'Essays in Analysis' [1973], p.127)
     A reaction: Formulated by Burali-Forti in 1897.
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 6. Successive Things
16698 Days exist, and yet they seem to be made up of parts which don't exist [Burley]
     Full Idea: I grant that a successive being is composed out of non-beings, as is clear of a day, which is composed of non-entities. Some part of this day is past and some future, and yet this day is.
     From: Walter Burley (Commentary on 'Physics' [1325], III text 11,f.65rb), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 18.3
     A reaction: The dilemma of Aristotle over time infected the scholastic attempt to give an account of successive entities. A day is a wonderfully elusive entity for a metaphysician.
16690 Unlike permanent things, successive things cannot exist all at once [Burley]
     Full Idea: This is the difference between permanent and successive things: that a permanent thing exists all at once, or at least can exist all at once, whereas it is incompatible with a successive thing to exist all at once.
     From: Walter Burley (Commentary on 'Physics' [1325], III txt 11,f.65rb), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 18.1
     A reaction: Permanent things sound like what are now called 'three-dimensional' objects, but scholastic 'entia successiva' are not the same as spacetime 'worms' or collections of temporal stages.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
16719 The primary qualities are mixed to cause secondary qualities [Burley]
     Full Idea: Secondary qualities are caused by a mixture of primary qualities.
     From: Walter Burley (De formis [1330], pars post p.65), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 21.2
     A reaction: Like paint. He probably has in mind hot, cold, wet and dry as the primary qualities.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data
6457 Sensations are mental, but sense-data could be mind-independent [Vesey]
     Full Idea: Whereas a sensation is by definition mental, a sense-datum might be mind-independent.
     From: Godfrey Vesey (Collins Dictionary of Philosophy [1990], p.266)
     A reaction: This seems to be what Russell is getting at in 1912, as he clearly separates sense-data from sensations. Discussions of sense-data always assume they are mental, which may make them redundant - but so might making them physical.