Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Douglas Lackey, J.O. Urmson and Otto Neurath

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6 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
Analysis aims at the structure of facts, which are needed to give a rationale to analysis [Urmson, by Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Urmson explains the direction of analysis as 'towards a structure...more nearly similar to the structure of the fact', adding that this metaphysical picture is needed as a 'rationale of the practice of analysis'.
     From: report of J.O. Urmson (Philosophical Analysis [1956], p.24-5) by Jonathan Schaffer - On What Grounds What n30
     A reaction: In other words, only realists can be truly motivated to keep going with analysis. Merely analysing language-games is doable, but hardly exciting.
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
Philosophy is not separate from or above empirical science [Neurath]
     Full Idea: There is no such thing as philosophy as a basic or universal science alongside or above the various fields of the one empirical science.
     From: Otto Neurath (works [1930]), quoted by Simon Critchley - Continental Philosophy - V. Short Intro Ch.6
     A reaction: This is what you get for becoming an empiricist. If philosophy is the quest for human wisdom, it seems to me highly unlikely that physical sciences will provide it. Human interests and values and understanding play absolutely no role in physics.
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / b. Cantor's paradox
Sets always exceed terms, so all the sets must exceed all the sets [Lackey]
     Full Idea: Cantor proved that the number of sets in a collection of terms is larger than the number of terms. Hence Cantor's Paradox says the number of sets in the collection of all sets must be larger than the number of sets in the collection of all sets.
     From: Douglas Lackey (Intros to Russell's 'Essays in Analysis' [1973], p.127)
     A reaction: The sets must count as terms in the next iteration, but that is a normal application of the Power Set axiom.
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / c. Burali-Forti's paradox
It seems that the ordinal number of all the ordinals must be bigger than itself [Lackey]
     Full Idea: The ordinal series is well-ordered and thus has an ordinal number, and a series of ordinals to a given ordinal exceeds that ordinal by 1. So the series of all ordinals has an ordinal number that exceeds its own ordinal number by 1.
     From: Douglas Lackey (Intros to Russell's 'Essays in Analysis' [1973], p.127)
     A reaction: Formulated by Burali-Forti in 1897.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
If we are rebuilding our ship at sea, we should jettison some cargo [Boolos on Neurath]
     Full Idea: If we are sailors rebuilding our ship plank by plank on the open sea, then I know of some cargo we might want to jettison.
     From: comment on Otto Neurath (Protocol Sentences [1932]) by George Boolos - Must We Believe in Set Theory? p.128
     A reaction: This may just be an assertion of Ockham's Razor, but the interest is that the Neurath image demands internal standards of economy etc, whereas reality itself seems to be a right mess.
We must always rebuild our ship on the open sea; we can't reconstruct it properly in dry-dock [Neurath]
     Full Idea: We are like sailors who must rebuild their ship out on the open sea, never able to dismantle it in a dry-dock and reconstruct it there out of the best materials.
     From: Otto Neurath (Protocol Sentences [1932]), quoted by Alex Orenstein - W.V. Quine Ch.8
     A reaction: This is the classic statement of the anti-foundationalist picture of knowledge. It is often quoted by Quine. A tricky issue. I have a lot of sympathy with Bonjour's rationalist foundationalism.